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ABSTRACT

UNPRESENTABLE MEMBERS:
THE THEOLOGY AND RADICAL PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SEXUAL FLESH

By
J. Leavitt Pearl
May 2019

Dissertation supervised by Dr. Marie Baird
Unpresentable Members begins with a wager: that a proper account of the flesh and its
sexual character may not only prove philosophically fertile within its own limited domain,
but may also provide insight into the theological question of the proper role and place of
gender and sexual difference within communities, particularly Christian religious
communities. In this regard, this dissertation has two distinct goals: one phenomenological
and one theological. Phenomenologically, it offers an account of the manifestation of
concrete sexual determinations not only as they objectively appear across the “bodyobject” (Körper, le corps) but with equal importance as they manifest within the subjective
affectivity of the flesh (Leib, la chair). Here, the text is particularly centered on the radical
phenomenologies of Michel Henry and Jean-Luc Marion, two theologically-inflected
phenomenologies that offer a powerful reconception of bodily-ownness, and yet
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nevertheless replicate the worst patriarchal and heteronormative prejudices of their
predecessors. Theologically, Unpresentable Members employs this account of the flesh in
order to construct an account of community that resists oppressive forms of social and
religious marginalization—particularly the oppression of sexual minorities and other
representatives of gender and sexual difference. In this regard, the present dissertation
brings together, for the first time, three discourses: radical phenomenology, queer theory,
and theology.
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Dismemberment: By way of an Introduction
The life of Spirit … wins its truth only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds
itself.
G. W. F. Hegel
Sexual difference is probably the issue of our time, which could be our ‘salvation’
if we thought it through.
Luce Irigaray

§1. The Question of Sexuality
The decades since Luce Irigaray suggested that sexual difference is probably “the issue” of our
time seem to have only confirmed her thesis. In the last forty years, feminist demands for equal
rights and equal pay have only intensified; the gay and lesbian liberation movements carried sexual
orientation into the streets; prominent transgender activists and celebrities have thrust gender
identity into the center of the public discourse; and the questions of sexual violence and consent
have become seemingly permanent fixtures of the nightly news cycle.
Theology and religion have in no way been immune to this tumult; “institutional
Christianity,” as Sarah Coakley suggests, “is in crisis about ‘sexuality’.”1 Mainline protestant
denominations—including Episcopalians, Congregationalists, Presbyterians, and Methodists—
face schism over the questions of gay marriage and gay ordination.2 The Catholic church lives
under the shadow of near constant revelations of clergy sexual abuse and coordinated coverups.

1

Sarah Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self: An Essay ‘On the Trinity’ (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2013), 1.
2

In the words of Tonstad, “that we live under the regime of sexuality is show perhaps most emphatically by the
many church schisms taking place over just such issues.” Linn Marie Tonstad, God and Difference: The Trinity,
Sexuality, and the Transformation of Finitude (New York: Routledge, 2016), 224.
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All while feminist and queer theologies continue to push the boundaries of theological discourse
in unexpected directions.
Indeed, much of this dissertation was written while I worked with youth at a congregation
in suburban Pittsburgh that was in a discernment process to leave the Presbyterian Church USA
(PCUSA) in response to the denomination’s 2015 vote to amend their regulations on marriage to
read: marriage is a “unique commitment between two people, traditionally a man and a woman.”3
While the congregation ultimately voted to remain within the denomination, the fractures only
widened. In early 2018 the congregation split, as those unhappy with the vote left, together with
the pastor, to form a new church in the conservative ECO Presbyterian denomination. This crisis,
which may bring an end to a one-hundred and thirty year old congregation, highlights the
imperative nature of constructing a sexual theology worthy of the challenges of the contemporary
world.
The present investigation begins with a wager: that a proper account of the body, or more
specifically, the flesh, and its sexual character may not only prove philosophically fertile within
its own limited domain, but may also provide insight into the theological question of the proper
role and place of gender and sexual difference within communities, particularly Christian religious
communities.
In this regard, this dissertation has two distinct goals: one phenomenological and one
theological. Phenomenologically, it seeks to offer an account of the manifestation of concrete

3

The new language reads, in full: “Marriage is a gift God has given to all humankind for the wellbeing of the entire
human family. Marriage involves a unique commitment between two people, traditionally a man and a woman, to
love and support each other for the rest of their lives. The sacrificial love that unites the couple sustains them as
faithful and responsible members of the church and the wider community.
In civil law, marriage is a contract that recognizes the rights and obligations of the married couple in society. In the
Reformed tradition, marriage is also a covenant in which God has an active part, and which the community of faith
publicly witnesses and acknowledges.”
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sexual determinations not only as they objectively appear across the “body-object” (Körper, le
corps) but with equal importance as they manifest within the subjective affectivity of the flesh
(Leib, la chair). Here, the dissertation is particularly centered on the so-called “radical
phenomenology” of Michel Henry and Jean-Luc Marion, two theologically-inflected
phenomenologies that offer a powerful reconception of bodily-ownness, and yet nevertheless
appear to replicate the worst patriarchal and heteronormative prejudices of their predecessors.
Theologically, this dissertation will seek to employ this account of the flesh in order to construct
an account of community that resists oppressive forms of social and religious marginalization—
particularly the oppression of sexual minorities and other representatives of gender and sexual
difference.
I will therefore here follow, as best as I am able, the footsteps of queer theology, insofar as
it is this theology that has more clearly and directly than any other, exposed the sexual and
embodied character of all theological thinking. “Theology is a sexual act, a sexual doing,”4 as
Althaus-Reid remarks, and it was “the queer theologians … [who] introduced the body into
theology, bodies in love, bodies entangled in ethics of passion—transgressive bodies at that.”5
In this regard, the present dissertation can be understood as an attempt to bring together,
for the first time, three discourses: radical phenomenology, queer theory, and theology. For radical

4

Marcella Althaus-Reid, Indecent Theology: Theological Perversions in Sex, Gender and Politics (New York:
Routledge, 2000), 36.
5

Marcella Althaus-Reid, The Queer God (New York: Routledge, 2003), 48.

xiv

theology has, since its inception, explored theological themes and motifs; 6 while queer theology7
and queer phenomenology8 have applied the insights of queer theory to theology and
phenomenology respectively. Yet, a consideration of radical phenomenology from the perspective
of queer theory—particularly with a sensitivity to the theological consequences of this work—has
until now not been attempted. It is the aim of the present dissertation of fill this conspicuous gap
in the literature.

6

For a summary of these reflections, see, e.g.: Dominique Janicaud (ed.), Phenomenology and the ‘Theological
Turn’: The French Debate (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000); Bruce Ellis Benson and Norman Wirzba
(eds.), Words of Life: New Theological Turns in French Phenomenology (New York: Fordham University Press,
2010); Christina Gschwandtner, Postmodern Apologetics?: Arguments for God in Contemporary Philosophy (New
York: Fordham University Press, 2013); Tarek R. Dika and W. Chris Hackett (eds.), Quiet Powers of the Possible:
Interviews in Contemporary French Phenomenology (New York: Fordham University Press, 2016); and Emmanuel
Falque, Crossing the Rubicon: The Borderlands of Philosophy and Theology (New York: Fordham University Press,
2016).
7

The literature of queer theology is much too large to summarize, but the following texts have been particularly
influential on the present work: John Boswell, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality: Gay People in
Western Europe from the Beginning of the Christian Era to the Fourteenth Century (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1980); James B. Nelson, Body Theology (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992); AlthausReid, Indecent Theology (2000); Althaus-Reid, The Queer God (2003); Patrick S. Cheng, Radical love: An
Introduction to Queer Theology (New York: Seabury, 2011); Tonstad, God and Difference (2016); Linn Marie
Tonstad, Queer Theology: Beyond Apologetics (Eugene: Cascade Books, 2018).
8

The literature in queer phenomenology, or at least in the intersection of queer theory/trans studies and
phenomenology is considerably smaller. Key texts include: Judith Butler, “Performative acts and gender
constitution: An essay in phenomenology and feminist theory,” Theatre Journal 40 (1988): 519–531; Henry S.
Rubin “Phenomenology as method in trans studies,” GLQ 4 (1998): 263–281; Sara Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology:
Orientations, Objects, Others (Durham: Duke University Press 2006). Julia Horncastle, “Queer orientation:
Selfhood and poetics,” Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies, Vol. 23, No. 6 (Dec. 2009): 903–920;
Gayle Salamon, “Justification and Queer Method, or Leaving Philosophy,” Hypatia Vol. 24, No. 1, Oppression and
Moral Agency: Essays in Honor of Claudia Card (Winter, 2009): 225-230; Gayle Salamon, Assuming a Body:
Transgender and Rhetorics of Materiality (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Lanei M. Rodemeyer,
“Husserl and queer theory,” Continental Philosophy Review (2017), doi:10.1007/s11007-017-9412-x; Lanei M.
Rodemeyer, Lou Sullivan Diaries (1970-1980) and Theories of Sexual Embodiment: Making Sense of Sensing
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2018).
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§2. Ἀσχήμων: the Dysmember and Dismemberment
The two methodological streams of this dissertation—phenomenological and theological—will be
united through Paul’s language of the ἀσχήμων (1 Cor. 12.23)—variously translated as “uncomely
parts” (KJV), “unpresentable parts” (NIV), or “less respectable members” (NRSV). Drawing upon
Paul’s usage, ἀσχήμων will be taken in a dual sense, bridging the phenomenological and
theological considerations, as a term that denotes both the sexual determinations of the individual
body (e.g. genitalia), and homologously, those members of social or political communities who
are “unpresentable”—that is to say, who are cast out or granted only restricted access to the
religious community (e.g. women and sexual minorities).
This introduction will serve to frame the discourse, by setting out this key term in
something like a word study. In context, the passage in which this term appears reads as follows:
Now concerning spiritual gifts, brothers and sisters, I do not want you to be
uninformed. … Now there are varieties of gifts, but the same Spirit; and there are
varieties of services, but the same Lord; and there are varieties of activities, but it
is the same God who activates all of them in everyone. To each is given the
manifestation of the Spirit for the common good. … All these are activated by one
and the same Spirit, who allots to each one individually just as the Spirit chooses.
For just as the body is one and has many members, and all the members of the body,
though many, are one body, so it is with Christ. For in the one Spirit we were all
baptized into one body—Jews or Greeks, slaves or free—and we were all made to
drink of one Spirit. Indeed, the body does not consist of one member but of many .
If the foot would say, “Because I am not a hand, I do not belong to the body,” that
would not make it any less a part of the body. And if the ear would say, “Because
I am not an eye, I do not belong to the body,” that would not make it any less a part
of the body. If the whole body were an eye, where would the hearing be? If the
whole body were hearing, where would the sense of smell be? But as it is, God
arranged the members in the body, each one of them, as he chose. If all were a
single member, where would the body be? As it is, there are many members, yet
one body. The eye cannot say to the hand, “I have no need of you,” nor again the
head to the feet, “I have no need of you.” On the contrary, the members of the body
that seem to be weaker are indispensable, and those members of the body that we
think less honorable we clothe with greater honor, and our less respectable members
[ἀσχήμονα] are treated with greater respect [εὐσχήμονα]; whereas our more
respectable members do not need this. But God has so constituted the body, giving

xvi

the greater honor to the inferior member, that there may be no division within the
body, but the members may have the same care for one another. If one member
suffers, all the members suffer together with it; if one member is honored, all rejoice
together with it. Now you are the body of Christ and individually members of it.
(Corinthians 12.12-27)9
As noted above, the NRSV renders ἀσχήμονα: “less respectable members.” While Paul here
undoubtedly has in mind genitalia, this coyer translation “is not bad since discretion on the part of
Paul calls for discretion in our own language.”10 Yet, while this is a passable translation, it is
perhaps overly reliant upon its synonymous parallel, wherein special honor [τιμήν] is granted these
dishonored members [ἀτιμότερα]. Whereas this second paradoxical contrast, where the
dishonorable is honored, is dependent upon socio-cultural perspectives or opinions—what might
be called, for lack of a better word, “subjective” assessments—a more precise rendering of
ἀσχήμων might draw forward its aesthetic or even ontological significance. For, while it is
certainly the case that its ἀσχήμων and its opposite, εὐσχήμονα, carry a social weight—as attested
by Mark 15, where Joseph of Arimathea is marked as a “prominent [εὐσχήμων] member of the
council”; or Acts 13 and 17’s marking of “prominent [εὐσχημόνων] women” within the early
church—a deeper translation of ἀσχήμων should recognize its root in σχῆμα: form, figure, or as
its transliteration would suggest: schema.
Whereas honor [τιμήν] marks a social assessment of value, the σχῆμα of a member—
whether positive [εὐ] or negative [ἀ]—denotes its formal characteristic. In Philippians 2.8, Jesus
the Christ takes on the very “form [σχήματι]” of a human; in 1st Corinthians 7, Paul anticipates the
passing away of the “form [σχῆμα] of the present world order.” In like manner, εὐσχήμων and
9

Unless otherwise marked, all translations in this dissertation are taken from: The Division of Christian Education
of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America, New Revised Standard Version
Bible (1989). Minor changes or variations from the NRSV are my own.
10

Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians in The New International Commentary on the New Testament
(NICNT), eds. Ned B. Stonehouse et al. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 1987), 609.
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ἀσχήμων reflect the formal characteristic of their respective members—rightly-formed in the first
case, malformed or disfigured in the second.
One can trace this usage of ἀσχήμων as that which is formally malformed or disfigured
throughout ancient Greek literature. Thus Herodotus describes Gelon, who faced with the
arrogance of the Spartans, refuses to be provoked to an “unseemly answer” [ἀσχήμονα ἐν τῇ
ἀμοιβῇ].11 For Plato, ἀσχήμων marks that which is “repugnant” [τῶν ἀσχημόνων] because it is
monstrous; that is to say, it marks that which breaks proper form by bringing together what should
by nature and right be opposed.12 Likewise, Hippocrates, will employ the term in a medical context
to refer straightforwardly to physical “deformity” [ἀσχήμονα].13
For Aristotle, this formal or aesthetic disorder is explicitly granted a moral character. Thus,
in the Nicomachean Ethics, the term refers to the morally bankrupt “uglier character”
[ἀσχημονέστερος] of the exaggerator.14 Likewise, Euripides employs the term to mark that which
is “unseemly” [ἀσχήμονες], such as an undignified death by hanging: “unseemly [ἀσχήμονες] is
the noose ‘twixt earth and heaven: even of thralls ‘tis held a death of shame. Noble dagger is and
honourable, and one short instant rids the flesh of life.”15
11

As a translation note, most contemporary translations render the double negative here as a positive: “nevertheless
I will answer you with courtesy.” Herodotus, The Histories, trans. Aubrey de Sélincourt (New York: Penguin Books,
1954/2003), 471 (7.160).
12

“Soc: Now, look at the pleasures that go with these types of maladies, what kinds of conditions they are. Pro:
What types do you mean? Soc: Those pleasures of a rather repugnant type [τῶν ἀσχημόνων], which our harsh
friends hate above all. Pro: What kinds? Soc. For example, the relief from itching by rubbing, and all of that sort that
needs no other remedy. But if this condition should befall us, what in heaven’s name should we call it, pleasure or
pain? Pro: That really would seem to be a mixed experience, with a bad component, Socrates.” Plato, “Philebus,”
trans. Dorothea Frede in Complete Works, Ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997), 435 (46a).
13

Hippocrates, “On Joints” in Hippocrates Vol. III, trans. E. T. Withington (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1928), 251 (27).
14

Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics” in The Complete Words of Aristotle, Vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1984), 1779 (1127 b13).
15

Euripides, “Helen,” Euripides: In Four Volumes, Vol. 1, trans. Arthur S. Way (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1912/1978), 491 (299-302).
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This moral condemnation takes on clear sexual connotations in the Politics, where Aristotle
argues that the children of the polis should be banned from the stage, where “indecent”
[ἀσχήμονας] performances will be produced: “clearly we should also banish pictures or speeches
from the stage which are indecent [ἀσχήμονας]. Let the rulers take care that there be no image or
picture representing unseemly actions, except in the temples of those gods at whose festivals the
law permits even ribaldry.”16 This sexual connotation is repeated in Josephus, who employs the
term to describe a soldier exposing himself to a group of Jews, thereby triggering civil unrest: “and
a Roman cohort stood over the cloisters of the temple … one of the soldiers pulled back his
garment, and cowering down [bending over] after an indecent manner [ἀσχημόνως], turned his
breech to the Jews, and spake such words as you might expect upon such a posture [τῷ σχήματι].”17
It is precisely the intention of the present dissertation to hold these three components of the
ἀσχήμων—formal, moral, and sexual—together. The ἀσχήμων represents that which is
“unpresentable” because its breaks with right form, because it corrupts good morals, and because
it engages in what is sexually illicit. The ἀσχήμων is the sexual member in every sense. Or rather,
insofar as it is ἀ-σχήμων, that is, the loss of form, or, morally speaking, the corrupt or disordered
member; I will suggest the translation “dys-member.”18 The dysmember is, as Althaus-Reid
describes the nomadic queer, “the image of the unstable or irredeemable body of a theological
subject who lives amidst insecurity and risk.”19

16

Aristotle, “Politics” in The Complete Words of Aristotle, Vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1984), 2120 (1336 b14-17).
17

Josephus, “The Jewish War” in The New Complete Works of Josephus, trans. William Whiston (Grand Rapids:
Kregel Publications, 1999), 744 (II.12).
18

From the Greek prefix δυσ- “hard, bad, unlucky, etc., …; destroying the good sense of a word, or increasing its
bad sense.” Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, Seventh Edition (New York: Harper
and Brothers, 1889), 453.
19

Althaus-Reid, The Queer God, 50.
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Moreover, the dysmember is that which is structurally excluded from the community. It is
the irreducible reminder that renders every body—whether the sexual body of the individual or the
body politic of the community—not-whole. In this regard, the dysmember is that which every logic
of wholeness and sameness must excise from the body; the dysmember must be cut out, for the
good of the community. The dysmember is “unpresentable,” precisely because its uncomfortable
presence provokes the dissolution of the fantasy of the One-body. Thus, discomfort with the
dysmember motivates the dismemberment of the body—whether rhetorical, social, or literal.
Phenomenologies and theologies of the body that seek to render the body as the wholeness of selfpresence must dismember themselves, symbolically casting off that which disrupts this unity of
theory. Religious and political communities which seek the homogeneity of sexual and social
unanimity must dismember themselves, literally casting out those who disrupt their communal
uniformity.20
Like a queer theology, a radical phenomenology and theology of the sexual flesh must
“come to terms first of all with the forgotten body parts and dismembering ceremonies to which
persons or communities have been subject in the past,”21 and in the present. It is the aim of the
present dissertation to employ the methodologies of phenomenology and theology in order to bring
the dysmember to the foreground, to make it the explicit subject of an investigation, in order to
expose it as a site of liberation and redemption.

20

In this way, communities attempt to convert what John Boswell calls “inferior insiders”—denigrated members of
the community—into “inferior outsiders,” denigrated individuals expelled from the community. Such inferior
outsiders are “not tolerated at all (they are killed, or banished, or incarcerated) or are relegated to nonexistence
conceptually.” John Boswell, “Homosexuality and Religious Life: A Historical Approach,” in James Nelson and
Sandra Longfellow (eds.), Sexuality and the Sacred: Sources for Theological Reflection (Louisville:
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1994), 362-363.
21
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§3. The Path to be Followed
The first chapter, “Phenomenology: Having a body, Being a Body,” briefly lays out the history of
the phenomenology of the body, first as it appears in Husserl, before turning to the French tradition
that anticipates radical phenomenology. In particular, the chapter will expose the ways in which
questions of gender and sexuality have been bound up with investigations into embodiment almost
from the beginning of the phenomenological movement.
The second chapter, “Michel Henry: Transcendental Asexuality,” takes up precisely where
the previous chapter left off, exploring the way in which Michel Henry’s phenomenology sought
to radicalize the account of embodiment and the flesh introduced by his predecessors. Once this
account of fleshly incarnation is laid out, the chapter exposes key patriarchal and heteronormative
prejudices that subtend Henry’s thinking, submitting them to a critique drawn primarily from the
French feminist tradition that was working concurrently with his own developments.
The third chapter, “Jean-Luc Marion: The Saturated Flesh,” lays out the specific ways in
which Jean-Luc Marion’s more recent phenomenological work follows and diverges from Henry,
particularly in regards to his account of the flesh. Following the model of Chapter 2, once this
account has been laid out, key patriarchal and heteronormative prejudices—most conspicuously
in his account of the child—are drawn forward, and a critique is leveled from the perspective of
queer theory, particularly the work of Lee Edelman.
The fourth chapter, “Nuptial Theology in the Communio School and Radical
Phenomenology,” traces the clear influence of ressourcement theology—particularly that of Hans
Urs von Balthasar, Karol Wojtyła (John Paul II), and Joseph Ratzinger (Benedict XVI)—upon
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radical phenomenology. Specifically, the chapter seeks to expose the way in which rather specific
claims regarding the nature of women, sexual difference, and procreation are directly drawn from
this theological tradition.
The fifth chapter, “A Radical Phenomenology of the Sexual Flesh,” suggests that the
problems identified in Henry and Marion are not simply reducible to the importing of theological
categories. Rather, it is here argued that the ground for these misrepresentations of women and
queer folk are motivated by phenomenological failures in Henry and Marion’s account of the flesh.
That is, a monadic tendency within radical phenomenology is identified, which views the flesh as
a total self-presence, given to itself without gap or remainder. Against this view an alternative
account of the constitution of the flesh, drawing both from the radical phenomenology of Jacob
Rogozinski and Lacanian psychoanalysis is offered as an alternative, which recognizes the
structural incompleteness and precarity of incarnation.
The sixth chapter, “Studies on the Sexual Member,” works out the logic of the previous
chapter by examining three phenomenological studies of sexual embodiment: acute male
impotence, anal pleasure, and polymorphous perversity. Through this trajectory, the chapter aims
both to lay out the key characteristics of each of these various phenomena, and to challenge the
model of sexual development proffered by Freud—thereby opening up the possibility of a wider
understanding of sexual embodiment.
The seventh chapter, “Membership and the Body of Christ,” moves away from the
phenomenological methodology that had dominated the early chapters and instead employs a
theological methodology—influenced by both ressourcement and queer theologies. Under this
method, the chapter works from the general notion of the communal body or corpore politico to
the uniquely Christian notion of the body of Christ. Here, specifically, the notion of the body of
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Christ is worked out in three registers: the physical body of Christ (Jesus of Nazareth), the
resurrected body of Christ, and the eucharistic body of Christ. In each instance, the analysis
attempts to highlight key embodied characteristics of the body of Christ, as well highlighting the
particular role of sexuality in each manifestation.
The eighth chapter, “The Cut and the Body of Christ,” functions as the pair of the seventh,
picking up a fourth and final conception of the body of Christ: the communal or social body of
Christ, that is, the church. In this chapter, careful analysis is given to the various accounts of the
body of Christ in the Pauline corpus, as well as its treatment among early interpreters—particularly
Cyprian and Augustine. These analyses seek to highlight the deeply ambivalent nature of this
symbol for liberative work in sexual politics, suggesting both that the notion of the body of Christ
should not be appropriated in a naive manner, while also suggesting that it may provide useful
tools in an emancipatory project.
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CHAPTER 1 - Phenomenology: Having a Body, Being a
Body
We stand amazed before consciousness, but ‘the truly surprising thing is rather the
body.’
Gilles Deleuze

Since its inception in 1900, phenomenology—particularly the transcendental phenomenology of
Edmund Husserl—has been haunted by a consistent accusation: it is marked by an ethereal
character, it has forgotten materiality. Through phenomenology’s concern for the region of
consciousness, the formal structure of logic, and the transcendental Ego—this criticism generally
argues—the fleshy, dirty corporeality of everyday life has been lost. Through its repetition of a
Cartesian dualism, it is further suggested, transcendental phenomenology has forgotten that we are
not merely subjects, souls, or Egos, but also human bodies—with all of the innumerable associated
complexities of race, gender, ability, sexuality, and so forth.
It is first and foremost the aim of this introductory chapter to disabuse the reader of this
wholly selective reading of phenomenology. Rather, what will subsequently be shown is, first, that
phenomenology has, since its very inception, been marked by a deep preoccupation with the
question of embodiment; and second, that this engagement has taken the form of an undeniable
trajectory within phenomenology—one that has increasingly situated these concerns together with
the related questions of sexuality and eroticism. Simply put, far from ignoring either the body or
sexuality, the former emerges as a central theme of phenomenological research at the latest in
1907, and the latter as early as 1943.
1

Mapping this trajectory is essential for the foregoing research, as it will situate and
contextualize the distinct character of Michel Henry and Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenological
reflections on sexuality and the flesh in the following two chapters. Moreover, it will likewise lay
the groundwork for much of the work in later chapters, work which will not only critique certain
formulations in Henry and Marion from the perspective of contemporary scholarship, but will also
seek to return to key notions in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological accounts of the
constitution of the body.
While countless thinkers could be brought forward to construct this phenomenological
genealogy, space has necessitated its limitation to five central figures. The first section will
exclusively engage with the work of Edmund Husserl, most notably his posthumously published
manuscript Ideas II. The second and third sections will center the work of the first generation of
French phenomenologists: viz. Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. This limitation undeniably carries its own weaknesses: ignoring, for
example the key phenomenological investigations into race and post-colonialism—epitomized by
the work of Trần Đức Thảo and Frantz Fanon—and the inestimable role of Didier Franck’s Flesh
and Body for the French reception of Husserl in the second half of the 20th century. Nevertheless,
these figures will provide a basic framework for understanding the phenomenological milieu in
which Henry and Marion developed their phenomenologies of the body. In Husserl we will find
that phenomenology has, since its inception, reserved primacy of place for the body, which
functions as a quasi-transcendental condition for the constitution of the objective world. In the first
generation of French thinkers we will find the gradual replacement of the transcendental Ego with
the body, as well as the emergence of sexuality as a key component of embodiment.

2

§I. Edmund Husserl: The Quasi-Transcendental Body
A. Does Edmund Husserl Have a Body?:
Already from the 1913 publication of Ideas I, Husserl’s “transcendental turn” drew swift criticism
for its rationalism, its formalism, and its abstract quality. Such criticisms first arose among his
early contemporaries—such as Roman Ingarden22 and the “Munich Circle” (e.g. Adolf Reinach23
and Johannes Daubert)—and later among existential-phenomenological thinkers including JeanPaul Sartre,24 Emmanuel Levinas,25 and, most prominently, Martin Heidegger.26 In each instance,
these thinkers rebelled against Husserl’s turn to the pseudo-Kantian language of the Ego and
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For an account of the principal critiques leveled by Ingarden against Husserl, see: J. N. Mohanty, “Roman
Ingarden’s Critique of Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology” in Phenomenology: Between Essentialism and
Transcendental Philosophy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1997), 32-45.
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See, e.g.: Adolf Reinach, Phénoménologie Réaliste, trans. Dominique Pradelle et al (Paris: Librairie
philosophique J. Vrin, 2012). For an English translation of the first chapter, see: Adolf Reinach, The Apriori
Foundations of the Civil Law: along with the lecture, “Concerning Phenomenology,” ed. John F. Crosby (Frankfurt,
Paris, Lancaster, New Brunswick: ontos verlag, 2012), “Concerning Phenomenology” (trans. Dallas Willard), 143166.
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Sartre, for example, marks Ideas I’s conception of the transcendental-I as a needless reversion (“il est revenu”)—
after the substantive steps forward in the Logical Investigations and the lectures On the Phenomenology of the
Consciousness of Internal Time—into an outdated paradigm: “The transcendental I thus has no raison d’être.” JeanPaul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, trans. Sarah Richmond (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 7.
For more on Sartre’s relation to Husserl, see: “§II. From the Transcendental Ego to Le Corps Propre” below.
25

Levinas’ reading of Husserl is complex, due in part to a discovery of a “difficulty or fluctuation” in Husserl’s
desire to ground phenomenology in “concrete life” and his competing desire to ground it in abstract theorization. As
he writes, “while asserting the primacy of theory for Husserl, we have also emphasized that his essential thesis
consists in locating being in concrete life.” Emmanuel Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s
Phenomenology, trans. André Orianne (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1995), 158. In a later work,
Levinas will critically describe Husserl’s account of intentionality as “neutralized and disincarnate.” Emmanuel
Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2001), 27-28.
26

For a detailed examination of the relationship between this “first schism” (1905-1913) and this “second schism”
(1927-1933), wherein it is argued that “the first schism anticipated the second and the second recapitulated the first,
so that, although the first could have occurred without the second, the second would not have happened as it did
without the first,” see: George Heffernan, “A Tale of Two Schisms: Heidegger’s Critique of
Husserl’s Move into Transcendental Idealism,” The European Legacy 21:5-6 (2016), 556-575.
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Transcendental Idealism27 in favor of the realist paradigm of the Logical Investigations and the
early lectures On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. As Heidegger wrote
in 1963, “even after the Ideas was published, I was still captivated by the never-ceasing spell of
the Logical Investigations.”28
While each of these thinkers would ultimately depart from Husserl in a unique direction, it
is nevertheless clear that, for a number of these thinkers, a central threat of transcendental idealism
was potential repercussions in the phenomenology of the body. By emphasizing the Ego or the
transcendental Ego, it was suggested, Husserl had relegated the body to a secondary status,
recapitulating the traditional Cartesian problematic of the soul and the body. Ingarden’s critique
of Husserl’s Ideas I is emblematic of this concern: “the problem of the relations between soul and
body—which is as old as European philosophy—has not been solved by Husserl and was not, in
my opinion, taken by him even one step beyond the traditional state of the problem in spite of
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See, e.g., Husserl’s engagement with the language of Transcendental Idealism in §40-41 of the Cartesian
Meditations. “Phenomenology,” he there writes, “seems to be rightly characterized also as transcendental theory of
knowledge.” He will clarify this assertion writing that “carried out with this systematic concreteness,
phenomenology is eo ipso ‘transcendental idealism,’ though in a fundamentally and essentially new sense. It is not a
psychological idealism … nor is it a Kantian Idealism. … On the contrary, we have here a transcendental idealism
that is nothing more than a consequentially executed self-explication in the form of a systematic egological science,
an explication of my ego as subject of every possible cognition, and indeed with respect to every sense of what
exists.” Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: an Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorian Cairns (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 81, 86.
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Martin Heidegger, “My Way to Phenomenology” in On Time and Being trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York:
Harper & Row, 1972), 78. Heidegger likewise writes that “from the beginning and always stood outside the
philosophical position of Husserl in the sense of a transcendental philosophy of consciousness” (Martin Heidegger,
“Was ist das Sein selbst?” [12 September 1946], GA, 16.423, as translated by and cited in Heffernan, 568). In the
words of Heffernan, “There can be no doubt that Heidegger viewed the transformation of descriptive
phenomenology into transcendental phenomenology accompanied by transcendental idealism as performed in
Husserl’s Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy as a ‘wrong path’ and that he did this
at the time at which it happened.” Heffernan, 564.
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undoubted progress in the research on the so-called ‘givenness of the body’ (Husserl’s
Leibgegebenheit).”29 Similar concerns can be found in Daubert30 and Reinach.31
The strong version of this critique—that Husserl simply failed to acknowledge the body or
grant it a key role—is belied by the prominent role of the body in his analyses of perception and
spatiality as early as the 1907 lectures Thing and Space.32 It is there that Husserl first articulated
his distinction between the Leib—the lived body, animate body, or flesh—and the Körper—
objective bodies (both living and not) in the spatiality of the world. Three characteristics remain
central to Husserl’s conception of the Leib throughout these early lectures.33 First, the body
functions as a spatial zero-point, a locus away from which one cannot move. “These things, that
are co-perceived,” he writes, “always also include the Ego-Body, which, as a body [Körper], is
likewise in space, in the space of the total perception. It stands there as the ever-abiding point of
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Roman Ingarden, On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism, trans. Arnór Hannibalsson (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), 69-70.
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“The experience of what is physical and of what is spatial cannot simply be gathered from any intuition
whatsoever; it originates from a primordial [quellhaft] experience of my own body which moves in space and which
does so while already in action and interaction with other bodies in space.” Johannes Daubert, “Daubertiana A I 3”
(Unpublished notes, 1930-1931), 35v. As cited in: Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith, “Against Idealism: Johannes
Daubert vs. Husserl’s Ideas I,” Review of Metaphysics 39 (1985): 763-93.
31

As MacIntyre writes, “for Husserl there is no essential relationship between my having or being a body and my
being the subject of conscious experience. Yet on Reinach’s account of social acts, a condition of the possibility of
such acts is that inner mental awareness and outward bodily expression are parts of a single unified act. Subtract
what is bodily and what we would be left with is not with a purely mental act, but no act at all.” Alasdair MacIntyre,
Edith Stein: A Philosophical Prologue, 1913-1922 (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 61.
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Edmund Husserl, Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1997).
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This categorization partially overlaps with that discussed by Sara Heinämaa who describes three fundamental
characteristics of the Leib in the following manner: “First, living bodies are given to us as fields of sensation. …
Second … the living body is its motility. … Third, the living body functions as the fixed point in perceptions of
direction, distance, and movement.” Sara Heinämaa, Toward a Phenomenology of Sexual Difference: Husserl,
Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 29.
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reference, to which all spatial relations seem to be attached.”34 Second and third, Husserl describes
the Leib as the “bearer” of the Ego and as the locus of kinesthetic sensation.35
Nevertheless, as central as the Leib remains throughout these early analyses, Husserl
perhaps remains susceptible to a weaker version of this critique—that while he acknowledges the
body, he relegates it to a merely accidental position. This critique is ostensibly justified by two of
Husserl’s claims regarding the Leib. First, the Leib is not essentially or eidetically bound to the
Ego or the transcendental Ego. Rather, the body merely “bears” or is “bound” to the transcendental
Ego. Second, Husserl positions the Leib within the region of constituted spatio-temporal objects
of consciousness. It is, he writes in Thing and Space, “primarily a thing like any other, insofar as
it (although only to a limited extent) can also be constituted like any other thing.”36 As a constituted
thing, the body (unlike the transcendental Ego) is susceptible to the bracket of the transcendental
reduction—as Husserl subsequently demonstrates in his 1913 Ideas I.
As in his earlier texts, Husserl’s investigation of the body in Ideas I begins with the body
as a continual presence in the normal life. “The world of things and our body within it,” he writes,
“are continuously present to our perception.”37 But, unlike his earlier writings, the ultimate goal
34

Husserl, Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907, 66.
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“This thing is precisely a Body [Leib], the bearer of the Ego; the Ego has sensations, and these sensations are
‘localized’ in the Body.” Ibid., 137. This model of the body is likewise repeated in The Basic Problem of
Phenomenology. These lectures, hosted in Göttingen in the winter of 1910/11, remain some of the most consistently
cited texts by the later Husserl (Ingo Farin and James G. Hart, “Translators’ Preface” in Edmund Husserl, The Basic
Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Ingo Farin and James G. Hart [Dordrecht: Springer, 2006], XIII), and offer one
of the clearest accounts of Husserl’s transcendental methodology. Yet, Husserl here grants the body a central
position, noting that, in the natural attitude, “every I finds itself as having an organic lived body [Leib]” (Ibid., 3.).
Recapitulating Thing and Space, the Leib is here granted three roles: Serving as a spatial zero-point around which,
and in relation to which, other physical bodies manifest—“everything, which is not lived body, appears to be related
to this lived body” ( Ibid., 4.)—; serving as a site for the localization of “I-experiences,” as, for example, perceptual
sensations; and functioning as that to which the transcendental-I is “tied” (Ibid., 92) or “bound” (Ibid., 96.).
36

Husserl, Thing and Space, 242. And again, in 1910/11, “the body [Leib], for its part, is not an I, but rather a
spatial–temporal ‘thing’.” Husserl, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 3.
37

Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (London and
New York: Routledge, 2002), 74 (§39) [emphasis added].
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of Ideas I is the immediate access to the “things themselves” [die Sachen selbst],38 that is,
conscious phenomena as they give themselves to pure consciousness.39 Thus, for the Husserl of
Ideas I, the omni-presence of the body, insofar as it stands between the phenomenologist and pure
consciousness, is a problem to be solved.
In order to solve this problem of access to pure consciousness, Husserl deploys an infamous
thought experiment in §49 of Ideas I: the imaginative destruction of the world. In this experiment,
Husserl introduces the notion of a non-empirical ego by imagining a total “nullifying of the
world”—that is, imagining that the “possibility of non-Being which belongs essentially to every
Thing-like transcendence”40 might become an actuality. Even in such an extreme experience,
Husserl argues, “it is then evident that the Being of consciousness, of every stream of experience
generally, though it would indeed be inevitably modified by the nullifying of the thing-world,
would not be affected thereby in its own proper existence.”41 Thus, Husserl argues, “no real thing
… is necessary for the Being of consciousness itself.”42
In §54, Husserl redeploys this experiment in order to likewise annul the animate body. “Let
us imagine,” he writes, “in the spirit of the foregoing exposition that the whole of nature—and the
physical in the first instance—has been ‘annulled,’ there would then be no more bodies [Leiber]
and therefore no men. … But my consciousness, however its states of experience might vary,
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It is important, given the similarity in English translation, to mark this as conceptually distinct from Kant’s “thing
in itself” [Ding an sich].
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“How then,” he asks, “does and can Consciousness itself separate out as a concrete thing in itself, from that within
it, of which we are conscious, namely the perceived being. ‘Standing over against’ consciousness ‘in and for
itself’?” Husserl, Ideas, 74 (§39).
40

Husserl, Ideas, 94.
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Ibid., 94.
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Ibid.
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would remain an absolute stream of experience.”43 Through this imaginative experiment, Husserl
understands himself to have established the phenomenological possibility of “an incorporeal
[leibloses] and, paradoxical as it may sound, an inanimate and non-personal consciousness.”44
Through this second experiment, Husserl establishes the phenomenological possibility of
distinguishing between transcendental consciousness and the body. Thus, he argues, the body can
itself be submitted to the phenomenological reduction.45
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Ibid., 107.
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Ibid.
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The notions of the epoché and the phenomenological reductions form the core of Husserl’s “transcendental turn.”
Merleau-Ponty suggests that “there is probably no other question over which Husserl spent more time” (Maurice
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith [New York: Routledge, 1962], xii); and Didier
Franck will later mark the reduction as the “pivotal and the permanent theme of Husserl’s entire enterprise” (Didier
Franck, Flesh and Body: On the Phenomenology of Husserl, trans. Joseph Rivera and Scott Davidson [New York:
Bloomsbury, 2014], 29). Husserl first used the term “phenomenological reduction” in the 1905 Seefelder
Manuscript, as well as his 1906/07 Lectures on Logic and Epistemology (See: Dermot Moran, Husserl’s Crisis of
the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: an Introduction [Cambridge and New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2012], 22-23; and Dermot Moran and Joseph D. Cohen, The Husserl Dictionary
[London: Continuum, 2012], 107), but it will not find a full articulation until 1907’s The Idea of Phenomenology.
There, Husserl insists that his epistemological project, seeking a certain foundation for science, must begin with a
phenomenological reduction: “I must exclude all that is transcendently posited. … This means: everything
transcendent (that which is not given to me immanently) is to be assigned the index zero, i.e., its existence, its
validity is not to be assumed as such, except at most as a phenomenon of a claim to validity” (Edmund Husserl, The
Idea of Phenomenology, trans. William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964], 4.).
In 1911, Husserl clarifies the transcendental reorientation inaugurated in 1905 with Philosophy as Rigorous
Science. While he does not there use the language of the reduction, he nevertheless proposes a “science of
consciousness that explores the psychic in respect of what is immanent in it,” and with careful consideration of its
specific mode of “direct givenness” (Edmund Husserl, “Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” in Phenomenology and
the Crisis of Philosophy, trans. Quentin Lauer [New York: Harper & Row, 1965], 93). In this methodology, one
abstracts oneself from what Husserl calls a “phenomenological naiveté” (Ibid., 94), in which any number of
“prejudices and preconditions” (Ibid., 102.), particularly those regarding the “empirical being in the ensemble of
nature” (Ibid., 91.), are simply presupposed. As in the prior case, the basic moves of the phenomenological
reduction, albeit without the later technical jargon, are present. This technical language will first appear two years
later in Ideas I.
In Ideas I, the “naiveté” of the previous work is fleshed out into the “natural attitude,” the mode of positing
within which phenomena are immediately incorporated into the metaphysically and axiologically dense schema of a
spatial, temporal, and valuable “world.” Against this natural attitude, Husserl posits a scientific alternative, the
phenomenological attitude. Here, “every thesis related to … objectivity must be disconnected and changed into its
bracketed counterpart” (Husserl, Ideas, 58), that is to say, every posited characteristic of the phenomenon,
everything that is not immediately given to consciousness, must be methodologically set aside.
By reducing all phenomena to what is absolutely given to consciousness prior to all metaphysical,
theoretical, or naive positings, Husserl understands himself to have granted access to a new domain of philosophical
inquiry; the only domain, to be sure, within which philosophy might attain scientific rigor: the domain of immanent
consciousness.
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This submission of the body to the transcendental reduction was taken by many of
Husserl’s contemporaries and later critics as evidence of a fundamental disregard for the body.
Thus, even if the strong version of the critique failed to hold—as Husserl undoubtedly centers the
body in his writings—the weaker version ostensibly stands. For Husserl, the body is merely
accidental. Were this the summation of Husserl’s account of the body, then one might conclude
with his early critics that Husserl’s account of the body is impoverished; to recall Ingarden’s
critique, one might suggest that the problem of the body was not “taken by [Husserl] even one step
beyond the traditional state of the problem.”46
Yet, as the defenders of Husserl are quick to note, this is by no means the end of Husserl’s
consideration of the unique role of the body. On the one hand, Husserl will not diverge from his
fundamental conception of the body as distinct from the transcendental Ego. The body, for Husserl,
remains couched in the language of property. The body is something which is possessed; it is
“mine” (mein),47 it is not “me.”48 Even in his most radical moments, he is unlikely to affirm, as
does the later French phenomenological tradition, “the problem of the body is that it is an I: not
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Ingarden, On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism, 70.
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See, e.g.: Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy:
Second Book, Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer
(Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), 223, 224, 259. For ease and concision of space,
subsequent citations will simply refer to “Husserl, Ideas II.”
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It is worth noting, even if only in passing, that much of the subsequent tradition of phenomenological reflection on
the body is precisely oriented toward the rejection of this “property” thesis. As Luijpen paradigmatically writes, “it
is not possible to apply to my body what, according to Marcel, can be said of the object of ‘having.’ I ‘have’ a car, a
pen, a book. In this ‘having’ the object of the ‘having’ reveals itself as an exteriority. There is a distance between me
and what I ‘have.’ What I ‘have’ is to a certain extent independent of me. I can dispose of it or give it away without
ceasing to be what I am—a man [sic]. The same cannot be asserted of my body, at least not without so many
restrictions that ‘having’ is deprived of its strict sense. My body is not so far removed from my conscious self as is
the ashtray on my desk. Likewise, my body is not something external to me like my car. I cannot dispose of my
body or give it away as I dispose of money or give away my golf clubs. All this stems from the fact that my body is
not ‘a’ body but my body, not in the same way as my golf clubs are mine, but in such a way that my body embodies
me.” William A. Luijpen, Existential Phenomenology (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1960), 188.
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some ‘thing’ that we may or may not possess, but something we are.”49 It is nevertheless the case
that the account of the body found in his subsequent writings—particularly his most sustained
treatment of the body in Ideas II—presents an account of the body which highlights that it is not
merely one constituted “thing” within the world of spatial-thingly objects. Rather, the body plays
an equally important constituting role. Far from merely accidental, the body stands as a condition
of possibility for any objective world whatsoever.

B. The Constituted Body:
In Ideas II, Husserl seeks to bridge the seemingly insurmountable gap between the immanent
region of pure consciousness opened up by Ideas I and the everyday, material-sensible world as
understood by the natural sciences. Central to this project is a deep understanding of the Leib,
understood as medium between these two spheres; the Leib is situated “between the rest of the
material world and the ‘subjective’ sphere.”50 But, this mediating role requires that the Leib stand
in a precarious position, both a constituted phenomenon and a necessary component in the
constitution of “higher objectivities.”51
The unique constituting-constituted character of the Leib becomes increasingly apparent
throughout Ideas II. By the third chapter of Section One, Husserl already suggests that the Leib
may be a necessary (rather than contingent) component in the constitution of spatial-thingly
objects. This suspicion emerges from the need for a receptive figure capable of receiving the
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sensible givenness of aesthetic sensations. This suspicion can be understood as a specific
application of Husserl’s broader polar, intentional framework.52 As Husserl writes:
It pertains in general to the essence of every cogito that a new cogito of the kind
called by us ‘Ego-reflection’ is in principle possible, one that grasps, on the basis
of the earlier cogito (which itself is thereby phenomenologically altered), the pure
subject of that earlier cogito.53
That is to say, to every form of givenness encountered in phenomenological reflection, there must
also correspond something like a subject-pole capable of receiving this particular mode of
givenness. Ultimately, Husserl insists, every cogito is intentionally referred to the transcendental
Ego: “everything objective, in the broadest sense of the word, is thinkable only as correlate of a
possible consciousness or, more precisely, a correlate of a possible ‘I think’ and consequently as
referable to a pure Ego.”54 Nevertheless, a central claim of Ideas II is that the transcendental Ego
on its own cannot account for the constitution of the spatial world or spatial things. What is needed
instead is an intermediary “Ego-like” structure that would permit this constitution of a spatialthingly world. It is the Leib which is granted this mediating role, due to its unique relationship to
sensible intuitions. In order to understand this particular relationship, it is necessary to situate the
discussion of the Leib in relation to the larger, overarching argument of the text.
Central among the aims of Ideas II is the recognition that the natural-scientific world is not
immediately given, but rather emerges through a complex series of constitutions, ultimately
reducible to the sensible impressions of the hyletic flux. “We are always,” Husserl insists:
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Led back further analytically and arrive finally at sense-objects in a different sense,
ones which lie at the ground (constitutively understood) of all spatial objects and,
consequently, of all thing-objects of material reality, too, and which lead us back
again to certain ultimate syntheses, but to syntheses which precede every thesis. …
Here, with the pure datum of sensation, we encounter a pregivenness which yet
precedes the constitution of the object as object.55
Yet, this return to “sense intuitions” or “sense things”56 is, on its own, unable to complete Husserl’s
project of tracing the “idea of the essence of nature”57—and ultimately all theoretical acts—back
to “pre-given objectivities which do not spring from theoretical acts but are constituted in
intentional lived experiences.”58
What Husserl recognizes is that the originary givenness of the sense-thing—the thing
insofar as it is not yet intersubjectively constituted as an Object [Objekt] in the technical sense—
always refers itself back to a subject capable of relating to this aesthetic intuition. “The qualities
of material things, such as they present themselves to me intuitively,” he suggests, “prove to be
dependent on my qualities, the makeup of the experiencing subject, and to be related to my Body
[Leib].”59 For Husserl, the primordial sensorial givenness, while ultimately reducible to a hyletic
flow, nevertheless cannot be intuitively given without the mediating influence of an aesthetic body.
It is necessary to bridge the gap between the constituting transcendental Ego and the “full
givenness of the thing,” insofar as it gives itself sensibly.60
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The transcendental Ego cannot play this role for two reasons. First, it lacks the selfreferential kinesthetic sensations necessary for the localization of sensible impressions. Second, it
is not itself spatially situated. These two characteristics therefore become central to Husserl’s
account of the Leib. In this regard the constitutive role of the Leib must begin with an account of
the Leib’s own constitution. For Husserl, the lived body or Leib cannot be assumed as a natural
given; “when we approach the constitution of the natural Object … we may not presuppose [the]
Body as a fully constituted material thing.”61 Instead, the Leib itself undergoes a constitution that
can be re-traced through phenomenological reflection.
In order to undertake this task, Husserl seeks to identify a phenomenon through which the
constitution of the body would be made manifest. He settles upon the analysis, later recapitulated
in a simplified form by Merleau-Ponty,62 of the experience of one hand touching the other. He
begins:
Touching my left hand, I have touch-appearances, that is to say, I do not just sense,
but I perceive and have appearances of a soft, smooth hand, with such a form. The
indicational sensations of movement and the representational sensations of touch,
which are Objectified as features of the thing, ‘left hand,’ belong in fact to my right
61
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hand. But when I touch the left hand I also find in it, too, series of touch-sensations,
which are ‘localized’ in it.63
This analysis begins with the recognition that each of these hands can rightly be understood as an
object among every other spatial-thingly object. This Leibkörper, insofar as it is conceived apart
from its relationship to sensation, is Körper, a mere object: “if I speak of the physical thing, ‘left
hand,’ then I am abstracting from these sensations.”64 Nevertheless, such a move is an abstraction.
What differentiates the Leibkörper from other bodies in the material world is that it is constituted
“in a double way.”65 As well as being “a physical thing, matter,” it is also constituted with equal
primordiality in relation to these sensations that “I find on it, and I sense ‘on’ it and ‘in’ it.”66 If
one does not abstract away from these sensations, Husserl suggests, “then it is not that the physical
thing is now richer, but instead it becomes a Body [Leib].”67 What Husserl discovers through his
analysis of the touching hands, is that the constitution of the Leib must be understood through its
relation to sensation68—or more precisely, through the relationship of two distinct modalities of
sensation.
The specific mechanism by which the Leib is constituted is a process through which
sensations—paradigmatically, but not solely, tactile sensations—are incorporated into a spatial
framework. Husserl names this process localization: the Leib “becomes a Body only by
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incorporating tactile sensations, pain sensations, etc.—in short, by the localization of the
sensations as sensations.”69 This process of localization describes the incorporation of external
sensations into what might be called—to borrow Merleau-Ponty’s later terminology—the Leib’s
body image or corporeal schema (Körperschema).70
This incorporation requires that the various hyletic “sensation-fields”71 (touch, sight,
hot/cold, aural, etc.) be drawn together with fields of kinesthetic sensations, such that when I move
my hand, these external sensations vary in a predictable manner. The same applies for other sensefields as well: “the eye, too, is a field of localization. … The same applies to hearing. The ear is
‘involved’.”72 Certainly, localization in these cases does not function in the same manner as tactile
localization—“the sensed tone is not localized in the ear”73—but it is nevertheless the case that
movements of the eye or ear, for example, produce predictably variable changes in sensation. This
fact constitutes the motivational character of kinesthetic sensation: the kinesthetic sensations
“motivate those apprehensions” of hyletic sensations. I move my eye to the right and objects move
across my visual-field to the left. As I move my ear closer to a sound, it gets predictably louder.74
Husserl names this richer, passive synthesis of hyletic and kinesthetic sensation: sensings
[Empfindnisse]. This neologism, Empfindnisse, as Al-Saji notes, “brings together the notions of
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both Erlebnis (lived experience) and Empfindung (sensation).”75 By turning to this language of
sensings, she continues, “sensation is productively redefined, away from Husserl’s earlier
understanding of sensation in terms of senseless and undifferentiated hyle calling for
apprehension.”76 That is to say, the turn to Empfindnisse represents Husserl’s attempt to think
sensation outside of an empirical or representational model. Rather, sensings are always manifest
in a double manner, both kinesthetic/lived and affective/impressional (hyle or Empfindung).
This dual character of sensings is central to Husserl’s account of the constitution of the
Leib. For Husserl, the Leib is precisely the constituted unity that emerges from the passive
synthesis and localization of these various sensings. As Al-Saji writes, these “sensations form an
overlapping and interpenetrating multiplicity, and it is this interwoven multiplicity that allows the
formation and animation of the Body as Leib.”77 Moreover, this constitution of the Leib permits
the body to stand “between the rest of the material world and the ‘subjective’ sphere”78 precisely
because the body is doubled at this primordial level. Having been constituted by Empfindnisse
which are the synthesis of hetero-affective impressions and auto-affective kinestheses, the
Leibkörper itself manifests in a double way, as both a subjective and an objective phenomenon—
a lived experience of bodily being (Leib) and at the same time a thing among things (Körper).
This constituted character is sometimes read as a rejection of the body’s constitutive
capacity: a phenomenon must be either constituted or constituting, ontical or ontological, it cannot
be both. This reductive approach is not the case for Husserl. Rather, as was already seen above, he

75

Al-Saji, “Bodies and sensings,” 18.

76

Ibid., 18-19.

77

Al-Saji, “The site of affectivity in the phenomenology of Husserl,” 53.

78

Husserl, Ideas II, 169.

16

remains clear: although it is itself passively constituted through the localization of sensations and
the synthesis of sensings, the Leib is also a necessary constituent in “the constitution of Objects as
spatial things.”79

C. The Constituting Body:
Having been constituted through the localization of sensations, the Leib becomes the zero-point
(the “here”) around which and in relation to which the sensed world is constituted. “Provisionally,
we must say: I have all things over and against me; they are all ‘there’—with the exception of one
and only one, namely the Body, which is always ‘here’.”80 This unique role of the Leib—as the
“zero-point”81 of orientation within the spatial world—allows one to make sense of Husserl’s
insistence upon the necessity of the body for the constitution of the spatial thing. Simply put, the
Ego cannot function, on its own, as the site for the localization of sensations because the
transcendental Ego does not have a site, it is not spatially located, it has no “here.” This “here” is
absolutely necessary for the constitution of spatial objects because, as eidetic reflection reveals,
perspective and constitution-by-adumbration are necessary features of the constitution of
perceptual objects.82

79

Ibid., 160.

80

Ibid., 166.

81

“The Body [Leib] then has, for its particular Ego, the unique distinction of bearing in itself the zero point of all
these orientations.” Ibid., 166.
82

“Besides its distinction as a center of orientation, the Body [Leib], in virtue of the constitutive role of the
sensations, is of significance for the construction of the spatial world. In all constitution of spatial thinghood, two
kinds of sensations, with totally different constituting functions, are involved, and necessarily so, if representations
of the spatial are to be possible. The first kind are the sensations which constitute, by means of the apprehensions
allotted to them, corresponding features of the thing as such by way of adumbration.” Ibid., 62.

17

Because the transcendental Ego lacks any sort of spatial character, the constitution of a
spatio-thingly world points back to the eidetic necessity of a body, the universal perceptual organ
of the Ego. As Husserl writes, the Leib is “the medium of all perception; it is the organ of
perception and is necessarily involved in all perception,”83 or again, “in all perception and
perceptual exhibition (experience) the Body is involved as freely moved sense organ, as freely
moved totality of sense organs.”84 In the constituting of a spatial world, the transcendental Ego
finds itself spatially manifest through an “organ of the spirit.”85
In his phenomenological analysis of the Leib, Husserl discovers an intimate relation
between the Leib and the Ego, for whom the Leib functions as a “system of organs.”86 Husserl
names the synthesis by which these two are brought into relation, animation. This animation has
two principal effects. From the perspective of the object-pole, the perceptual experiences of the
Leib are now granted full “psychic significance”—the perceptual experiences of the Leib are
intentionally constituted as meaningful. From the perspective of the Ego-pole, the Leib manifests
as “an organ of the will,” as an “I can” that is capable of undertaking free acts.87
Having been animated in this manner, the constitution of the objective world emerges as
the reciprocal side of the constitution of the Leib itself. Just as the Leib is constituted through the
localization of sensations motivated by kinestheses, so too is the objective world—the “Object
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counter-pole”—itself simultaneously constituted through this self-same process of localization.88
In this reciprocal constitution, the auto- and hetero-affective sensings draw these two constituted
poles together; they are revealed as “the way my Body lives in, and experiences, the ‘redness’ of
the thing, the roughness of the surface—as vibrations of its own being.”89

D. The Ego-Like Body:
Because the animation of the Leib grants it a key role in the constitution of objectivities, this
animation draws the Leib into an ambiguous relationship with the transcendental Ego. In the
constitution of an Objective world, the Ego must deputize the Leib as what Husserl calls an “Egolike” structure. “Everything properly ‘subjective’ and Ego-like, lies on the side of the spirit,”
Husserl writes, “whereas the Body is called ‘Ego-like’ only in virtue of this animation, and its
states and qualities are only thereby called ‘my’ qualities, subjective, of the Ego.” 90 This term—
“Ego-like”—perfectly captures the extent to which Husserl appears torn between two ways of
conceptualizing the nature of this relationship between the Ego and the Leib. On the one hand,
Husserl recognizes that the Leib holds a key constitutive role in phenomenological life. Yet, on
the other, he appears deeply reticent to grant the Leib the full subjective significance of the
transcendental Ego.
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The weight of the relationship between the Leib and the Ego can be identified in a
particularly revealing appendix to Ideas II. There, Husserl develops the distinction between the
Ego and constituted objects, or as he there calls them: the “over-and-against” or the “non-ego.” As
he opens the appendix: “everything originally proper to the subject is unified in the Ego and
belongs consequently on the side of the Ego. Everything else is over and against it. We have here
with respect to all constituted ‘things’ and ‘matters,’ an asymmetrical, non-reversible relation.”91
Throughout this appendix, it is clear that Husserl is unsure how to deal with the Leib. On
the one hand, he is certain that objectivities constituted through the Leib are non-ego.92 But does
the same conclusion apply to the Leib itself, insofar as it too is constituted? Or, does the unique
role of animation put the Leib, insofar as it is Ego-like, “on the side of the ego”? Whichever route
Husserl chooses to follow will not only be determinative of the relationship between the Leib and
the Ego, but will likewise remain key for understanding the relationship between the analyses that
dominate Ideas I and Ideas II.
Husserl’s solution to this problem is threefold. First, he emphasizes the constituted
character of the Leib and highlights its continuity with the world of constituted, material beings.
Second, he marks the Leib as something that the transcendental Ego “has” as its property or
possession. Third, he renders the relationship between the Leib and the Ego—the “Ego-like”
character of the Leib—through the language of the “gift.”
Husserl most clearly marks this first point in §57 of Ideas II where he is tasked with
determining the distinction between the “personal Ego” and the “pure Ego.” There, Husserl insists
91
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that the personal Ego must be distinguished from the pure Ego, because whereas the former is
itself closely bound to the Leib, the pure Ego is essentially distinct or independent of the Leib.
The Body is in that case something I have, hence in the broadest sense something
over against me just like everything pregiven, foreign to the Ego, in analogy with
the things of my environment. To be sure, the Body has here (as we already saw
earlier) a particular subjectivity; it is proper to me in a special sense: it is the organ
and system of organs of the Ego, the organ of perception, the organ of my effects
on the “outside,” on the extra Bodily environment, etc. I myself, however, am the
subject of the actual “I live”: I undergo and I do, I am affected, I have my own
“over and against.”93
Yet, even in this case, there remain clear moments of wavering. The Leib is “just like” other
constituted objectivities; yet it is likewise “proper to me in a special way.” Even when Husserl
self-consciously seeks to demarcate the Leib from the pure Ego, the precise manner of their
distinction is not obvious. Because of this ambiguity, the essential difference appears to stand not
on the correlation between the Leib and the environment—a correlation always already
undermined by the unique constitutive role of the Leib. Rather, the essential difference between
the two—taken in the rigorous sense of an eidetic difference—is marked by the use of the language
of “having” versus the language of “being.”
Whereas the Ego is something that I am, something that, properly speaking, “lives” its
experiences, the Leib is merely something that the I (or my transcendental Ego) has. It is merely
the “organ and system of organs of the Ego.” This possessive language runs throughout Ideas II.
“The subject also ‘has’ his Body, and as it is said, his psychic lived experiences are ‘bound to the
Body,”94 and again, more succinctly: “I am not my Body, but I have my Body.”95 While Ideas II
lacks a rigorous analysis which would establish this distinction, Husserl is here likely presupposing
93
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the analyses of §54 of Ideas I, discussed above: wherein an imaginative variation of the
annihilation of the entire transcendent world established the formal distinction between the
transcendental Ego and the Leib.
The subjectivity of the Leib must therefore be understood as originally proper to the
transcendental Ego. The act of animation wherein the Leib is endowed with its Ego-like character
is a contingent act wherein the Ego “gifts” the Leib with subjectivity. The Leib, Husserl writes, is
“an intuitively constituted Objectivity … consequently the special status of the Body is by grace
of the Ego (or of Ego-like originary intuition).”96
***
While this account of the “Ego-like” body is unlikely to appease those who would demand a total
identification of the Ego and body, it does give the lie to those who would suggest that the body
was insufficiently theorized by Husserl. Rather, as is clear throughout Ideas II, if not already in
Thing and Space, from the very foundation of phenomenological thinking in Edmund Husserl, the
body has played a prominent role. Never merely one object among others, the body stands as a key
bridge between the pure region of immanent consciousness opened up by Ideas I and the
transcendent region of nature, as studied by the empirical sciences.97 By situating this Leib in this
precarious position of both a constituted and constituting phenomenon, the Leib is able to keep
one foot in both regions. On the one hand, being passively constituted by the localization of
sensations, the Leib can account for the passive or receptive character of the Ego. Through the
Leib, the Ego can have access to the sensations necessary for the manifestation of a spatio-material
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world. Only through the Leib can the Ego find itself affected by the world of transcendent objects.
On the other hand, as an “Ego-like” entity, the Leib is also animated by the pure Ego. It is free,
can will, act, and think (see: Ideas II §38). In this regard, it is only through the body that the active
characteristics of the Ego are granted the ability to affect the world. The body is precisely the
system of organs through which the Ego can reach out into and affect the transcendent world.

§II. The Living Body in French Phenomenology

In the genealogy of radical phenomenology’s account of the sexual flesh, the first generation of
French phenomenologists—particularly Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de
Beauvoir, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty—play an indisputable role. The following two sections will
mark two significant transformations within the phenomenological thinking of the body
inaugurated by these thinkers. In the present section, it will be shown how Husserl’s transcendental
Ego is gradually erased from phenomenological discourse and eventually replaced by the
immanent manifestation of the body itself; any problem solved by the transcendental Ego, these
thinkers will gradually suggest, can be more directly solved by the body itself. In the following
section, it will be shown that the body cannot be properly understood unless its nearly inescapable
saturation by sexuality is recognized. For, as Merleau-Ponty famously remarked, “sexuality is coextensive with life.”98
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A. The French Husserl
In order to understand the account of the body generated by this first generation, it is necessary to
recognize their work as a product of a distinctively French reception of Husserl—a reception
uniquely centered on one text: the Cartesian Meditations.
In 1929, Husserl delivered two lectures at the Sorbonne, entitled “Introduction to
Transcendental Phenomenology.” These lectures constituted the first formal introduction of
phenomenology to the French context. In the lectures—later expanded as the Cartesian
Meditations, and translated into French by Gabriella Peiffer and Emmanuel Levinas in 1931—
Husserl recontextualizes his phenomenology “if not ingratiatingly, at least with a degree of
dexterity”99 into a Cartesian idiom. As he writes in the opening moments, “one might almost call
transcendental phenomenology a neo-Cartesianism,” even if, Husserl will immediately insist,
phenomenology “is obliged—and precisely by its radical development of Cartesian motifs—to
reject nearly all the well-known doctrinal content of the Cartesian philosophy.”100 In this short
text, one finds an at-times novel account of phenomenology. Nevertheless, Husserl will shortly
thereafter characterize it as his magnum opus, writing in a letter to Roman Ingarden in 1930:
This is to be the main work of my life, an abridgment of my philosophy I have
developed, a fundamental work of method and of a philosophical problematic. It is
for me, at least, in light of the conclusion and ultimate clarity that I have developed,
something with which I can die in peace.101
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The heart of the Meditations is the Fifth Meditation, which Franck rightly notes, “is almost
as important as the first four together.”102 Titled “Uncovering of the Sphere of Transcendental
Being as Monadological Intersubjectivity,” this fifth section undertakes “a peculiar kind of
epoché,”103 one which “disregard[s] all constitutional effects of intentionality relating immediately
or mediately to other subjectivity”104 in order to return to a sphere of radical ownness.
This focus upon the monadological sphere of ownness together with a Cartesian tenor—
the “radicalness of [Descartes’] spirit”105—, results in a uniquely “egological” appropriation of
Husserl within France. As Michel Foucault later reflects:
It is absolutely true that at the time that I was studying the only form, the only two
forms of philosophy that seemed possible to us, I don’t even say that they were
dominant, the only two domains of possibility were Hegel—and Marx—and then
there was phenomenology, which had always functioned in France, always
developed as a philosophy of the subject. … once Husserl arrives in France, once
he is finally recognized in France, and gives lectures under the auspices of the
Société Française de Philosophie, what does he talk about? What does he do? The
Cartesian Meditations! Which means that France only knew Husserl via an angle
which I am not sure was, or represented, the main line of phenomenology. Because
in particular, the whole fundamental problem of phenomenology was ultimately a
problem of logic: how to found logic. We were not so familiar with all that in
France.106
For the French readers of Husserl, phenomenology first and foremost represented a new
philosophy of the subject, an egology which, while meaningfully distinct from its Cartesian and
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Kantian forebears, was directly situated within their shadow. Nevertheless, even given this focus
upon the philosophy of the subject, the French tradition was far from neglecting the body in favor
of the Ego. Rather, quite to the contrary, almost from the beginning the French tradition sought to
radicalize the relationship between the Ego and the body through two complementary
reorientations: a diminishment—eventuating in an erasure—of the transcendental Ego, and the
substitution of this Ego with the body itself. The first of these steps is exemplified in the work of
Jean-Paul Sartre.

B. The (R)ejected Ego
In his 1936 The Transcendence of the Ego, Sartre sought to rescue the phenomenological project
by casting the Husserlian Ego out of the sphere of ownness. Like his countryman Robespierre,
who proclaimed that “Louis must die so that the country may live,”107 Jean-Paul Sartre likewise
sought to save the most profound insights of phenomenology by decapitating phenomenology’s
own illegitimate regent, the transcendental Ego. According to Sartre, this revolution was
undertaken with ease; one can “quite simply eject” the deposed Ego from the immanent sphere of
ownness “like some noisy visitor.” Indeed, for Sartre, the Ego is “perfectly all right outside.”108
In this early essay, Sartre echoes his predecessors—both the early “Munich circle” and
Martin Heidegger—pitting Husserl’s early Lectures on the Consciousness of Internal Time and the
Logical Investigations against the post-transcendental-turn writings (particularly Ideas I).109 In
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these early texts Husserl remains convinced that the empirical ego can be ultimately reduced to
the unified flow of conscious experience: “the phenomenologically reduced [empirical] ego is
therefore nothing peculiar, floating above many experiences: it is simply identical with their own
interconnected unity.”110 The transcendental Ego, on the other hand, is quite simply and
unceremoniously set aside: “I am quite unable to find this ego, this primitive, necessary centre of
relations.”111 Nevertheless, in his subsequent edition of The Logical Investigations Husserl will,
perhaps playfully, remark “I have since managed to find it.” 112 Indeed, the missing Ego of The
Logical Investigations takes pride of place in Ideas I where it will be identified as the “pure subject
of the act,”113 which “no reduction can get any grip on.”114
In The Transcendence of the Ego, Sartre sets himself the task of recovering this earlier
Husserlian position, inverting Ideas I and once again submitting the ego to the reign of
consciousness: “the Ego is not the proprietor of consciousness,” he writes, “it is its object.”115 That
is to say, rather than functioning as a primordial, immanent pole of every act of consciousness,
Sartre suggests that the Ego itself is simply one more product of consciousness’ own constituting
capacity: “it is a transcendent pole of synthetic unity, like the object-pole of the unreflected
attitude. But this pole appears only in the world of reflection.”116 Having characterized the Ego as
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a constituted product of reflection, the Ego is therefore cast out of the immanence of primordial
consciousness and into the constituted world of transcendent objects—“neither formally nor
materially in consciousness: it is outside, in the world; it is a being in the world, like the Ego of
another.”117
In his magnum opus, Being and Nothingness, Sartre recapitulates and clarifies this thesis:
often derisively condemning the notion of the transcendental Ego as a “useless and disastrous”
hypothesis.118 Situating his previous claims within his present phenomenological ontology, he
insists that “the Ego does not belong to the domain of the for-itself.”119 Rather, “the Ego appears
to consciousness as a transcendent in-itself, as an existent in the human world, not as of the nature
of consciousness.”120 That is to say, the transcendental Ego is not found within the “absolute
immanence”121 or “presence to itself”122 of consciousness. On the contrary, insofar as the Ego is a
product of reflection, it is an object like every object of the world. For Sartre’s existential
phenomenology, this fact serves to propel the subject into the world, highlighting the Being-inthe-world that is factically central to every subject. “If the Ego and the world are both objects of
consciousness, if neither has created the other,” Barnes comments, “then consciousness by
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establishing their relations to each other insures the active participation of the person in the
world.”123
This ejection of the deposed transcendental Ego inaugurates, but fails to culminate the
French radicalization of phenomenology. For, the ultimate aim of their phenomenological project
is not only the erasure of the Ego, but ultimately the substitution of the body for the Ego.

C. From Transcendental Ego to Living Body
This turn to the body does not emerge as a rejection of Husserl, but as a radicalization of the
account of the Leib found in Ideas II and the Cartesian Meditations. In the fifth meditation, for
example, the Leib plays a prominent role in the sphere of ownness. As Husserl writes, “among the
bodies belonging to this ‘nature’ and included in my peculiar ownness, I then find my flesh [Leib]
as uniquely singled out—namely as the only one of them that is not just a body but precisely a
flesh [Leib].”124 As Didier Franck will later attest—but in a move consistent with the earlier French
tradition—“the sphere of ownness [is] anchored in my flesh. … Flesh is the condition of the
possibility of the thing, or better, the constitution of flesh is presupposed by all constitution of
things. … This means that flesh is the universal medium for the givenness of bodies within the
sphere of ownness.”125 By reading this priority of the flesh in a radical manner, the French
reception of Husserl consistently amplifies the constitutive role granted the flesh in Husserl’s Ideas
II, until it finally supplants the constitutive role of the transcendental Ego itself.
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As in the previous case, this French tradition again begins with Jean-Paul Sartre. Emerging
from the pseudo-Hegelian ontology of Being and Nothingness, Sartre identifies a tripartite
manifestation of the body: the body for-itself, the body for-others, and the body “for myself as
known by the other.”126 For the purpose of the present investigation, it is the first manifestation of
the body that is particularly relevant. Here, the for-itself—that is, consciousness—is manifest in
its facticity as body. “Being-for-itself must be fully body,” Sartre suggests, “there is nothing behind
the body.”127
This body is understood as facticity insofar as its precise configuration remains contingent.
But while the specific characteristics of the body are contingent, embodiment itself is not. Rather,
the body is the for-itself made form: “we could define the body as the contingent form which is
assumed by the necessity of my contingency.”128 Thus incarnation is not incidental to human
existence, but a necessary transcendental feature: “for human reality, to be is to-be-there … it is
an ontological necessity.”129 This necessity hinges on the ontologically foundational role of the
body; it is only on the grounds of embodiment that the world and its “things” 130 manifest to
conscious being (for-itself).
Nevertheless, because Sartre’s broader ontology associates the for-itself with negation and
nothingness—the for-itself is the “being by which nothingness comes to things” 131—Sartre
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unsurprisingly refrains from a positive account of the body-for-itself: “the body-for-itself is never
a given which I can know … it exists only in so far as I escape it by nihilating myself.”132 The
body is not a positive given precisely insofar as it is only manifest through the resistance of objects
in the world: we do not perceive the body-for-itself, “we perceive the resistance of things.”133
Moreover, in the same way, a bodily sense is never directly given, “any sense in so far as it is-forme is an inapprehensible.”134 Instead, the senses are reflectively constituted from the apprehension
of various objects.135 Thus, Sartre turns against Maine de Biran’s famous thesis of the “sensation
of effort.” Such a sensation, he insists, “does not really exist. For my hand reveals to me the
resistance of objects, their hardness or softness, but not itself.”136 Ultimately, within Being and
Nothingness the body-for-itself is therefore phantasmatic, reduced to the status of a mere sign of
one’s being-in-the-world.137 A positive account of the body will necessitate a turn to Sartre’s
contemporary, Merleau-Ponty, and his phenomenological analyses of perception.
Unlike Sartre’s Hegelian inflected phenomenological ontology, Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenology of the body directly draws upon Husserl’s account of the Leib in Ideas II. In fact,
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Merleau-Ponty would be the first international scholar to visit the newly established Husserl
Archive at Leuven in April 1939, with the express intention of consulting Husserl’s Ideas II.138
Although Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception only explicitly cites the then
unpublished manuscript one time,139 its influence on the production of Merleau-Ponty’s early
thinking is undeniable. Throughout this early period, Merleau-Ponty’s aim will be to “re-establish
the roots of the mind in its body,”140 thereby revealing the primacy of the living body—le corps
vivant, as Merleau-Ponty will often render Leib—as the principal site and condition for the
constitution of phenomena.
The first manuscript to emerge following Merleau-Ponty’s discovery of Husserl’s Ideas II
is the oft neglected The Structure of Behavior. With this thesis, Merleau-Ponty sought to challenge
behaviorist psychology through a synthesis of gestalt psychology141 and phenomenological
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insights.142 While much of the text serves to elucidate technical disputes within the study of reflex,
conditioning, and related behaviors, the text does establish a number of central theses regarding
Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body. Already in his analysis of animal behavior and critique of
Pavlov, for example, Merleau-Ponty insists that nothing would “be served by saying that behavior
‘is conscious’ and that it reveals to us, as its other side, a being for-itself (pour soi) hidden behind
the visible body.”143 While the terminology suggests a critique of Sartre,144 what is already
apparent in The Structure of Behavior is a more general rejection of anything like a consciousness,
mind, or Ego, insofar as it is understood as temporally, logically, or ontologically prior to
embodiment. Simply put, Merleau-Ponty flatly “rejected Husserl’s notion of the transcendental
ego.”145 In place of this transcendental Ego, as Sallis suggests, “Merleau-Ponty is substituting a
bodily or sensible for-itself.”146 Thus, finally, the body is not something that one “has,” as we have
seen Husserl continued to insist throughout his career, but something one “is.”147
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Merleau-Ponty gives his fullest account of this lived body that one “is” in Phenomenology
of Perception. The heart of Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body is the recognition—following
Husserl, albeit in a simplified form—of the multivalent manifestation of the body; the body is
simultaneously both object and subject; it is “for us an in-itself.”148 As this language suggests, this
account of the body is once again intended as a critique of the Sartrian ontology. Simply put, in
order to disrupt the dualism of the in-itself and the for-itself, Merleau-Ponty draws forward the
body as a limit phenomenon—both an object (in-itself) and a subject (for-itself)—which reveals
the limit of this distinction.
Merleau-Ponty begins his analysis with the “body as object,” as it is manifest within the
mechanistic sciences. In analyses that follow and expand upon the studies of behavior in The
Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty shows that the body consistently “evades”149 any simple
reduction to objective materiality. This evasion is a result of the intentional structure of the body;
the body—like the transcendental Ego it is understood to efface—“rises toward the world.”150
Roughly following Husserl’s distinction between Körper and the Leib, Merleau-Ponty understands
this intentionally directed body to be meaningfully distinct from the objective body. Whereas the
objective body manifests within objective space, one’s lived body (le corps vivant)—also
periodically designated as “one’s own body” (le corps propre), “phenomenal body” (corps
phénoménal) or “body schema/image” (schéma corporel)151—is constituted through an entirely
148
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distinct synthesis whereby it is not merely “in space,”152 but instead finds its own “bodily being”
in a “primitive spatiality” defined not by the objective distance of a res extensa, but by the
perceptual and practical spatiality of lived experience.
Phenomenological evidence for this distinction is drawn from the examination of phantom
limb syndrome (and its converse, anosognosia). In phantom limb syndrome one finds a disjunction
between the objective body—missing a limb—and one’s body schema. What is at issue in the case
of phantom limb syndrome, Merleau-Ponty argues, is therefore not a misplaced representation,
which would itself still be an objective manifestation: “the phantom arm is not a representation of
the arm, but the ambivalent presence of an arm.”153 Indeed, the phantom member reveals a
disjunction not between mental representation and material reality, but between the objective body
and the subjective experience of the body—le corps vivant.
Like Husserl before him, Merleau-Ponty seeks to ground the constitution of le corps vivant
in sensation and movement. Nevertheless, Merleau-Ponty refuses to reduce the constitution of the
body to “tactile sensations.” Instead, drawing upon the existential influence of Heidegger and
Sartre, he suggests that “what unites ‘tactile sensations’, in the hand and links them to visual
perceptions of the same hand, and to perceptions of the other bodily areas, is a certain style
informing my manual gestures … and contributing, in the last resort, to a certain bodily bearing.”154
Thus, in a surprising turn, it is not the individual sensations or kinesthesis which constitute le corps
vivant, but conversely, le corps vivant functions as a “law of [their] constitution.”155 It is a certain
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bodily comportment or “style,” a pre-reflexive motility discovered and manifest in the concrete
movements and gestures by which it engages the world, which is granted a constitutive primacy.
Thus, while le corps vivant exists within “one and the same world”156 as the objective body, it is
granted a quasi-transcendental privilege: “there would,” for example, “be no space at all for me if
I had no body.”157 In its dialogical and dialectical relationship to the world, le corps vivant permits
phenomena to manifest.
This understanding of the body as something one “is,” rather than something one “has”
will be likewise echoed by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty’s contemporary, Emmanuel Levinas. In the
early Existence and Existents, he will explicitly critique the Husserlian language of ownership,
writing that “the body of possession is finally resolved into a set of experiences and cognitions. …
I am my pain, my breathing, my organs. … I do not have a body, but am a body.”158 Or, more
strongly in Totality and Infinity, “the body as naked body is not the first possession; it is still
outside of having and not having.”159
Yet, in a manner even more radical than his existential contemporaries, Levinas aims to
fully extricate the body from any notion of self-constitution, whether the constitution of a

156

“It is not a question of how the soul acts on the objective body, since it is not on the latter that it acts, but on the
phenomenal body. So the question has to be reframed, and we must ask why there are two views of me and of my
body: my body for me and my body for others, and how these two systems can exist together. It is indeed not
enough to say that the objective body belongs to the realm of ‘for others’, and my phenomenal body to that of ‘for
me’, and we cannot refuse to pose the problem of their relations, since the ‘for me’ and the ‘for others’ co-exist in
one and the same world, as is proved by my perception of an other who immediately brings me back to the condition
of an object for him.” Ibid., 121-122 n.17.
157

Ibid., 117.

158

Ibid., 69.

159

Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: an Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne
university Press, 1969), 162. The first clause should not be read to say that the body is a later possession, but rather,
as the second clause clarifies, that the body is no possession whatsoever.

36

transcendental Ego or the “gestural” constitution of Merleau-Ponty’s bodily comportment. The
body, he suggests:
Is not a thing among things which I ‘constitute’ or see in God to be in a relation
with a thought, nor is it the instrument of a gestural thought. … The body naked
and indigent is … irreducible to a thought, of representation into life, of the
subjectivity that represents into life which is sustained by these representations and
lives of them; its indigence—its needs—affirm ‘exteriority’ as non-constituted,
prior to all affirmation.160
For Levinas, the body is always already marked by its encounter with the material world that
nourishes it.161 The body is certainly passively constituted, but this is not the constitution of an
Ego. Rather, the body emerges from a material relation that always already precedes the Ego: “to
be a body is on the one hand to stand, to be master of oneself, and, on the other hand, to stand on
earth, to be in the other, and thus to be encumbered by one’s body.” 162 This material conception
of bodily constitution permits Levinas not only to collapse the Sartrian dualism between the body
in-itself and the body for-itself (as had Merleau-Ponty), but likewise to collapse even MerleauPonty’s own distinction between le corps vivant and the objective body. For Levinas, any possible
dualism within the manifestation of the body is overcome by the body’s own material origin: “there
therefore exists no duality—lived body and physical body—which would have to be reconciled.
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The dwelling which lodges and prolongs life, the world life acquires and utilizes by labor, is also
the physical world where labor is interpreted as a play of anonymous forces.”163
The ultimate result of this French tradition’s complementary movements—the diminution
of the Ego and the amplification of the body—is an increasing commitment among French
phenomenologists that the role reserved for the Ego in Husserl’s phenomenology may be realized
by the flesh itself. Insofar as the Ego is demoted to a mere “material me”164 within the world, and
the living body is simultaneously recognized as a necessary (and perhaps even sufficient)
component in the constitution of objective phenomena and unification of conscious life, then a
tendency to either erase the transcendental Ego or absorb it into the flesh becomes almost
unavoidable. As Merleau-Ponty summarizes the position:
The body is no longer merely an object in the world … It is on the side of the
subject. … As Descartes once said profoundly, the soul is not merely in the body
like a pilot in his ship; it is wholly intermingled with the body. The body in turn, is
wholly animated, and all its functions contribute to the perception of objects—an
activity long considered by philosophy to be pure knowledge.165
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§III. Phenomenology and the Sexual Body
A: Husserl On Sexuality
In §55 of The Crisis of European Sciences, Husserl lists a number of problems that emerge from
the phenomenological analysis of “communal life,” setting an agenda for future phenomenological
research. Among the listed problems are birth, death, and “the problem of the sexes.”166 Yet, as
Sara Heinämaa has noted, “Husserl’s work does not include a phenomenological analysis of
sexuality or sexual difference.”167
Certainly, this claim should not be taken in an absolute sense, for as Heinämaa herself notes
in a subsequent footnote, Husserl’s “Universal Teleology,”168 offers an analysis of sexual drive
[Geschlechttrieb].169 Nevertheless, Heinämaa’s basic point stands. Husserl barely considered
sexuality, and when he did, his analyses left much to be desired.
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In “Universal Teleology,” Husserl attempts to offer an account of the sex drive “viewed
transcendentally.”170 The primary theses of the text, as explicated by Elliston, are threefold: “T1
Sex is a social act; T2 Sex seeks copulation; and T3 Sex is heterosexual.”171 Yet, as subsequent
commentaries—including Elliston and Al-Saji—have shown, each of these three theses appear
marred by naturalistic commitments that, methodologically speaking, should have been bracketed
by the phenomenological reduction.
The first thesis—“Sex is a social act”—emerges from Husserl’s goal-driven account of
drive. In the case of hunger, for example, the drive is directed toward the object of food—even if
this object is indeterminate; that is, my hunger is not necessarily directed toward any particular
food. In the same manner, Husserl suggests, the sexual drive is directed. The object of this drive,
“its enticing, exciting goal … is the other.”172 Thus, sexuality is an eidetically intersubjective
phenomenon. Yet, this ostensible characteristic may not be as certain as Husserl assumes. Further
reflection seems to suggest non-intersubjective manifestations of sexuality. “Whatever one’s
moral scruples or reservations,” Elliston notes, “masturbation (along with fetishism and bestiality)
are clearly forms of sexual activity.”173 It seems therefore, that Husserl’s first thesis is too narrowly
constructed; restricting alternative sexual manifestations without phenomenological evidence.
Husserl’s second and third theses fare no better. Husserl’s argument in the second case—
“Sex seeks copulation”—foregrounds a key development of “Universal Teleology.” Just as
individual conscious acts are intentional, Husserl here argues, so too is there something like a
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global directedness that links together the distinct manifestations of human drive: “shouldn’t we
or mustn’t we posit a universal intentionality of the drive?”174 There is, Husserl posits, a
directedness of the drive writ large which remains analogous to the intentional structure of the
individual act. Husserl names this intentionality “teleology.” In the case of the sexual drive, he
argues, the universal object of the drive, its teleological aim, is reproduction. Thus, the properly
sexual act must be that which aims toward such reproduction. While this teleology is particularly
manifest in the pregnant mother, it is nevertheless universally present within the drive; “teleology
encompasses all of the monads.” Thus, “what occurs in the motherly domain is not limited to it,
but ‘is reflected throughout’.”175
Husserl’s third thesis—“Sex is heterosexual”—follows directly from the second. If the
teleological aim of the sex drive is reproduction, then it must find its natural fulfillment in
heterosexual copulation. “I can [attain fulfillment] only as a man in the actual reciprocal feeling
or empathy with the woman,”176 Husserl presumes. Simply put, the sexual drive is “the drive
toward the other sex.”177
The critical response to these theses is unambiguous. “Even if it is not taken to identify the
goal of all social encounters,” Elliston argues, Husserl’s account “overstates the goal of even those
that are sexual.”178 The result is an account of sexuality that unjustifiably restricts sexuality to its
determinately heterosexual manifestations:179 “what is thereby ruled out by fiat is that homosexual
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encounters can qualify as sexual, or that group sex … can even be counted as sex.” 180 Al-Saji
offers an even sharper critique, tracing Husserl’s account of reproduction to a “patriarchal and
masculinist ‘natural’ attitude on sex”; a heterosexist “framework of reproduction that …
imaginatively excludes other forms of sexuality.”181
In a manner that will be tragically reiterated in subsequent phenomenologies—particularly
Levinas, Henry, and Marion—Husserl has here failed to employ the very reduction that should
grant access to the sex drive in its transcendental essentiality. Husserl, as Elliston notes, “has built
into his definition of what sex is undefended assumptions of what it ought to be.”182 Echoing
Merleau-Ponty’s assertion that “the most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the
impossibility of a complete reduction,”183 Elliston insightfully concludes his critique with the
recognition of the difficulty of the phenomenological method: “to disengage oneself from such
preconceptions in order to examine them critically is indeed an infinite task.”184
The subsequent phenomenological tradition will take Husserl’s task to engage “the
problem of the sexes”185 seriously, producing significantly more material than Husserl’s short
essay. More importantly still, these accounts of sexuality will explicitly link the problematics of
sexuality to those of the lived body in its concrete affectivity—a link which, excluding his passing
reference to “the physiology of pregnancy,”186 is ignored by Husserl’s “Universal Teleology.”
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Nevertheless, as will be shown, these subsequent phenomenologists will likewise find it difficult
to avoid the temptation to illegitimately import their own naturalistic preconceptions into their
ostensibly phenomenological investigations.

B: Sexuality in the Constitution of the Body
The first substantial, phenomenological treatment of sexuality in the French tradition can be found
in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness. Following directly from his analysis of the body, Sartre turns
to the phenomena of love, desire, and sexuality as a necessary supplement to his analysis of the
body-for-others. Simply put, Sartre will attempt to show that the body cannot be understood in its
multiplicitous manifestation unless the body is recognized as ontologically bound to sexuality.
Thus, against the “existential philosophers”—among whom Sartre has Heidegger particularly in
mind187—who “have not believed it necessary to concern themselves with sexuality,” Sartre
suggests that “desire and its opposite, sexual repulsion, are fundamental structures of being-forothers.”188
Certainly, Sartre recognizes, the particular biological and desirous character of one’s
sexuality is “in the domain of absolute contingency.”189 The particular sexual structures of one’s
body—genitalia, chromosomes, hormones, etc.—as well as one’s sexual orientation (and the
modern reader might presume gender identity) are contingent rather than transcendental or
ontological; they belong to the domain of facticity. Yet, as in the case of the body—where the
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specific bodily configuration is factical, but embodiment itself is transcendental—Sartre, refuses
to draw the conclusion from this facticity that “the same must be true for sexual desire.”190 Rather,
while the specific sexual configuration is factical, sexuality as such is not. For as we have seen,
for Sartre, to be in-the-world is to be in the world as a body. Likewise, to be in the world is to be
in the world with others, who are themselves manifest as body. But, this inter-corporeal relation is
not a purely neutral relation, inter-corporeal engagement manifests primordially as a desirous
relation (attraction or repulsion).191 Thus, he concludes, “we shall be able to say that the For-itself
is sexual in its very upsurge in the face of the Other and that through it sexuality comes into the
world,”192 or more succinctly, “sexuality appears with birth and disappears only with death.”193
This insistence upon sexuality within the constitution of the body will be reiterated in 1945
by Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception. Like Sartre, Merleau-Ponty posits sexuality as
a necessary constitutive feature of human embodiment. But, whereas Sartre emphasized the
intersubjective character of sexuality, Merleau-Ponty uses sexuality in order to explicate the
“affective life.” It is through affectivity, he argues, that “a thing or a being begins to exist for
us”;194 phenomena do not emerge in a flat neutrality, but as pleasures and pains, attractions and
repulsions.195 As Husserl already noted of the natural attitude, “without further effort on my part,
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I find the things before me furnished not only with the qualities that befit their positive nature, but
with value-characters such as beautiful or ugly, agreeable or disagreeable, pleasant or unpleasant,
and so forth.”196 It is therefore through the specifically sexual affects that the sexual-body and the
“sexual world”197 co-constitute one another.
It is certainly possible to live a life largely devoid of a sexual world, as Merleau-Ponty
shows in an exaggerated form though the Schneider case, wherein “perception has lost its erotic
structure, both spatially and temporally.”198 But, as Merleau-Ponty seeks to illustrate, the loss of a
sexual world, even in a limited sense, can have serious, rippling repercussions for one’s being-inthe-world as such: “a girl whose mother has forbidden her to see again the young man with whom
she is in love, cannot sleep, loses her appetite and finally the use of speech.”199 This is because
“sexuality has an existential significance,”200 it is “co-extensive with life.”201 Thus, Merleau-Ponty
marks the loss of a sexual world as pathological,202 because, in his analysis, sexuality functions as
a necessary constitutive of human embodiment:
physiognomy, and eliciting the gestures of the masculine body which is itself integrated into this emotional totality.”
Ibid., 180.
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All human ‘functions,’ from sexuality to motility and intelligence, are rigorously
unified in one synthesis, it is impossible to distinguish in the total being of man a
bodily organization to be treated as a contingent fact, and other attributes
necessarily entering into his make-up. Everything in man is a necessity.203
Thus, for Merleau-Ponty neither the constitution of the body nor the world can be understood apart
from the diffuse saturation of sexuality: “existence permeates sexuality and vice-versa, so that it
is impossible to determine, in any given decision or action, the proportion of sexual to other
motivations, impossible to label a decision ‘sexual’ or ‘non-sexual’.”204 Sexuality is marked a
“principle of indeterminacy” that is itself necessary and transcendental.

C. The Problem of Sexual Difference
Both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of sexual embodiment remain surprisingly silent on the
issue of sexual difference. Differences in the phenomenological experience of sexual embodiment
between men and women, for example, are largely overlooked. The result, for much feminist
scholarship,205 is the implicit substitution of a determinately male body for the ostensibly
“universal” subject of sexuality. Yet, this is not the case for Levinas, who, as early as his 1948
Time and the Other, centralizes sexual difference in his phenomenology of Eros.
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For Levinas, Western philosophy, particularly within the Hegelian tradition—as
epitomized by Sartre—is marked by an oppositional and conflictual conception of
intersubjectivity. For these philosophies, individuals are pitted against one another in a struggle
for recognition. As Sartre writes, “I am—at the very root of my being—the project of assimilating
and making an object of the Other.”206

In ethical analyses that will culminate with the

phenomenology of radical responsibility in Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being,
Levinas seeks to discover an alternate mode of intersubjective relation that does not reduce the
experience of the other to struggle, violence, and totalization.207 While this ethical analysis will
ultimately conclude in the analytic of the Face (visage), already in Time and the Other Levinas
begins to think a non-oppositional mode of intersubjective relation through a detailed analysis of
the erotic encounter and the relationship of paternity—an analysis that will be largely affirmed and
repeated in both Totality and Infinity (1961) and Ethics and Infinity (1982).208
To encounter another in a non-oppositional mode is not merely to encounter the other as
alter-ego—another me, reducible to a logic of the same—but as truly other (autrui), as the Other
(le Autre). For Levinas, this otherness is uniquely manifest in nudity: “nudity is the true experience
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of the otherness of the other.”209 This recourse to nudity has a dual meaning for Levinas. In the
context of ethical responsibility, for example, nudity will often be paired with poverty to suggest
vulnerability: “the body naked and indigent…”210 Yet, nudity also points toward another mode of
non-oppositional encounter: the erotic caress. In Eros one aims at the Other as an object of need
and desire, but one which is not reduced to objectivity: “the possibility of the Other appearing as
an object of a need while retaining his alterity, or again, the possibility of enjoying the Other …
constitutes the originality of the erotic.”211
What the phenomenology of the erotic encounter reveals is an essential necessity of
alterity. “The pathos of the erotic relationship,” Levinas argues, “is the fact of being two, and that
the other is absolutely other.”212 Yet, this absolute alterity cannot take on just any form. Rather,
this absolute character points toward a specific mode of alterity: “the notion of the sociality of two,
which is probably necessary for the exceptional epiphany of the face—abstract and chaste nudity—
emerges from sexual differences, and is essential to eroticism and to all instances of alterity.”213
Moreover, for Levinas the sexual difference that underlies the erotic relation is asymmetrical. The
unique mode of the beloved (Aimée) object of erotic desire is granted a concrete name: the
feminine. “The plane of eros allows us to see that the other par excellence is the feminine.”214
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In Levinas’ analysis, the feminine is granted this unique role not only because of a
biological or ontic alterity between man and woman; indeed, “alterity is in some way [femininity’s]
nature.”215 That is to say, the ontological structure proper to femininity is represented by the fact
that the feminine is described “as of itself other, as the origin of the very concept of alterity.”216
Thus, in Time and the Other Levinas will name the feminine the “absolutely contrary contrary…
absolutely other.”217
Before turning to enactment of erotic desire in the caress, it will be helpful to briefly note
persistent charges of androcentrism that have been levelled at Levinas, almost since the inception
of Time and the Other. The most significant responses to Levinas have been levelled by Simone
de Beauvoir (who will be covered below) and Luce Irigaray. Both thinker’s fundamental objection
can be summarized by Irigaray’s “The Fecundity of the Caress,” which takes Levinas to task for
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forgetting the subjectivity and consciousness of the woman, rendering woman as Other and
therefore as “object.” As she parodies Levinas’ approach, “beloved woman. Not female lover.
Necessarily an object, not a subject with a relation, like his, to time.”218 Simply put, insofar as the
object of the erotic encounter is explicitly marked as necessarily the feminine, Levinas presupposes
that the philosophical subject is itself masculine.219
Certainly Richard Cohen has suggested a more generous reading, emphasizing “that the
issue is important but certainly not as simple as de Beauvoir, in this instance, makes it out to be,
because for Levinas the other has a priority over the subject.”220 Yet, this response is largely belied
by Levinas’ account of femininity and its persistent recourse to stereotyped tropes of femininity—
associating femininity with mystery,221 frailty/weakness,222 the home (as opposed to labor),223 etc.
Returning to Levinas’ analytic, the concrete phenomenon that Levinas draws forward in
order to draw out the phenomenality of the erotic encounter is the “caress.” Levinas is not unique
in undertaking this analysis, as Sartre had already undertaken a similar analysis of the caress in
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Being and Nothingness,224 and both Henry and Marion—as we will see below—will likewise
situate a phenomenology of the caress at the heart of their phenomenologies of Eros. For Levinas,
the caress is uniquely distinguished from similar phenomena (e.g. touch)225 insofar as it
“transcends the sensible.”226 In this regard, the caress is distinguished from mere perception; it is
in no way identifiable with the bodily sensings (Empfindnisse) analyzed by Husserl in Ideas II.
Rather, the caress seeks to appease the “metaphysical desire”227 for absolute alterity. Thus, the
caress “aims at neither a person nor a thing”228 —beings which can be “reabsorbed into my own
identity as a thinker or a possessor.”229 Instead, the caress seeks a pure experience of the Other
beyond conceptualization or language, “irreducible to intentionality.”230 In this experience, one
encounters the Other “beyond the face,” which is the mere existent par excellence. Instead the
caress aims at an erotic unification of love. But the Same cannot in principle be united to the
absolute Other. Therefore it is necessary that love overflow in a positive fecundity: the child. “The
same and the other are not united but precisely … engender the child.”231
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What Levinas discovers through the introduction of the child is a final figure of the Other,
a figure that manifests as the paradox of paternity: the child is me, and is not me. As he writes in
Time and the Other, “the son … occurs as a possibility beyond the possible!”232 Through this
experience of fecundity, the totalization of the self-same not only encounters alterity as an external
blow, as in the case of the feminine, but as a fracture internal to the self. In fecundity transcendence
pierces the heart of immanence. The result of this paradoxical fracture is the advent of a futurity
beyond conceptuality; “the absolute future, or infinite time”233 is anticipated in the caress,234 but
only manifest in the Other that is also I, the other who will outlive me.235
Critiques of Levinas’ account of fecundity/paternity/filiation tend to follow directly from
those aimed at his account of sexual difference. Insofar as he already presumed a determinately
male subject, he likewise posits fecundity’s liberatory potential as the liberation of the male
subject, the father.236 This androcentrism is redoubled by Levinas’ insistence upon the masculine
child. Paternity is not merely the case of the relationship between the father and the child, but
between the father and the son: filiation is a matter of “the father-son relationship, … the son’s
relation with the father…”237 The masculine particularity of this relationship is highlighted by
Derrida, who asks a series of insightful questions: “Is ‘son’ another word for ‘child,’ a child who
could be of one sex or the other? If so, whence comes that equivalence, and what does it mean?
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And why couldn’t ‘daughter’ play an analogous role? Why would the son be the work beyond ‘my
work,’ more or better than the daughter, than me? If there was as yet no difference from this point
of view, why should ‘son’ better represent, in advance, this indifference? This unmarked
indifference?”238 It remains unclear what possible justification Levinas might muster in defense of
this un-thematized choice.
Finally, it is necessary to note a certain heteronormativity implicit in Levinas’ account of
fecundity. First, insofar as it explicitly marks Eros as the male caress of the feminine, Levinas’
account of the erotic encounter presupposes a heterosexual union. While Levinas remains silent
on the question of queer eroticism, his insistence that the feminine stands as the paradigmatic
figure of absolute Other strongly suggests that Eros, insofar as it is a move into absolute alterity,
beyond the face, could not manifest within a male homosexual relationship, for example. In that
instance, it seems, the “sameness” of the erotic partners would necessitate a fall into the totalization
of the same. Second, while Levinas will not mark the fecundity of the child as a necessary
requirement of Eros,239 it does seem that the child (or more specifically, the son) is a necessary
requirement for the full liberation (or “trans-figuration”) of the self.240 Insofar as biological
reproduction is not a consequence or possibility within many queer relationships—e.g. many
homosexual relationships, as well as heterosexual relationships

which include transgender
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partners—it seems that the final act of transcendence is posited as the sole domain of straight,
cisgender men.
While this heteronormative logic is merely implicit in Levinas, its consequences can be
found in an explicit form in subsequent proponents of his philosophy. As will be extensively
examined below (Chapter 3), Jean-Luc Marion will directly recapitulate this argument in analyses
that remain explicitly heteronormative. For Marion, queer sexuality is built upon the expulsion of
the Other: “homosexuality [is] the ultimate refusal of dissimilarity.”241 In a similar vein, the
philosopher and theologian Enrique Dussel reveals the heteronormative potential of Levinas in his
“Philosophy of Liberation,” in which he seeks to synthesize a Marxist theory of liberation with a
Levinasian account of otherness. Toward this end he not only highlights economic oppression, but
also gendered oppression—advocating for the liberation of women. Nevertheless, this liberation
is constructed upon biologically essentialist grounds. “Liberation is real sexual distinction: the
male affirms his phallic openness (with what risk that may entail) and the woman equally affirms
her clitoral-vaginal and mammary-oral openness (in her dimension as wife and mother;
4.2.6.2).”242 The homophobic character of this essentialism is explicitly marked in a passage
(excised from the English translation) which reads “liberation is not the pure negation of
domination by the denial of sexual diversity (as when feminism promotes homosexuality, test-tube
babies, etc.),”243 or again, a few years later, “feminist homosexuality ends up summing up all
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perversions … [it is] a radical loss of [the] sense of the reality of the Other.”244 Thus, while Levinas
himself remains silent on the issue of queer sexuality, the logic of his analysis of Eros is clearly
manifest in these subsequent thinkers. As long as women are defined as the “absolutely contrary
contrary”245 and reproduction is valorized as the only means of liberation, then the erotic analytic
can only reproduce patriarchal and heteronormative oppression.
While this work has been targeted for critique by contemporary thinkers, Levinas also
faced a serious challenge from his own contemporary, Simone de Beauvoir. In 1949 de Beauvoir
undertook The Second Sex as a project at once personal,246 political, and philosophical. The aim of
The Second Sex was to engage directly with sexual difference by asking the question: “what is a
woman?” The answer that de Beauvoir discovers is incredibly complex, drawing as it does from
feminist literature, psychoanalysis, Marxism, Hegelian philosophy, and—most important for the
discussion at hand—existential phenomenology.
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The central thesis of de Beauvoir’s text, one which falls directly from Levinas, is that
woman has been made Other. Certainly, this is not to suggest as many all-too-quick readers have
argued, that de Beauvoir believes in a naive fashion that woman is Other, or even less that she
defends this positioning. Rather, the heart of The Second Sex is a critique of such a myth of the
“eternal feminine.”247 Woman is not Other in- or for-herself. Rather, woman is Other only from
the masculine perspective: “man defines woman not in herself but as relative to him.”248 It is in
fact Levinas himself who is drawn forward as a paradigmatic case of androcentric thinking. In a
key footnote, she writes of Time and the Other:
I suppose that Levinas does not forget that woman, too, is aware of her own
consciousness, or ego. But it is striking that he deliberately takes a man’s point of
view, disregarding the reciprocity of subject and object. When he writes that woman
is a mystery, he implies that she is a mystery for man. Thus his description which
is intended to be objective, is in fact an assertion of masculine privilege.249
For de Beauvoir, the presumed otherness of women is a product of men’s false sense of
universality. Failing to take into account women’s lived experience [l’expérience vécue], men
misunderstand women. Further failing to account for their own gendered situation, men assume
this misunderstanding is the reality of women—women simply are mysterious, are Other. Thus,
as Heinämaa suggests, “the Feminine is not just an end result of idealizing thinking but results
from the reiteration of unnoticed androcentric valuations.”250
For de Beauvoir, this rendering of woman as absolute Other is not merely wrong; it is selfrefuting. In their radical pursuit of alterity, thinkers like Levinas and Sartre have failed to recognize
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the necessary reciprocity of human relations. In such a phenomenology, “woman thus seems to be
the inessential who never goes back to being the essential, to be the absolute Other, without
reciprocity.”251 This masculine understanding of the Other seeks two diametrically opposed aims:
“[the man] hopes to fulfill himself as a being by carnally possessing a being, but at the same time
confirming his sense of freedom through the docility of a free person.”252 Man wants to capture—
whether literally or figuratively—the woman, and thereby objectify her. Yet, at the same time,
man wants to be freely chosen (loved). Sartre explicitly thematizes this paradox, ultimately
concluding that there is only one resolution: the lover must set the terms of the beloved’s
freedom—“in love the Lover wants to be ‘the whole World’ for the beloved.” 253 De Beauvoir
identifies an internal inconsistency, the necessary failure of this project. As Heinämaa summarizes
her argument, “the idea of an absolute other is self-refuting. This is because the self-other relation
is essentially—necessarily—reciprocal: I see an other only if I see a living body which is able to
see me as a body.”254 Undertaking an eidetic analysis, de Beauvoir suggests a structural
relationship between subject and other. Every experience of the other is necessarily bound to a
recognition that, simultaneously, the Other is for-itself a subject for whom I am an object. There
can be no absolute Other, because every other is relative to a certain subject position, a certain
situation. “There can be no intersubjective relation if there is only one subject.”255
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While de Beauvoir articulates this sharp critique of her contemporaries, The Second Sex is
by no means limited to this negative project. Quite to the contrary, de Beauvoir seeks to offer a
positive account of feminine existence. Moreover, as Heinämaa’s Toward a Phenomenology of
Sexual Difference has definitively shown, this account is both explicitly embodied and
phenomenological. This confluence of embodiment and phenomenological investigation is key to
de Beauvoir’s argument, for it gives lie to critiques which have often misunderstood her recourse
to bodily difference as a bioscientific reductionism. To the contrary, de Beauvoir concludes her
discussion of the “data of biology” by explicitly rejecting such an approach.256 As she writes:
We must view the facts of biology in the light of an ontological, economic, social,
and psychological context. … The body of woman is one of the essential elements
in her situation in the world. But that body is not enough to define her as woman;
there is no true living reality except as manifested by the conscious individual
through activities and in the bosom of society.257
De Beauvoir considers a few alternative approaches that might situate female embodiment within
its social context, including psychoanalysis and historical materialism, but ultimately finds these
alternatives wanting. Instead, de Beauvoir relies upon an existential phenomenological approach.
The starting point for The Second Sex is therefore a phenomenological investigation into
the meaning of woman’s lived body [corps vivant, corps vécu].258 The account of the body implied
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by this analysis is precisely that traced above—from Husserl’s Leib, to Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and
Levinas’ lived body. As de Beauvoir herself notes: “the body is not a thing, it is a situation, as
viewed in the perspective I am adopting—that of Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty; it is the
instrument of our grasp upon the world, a limiting factor for our projects.”259 Generally,
scholarship has emphasized the unique role of Sartre’s analyses of the body in Being and
Nothingness. Thus Judith Butler, for example, paradigmatically writes that “we can see in The
Second Sex an effort to radicalize the Sartrian program to establish an embodied notion of
freedom.”260 Yet, while one should certainly not underestimate the influence of Sartre, Heinämaa
has shown that it is not primarily Sartre’s, but Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body that most
directly influenced de Beauvoir: “Merleau-Ponty presented a viable alternative to Sartre’s
‘phenomenological ontology’ troubled by the problems of solipsism and dualism.”261
From Merleau-Ponty, de Beauvoir develops the notion of the lived body as a situation. Yet,
as an analysis of sexual difference, The Second Sex is unfulfilled by Merleau-Ponty’s neuter
conception of embodiment. Rather, de Beauvoir seeks to show the unique mode of embodiment
characteristic of women’s experience. While the full description of women’s embodiment is
beyond the scope of the present discussion, one key feature should be highlighted. For MerleauPonty, the central feature of the living body is its activity within the world: “consciousness is in
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the first place not a matter of ‘I think that’ but of ‘I can’.”262 Yet, through phenomenological
analyses of traditionally feminine experiences—such as menstruation and pregnancy—de
Beauvoir seeks to show that feminine embodiment is not merely marked by activity, but equally
by passivity. As she writes of pregnancy, for example, “in any case giving birth and suckling are
not activities, they are natural functions; no project is involved, and that is why woman found in
them no reason for a lofty affirmation of her existence—she submitted passively to her biologic
fate.”263 And again, of menstruation, “it is during her periods that she feels her body most painfully
as an obscure, alien thing.”264 Certainly, as de Beauvoir repeatedly insists, this discussion should
not be misunderstood as a reduction of feminine experience to biology; “human society is never
abandoned wholly to nature.”265 Nevertheless, this discussion is intended to unveil the unique
meaning of the woman’s body. As she summarizes this finding, “woman, like man, is her body;
but her body is something other than herself.”266 What de Beauvoir seeks to show is not that men
are active, and women are passive. Indeed, it is one of the chief roles of the myth of the “eternal
feminine” to mask the passivity of masculine embodiment.267 Rather, de Beauvoir argues that the
experience of bodily alienation characteristic of both men and women in illness, dysphoria, and
other acute scenarios, takes on a more persistent or periodic form in women’s embodiment. Thus,
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feminine being-in-the-world takes on a distinct character from the masculine experience that not
only tends to lack this more persistent form of passivity, but also tends to cover over its own
passivity, casting it mythologically onto the feminine Other: understood as “matter, passivity,
immanence, … flesh.”268
This attempt to phenomenologically uncover the meaning of feminine embodiment is often
accused of a gender essentialism. Yet, it is worth reminding oneself that de Beauvoir is not seeking
a metaphysically static account of sexual difference. Indeed, sexual difference itself is not even
understood by de Beauvoir as an ontological necessity.269 To the contrary, de Beauvoir seeks to
uncover the meaning of feminine embodiment within the contemporary situation. Thus, she
consistently emphasizes that woman is not a being, but a becoming. 270 As she famously stated,
“one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman.”271 Yet, against many readings of de Beauvoir
which correlate this famous dictum with contemporary theories of social construction, 272 de
Beauvoir offers less a genealogy or archeology of sexual difference, than a genetic phenomenology
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of sexual difference. Thus, what is revealed by her analysis is not an eternal essence of femininity,
but the specific possibilities of being granted to women insofar as they find themselves within a
patriarchal world: “woman is not a completed reality, but rather a becoming, and it is in her
becoming that she should be compared with man; that is to say, her possibilities should be
defined.”273
***
Having traced a genealogy of the phenomenology of the body, particularly in the work of Husserl
and the early French tradition, it should now be clear that, despite the internal disagreements over
precise details, this development has followed a clear trajectory. First, the phenomenological
tradition has increasingly recognized the primacy of lived embodiment within the constitution of
the world, and second, it has increasingly recognized the priority of sexuality and sexual difference
in this constitution of the body’s relation to the world and others.
In the following two chapters it will be shown that the radical phenomenologies of Michel
Henry and Jean-Luc Marion tend to reflect this broader tradition both at its strongest and its
weakest moments. Like the preceding tradition, they emphasize the unique constitutive role of the
body. Moreover, each of these subsequent thinkers have developed a complex analysis of sexuality
and eroticism. Yet, at the same time, they will tend to draw forward some of the most troubling
patriarchal and heteronormative aspects of this earlier tradition as well. For example, Levinas’
account of the caress will be found almost explicitly recapitulated in both Henry’s Incarnation and
Marion’s The Erotic Phenomenon. The result of this repetition is that Henry—having failed to
recognize de Beauvoir’s critique—tends to echo Levinas’ own androcentric mode of thinking:
ignoring possible varieties of sexual embodiment, proffering an account of the universal male, and
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rendering the feminine as structurally other. Marion, likewise repeats the most troubling aspects
of Levinas’ account and, like Dussel, renders Levinas’ implicit heteronormativity as an explicit
homophobia.
Nevertheless, as radical phenomenologies, these two thinkers will also offer new ways
understanding the flesh; opening the door to a more complex account of affectivity and givenness
which has proven philosophically and theologically fecund. Thus, the aim of the following
chapters will not merely be the dismissal of Henry and Marion as irredeemably heteronormative.
Rather, identifying the distinct advantages of their accounts of the flesh and the body, it will seek
to identify the precise points at which their analyses have gone wrong. This precision will open
the possibility of a fusion of radical phenomenology and queer theory in the second half of the
dissertation, a fusion that will seek to retain the benefits of radical phenomenology, while casting
aside its history of androcentric and heteronormative thinking around sexuality and eroticism.
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CHAPTER 2 - Michel Henry: Transcendental Asexuality
Sexes must vanish & cease To be when Albion arises from his dread repose.
William Blake

§I: Radical Phenomenology
A. From Onto-Phenomenological Monism to Radical Phenomenology
In order to approach Michel Henry’s “radical phenomenology”—or as he will sometimes prefer
“material phenomenology”1—it may be best to begin with a biographical note. In 1943, during the
Second World War, Henry found himself involved with the resistance movement known as the
“Free French Forces.” Operating as an undercover agent in Lyon, Henry found that his very
survival necessitated that he obscure his true motivations, beliefs, and feelings. This powerful
experience of subterfuge produced the guiding conviction of his subsequent philosophical career:
the truth of reality does not reside in the visible world where appearances deceive and words can
lie, but rather, as Scott Davidson remarks, “one’s true identity withdraws from the visibility of the
public realm and resides in the secrecy of a clandestine, underground life.”2
Henry’s lifelong philosophical project may be understood as an attempt to unpack this
guiding intuition, articulating it through the language of phenomenological philosophy. From the
very beginning, in Le Bonheur de Spinoza (The Happiness of Spinoza), until his final The Words
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of Christ, Henry’s firm conviction remains—as will be seen below—that immanence, what he
calls by various names—“internal = interiority = life = invisible = pathos”3—is the true nature of
Being and the true essence of manifestation.
Nevertheless, this introduction may be served not by turning directly to Henry’s positive
contribution, but rather to his reconstruction of the dominant strain of Western philosophy, what
in 1963 he has already named “ontological monism” (or as he will later prefer, “phenomenological
monism”).4 Most directly, onto-phenomenological monism refers to any philosophical system that
seeks to reduce the diversity of manifestation to a single modality: what Henry will call the
“horizon of visibility that is the world, that is Time, and … history.”5 What draws together
visibility, time, history—and one should add spatiality, representation, and objectivity—is the
privileged role of ek-static distance or separation, that is transcendence or alienation.6 For the
onto-phenomenological monist—both idealist and realist—“alienation is the essence of
manifestation.”7 Whether a philosophical system is centered on “Being,” “consciousness,” or
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“God,” manifestation necessitates an internal splitting, the creation of distance as the necessary
condition of phenomenality. Thus, in the words of the 17th century theosophist Jacob Boehme—a
particularly common target of Henry’s criticism8—“that cannot enter into particular existence …
which cannot be comprehended, which dwells in itself and possesses itself; but [in order to attain
existence] it proceeds out of itself, and manifests itself out of itself.”9
Within Henry’s philosophical milieu, this phenomenological prejudice was most readily
apparent in Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, where self-alienation is granted primacy of
place. As Sartre there writes, “the being of consciousness qua consciousness is to exist at a distance
from itself.”10 Yet, Henry discovers the tendency toward onto-phenomenological monism
throughout the Western philosophical canon: in ancient Greek thought, Kant, Schelling, Husserl,
Heidegger,11 Merleau-Ponty and to a lesser extent Descartes, Fichte, and Schopenhauer. Indeed,
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Henry will ultimately conclude that this prejudice is nearly unanimous within Western thinking.12
Ontological monism simply is “Western metaphysics, with its origin in Greek truth, [where] the
only recognized mode of manifestation is ek-static, which after its Kantian elaboration becomes
the essence of representation.”13
Nevertheless, Henry’s argument is not that onto-phenomenological monism fails in its task
of elucidating transcendence—it quite rightly recognizes this mode of givenness as distanciation
or alienation—but rather, he critiques the way in which its assumption of the sole reign of
transcendence serves to efface the possibility of a more primordial region, what he will call radical
immanence, or simply, “life.”14 For Henry, immanence is the true “essence of transcendence.”15
Nevertheless, Henry is unsatisfied to merely deduce the necessity of a primordial region of
Being through a sort of transcendental deduction; he does not only seek to defend the thesis that
there exists a region prior to the phenomenality of the representative world. Indeed, as he argues,
such a conception is by no means foreign to ontological monism. Kant, for example, argues that
the phenomenal world is rightly surrounded by the noumenal world of the thing-in-itself. But,
while thinkable, the noumenal world is nevertheless empty. “In the end,” Kant writes:
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We have no insight into the possibility of such noumena, and the domain outside
of the sphere of appearances is empty (for us), i.e., we have an understanding that
extends farther than sensibility problematically, but no intuition, indeed not even
the concept of a possible intuition, through which objects outside of the field of
sensibility could be given, and about which the understanding could be employed
assertorically. The concept of a noumenon is therefore merely a boundary concept,
in order to limit the pretension of sensibility, and therefore only of negative use.16
In like manner, Fichte’s 1804 Wissenschaftslehre announces the “Absolute,” what he names life.
But nevertheless, this Absolute is denied its own phenomenality: “for us the oneness beyond is
nothing in itself, although it is posited as in itself; rather it exists only through the light and in the
light, and (is) its projection … [and] when we observe the light, the light is objectified, alienated
from us and killed as something primordial.”17 Thus, Henry aims not only to affirm an immanent
region heterogenous to the ek-static transcendence of the world. Rather, the task of a radical
phenomenology is to further uncover the unique mode of givenness [mode de donation] of this
immanence.18
Henry’s critique of Husserl provides an instructive case study in onto-phenomenological
monism. Henry’s deepest reflections on Husserl can be found in his 1990 Material
Phenomenology, where Henry compares his radical phenomenology to Husserl’s “hyletic
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Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 350.
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Johann Gottlieb Fichte, The Science of Knowing: J. G. Fichte’s 1804 Lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre, trans.
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University Press, 2008), 22 [emphasis added].
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phenomenology”19 and offers his most sustained critique of Husserl, and treatment of his own
relationship to the founder of phenomenology.
This engagement begins with a distinction first explicitly articulated by Husserl in §§8586 of Ideas I. There Husserl juxtaposes two forms of phenomenology, each corresponding to a
distinct field of givenness: intentional phenomenology and hyletic phenomenology. Hyletic
phenomenology, Husserl writes, is oriented toward “all the experiences which in the Logical
Investigations were designated ‘primary contents,’ … [that is], sensory contents such as the data
of colour, touch, sounds, and the like.”20 Or, as Husserl will now call them, the sensile hyle (ὕλη).
Distinct from these “concrete data” or “formless material,” are the “immaterial forms” which
constitute the objects of intentional phenomenology, what Husserl will now call the intentional
morphe (μορφή). Whereas the former function as the mere material of experience, the intentional
morphe include all phenomena which bear a meaning or a sense [Sinn],21 and can therefore be
phenomenologically examined for their noetic and noematic content.
While Husserl will hold that both forms of analyses are possible, he will nevertheless
strictly bias intentional phenomenology. Thus, while hyletic phenomenology “has a value in
itself,” Husserl insists that “it stands clearly below noetic … phenomenology.”22 Indeed, the vast
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majority of Husserl’s subsequent phenomenological investigations will be devoted to intentional
content. Insofar as Henry’s radical or material phenomenology bears a noticeable similarity to
Husserl’s hyletic phenomenology, it is precisely this bias that Henry will target in Material
Phenomenology, aiming not only to resist the denigration of hyletic phenomenology, but to
completely invert the priority: “material phenomenology, as I conceive it,” Henry there writes,
“results from a radical reduction of every transcendence that yields the hyletic or impressional
component as the underlying essence of subjectivity,”23 or again, “hyle is more essential than
morphe for the determination of the object.”24
In his defense of hyletic phenomenology, Henry first notes a tendency in Husserl to efface
the unique givenness of the impressional hyle. Simply put, rather than recognizing the unique
phenomenality of the impression, Husserl reduces it to a mere component of intentionality, thereby
subsuming the hyle within the morphe. As Henry notes, under Husserl’s analyses, “the hyle
becomes originally and in itself lacking … of the capacity to carry out the work of manifestation
in and by itself.”25 The result of this “dejection” of the impression is its “ejection” into the sphere
of transcendence, the horizon of visibility; the hyle become mere “sense data.” Thus, by the time
that Husserl writes Ideas II, affectivity will be stripped of its unique givenness and bound together
with objects, as an “act of feeling.” Affects are there found “in the object itself”; they are
“predicates of objects,”26 lacking any capacity to manifest themselves from themselves.27 Thus
23
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ultimately, for Husserl, all phenomenology (rightly bearing the name) is intentional
phenomenology, that is, phenomenology of the transcendent.28
According to Henry, this is a problem precisely because it betrays the phenomenological
project itself. For Henry, the phenomenological enterprise seeks “to describe phenomena
themselves, … as they are given and consequently in their givenness itself.”29 “The object of
phenomenology,” he writes, drawing upon the Husserl’s 1907 The Idea of Phenomenology, is “the
object in its How [Wie],” that is “in the how of its givenness.”30 Yet, he suggests, Husserl has here
rejected the givenness of the hyle not due to a phenomenological insight or eidetic necessity, but
due to a pre-phenomenological prejudice: onto-phenomenological monism.
As Henry will seek to illustrate, Husserl’s analyses themselves often reveal precisely the
opposite of what his ideological perspective demands. Indeed, as Husserl will note:
The reference to the phenomenological reduction, and similarly to the pure sphere
of experience as ‘transcendental,’ depends precisely on our finding in this reduction
an absolute sphere of materials and noetic forms, to whose interlacings, nicely
articulated in accord with as immanent essential necessity belongs this wonderful
conscious possession of something definitively or definably given in such and such
a way.31
As Henry glosses the consequences of this passage, intentionality—this wonderful conscious
possession of something—“always requires what is wholly other than itself: the sensation, the

an empty representational intending which is not a being in the presence of the object, so there is a feeling which
related to the object emptily; and as the former is fulfilled in intuitive representing, so is the empty feeling fulfilled
by way of the delighting.” Ibid., 11. Here feeling—the impression or hyle—is submitted to the reign of objectivating
distance, the horizon of transcendence or alienation.
28
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29

Henry, Material Phenomenology, 16.

30

Ibid.

31

Husserl, Ideas, 207 [emphasis added].

71

impression. The latter must first be given in order for any experience whatsoever to take place.”32
Thus, the task of a hyletic—or a material/radical—phenomenology must not be the erasure of the
unique mode of givenness of the affective material or the impressional hyle. It is rather the task of
a radical phenomenology to discover this unique givenness that not only manifests itself, but
likewise functions as the foundation of all transcendent phenomenality: “everything that is given
is given to us, so to speak, two times. The first givenness, the Empfindung, … and then, … [it is]
given a second time in and through intentionality, as a transcendent and irreal thing, as its ‘vis-avis’.”33 Whereas, “‘transcendental’ phenomenology, is limited to the description of this second
givenness,” it is the first mode of givenness that Henry’s radical phenomenology seeks to uncover
in its unique manifestation. In order to uncover this more primordial phenomenon, Henry will
develop a methodology that aims to radicalize Husserl’s phenomenological reduction: this he
names “the radical reduction.”

B. The Radical Reduction
The radical reduction, as Henry suggests in The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, is not completely
unique to his own radical phenomenology. For, apart from its obvious precedence in Husserl,
Henry also discovers a “radical reduction” at the heart of Cartesian philosophy. 34 The Cartesian
methodology constitutes a reduction, Henry argues, precisely because it seeks to bracket appearing
beings (l’étants)—what Martin Heidegger will call the ontic—from the act of appearing itself
(l’être)—the ontological or transcendental. As Henry writes, “the cogito's phenomenological
32
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it radical.” Ibid., 22.
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reduction begins this differentiation, the separation of appearance’s appearing from what appears,”
or in Descartes’ language, the videor/cogitatio from the videre/cogitatum.
It is precisely the task of returning from appearance to its very act of appearing, from what
is given to its givenness, that Henry takes to be the task of his radical reduction. Husserl quite
rigorously sets out this task in The Idea of Phenomenology, where he describes the
phenomenological reduction as a method for attaining the “absolute data” of the immanent;
“everything transcendent (that which is not given to me immanently) is to be assigned the index
zero, i.e., its existence, its validity is not to be assumed as such.”35 Yet, it remains ambiguous what
is to be understood by immanence. As Husserl notes: “the phenomenon of sound perception, even
as evident and reduced, demands within the immanent a distinction between appearance and that
which appears. We thus have two absolute data, the givenness of the appearing and the givenness
of the object.”36 We here have, in Henry’s language, a first and a second givenness. But Husserl
remains clear on this point, continuing “the object within this immanence is not immanent in the
sense of genuine immanence.”37 The object—what Husserl will later designate as the morphe, or
the object of intentional phenomenology—is not genuinely immanent [reell Immanente]; for
genuine immanence refers to that which “presents nothing else, ‘points’ to nothing ‘outside’ itself,
… [it is] self-givenness [Selbstgegebenheit].”38 But, Husserl will almost immediately substitute
for this radical project, a reduction that instead privileges this “second givenness”—the givenness
of the object, rather than the givenness of its appearing. By making this substitution, Henry argues,
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Husserl introduces a “perversion of the concept of immanence,”39 whereby “the mode of givenness
of the transcendence of the pure gaze,” is granted “the false title of ‘immanence’.” 40 Henry
therefore understands the radical reduction as a retrieval of this earlier conception of the
reduction—a radical reduction discovered by Descartes and Husserl, but ultimately abandoned by
both in favor of the object/videre/cogitatum.
Henry’s radical reduction therefore aims—to use Husserl’s language—at the genuinely
immanent. In this reduction everything that appears within the horizon of visibility is bracketed;
“if we bracket every empirical or worldly image … there remains a pure … affective tonality.”41
This not only includes the general thesis of existence and the positings of the natural attitude, as
in Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, but also the second givenness—“which is the ek-static
givenness in the perception of the now.”42 That is, everything that is given in intentionality, both
the noetic and the noematic content is entirely bracketed. Simply put, in Henry’s radical reduction,
everything that is marked by distance or transcendence—even the “immanent transcendence”
described by Husserl in the Cartesian Meditations43—is placed out of play in order that the
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givenness or appearing of the phenomenon, what Henry calls the essence of phenomenality, might
be manifest in its phenomenological purity.44 As Henry describes the reduction:
The radical reduction reduces appearing itself. Within appearing, it sets aside this
range of light that we call the world in order to reveal that without which this visible
horizon would never become visible, namely, the auto-affection of its
transcendental exteriority which actualizes itself in the pathos of Life that is never
outside.45
Insofar as this reduction brackets everything that manifests within the distance of the
horizon of the world, its phenomena manifest without distance or gap. That which is given is
nothing other than the act of givenness itself, and this act likewise in no way differs from that
which receives the givenness. It is an “original givenness [la donation originelle] in self-givenness
[l‘autodonation].”46 It is in this self-givenness that the self gives itself from itself to itself, in its
own self-affectivity.47 Henry names this self-givenness in affectivity: Life.48

C. Self-Affectivity, the Essence of Life
“Immanence and affectivity are the two essential characteristics of life.”49 Insofar as Henry
identifies immanence, self-givenness, and self-affectivity with Life, his radical phenomenology
44
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might be rightly identified as a philosophy of life. But, for Henry, the meaning of the living being
shares little in common with the bios of the biological sciences: it “differs totally from what
biology studies.”50 Whereas “life” in the biological sciences refers itself to “neurons, electrical
currents, chains of amino acids, cells, or chemical properties,”51 these constituents remain
phenomena, ontic beings “wholly foreign to phenomenality.”52 For Henry, on the other hand, Life
refers to the transcendental condition of phenomenality, the first givenness—the genuine
immanence of the hyle, impression, or Empfindung—which is most readily manifest in the selfaffectivity of the living individual (le vivant). Thus, to be living here designates the self-feeling by
which the living individual feels itself to be living, its self-affectivity.53
In these affections or impressions—such as joy, suffering, anxiety, boredom, etc.—there is
no difference between that which feels, that which is felt, and the feeling itself. Rather, “feeling
… ‘reveals itself’ in such a way that that which it reveals in this revelation which constitutes it is
itself and nothing else.”54 In self-affectivity one feels oneself without gap; here, “life refers to life,
spirit to spirit, wherein the absolute is related to itself, there is no place whatever for objective
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knowledge which would occur there only as a ‘cleft’ [faille], which would only destroy the spiritual
world.”55
This is the essence of the unique phenomenality of immanence. Whereas transcendence
depends upon the gaps or fissures of representivity—the “cleft” between subject and object, noesis
and noema, intention and intuition—genuine immanence marks a direct givenness of the self to
itself, without the distanciation of the horizon of the world. In Henry’s theo-poetic language, “the
content of Life—what it experiences—is Life itself, [it] refers back to a more fundamental
condition, to the very essence of ‘Living,’ to a mode of revelation whose specific phenomenality
is the flesh of pathos, pure affective material, in which any cleavage, any separation, finds itself
radically excluded.”56 In this manner, the phenomenality of affectivity serves as an “archrevelation” of Being, the manifestation of “a reality-in-itself, totally foreign to the world of
representation, excluded from its phenomenological mode of presentation and content.”57
Self-affectivity is therefore marked by a primordial ipseity; each affection is mine, or more
precisely, it is me. As Heidegger of all thinkers argues, “what is phenomenologically decisive in
the phenomenon of feeling is that it directly uncovers and makes accessible that which is felt, and
it does this not, to be sure, in the manner of intuition but in the sense of a direct having-ofoneself.”58 Thus, Henry argues, “the difference which is instituted among our various feelings is a
difference in the unity of life such as takes place concretely with the ceaseless passage from one
modality to another as modalities of a single life.”59 That is not to suggest that the experience of
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the self in its radical immanence-to-itself is univocal. On the contrary, Henry seeks to describe a
differentiation, but one without gap or cleft. In a manner that explicitly draws from Husserl’s
account of the Ur-impression, which finds itself “engaged in continuous alteration,”60 the affective
tonalities of the self manifest in a continuous flux, inescapably present to the self, but nevertheless
always new and renewed.61 In this radical receptivity or passivity of the self to itself, one
experiences not only the intoxication of joy, but also the terror of suffering.62
Indeed, Henry will consistently emphasize the quasi-dialectical “oscillation” between
suffering and joy, the two “fundamental tonalities”63 of affectivity. Thus, he writes in The
Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, for example:
Suffering and joy are not two modes of affectivity. Together they constitute the
unique essence of being, as life, as the original self-experience in self-growth of
self-delight. Nor are suffering and joy two separate, self-sufficient tonalities.
Rather, they are the eternal transition from one to the other since self-suffering in
its actualization is always a growing from and delighting in self, since delight has
no site or phenomenological actuality except the suffering of that suffering.64

60

Edmund Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness (1905), trans. James S. Churchill
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), 50. For Henry’s account of the Ur-impression, see: Henry,
Incarnation, 55-59.
61

“All our impressions pass, … and are … constantly modified, not into the non-being of the immediately past
where they vanish, but into another and always ‘new’ impression—sickness into well-being, desire into satisfaction,
worry into rest, suffering into joy, and despair into beatitude.” Henry, Incarnation, 57.
62

Thus, Henry suggests, for example, that it is this inescapability of self-feeling, particularly in the mode of
suffering, that constitutes the transcendental condition for suicide—whether literal or figurative—the only possible
escape from the self-givenness of life. “The horror of life always results from [suffering] … It is rather within itself,
in one of the tonalities by which it necessarily happens … that the crazy idea of no longer experiencing what it
experiences, of dismissing its own condition of being alive is rooted … suffering is trapped in itself.” Henry,
Barbarism, 67.
63

“Life is the eternal movement of the passage from Suffering to Joy.” Henry, Seeing the Invisible, 122. Henry will
elsewhere designate other affective tonalities as “fundamental,” such as anxiety, as will be seen below.
64

Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, 232 [emphasis added].

78

Nevertheless, the unique status of suffering and joy should not be overemphasized, as Henry insists
upon a complex pantheon of affective tonalities in the self-givenness of life. Not only suffering
and joy, but also hunger and thirst, boredom, anxiety, pain, pleasure, despair, fatigue, and drive—
in fact, insofar as affectivity functions not only as “content,” but also as the “form” of
manifestation,65 every experience is founded in the impressionality of affectivity: “this is precisely
what affectivity is: the universal form of all possible experience in general, the ontological and
transcendental dimension which constitutes the foundation of the reality of everything which is.”66
Thus it is not only the obvious experiences of pathos which depend upon affectivity, but every
experience whatsoever.67 For the perceptual experience there is a self-affectivity of the sense: for
every sight a seeing, for every sound a hearing, for every touch a feeling. For the intellectual
experience there is an “affectivity of thought.”68 For every intentional act of whatever kind—
whether of perception, intellection, imagination, memory, etc.69—every act is bound together with
a more primordial manifestation in the immanence of affectivity.
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Henry often draws clear connections between this notion of the self-affective Life and the
cogito (whether Cartesian or Nietzschean70); he will even go so far as to identify it with the “soul”
as affirmed in Descartes and critiqued by Kant.71 Certainly, as Ezio Gamba rightfully notes, “he
does not have any space for the soul as a transcendent substance, as an object.” 72 Nevertheless,
this recourse to the language of the ego, the cogito, and the soul can lend itself to an ethereal quality
in Henry’s philosophy. Therefore, it might be suspected, given his emphasis upon radical
interiority, that Henry affirms the Cartesian priority of the “knowledge of soul” over the
“knowledge of body.” But the truth is quite the opposite. While Henry seeks a recovery of radical
immanence, he nevertheless continuously insists that “the mode in which it presents itself to us is
our body.”73 Simply put, the “original body is soul, in the Cartesian sense of the word; it is
immanence and life.”74 Thus, already by 1948, while composing the Philosophy and
Phenomenology of the Body, the central figure of immanence will be the subjective experience of
the originary body. As he would later write:
It may seem paradoxical, in order to make legitimate this concept of a radical
interiority and thereby the concept of the soul, to make an appeal to the body. This
paradox diminishes once the idea of a subjective body comes to light. Actually
when the body is interpreted, no longer in a naive and unilateral way as an object,
but also as a subject and perhaps as the true subject, … then the analysis of the body
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thus understood in its original subjectivity may have some semblance of leading us
to this interiority which we seek.75
It is to this notion of the embodied flesh that we will now turn.

§II: The Erotic Flesh
A. The Objective Body and the Subjective Flesh
The questions of incarnation have functioned as a central problematic for Henry since the
beginning. “We know,” he writes, “that man is an incarnate subject”;76 but what does it mean to
be an incarnate being? What is the essence of our body? How does are body differ from the mere
objects of the world? Already in 1948 he devoted his work to an articulation of the body understood
not as a contingent, ontic being within the world, but as a transcendental condition of
manifestation. This work, originally envisioned as a chapter of The Essence of Manifestation,77
would instead by developed as a self-standing manuscript and published almost twenty years later
as Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body. While these initial investigations would be
supplemented and nuanced by subsequent works, most importantly Incarnation: A Philosophy of
Flesh (2000), his dualistic account of the body is there already worked out in surprising detail.
In many ways Henry’s account of the body bears a striking resemblance to his
contemporaries, particularly Merleau-Ponty.78 Like these other thinkers, Henry avoids the
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temptation to reduce the body to a single modality; instead the body—as he will later write—
“splits strangely in two.”79 For Henry, the body is the paradigmatic figure of the duplicity of
appearing—“our body offers us the crucial experience in which the duality of appearing is
decisively confirmed”;80 The body is both objective and subjective, both ontic and ontological.81
As he will later write in Seeing the Invisible:
On the one hand, I live this body internally, coinciding with the exercise of each one
of its powers—I see, I hear, I feel, I move my hands and eyes, I am hungry, I am
cold—in such a way that I am this seeing, this hearing, this feeling, this movement
or this hunger. … On the other hand, I also live this same body externally, because
I am able to see it, touch it, and represent it as one represents an object.82
Undoubtedly, Henry is here influenced by Husserl’s analyses of the body in Ideas II (see:
Chapter 1), particularly his distinction between the Leib and the Körper, as well as a variety of
bodily specifications within these broader categories: such as the sensing body, organic body,
“biological body, living body, and human body.”83 Nevertheless, in Philosophy and
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Phenomenology of the Body, Henry adopts Maine de Biran—who he will later call “one of the
most profound philosophers of all time”84—as his primary interlocutor.85 For, according to Henry,
the traditional approach that depends upon the distinction between the Leib and the Körper—the
constituting body and the constituted body—is too “limited … [for], they are both worldly
bodies.”86 Instead, following de Biran, Henry seeks to institute a deeper ontological distinction
between an originary flesh and any manifestation of the body within the visibility of the world.
The central focus of this work is de Biran’s deep challenge to both rationalism (Descartes,
Leibniz, and Kant) and empiricism (Locke, Hume, and Condillac). Most centrally, Henry
recognizes de Biran as the first philosopher to have rejected the universal conviction of occidental
philosophy, “that the being of our body belongs to the world.”87 Instead, de Biran inaugurates a
genuinely new mode of conceptualizing the body as a “subjective body.”
For de Biran, there are two modes of knowledge:
In the first form of knowledge, being is given us through the mediation of a
phenomenological distance, it is transcendent being. Maine de Biran calls this
knowledge “exterior knowledge.” In the second form of knowledge, being is given
to us immediately, in the absence of all distance; and this being is no longer any
being whatever, it is the ego, whose being is uniquely determined according to the
manner in which it is given to us. Maine de Biran calls this second form of
knowledge “reflection.”88
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While it is quite tempting, particularly following Hegelian philosophy, to read “reflection” as a
mediated knowledge, lending itself to a phenomenological distance, Henry goes to great length to
establish the immediacy of reflection in de Biran’s usage. For de Biran, reflection refers to an
“unrepresentable idea”89 that “in no way sees itself as object.”90 Indeed, this notion of reflection
will be most readily apparent in de Biran’s famous “feeling [or sensation] of effort,” 91 wherein
during an act of movement one not only feels the resistance of external bodies, but likewise has an
immediate sensation of the body’s own inner force of action. Thus, for example, to lift one’s hand
is distinct from having one’s hand lifted by another; not only because of the presence of sensation
(the pressure of the other’s hand lifting from below), but also due to the lack of an inner sensation
of effort (I do not feel myself lifting).
In these two modes of knowledge, Henry finds precisely the alternative to ontophenomenological monism that he seeks. For de Biran, the body is not first and foremost known
by its external manifestations—biological, behavioral, etc.—but by the unique immanent
givenness of the body to itself. Indeed, one-hundred and fifty years before the French reception of
Husserl, de Biran would seem to suggest a collapse of the ego into the subjective experience of the
lived body. As Henry writes: “the teaching of Maine de Biran may be summarized in these words:
A body is subjective and is the ego itself.”92 But this ostensible similarity may be misleading, for
quite against his predecessors and contemporaries, who begin by casting the ego out of its
transcendental sphere and into the transcendence of the world—as epitomized by Sartre’s The
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Transcendence of the Ego—Henry takes the opposite approach and attempts to identify an
originary manifestation of the body within the transcendental sphere:
The Biranian determination of subjective movement is … a radical critique of the
Cartesian conception of the body, because by tearing away, not the idea, but the
very being and reality of movement from the sphere of transcendent being, it
defines the real body, and not the idea of the body, as a subjective and
transcendental being.93
By drawing upon this distinction, between the “real body” which is transcendental subjectivity,
and the mere idea of the body, thrown into the irreality of the ek-static horizon of the world, Henry
develops the dualistic conception of the body that he will maintain with only limited alteration
throughout his subsequent career.
Henry names this latter conception of the body—as manifest within the world and its
transcendence—the objective body, or eventually, simply “the body” (le corps). This term stands
in for any objective manifestation of the body as an object in the world—including the biological
body of the medical sciences, the body as living organism, or the body as brute matter. Since each
of these manifestations of the body appear within the horizon of visibility, they are united insofar
as they are necessarily constituted by intentional acts and their associated sensible intuitions; that
is to say, they presuppose the structures of the transcendental ego. 94 Simply, if the body is
understood as a being within the horizon of the world, then it cannot at the same time be identical
with the transcendental condition of that horizon.
Within the ontological monism of Western society, it is presumed that this objective
manifestation of the body is the sole manifestation of the body. This conviction, Henry suggests,
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emerges from an abstraction that, following Husserl’s Krisis, he will call the Galilean reduction.95
Under this reduction, “Galilean science has separated from itself everything that is subjective and
even subjectivity itself.”96 Rather than addressing itself to the sensible life-world, Galilean science
insists that “the real universe is made up of extended material bodies,”97 and therefore all true
knowledge of the universe must take the form of geometrical relations between extended
substances. On the level of the human body, this reduction “substitutes for the sensible body a
body unknown until then—the scientific body.”98 For Henry, this reduction constitutes an
abandonment of the truth of life, that we are living beings who experience ourselves in our
ownmost intimacy and that we experience the world through innumerable sensible givens.
Moreover, Henry insists that this scientific body always depends on the prior givenness of the
horizon of Being, whose essence is nothing transcendent. That is to say, insofar as all science
presupposes the sensible experience of living beings—the scientist or investigator—the objective
body depends upon a more primordial manifestation of the body within life.99 “My body is always
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there and sensuously prominent,” Henry writes, “while the original body is this sensibility itself to
which both the constituted body and the reduced world of the sphere of ownness are present.”100
In this quest to determine the original body in its primordial givenness and radical
immanence to itself, Henry not only aims at the transcendental condition of the objective body,
but the ultimate transcendental condition. Thus, he enacts a “splitting of the transcendental
body”101 (dédoublement du corps transcendental): “the transcendental body, which opens us to the
sensed body (whether it is a question of our own or of things), rests upon a corporeity far more
originary, which is transcendental in a final, non-intentional, non-sensible sense, the essence of
which is life.”102
Following de Biran, Henry will first name this most primordial manifestation of the body
the “subjective body” (le corps subjectif) or the Archi-body (Archi-corps). But, by 1983, he will
adopt the language of “the flesh” (la chair).103 The flesh is the subjective and affective
manifestation of the body to itself; it is the mode in which the body feels itself and its own
capacities. It is not the eye, but seeing itself, not the hand, but grasping as such. Thus, as suggested
above, Henry understands the flesh to be identical to the ego; it is “a body which is an ‘I’.”104 More
specifically, insofar as the flesh is shown to be the very manifestation of the ego to itself, the auto-
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affection of the self is likewise the auto-affection of the flesh. Therefore, it likewise constitutes the
transcendental condition of the ek-static givenness of the world, serving as the transcendental
condition of everything that manifests within the sensible horizon of that world, including the
objective body.105 This, for Henry, is the essence of life; to live is not simply to feel oneself as
living, but more specifically to experience one’s affective flesh—simply put, “this living autoimpressionality is flesh.”106

B. The Failure of Sexuality and the Erotic

Despite his consistent recourse to self-affection, Henry does not understand the flesh in purely
solipsistic terms: “auto-affection,” Jean-Luc Marion notes, “was never an autism.”107 Rather, for
Henry as for his contemporaries, the questions of intersubjectivity are central. Yet, following his
distinction between the flesh and the body, Henry likewise aims to substitute a notion of “pathoswith” for the Husserlian “association” of the fifth Meditation or the Heideggerian “mit-sein”—
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both of which on his account presuppose that the intersubjective relation must manifest within the
ek-static horizon of the world.108 Thus, he writes, “before intentionally grasping the other as other
and before the perception of the other’s body, every experience of the other in the sense of a real
being with the other occurs in us as an affect.”109
The preeminent form of pathos-with, for Henry, is the erotic encounter, wherein one aims
at an intermingling with the flesh of the other.110 Nevertheless, Henry also consistently denigrates
“sexuality.” While a clear distinction between the sexual and the erotic is not employed in a
consistent enough manner to constitute a law, it nevertheless constitutes a general principle and
useful heuristic. For Henry, the erotic generally refers to an affective encounter with the other in
the flesh, while sexuality refers to an objective relation to the body of the other. Nevertheless, as
will become increasingly clear, this distinction does little to rescue even the erotic from its essential
and ultimate disappointment.
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The overarching unity of Henry’s discussion of sexuality is the inevitability of failure
(l’échec).111 Already in The Essence of Manifestation, sexuality is a “vain repetition”;112 sexuality
is always already “the failure of sexuality” (l’échec de la sexualité).113 In essence, sexuality
becomes paradigmatic of the limits of representation and objectivity. Whereas love (l’amour),
desire, or libido are affective sentiments, auto-affections rightfully given from themselves to
themselves, the “reduction of love to sexuality”114 represents a bastardization of this affect,
whereby it is cast out of its proper intimacy in affective pathos-with, and into the cold irreality of
the world.
This denigration of sexuality is already perfectly clear in Philosophy and Phenomenology
of the Body. There, thinking in Husserlian and Schelerian terms, sexuality is constituted within the
transcendence of the horizon of visibility as a “sexual intentionality.” Yet, Henry identifies an
immediate failure implicit in all sexual intentionality. “Insofar as it directs itself toward sex,
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understood as a being-there and as an object,” Henry writes, “sexual intentionality encounters an
obstacle prescribed by ontology.”115 Unlike, for example, perceptual intentionality, sexual
intentionality is marked by an ontological aporia; it is in-principle unfulfillable. The formal
unfulfillability of sexual intentionality emerges from its self-contradictory character. On the one
hand, the proper object of sexuality is the absolute subjectivity of the other.116 Yet, this subjectivity
is approached through the realm of objective being, a realm essentially foreign to absolute
subjectivity.117 Therefore, sexuality is defined in terms of a fundamental frustration. Because
sexual intentionality lacks access to the interiority of subjectivity, it retains no reality; it is a mere
representation. As Henry insists, “when the anxiety of sex is dissipated there is nothing left, except
an objective determination. The Subjectivity which had been aimed at has vanished.”118
This relegation of sexuality to objectivity—and its correlate inability to access absolute
subjectivity—follows from its relegation to the body rather than the flesh. Henry is explicit on this
point: “the ontological status of our objective transcendent body is the foundation which makes
the existence of a sexual world possible.”119 As Henry will later write, in Material Phenomenology,
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in sexuality “the caress follows the trail of the other’s pleasure. It calls upon the other’s pleasure
but what it touches is the other’s body-object. It does not touch the other’s original body, which is
radically subjective and radically immanent.”120 In general, discussions of sexuality throughout
Henry’s middle-period will largely presuppose this intentional framework and the reduction of
sexuality to objectivity.121
This critique of sexuality culminates in Incarnation. There Henry recognizes that the body
is necessarily embedded in a sexual world and as such “our body is always marked by sexual
difference”122—a mark which manifests, for Henry, most conspicuously in concrete “sexual
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determinations.” Yet, these determinations of sexual difference remain nothing more than
objective facts, essentially divorced from the living affectivity of the flesh and its eros. Focusing
upon the experiences of anxiety123 and shame that often accompany the exposure of these
determinations—e.g. nudity or sexual activity124—Henry here reiterates his earlier assertion of the
centrality of failure in sexuality. But, importantly, he here moves to intensify this failure.
Whereas in Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, the failure of sexuality is centered
on the inability of sexual intentionality to grasp the subjectivity of the other, its inability to
reconcile the body of the other with his or her absolute subjectivity, in Incarnation, this anxiety
and failure is redoubled. It not only emerges from an inability to reconcile the other’s body and
flesh, but likewise, the inability to reconcile this difference within oneself. Thus “the failure of
desire”125 and the related anxieties of sexuality are reduplicated in the gap between one's own flesh
and body. Turning to Kierkegaard’s language of “the soul”—which here should be understood as
the affectivity of one’s original corporeity—Henry presents the anxiety of sexuality in terms of a
failure to properly reconcile the relation between one's soul (flesh) and body. “Anxiety as such,”
he writes, “is the result of the paradoxical synthesis, in the spirit, of the soul with a sexually
differentiated objective body.”126
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Nevertheless, despite its recourse to the language of failure common throughout his earlier
corpus, Incarnation does offer a partial answer to the problematic of sexuality from the perspective
of immanence and the flesh. For, as Henry writes in Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body,
“the entire philosophy of sexual love has to be re-done beginning with the data of the philosophy
of the subjective body.”127 There should be, together with the sexual intentionality of sexuality,
another “form of our sexual life,”128 one which “finds its most fundamental ontological
presupposition in the theory of the subjective body.”129 In Incarnation, Henry attempts to offer
precisely such a rethinking, which will here be designated as the erotic.130
For Henry, the erotic gives itself as the peak manifestation of intersubjectivity. In dialogue
with Merleau-Ponty's notion of the “chiasm,”131 the unity of the touching and the touched, Henry
situates the erotic caress within the immanence of the flesh; “being-touched,” he writes, “is a
modality of our original flesh.”132 This emphasis upon the erotic touch marks Henry's indebtedness
to Levinas' phenomenology of the “caress,” which both “is sensibility,” but nonetheless,
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“transcends the sensible.”133 For Levinas, the essence of the caress is that it “grasps nothing.”134
This incapacity of the erotic caress to “grasp” an object easily translates into Henry's ontophenomenological dualism. As a modality of the flesh, the erotic manifests on the plane of radical
immanence, never appearing to the ek-static sight of objectivity. The erotic caress “grasps nothing”
precisely because, in the immanence of radical interiority, there is no-“thing” to grasp.135 “The
young woman’s hand,” Henry writes, “belongs to an original flesh; only in belonging to this flesh,
and never as an object or thingly body, is it capable of being touched and entering into the erotic
relation.”136
This distinction holds not only for the hand of the caress, but for embodiment as such: in
“eroticism, corporeity as an objective element disappears completely. This is purity.” 137 Thus,
what Henry identifies under the language of the erotic is a direct encounter with the other within
the radical immanence of subjectivity, within the affectivity of life. In this pathos-with, completely
foreign to the givenness of the world, one has a non-intentional encounter with the other.138
The erotic therefore radically differs from Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body’s
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sexual intentionality. Indeed, just as every intentionality presupposes a first givenness in
affectivity, the truly erotic encounter represents the ontological condition of any possible sexual
intentionality. In this manner, the erotic encounter bypasses the aporia of sexual intentionality.
Rather than seeking the absolute subjectivity of the other in the objectivity of the world—a
Sisyphean task—genuine eroticism is the direct encounter with the flesh of the other in
immanence.
This immanence makes it all the more surprising that, on Henry’s account, even when it
remains at the level of the flesh, even when it is a properly erotic relation in the immanence of life,
even when it is not yet reduced to the “nihilism” of sexuality, the erotic relation nevertheless
inevitably fails: “in considering the erotic relation, either in its immanent achievement, or in its
worldly appearing, we have recognized how in each case it is wrapped in anxiety and in each case
leads to failure.”139 This failure, Henry remains clear, does not result from an external impetus (a
“distraction”); Henry is not here describing the “fall” of the erotic into the sexual—though he will
elsewhere. Rather, “maintaining our attitude of reduction,” he nevertheless discovers an impasse:
“the failure of sexual desire, far from being able to be overcome in the affective relation to the
other, on the contrary condemns this affective relation to reproduce that failure in itself, thus
leading it to advance its own failure.”140 While the flesh that is my own and the flesh of the other
can truly touch, can come into contact, they nevertheless constitute a barrier or limit. I cannot
experience the other as they experience themselves; nor can they experience my self-givenness as
I experience myself. The flesh of the other constitutes a limit or boundary line that cannot be
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crossed.

C. Concrete Sexual Determinations
This failure of sexuality not only strikes the erotic encounter, but is likewise determinative of the
status of the flesh itself. For Henry proffers a distinctly monadic account of the flesh. Simply put,
in its true interiority, the flesh manifests without sexual members—without, to use Henry’s
language, sexual determinations. These sexual organs or members are instead cast out of the
originary immanence of affectivity and into the objectivity of the world.
This is not to suggest that sexuality finds no proper basis in immanence. For love, desire,
and libido are all properly speaking affective tonalities of our originary flesh. Yet, in the erotic
encounter, these original impressions are objectified. As Henry writes of the hand, for example,
insofar as it is “considered as an objective organ, as part of the worldly body, the hand is incapable
of touching and sensing anything at all, … the subjective power of touching alone can do this.”141
That is to say, the hand considered in its true immanence, simply is “the radically subjective power
of prehension.”142 In order to appear within the objectivity of the organic body or the world, this
original impression must be objected, cast into exteriority. It is precisely this process that Henry
understands to be determinative of sexuality, insofar as sexuality appears in anything like a sexual
organ, an erogenous zone, or any other member. Thus, for example, while Henry reads the
Schopenhauerian will as roughly analogous to the immanence of life, he nevertheless affirmatively
cites Schopenhauer’s assertion that “the body objectifies in the genitals the will to propagate.”143
141
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Here “objectifies” or “réalise-t-il extérieurement”144 should be understood in the strong sense as
an externalization, a representation, a casting into the horizon of visibility of the world: it is the
“will's illusory doubling in the objective body.”145
It is this which unites Henry’s account of sexual determinations. Sexual determinations
stand as an objectification—even a “fall” in all of its Christian connotations—of the original
affectivity of eros. In them, “the erotic relation is reduced to an objective sexual relation; and that
is how it now comes about, as a performance and a set of objective phenomena.”146 Thus, for
example, “sensible tactile zones, or erogenous … zones”147 are found on the “thingly body.” Or
again, in the sexual caress, one touches “the other at the most ‘sensible’ point of their body, the
extreme point of its sexuality—‘there,’ which means on their own thingly body as it is shown in
the world.”148 Simply put, the sexual member always manifests in the phenomenological mode of
objectification.
Henry refers to this objectification as the naked body; naked, not necessarily in a literal
sense, but insofar as it is exposed to the visibility of exteriority: “thus unveiled in the objectivity
of the world, naked, sex no longer offers anything more than this contingent and absurd
appearance.”149 Exposed in this manner, the body cannot be experienced as anything but absurd.
This is true for any member which, exposed to the light of visibility, is exposed as irreducibly
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contingent or arbitrary. There is no “why” for the particular configuration of the body. As Henry
notes, “doubtless, the nose, the eye, the members, etc., manifest themselves to us as determinations
concerning which no justification, for example, a functional one, suffices to hide their strange
configuration or absurd characteristic from the view of a lucid mind.”150 And while this absurdity
strikes every member exposed to the light, it is given a particular resonance in the case of the
sexual member. Henry therefore finds it necessary to highlight “the contingency and therefore
absurdity of sexual difference, and above all of sexual determination as such.”151
Simply put, it is the experience of the absurdity of the synthesis of the originary flesh with
an objective body which provokes the distinctive anxiety of sexuality. 152 Or more precisely, it is
not simply the correspondence of the originary flesh and the objective body that produces this
anxiety, but the flesh’s correspondence with “this body there in the world, with its determinations
and its objective sexual configurations.”153 For Henry, anxiety “emerges in the presence of an
objective sexual determination, it is in the spirit that it feels anxiety at not recognizing itself in a
sex.”154
Thus in a very real sense it is sexual determinations, insofar as they are always conceived
as objective sexual determinations, that are responsible for the failure of desire—that is, the failure
of both sexuality and the erotic. “It is the duality of appearing, and more precisely the objectivity
of sexual determinations and thus of the erotic relation itself which is responsible for the absurdity
150
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of these determinations as well as for the failure of desire.”155 Therefore, all that remains after this
failure of desire, is an “unimaginable synthesis”156 in the spirit of the originary flesh wherein life
experiences itself in itself and the objective sexed body; a synthesis which is unimaginable,
because it can never overcome the “monstrous, ‘enormous’ difference that is established in it,
between itself and its sexed body.”157 The sexual member is therefore the dysmember.
Thus, despite the fact that Henry critiques Kierkegaard for “surreptitiously [treating the]
body, and particularly sexual difference, as objective determinations, referring inevitably to the
world’s ek-static appearing,”158 Henry ends up reproducing precisely this tendency. Having asked
in Barbarism if a solution to scientistic (e.g. behaviorist) readings of sexuality might be cured by
recognizing “the relation of the absolutely immanent, absolutely subjective, transcendental life to
its incomprehensible objective double, to this body, with its sexual characteristics and its strange
configuration?”159 Henry offers an undeniable “no.” According to Henry, such a response is
“incomprehensible for this transcendental life.”160 Transcendental life always brackets sexuality.
D: Transcendental Asexuality
If all sexual determinations have been thrown into the objectivity of the world, then so too has
sexual difference as such. One is not just a body, but always already a “sexually differentiated
objective body.”161 Thus “between these [objective sexual] properties, and in spite of their
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common phenomenological status, a difference is revealed: … It is … a man’s or woman’s
body.”162 The question, Henry suggests, is therefore “one of knowing what this presence of the
spirit in our own body means exactly, when this is defined by a set of objective properties, and in
a singular way by sexual difference.”163 That is to say, what does it mean to be living flesh bound
to a sexually differentiated body—a man’s or a woman’s body? The answer, perhaps unsurprising
at this point, is that the synthesis of the flesh with sexual difference is an absurdity that provokes
anxiety. For, insofar as sexual difference depends upon sexual determinations, it likewise depends
upon their mode of phenomenality, which is the mode of exteriority and objectivity. 164 As Henry
summarizes this moment of recognition: “the discovery of one’s own body as an objective body—
and even more as an objective body marked by sexual difference—is identical to an affective
disposition, the fact that such a body belongs to the mind is experienced as anxiety at the outset.”165
Nevertheless, the affective tonality of this anxiety is not univocal. Rather, Henry here
comes close to affirming something like sexual difference within the flesh, insofar as sexual
difference is revealed to the flesh in affectively unique ways. “It is in the immanence of our flesh,”
he writes, “that sexual difference reveals itself originally in the form of distinct, pure impressions,
some proper to female sensibility, unknown to male sensibility, and vice-versa.”166 This echoes a
similar assertion in I am the Truth, where Henry suggests that being a woman is defined by an
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“internal and lived unfolding of feminine ‘sexuality’.”167 But, in both cases this potential is
immediately undermined by Henry in favor of a transcendental purity devoid of sexual difference.
Thus, despite this initial promise, it is ultimately revealed that “this givenness to itself takes place
in the same way, in the same, for man as for woman … [it] is identical in each.”168 There is, Henry
notes, paraphrasing Paul, “neither male nor female.” Rather, “what we are dealing with in the
relation to the other is never primarily, or solely, despite worldly appearance, a man or a
woman.”169 Instead, as he will later argue, one is ultimately given to oneself—and given to the
other—within the self-givenness of life “before every subsequent determination—before being
man or woman.”170
As Yannick Courtel, writes in “Chair et différence sexuelle chez Michel Henry”: “it is
therefore necessary for us to conclude that the flesh is not sexuated … in its relation with absolute
life, the flesh ignores sexual difference.”171 But, whereas Courtel rightfully marks this absence,
tying it to the paradoxical synthesis of the flesh and the objective body, it is here possible to be
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even more precise. The flesh ignores sexual difference, in its relation to absolute life, because in
this life there are no sexual determinations, no organs or members. In “the lover’s night”172 there
is no skin, gender, secondary sexual characteristics, or genitalia. In Henry, the transcendental flesh
has been, to use my own language, dis-membered. Thus, we might say of Henry, as Sartre once
said of Heidegger, “his Dasein appears to us as asexual.”173

§III: Consequences of the Erasure of Sexual Difference
A. The Universal Man

Henry’s insistence upon a transcendental asexuality motivates a few unfortunate tendencies in his
account of gender and sexuality. Specifically, despite the ostensible sexually-neutral character of
his account of the flesh, he nevertheless ends up presupposing a determinately male subject,
reiterating problematic tropes of femininity, and variously erasing or denigrating non-traditional
sexual relationships. In the final division of this chapter, these three tendencies will each be
examined in turn.
At first blush, Henry appears to unambiguously affirm the fundamental gender nonspecificity—and thus logical interchangeability—of the human person within the sexual or erotic
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relation. Just as a phenomenology of the chiasm reveals an eidetic “reversibility”174 of the touching
and the touched, so too does a phenomenology of the erotic caress. In the erotic relation the
touching and touched are “absolutely symmetrical.”175 This symmetry of the caress likewise
determines the symmetrical character of the erotic relation as such; thus, “the only difference
between the two cases of transcendental flesh …, is that the one is ‘active’ and the other ‘passive’;
they are two modalities of one and the same capacity for power, so they are interchangeable, and
the man and woman can exchange their roles.”176 This interchangeability seems to perfectly
cohere with Henry’s broader framework, following from his marked preference for an asexual
transcendental ego and his insistence upon the priority of the existentially unique, living person
over every sociological category—including gender and sexual categories. Thus, in From
Communism to Capitalism, for example, Henry will criticize Marxist class analysis for its
effacement of the living individual; “what characterizes Marxism from a theoretical point of view,”
he will there suggest, “is the replacement of the living individual with a number of abstract
entities.”177
Nonetheless, a rhetorical analysis of Henry’s discussion of sexuality, particularly in I am
the Truth and Incarnation, suggests that, even granting his official statement regarding the
symmetrical and interchangeable relation of the genders, Henry’s philosophical model of the
human person bears the distinctive marks of the traditional “active male subject.” For these texts,
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the male is subject; the female is object. The transcendental purity of the originary flesh is always,
even if often only implicitly, “a pure man.”178
Feminist scholarship has long marked this tendency of Western philosophy to introject the
characteristics of socio-cultural masculinity into any notion of the “universal” human, so it will
little serve this project to survey the entire tradition. Instead, given Henry’s French context, it will
be helpful to limit discussion to three of his direct contemporaries: Simone de Beauvoir, Luce
Irigaray, and Hélène Cixous. This limitation will highlight the fact that the present critique is not
anachronistic, but rather reflects debates internal to Francophone philosophy, to which Henry
would have had perfect access.
According to de Beauvoir, within the Western philosophical canon “there is an absolute
human type, the masculine.”179 To be masculine is to be universal, to be universal is to be
masculine. This tendency, according to de Beauvoir, emerges from the “subject”-centered
character of Western thought: “he is the Subject, he is the Absolute—she is the Other.”180 But, this
is not to suggest that this correlation between the universal/absolute and the masculine is in any
sense natural. Rather, as Irigaray notes, “any theory of the subject has always been appropriated
by the ‘masculine’.”181 Given Irigaray’s interest in political economy, this notion of appropriation
should be taken in a quite literal sense. The masculine has made the “subject” propre (one’s own);
it has been expropriated and has therefore become his property.182 The means of this expropriation
178
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is the maintenance of a certain posture or perspective: men “describe [the world] from their own
point of view, which they confuse with absolute truth.”183 In so describing the world, “man defines
woman not in herself but as relative to him; she is not regarded as an autonomous being.” 184 As
Irigaray describes this asymmetrical relation: “the feminine has been construed only as the
negative, inferior version or opposite of the masculine: always defined in relation to, against, and
beneath the masculine, paradigmatically as object in contrast to the masculine subject.”185
Having been defined against the supposed universality of the masculine, woman simply
becomes “the sex,” always posed against masculine neutrality. This designation of woman as “the
sex” has, for de Beauvoir, a clear genesis, one that is particularly relevant to a critique of Henry:
the forgetting or erasure of sexual determinations.
Woman has ovaries, a uterus; these peculiarities imprison her in her subjectivity,
circumscribe her within the limits of her own nature. It is often said that she thinks
with her glands. Man superbly ignores the fact that his anatomy also includes
glands, such as the testicles, and that they secrete hormones.186
Precisely as in Henry, this erasure of sexual determinations produces a subsequent erasure of
sexual difference. As Irigaray notes, Western philosophy depends upon a “power to eradicate the
difference between the sexes in systems that are self-representative of a ‘masculine subject’.”187
expropriation of “communal property” (Ibid., 885) which “precedes capitalist accumulation” (Ibid., 873). This
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Thus, Henry’s tendency to implicitly center a masculine subject in his ostensibly universal
analyses of the transcendental flesh is neither unique, nor unexpected. But rather, this tendency is
deeply embedded in the Western philosophical tradition and falls from precisely the attempt to
subordinate sexual difference to a transcendental subject that Henry explicitly marks as his project.
Nowhere is this prejudice clearer than in a particularly odd thought experiment that marks
the conclusion to I am the Truth. Anticipating analyses that will be undertaken with considerably
more depth in Incarnation, Henry closes I am the Truth’s theological speculations with a turn to
“the erotic relations between men and women.”188 There, amidst a critique of scientism and
technology, Henry suggests that the reader consider the possibility—even inevitability—of “the
simulation in the technical and scientific world of a procedure applied not only in the military
domain but to social relations, for example the erotic relation.”189 Drawing from the idea of flight
simulators, Henry there posits an “erotic simulation,” in which an artificially simulated woman’s
body could be used as an outlet for sexual desire. For Henry, such an “erotic simulation” would
enact a total erasure of the “living transcendental Self”; the fulfillment of the technologization that
Henry traces to Galileo, but sees with particular intensity in modern capitalism: “science has
reduced the living transcendental Self to a dead object of the Galilean field.”190
A rhetorical analysis of this thought experiment suggests an implicit gender asymmetry at
the heart of Henry’s paradigm. “Let us hypothesize that men can use a simulator,” he says,
introducing the thought experiment. “The man (like the student pilot) is placed in a certain position
and the appearance of a woman’s body is gradually unfolded…” he continues; “beneath his
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touching, the appearance of the female body quivers…” Ultimately, this simulation is that wherein
“a man who wants to embrace a woman…”191—as one embraces an object—finds fulfillment.
Here, the man “uses,” “touches,” “embraces”—in sum, is the subject of an erotic encounter. The
woman, or rather “the appearance of a woman’s body,” is entirely passive; she merely corresponds
to the masculine subject’s activity as a passive recipient.192
What is clear throughout this passage—as well as his broader corpus—is that Henry’s
tendency to prioritize the masculine manifests most conspicuously at a strictly grammatical level.
Thus, for an especially stark example, in the pages immediately following his thought experiment
Henry embraces the apocalyptic and eschatological fervor of 1st Thessalonians and Revelation. In
the increasing technologization of the world: “men [are] debased, humiliated, despised…” “Men
[are] reduced to simulacra”; “men [are] chased out of their work and their homes”; “men [are]
replaced by abstractions…”; “men [are] treated mathematically, digitally, statistically.” “Men [are]
turned away from Life’s truth”; “men whose emotion and loves are just glandular secretions”;
“men who have been liberated by making them think their sexuality is a natural process”; “men
whose responsibility and dignity have no definite site anymore. Men who in general degradation
will envy the animals. Men will want to die.”193
Like the authors of his period, Henry’s texts rely almost exclusively on masculine nouns
and pronouns throughout: “men [are] turned away from Life’s truth”;194 the philosophical subject
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is “il”: “he is related to life,”195 he is the “Son with the Son” [fils dans le fils],196 the other is neither
“a man or a woman: it is a Son.”197 This grammatical convention seems to reveal little beyond
Henry’s social location: he is French, so he uses “il” as a general pronoun; he is Catholic so he
uses “son [of God]” to speak of one’s relation to God.
Nevertheless even if they are traditional, such conventions are not beyond repute. De
Beauvoir, for example, will highlight the connection between this linguistic convention and the
tendency to conflate the universal and the masculine. As she writes:
A man never begins by presenting himself as an individual of a certain sex; it goes
without saying that he is a man. The terms masculine and feminine are used
symmetrically only as a matter of form, as on legal papers. In actuality the relation
of the two sexes is not quite like that of two electrical poles, for man represents
both the positive and the neutral, as is indicated by the common use of man to
designate human beings in general; whereas woman represents only the negative,
defined by limiting criteria, without reciprocity.198
For Irigaray, this connection necessitates “a revolution in thought and ethics”199 as well as
language. “We need to reinterpret … everything, beginning with the way in which the subject has
always been written in the masculine form, as man, even when it claimed to be universal and
neutral. Despite the fact that man—at least in French—rather than being neutral, is sexed.”200 Thus,
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even if Henry is here employing the standard—albeit questionable—convention of his epoch, one
might still note clear connections between this linguistic convention and a determinately masculine
conception of the subject.
Yet, more strongly, if one turns from I am the Truth to Incarnation’s phenomenological
analysis of the caress, it will be clear there is good reason to believe this linguistic usage is not
simply convention. Rather, throughout this analysis, Henry conspicuously inverts from exclusively
masculine to exclusively feminine language in his account of the “other” of the erotic caress. Thus
the recipient of the caress is “she” [elle] or even, with a remarkable regularity, the “young woman”
[jeune femme].201 One finds “the young woman’s hand,” “the original flesh of the young woman,”
“our dancer … the young woman.”202 This inconsistency suggests that Henry’s use of masculine
language for the philosophical subject may not be strictly reducible to traditional convention.
Rather, the subject of the caress—which, according to basic moves of Henry’s analysis, should
remain in principle sexually generic—is in a non-trivial sense configured as determinatively male.
The “object” or recipient of the caress, the passive partner of the erotic encounter, is figured as
female.
This privileging of the male subject in an analysis of the caress is not without precedence.
As was already discussed in Chapter 1, Emmanuel Levinas’ Totality and Infinity offered a
phenomenological account of the caress that has been roundly criticized for its explicitly gendered
character. Instilling the traditional patriarchal family structure into his phenomenology of eros,
Levinas there contrasts the “feminine”—the welcoming character of the home, epitomized in the
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wife—with the masculine subject of the erotic relation.203 While Henry does not explicitly
reference Levinas’ gendered analysis, it is without question that he has his contemporary in mind.
Taken together with I am the Truth’s “erotic simulation,” these passages suggest that the
philosophical and existential subject of Henry’s philosophy is figured as determinately male,
whereas the passive object is figured as female. In this regard, the caress and the erotic simulation
stand together. Thus, while for Henry the horror of the technologized modern world is that “a man
or a woman is only an object,”204 his analysis appears to offer liberation for the man alone; woman
remains an object, passive to the caress and the domination of the masculine subject. In the words
of Hélène Cixous, “Active—is reserved for man”;205 “woman is always associated with passivity
in philosophy. … Either woman is passive or she does not exist.”206 This specification of an active
male subject and a passive female object is not unique within Henry’s project. Rather, it emerges
together with some rather insidious, stereotyped notions of femininity.
B. Tropes of Femininity
Henry’s decision to employ traditional gender stereotypes is particularly unfortunate, as his
philosophy is uniquely situated to think beyond these traditional tropes of femininity. For, these
tropes have always emerged from a structured binary. “Thought,” as Cixous argues, “has always
worked through opposition.”207 And yet, it is this oppositional—or perhaps dialectical—model of
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philosophical thinking that Henry directly challenges in his critique of onto-phenomenological
monism. Moreover, Henry’s line of flight from this oppositional model of thought is through an
affirmation of affectivity. And this is precisely the route likewise suggested by Cixous, for whom
women must write from a “direct contact with her appetites, her affects.”208
Indeed, if one turns to a table of the gendered binary, such as that provided by Irigaray, the
confluence between this table and Henry’s distinction between the two principal modes of
givenness is rather illuminating. As Irigaray sets out the traditional paradigm: “be/become,
have/not have sex (organ), phallic/non-phallic, penis/clitoris or else penis/vagina, plus/minus,
clearly represented/dark continent, logos/silence or idle chatter, desire for the mother/desire to be
the mother.”209 While certainly not an exact match, important points of intersection appear. For
Henry, the first givenness in affectivity is marked by a certain conspicuous negativity, but only
from the perspective of the world. Thus, where the world offers the “plus” of beings [les étants]—
“exteriority constitutes visibility”210—affectivity offers the “minus” of an absence, insofar as
affectivity does not, nor eidetically speaking ever could, appear within the world’s visibility.
Where the world therefore offers “clearly represented” phenomena, the invisible affective life
offers nothing to be seen: “the invisible concerns the human being itself and his or her true
reality.”211 Life is, Henry writes, “clandestine”;212 or, in the words of Irigaray, it is a “dark
continent.” Likewise, “the invisible life,” Henry writes, “does not cease to be invisible and remains
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forever in the dark.”213 Whereas the world offers the rationality of the spoken word [Greek Logos],
life speaks with an altogether different Word [Johannine Logos214], a Word that can only appear
to the world as a silence: “it is a silence where there cannot be any, because, where it is established,
no sense is a work, no ear.”215 Moreover, insofar as “logos” stands for the theoretical attitude,
Henry again seeks to cast such theory out of the immanence of life and into the world of
representation. Borrowing his language from Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach, Henry writes, “I call
‘praxis’ the knowledge of life. … By contrast, I call ‘theory’ the knowledge that defines this
relation to the world.”216
Taken together, these confluences suggest a remarkable overlap. The invisible, affective,
practical, silent life that Henry champions seems a far cry from the theoretical, representational
visibility of traditional phallocentric philosophy. And yet, Henry falls into precisely the same traps
as his forbearers—or perhaps, forefathers—recapitulating gendered stereotypes of women as
anxious, passive, and exaggerated in their “sexuality.” But for Henry, these three principles are
not unconnected. Rather, Henry develops a clear causal chain that brings one from the particularly
“sexual” or “sensual” character of the female form, through an intensified anxiety, into a quietist
passivity.

213

Henry, Seeing the Invisible, 10.

214

“Totally different from the Greek Logos that denotes at once Reason and the possibility of language that men
speak, which consists in the formation of ideal and as such unreal significations, the Word of Life is the radical and
final, transcendental, phenomenological condition of every possible flesh.” Henry, Incarnation, 256.
215

Henry, Words of Christ, 107. Again, this silence is always a silence from the perspective of the world. Thus,
“Kafka’s ‘Heaven is silent, it is only the echo of silence,’ [has] forgotten only one thing: the nature of the Word
which they accuse of silence and which yet speaks but in a completely different manner from what they think.”
Ibid., 106.
216

Henry, Barbarism, 18.

113

In Incarnation, Henry will note that “the woman’s body is much more marked by sexual
determination. … She is more sensual than the man.”217 This statement is noteworthy in two
distinct regards. First, and most conspicuously, it is completely unclear what evidence,
phenomenological or otherwise, is brought in support of the assertion that the feminine body is
more sexual than the masculine. One wonders, as did de Beauvoir, by what possible standard the
feminine is perceived to be particularly marked by sexuality. “She is called ‘the sex’,” de Beauvoir
notes, “by which is meant that she appears essentially to the male as a sexual being. For him she
is sex—absolute sex.”218 Why is this so? The answer, as we have seen, is that “man superbly
ignores the fact that his anatomy also includes glands, such as the testicles, and that they secrete
hormones.”219 The masculine lacks neither genitalia, erogenous zones, hormones, nor secondary
sexual characteristics, but these are not included in what is “essential” to masculine being. Rather,
as we have seen above, Incarnation’s erotic analytic is built upon the presumption of male
universality; and insofar as the male is the generic, the female is necessarily constituted as the
aberrant. To be male is to lack the mark of sexuality; the male precedes sexual differentiation, the
male precisely is the “before man and woman.” In this sense, Henry broadly recapitulates the
Aristotelian figure of women as a πεπηρωμενον male, that is, “defective” or “mutilated.”220
At first glance, the correlation of Henry’s particularly marked feminine sexuality with
Aristotle’s notion of feminine deficiency may appear exaggerated. But, turning to the second
concern regarding this passage, it is worth noting that within the Henrian paradigm, the designation
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of the female body as particularly sexual or sensual is by no means a merely descriptive claim.
For, it is certainly true that Henry’s radical phenomenology may be read as a simple defense of the
phenomenological and ontological priority of immanence over transcendence. As Henry writes in
Material Phenomenology, “the second givenness, which is the ek-static givenness in the perception
of the now, presupposes the first non-ek-static givenness in affectivity.”221 But, aside from this
phenomenological and ontological claim, Henry also insists upon a normative priority: what he
calls an “essential hierarchy.”222
For Henry, the visibility of the world is not only phenomenologically secondary, but
rather—in a move likely intended to ground the cultural criticism of Barbarism and the political
intervention of From Communism to Capitalism—this visibility manifests as a terrifying violence
and indifference. As he writes:
An appearing of this sort turns away from itself with such violence, it casts itself
outside with such force, … that everything to which it gives appearing can indeed
never be anything but exterior in the terrible sense of that which, put outside,
chased in some way from its true Dwelling, from its Homeland, and deprived of the
goods most proper to it, is henceforth abandoned, without support, and lost. … Like
the light Scripture speaks of and that shines on both the just and the unjust, the
world’s appearing illuminates everything it illuminates without making a
distinction between things or persons, in terrifying neutrality.223
This normative hierarchy is nowhere more conspicuous than in Henry’s account of sexuality. For
Henry, sexuality is constituted as a falling away or corruption of the original, pure erotic affects;
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“this is the case for the erotic relation, when torn from life’s pathos, handed over to the world,
reduced to what of it is shown in the world, across all the objective determinations of a thingly
body; it is at the same time reduced to what in it can still become an object of desire—its
sexuality.”224
This hierarchy falls directly from the binary character of Henry’s phenomenological
dualism—immanence/transcendence, flesh/body, erotic/sexual. To borrow a passage from
Derrida’s Positions, in each of these binaries, “we are not dealing with the peaceful coexistence of
a vis-à-vis, but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms governs the other
(axiologically, logically, etc.), or has the upper hand.”225 For Henry, that which is sexual is lesser;
one “falls” into sexuality when the authentic erotic relation is reduced to its visibility. Therefore,
to directly associate the feminine body with marked sexuality is to implicitly situate the feminine
more fully within the world, therefore transitively positioning the feminine below the masculine
in the same normative hierarchy.
Transitioning from this marked “sexuality” of the female body to an ontological increase
in anxiety, Henry suggests that “because [the woman] is more sensual, she is more anxious. Her
anxiety is more ‘feminine’ even than his.”226 Strangely, Henry seems to understand this movement
from sexuality/sensuality to anxiety as a means of attenuating the negative bias of his prior
assertion. Here he will argue that the increased sexuality of the feminine body “does not mean that
she is more culpable than the man. … Nor does this mean that she is inferior, but, on the contrary,
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here, spiritually superior—if anxiety is the sign of the spirit—the sign of our heterogeneity.”227
But, this assertion appears to contradict the spirit, if not the letter, of Incarnation’s broader erotic
analytic for two reasons. First, while anxiety is certainly an immanent affective tonality, sexuality
is generally understood, as shown above, as a category of the objectified body—either organic or
thingly. Since this hierarchy is not only descriptive, but also normative, sexuality is therefore a fall
from the flesh's transcendental purity. Within this paradigm, it is unthinkable that a centering of
femininity in the sexuality of the body could be understood as a positive characteristic, nor a
spiritual superiority, even if—as productive of anxiety—its repercussions are extended into
immanence. Simply put, within Henry’s account, greater sexuality corresponds to greater nihilism
and an increased forgetting of life. Henry makes this point explicitly clear in an earlier section,
again identifying femininity and anxiety, and designating their ultimate form as nothing other than
weakness: “Anxiety then takes on its feminine form as weakness: even though it comes from the
Self, it crushes it and leaves it powerless, left to drift in the anxiety that drowns it.”228
At a more methodological level, Henry's critique of scientism in Barbarism aims to
establish the impossibility of quantification and calculation within the immanence of life. Indeed,
the modern tendency to reduce human life to statistics produces only “its gradual impoverishment,
which reaches its highest point in mathematical treatment.”229 To speak of a quantitative increase
in anxiety (immanent life) that is somehow directly proportional to an increase in sexuality
(transcendent being) is, in Henry’s paradigm, to make a fatal category error—to fail to appreciate
the ontological difference between immanence and transcendence. And insofar as there is a
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movement between immanence and transcendence, it is always a movement from the former to
the latter: from the reality of affective life to the irreality of the transcendent world. It is precisely
this failure to respect this uni-directionality that, in Henry’s eyes, marks the utter failure of the
modern scientific study of sexuality. “Doesn’t the reader of Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety
know,” Henry asks, “a bit more about sexuality than someone who would have covered all of the
past and future scientific treatises on the subject, with their cumbersome statistics?”230 For Henry,
such statistics can teach us that “seven percent of French people have made love in a stairwell,”231
but can teach us nothing of the erotic life, because quantification necessarily misses the autoaffective character of eros.
In the final move of Henry’s treatment of feminine sexuality, Henry suggests that this
increase in anxiety spawns a quietist passivity. “The feminine character of anxiety,” he argues,
“denotes not the fact that it is a woman’s, but the moment proper to all anxiety, where
overwhelmed by it the Self loses all initiative.”232 Here Henry makes two important shifts. First,
his claim that women are more anxious is inverted. It is not simply that women are more anxious
than men, but rather that anxiety itself—and its correlate passivity—is feminine. This is an
assertion that can be traced back to Henry’s earliest work, where he speaks of a distinctly “feminine
attitude”233—in relation to passivity. Second, it is here that this analysis of feminine tropes reverts
to the conclusions of the first and establishes a circularity—a vicious Ouroboros of gendered
stereotypes. For, by positioning erotic anxiety as a stultifying anxiety, particularly one that
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uniquely strikes the feminine individual, Henry marks femininity itself as passive. Given this
particularly feminine passivity, it is not surprising that Henry’s analysis of the “erotic simulation”
and the caress would ultimately find an objectified woman, who, as passive, functions as object to
the active male subject of the phenomenological gaze. Trapped in her overt sexuality, burdened by
uncontrollable anxiety, the Henrian woman cannot act, but can only be acted upon. One could not
fault the woman, who presented with such a paralysis, responds as Cixous, “I resist: detest a certain
passivity, it promises death for me.”234

C. Profanation: on Non-traditional Sexuality
Despite his numerous writings on the erotic experience, Henry offers little reflection on nontraditional sexualities. This silence is most conspicuous in the case of sexual orientation. Simply
put, at no point in his written work does Henry ever explicitly consider the possibility of a nonheterosexual erotic encounter. Insofar as Henry has bracketed sexual difference from the
immanence of the flesh, from the true seat of subjectivity and reality, this is not particularly
surprising. For, just as the “universal man” emerged from an inadequate consideration of sexual
difference, so too does an inadequate consideration of difference in sexual orientation tend to
produce a “universal heterosexual.” Therefore, given Henry’s transcendental asexuality, it is
unsurprising that his phenomenology of the caress or erotic simulation thought experiment both
presuppose not only a masculine subject, but likewise a cisgendered heterosexual subject.235
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Nevertheless, there are a few oblique references that may refer to non-heterosexual erotic
relations, but these are invariably derogatory and dismissive. Thus, for example, Henry writes of
“depraved” sexualities that are “against nature”236—references that, given their distinct echoes of
the anti-queer rhetoric of his context, may very well refer to queer sexualities.237 These references
follow a uniform structure: non-traditional sexualities are a product of the objectification of
sexuality, the casting of the erotic onto the objective body and its horizon of visibility. Using a
style of argumentation that is methodologically problematic,238 Henry describes this process as a
“denaturing”239 [dénaturation] of life.
The reduction of eroticism to objective sexuality … goes against the nature of life,
and stipulates that it be consummated where its very existence is simply impossible,
we would claim it follows from a decision. But every decision against nature
assumes the form of violence because it implies an active negation that opposes the
consistency and coherence of reality. This must be eliminated and destroyed. This
active and deliberate destruction of reality, in this case life’s own reality, is
nihilism.240
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Insofar as this denaturing exacerbates the conflict between the living individual and their objective
body, marked as it is by sexual difference, this denaturing ushers in the reign of anxiety. As Henry
writes, “in the most depraved societies, when all moral rules and all ‘taboos’ are abolished, and
when various forms of perversion are welcomed with immense favor … anxiety has not so much
disappeared as put itself in charge.”241
This reign of objectivity and anxiety—wherein “life exposes itself, and thus affirms that it
is nothing other, and nothing more, than [sexuality]”242—is given a variety of titles by Henry. It is
the rule of an “indecent sex”243 [ce sexe indécent]. It is a “profanation”244 of life, that is always
also a profanation by life: a “self-profanation.”245 It is “voyeurism”246 and “pornography.”247 These
last two are particularly enlightening, as they mark the essence of Henry’s account of profanation:
“in pornography an attempt to bring the objectivity of the erotic relation to its limit emerges, where
everything is given to be seen—which then requires the vantage points on the behaviors and sexual
attributes to be multiplied.”248
Here, and despite the consistent use of French feminism as a foil for Henry, there emerges
an interesting parallel. For, since the middle of the last century, feminists have consistently
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critiqued the ocular-centric character of masculinity, the recourse to sight as the sense par
excellence.249 In Irigaray this tendency is named “specularity.” It is that “which confuses all
individuality in the extrapolated operation of the specular.”250 But not all speculation and
spectation is equal under the reign of specularity, rather, “it is in [the father’s] gaze that everything
comes into being.”251 The father’s gaze, that is, the masculine gaze, here delimits the bounds of
reality.252 This theory finds a practical outlet in the feminist anti-pornography movement. Here in
thinkers such as Andrea Dworkin,253 one finds close parallels to Henry’s theory of pornography as
specularity and objectification. Thus, as Catharine MacKinnon argues, “pornography creates an
accessible sexual object. … This is not because pornography depicts objectified sex but because it
creates the experience of a sexuality which is itself objectified.”254
Yet, this parallel with Henry should not be taken too far. For, while feminist critiques of
specularity—at least at their best255—open up a space of liberation for oppressed sexual and gender
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classes, Henry’s critique of objectivity primarily serves to discipline and shame non-normative
sexual practices. Thus, Henry rhetorically targets fetishists,256 practitioners of sadism and
masochism (S&M),257 and those engaged in polyamorous or open relationships.258 This fervor
takes on its sharpest form in Henry’s critique of sex workers: for whom objectification is seen to
take on its strongest form, economization.259 Thus, Henry writes, “the same radical project of
objectification occurs in prostitution, which is not first and foremost a social fact, but is also a
metaphysical act, whose ‘publicity,’ however limited it may be, remains the hidden telos (the
prostitute is one who, just like money, concentrates this potential advertising in his being).”260
256
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Moreover, just as Henry laments that all profanation is ultimately the self-profanation of life, he
likewise holds his strongest ire for those who would willingly enter sex-work: “... right up to the
kind of prostitution that one might call artificial to the extent that it is no longer a question of
prostituting oneself for money, but for the pleasure of prostituting oneself—for the anxiety that
every form of self-abasement purveys.”261
This targeting of non-traditional sexual minorities—like Henry’s prior stigmatization of
the feminine—does not merely reflect the personal biases or idiosyncrasies of Henry’s personal
sexual ethic. Rather, they are directly motivated by his account of the flesh, which illegitimately
expels all sexual determinations, and therefore all sexual difference, from the ultimate site of
human subjectivity. Certainly, one can suggest external influences upon Henry’s account of
sexuality—I will do precisely this in chapter 4’s discussion of the so-called “communio” school
of Catholic theology. But, this adoption of theological and moralistic conceptions of sexuality is
not self-grounding; it depends upon a prior phenomenological opening, that is, upon a
phenomenology of the body.
D. Life is not Anonymous
For Henry, as we have seen, the heart of modern technocratic society is the “Galilean reduction,”
wherein all that is living and sensible is stripped from reality. Science, he writes, “believes that it
continues to operate in its own proper domain when it reduces … properties to their material
physical substrate.”262 Parodying this scientistic reduction, Henry quips:
Likewise, if it is a question of human sexuality, one will first define a certain
number of behaviors, and they will be listed in terms of age, sex, class, and type in
order to enumerate the circumstances in which they occurred. One will be able to
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refine the definition of the types, categories, and conditions, to cross check them,
to demonstrate their forms and structure, in short, to arrive at ever more
sophisticated, scientific and objective results.263
Having been reduced to its transcendent character, its objectivity and visibility—its specularity—
sexuality is here stripped of its true living reality. All that remains is the motion of objective
materials, statistics, patterns, and behaviors. Yet, rather than opposing the relegation of sexuality
to its transcendent manifestation, this is precisely the route that Henry's radical phenomenology
has taken in its stripping of sexual determinations and sexual difference from the originary flesh.
Thus, rather than constituting a decisive break with the onto-phenomenological monism of the
Galilean reduction, Henry has admitted its central thesis, that sexuality is essentially reducible to
its visible manifestation. Of course, this failure is partially moderated by the introduction of certain
erotic, affective tonalities such as libido and desire. But even these affections remain secondary,
insofar as within the original givenness of life to itself, there is not sexuality; life is “before being
man and woman.”
This failure seems to contradict the spirit, if not the letter, of Henry’s radical
phenomenology insofar as Henry insists that “life is nothing anonymous or universal”;264 “there is
no ordinary life.”265 By casting the sexual determinations and sexual difference of the individual
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125

out of the flesh, and therefore out of lived immanence, Henry has constructed an account of
sexuality that is detached from its affective source. As Courtel puts it: “however, an idea is time
and again repeated by Michel Henry: the flesh is never an anonymous flesh, the flesh is never the
flesh of someone, it is always that of a living being. [Is the denial of sexual difference therefore a]
contradiction?”266 While Courtel will follow Henry, answering “no, because the living being in
question is a transcendental self,”267 I will take a harder line.
For Henry, lived individuality is only accessible if one brackets: “every consideration
pertaining to a professional, economic, social, intellectual, ethnic, or other condition”; only then
can one disclose “what is unique in each one.”268 But, without an account that recognizes sexual
determinations and sexual difference as essential and irreducible components of lived experience,
Henry’s speculations regarding sexuality themselves become anonymous and universal. As
Merleau-Ponty rightly recognized, “all human 'functions', from sexuality to motility and
intelligence, are rigorously unified in one synthesis, it is impossible to distinguish in the total being
of man a bodily organization to be treated as a contingent fact, and other attributes necessarily
entering into his make-up.”269 Simply put, what Merleau-Ponty here recognizes is the inability to
bracket sexuality from the human individual without fundamentally disrupting one's view of
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person-hood itself, without losing the true ipseity of the individual. In the words of Frédéric Seyler,
“by exclusively focusing on life, radical phenomenology seems to have forgotten existence and its
everyday challenges for phenomenology, philosophy, and ethics.”270 Indeed, having bracketed
sexual determinations and difference, one now finds, in place of the living individual who should
ground a radical phenomenology, a universal heterosexual male. Other lived experiences of
sexuality, and the individuals for whom these experiences are essential, find themselves denigrated
and cast out of the true reality of lived immanence.
Thus I find myself in a similar position to Rivera, who writes of Henry, “I see him as a
kind of rival that is also a model, one whom I both appreciate and despise.”271 That is to say,
despite the present critique, radical phenomenology should not be summarily dismissed as
irreducibly patriarchal; there is much here to be appreciated. Instead, the aim of the following
chapters—particularly chapter 5—will be to work out a solution to the problem of sexual
determinations and sexual difference from within radical phenomenology. But, before turning to
this constructive project, Henry’s project will first be juxtaposed with Jean-Luc Marion’s novel
take on radical phenomenology, which, although it borrows greatly from Henry’s phenomenology
of the flesh, nevertheless develops an importantly distinct—though itself not unproblematic—
account of sexuality and sexual difference.
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CHAPTER 3 - Jean-Luc Marion: The Saturated Flesh
Perhaps in the Parisian context, there can be no ultimate difference between
radical and reactionary thinking.
Thomas J. J. Altizer

§I: A Phenomenology of Pure Givenness
A. Reduction, Givenness, and Receptivity
The term “radical phenomenology” is not spoken univocally. Rather, radical phenomenology
marks a diverse range of approaches to phenomenology—certainly bound together by
methodological overlap, common objects of interest, and similar general orientations—but
nevertheless each offering unique nuances. As Simmons and Benson write, “there is value in
viewing recent French phenomenology as a coherent and distinctive philosophical family. And,
like all families, there are sure to be robust disagreement as well as underlying shared values and
commitments.”1 It will therefore be helpful to begin this chapter by articulating the unique
character of Marion’s phenomenology, as well as the precise ways in which his approach to radical
phenomenology differs from that embodied by Henry.2
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Henry employed a material phenomenology of radical interiority and pure self-affection in
order to challenge the “ontological monism” of Husserl, Heidegger, and the preceding
philosophical tradition. Marion’s radical phenomenology, on the other hand, is invested in a notion
of radical heterogeneity. This account of heterogeneity is centered upon an account of
phenomenological givenness; “Givenness,” Kevin Hart writes, “such is Marion’s maître mot.”3
Drawing upon the Husserlian notion of gegebenheit (translated into the French as donation),
Marion seeks to offer an explicitly anti-constructivist reading of phenomenology. “The
phenomenological method,” he argues in Being Given: “even when it constitutes phenomena, is
limited to letting them manifest themselves. Constituting does not equal constructing or
synthesizing, but rather giving-a-meaning, or more exactly, recognizing the meaning that the
phenomenon itself gives from itself to itself.”4 For Marion, Husserl’s famous call to return to the
“things themselves” [Sache selbst]5 must be understood as a comportment that permits the
givenness of the phenomenon to manifest itself without condition or mediation. The role of the
phenomenologist is to resist the perennial temptation of consciousness: the desire to circumscribe
or control the phenomenon, to grasp or take it.
This comportment of radical receptivity manifests methodologically in Marion’s
idiosyncratic reading of Husserl’s Principle of Principles:
Every primordial dator Intuition [“originally given intuition”] is a source of
authority for knowledge, that whatever presents itself in ‘intuition’ in primordial
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form (as it were in its bodily reality), is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out
to be, though only within the limits in which it then presents itself.6
Counter to the most common interpretation of this principle, Marion does not see the Principle of
Principles to have granted ultimate evidential priority to intuition as such. Rather, Marion identifies
Husserl’s persistent recourse to the language of givenness [donation/gegebenheit] throughout the
rendering of the principle. It is not any intuition whatsoever that functions as an “authority for
knowledge,” but every “originally given intuition” [originär gegebende Anschauung]—an
originally given intuition that should be accepted only in regards to the way in which it “gives itself
out to be” [als was es sich gibt]. Simply put, for Marion, “the phenomenological breakthrough
consists neither in the broadening of intuition, nor in the autonomy of signification, but solely in
the unconditional primacy of the givenness of the phenomenon.”7
Marion first attempted to formulate this radical priority of givenness in his 1989 Reduction
and Givenness. The difficulty staged by this text is one of phenomenological access. Every
phenomenon manifests within a horizon of visibility that mediates the phenomenon, delimiting the
precise conditions by which it might manifest itself. What is needed to bring the principle of
principles into fruition—to draw forward the givenness of the phenomenon in its purity—Marion
argues, is a methodology that would permit one to bypass these mediating conditions. This
methodology, he insists, is the phenomenological reduction: “this is confirmed by a final twist.
The ‘principle of all principles’ comes up before and without the reduction being operative. And
yet, without the reduction, no procedure of knowledge deserves the title of ‘phenomenology’.”8
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This reduction increasingly takes on the status of an unconditional demand, “without it, everything
collapses.”9 As the reduction provides the means by which the phenomenologist can
methodologically set aside or bracket any condition that would seek to mediate or delimit the
givenness of the phenomenon, phenomenological givenness and the reduction therefore become
entangled in a principle of proportionality: “as much reduction, as much givenness.”10
Yet, Marion is content neither with the Husserlian transcendental-phenomenological
reduction nor with the Heideggerian existential reduction. Through neither articulation of the
reduction, Marion argues, can the givenness of the phenomenon be directly accessed: “objectness
(Husserl) and beingness (Heidegger) only offer specific and possible cases, but surely not the most
legitimate ones, of the naming of givenness.”11 Whereas the aim of the reduction is the removal of
every mediator between the phenomenological investigator and the phenomenon, both the
Husserlian and Heideggerian reductions reinstate mediating conditions of phenomenality. These
delimiting horizons, Marion argues, do not truly permit the manifestation of the pure givenness of
the phenomenon as it gives itself to be. Tackling each of these reductions in turn, Marion ultimately
suggests that a new conception of the reduction will be necessary: a “third reduction” to givenness
itself.
For the Husserl of Ideas I, the transcendental-phenomenological reduction provides the
route out of the natural attitude and into the properly phenomenological attitude—unveiling the
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proper objects of phenomenological inquiry. In the mundane horizon of the natural attitude
phenomena manifest within a “world spread out in space endlessly, and in time becoming and
become without end”12—a world that “gives itself to me as something that exists out there.”13
Under the phenomenological reduction, this natural experience “undergoes a modification”14
wherein this “general thesis” (of the spatio-temporal existence of the world) is methodologically
bracketed or set aside in order that the things themselves (“reduced phenomena”) might be brought
to the fore. Yet, for Marion, the reduced phenomenon that is produced by the phenomenological
reduction fails to exhibit its givenness without condition.
The horizon of this Husserlian reduced phenomenon is consciousness or transcendental
subjectivity; which, as Heidegger notes, “is already presupposed [by Husserl] as the matter of
philosophy.”15 The reduced phenomenon is “the phenomenon whose mode of Being is reduced by
the reduction to what the primacy of consciousness imposes upon it.”16 What this consciousness
imposes on the phenomenon is a particular mode of Being or phenomenality; “consciousness …
predetermines, in advance and in conformity with the prevalence of pure presence in it, the mode
of Being of the phenomena: these give themselves as they appear only on condition of appearing
in the mode that consciousness silently imposes on them.”17 This silent condition of phenomenality
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is the requirement of objectivity, “every phenomenon that is not reduced to that [objective]
presence is of itself excluded from phenomenality.”18 The reduced phenomenon, therefore, is the
object of consciousness.
This limitation of givenness to the mode of Being particular to consciousness can be
identified in a typical introduction to a phenomenological analysis in §15 of Ideas II:
If we should touch on the thing itself, then it is required of us, assuming we wanted
to grasp the essence of the thing and determine it conceptually, that we not be
content with vague locutions and traditional philosophical preconceptions but
instead draw from the very source of clear givenness. Thus we have to go back, as
exemplary, to the consciousness in which things are given to us originally and so
perfectly that we can be lacking nothing for grasping the universal essential form
which prescribes the a priori rule for such objects.19
For Marion, this reduction and its correlate reduced phenomena, fail to live into the radicality of
the phenomenological impulse. Givenness has not been accessed in its purity, the “thing itself” has
not been truly reached, because the horizon of the phenomenological reduction (the
phenomenological attitude) still excludes those phenomena whose mode of givenness does not
lend itself to objectification: “it thus excludes from givenness everything that does not let itself be
led back to objectivity, namely the principal differences of ways of Being (of consciousness, of
equipmentality, of the world).”20
For Heidegger, the Husserlian reduction’s inability to approach the “originary givenness”
of the phenomenon requires a radical reconceptualization of the phenomenological reduction and
its correlate conception of the phenomenological self. This reorientation finds its clearest
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formulation in a 1927 lecture course collected as The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, where
Heidegger explicitly marks out the divergence between his own reduction—what Marion calls the
“redoubled reduction”21—and the reduction as understood by Husserl.
For Husserl, phenomenological reduction, which he worked out for the first time
expressly in the Ideas Toward a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological
Philosophy (1913), is the method of leading phenomenological vision from the
natural attitude of the human being whose life is involved in the world of things
and persons back to the transcendental life of consciousness and its noetic-noematic
experiences, in which objects are constituted as correlates of consciousness. For us,
phenomenological reduction means leading phenomenological vision back from
the apprehending of a being, whatever may be the character of that apprehension,
to the understanding of the being of the being (projecting upon the way it is
unconcealed).22
For Heidegger, the role of the reduction was not to grant access to the consciousness of the
phenomenon. More primordially, Heidegger aimed to grant access to the Being [Sein] of beings
[Seiendes], and ultimately to grant access to Being [Sein] itself as a phenomenon. In this way,
Heidegger seeks to radicalize an opening granted by the sixth Logical Investigation’s introduction
of the categorial intuition of “Being.”23 Phenomenology, for Heidegger, is that science which
grants a unique access to Being. Phenomenology is the proper route to a fundamental ontology,
that is, an attempt to grasp the meaning of Being itself.24
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Yet, as is already clear within the opening pages of Being and Time, a fundamental
ontology will only be possible if approached from the perspective of Dasein—that peculiar entity
who “in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it.”25 Dasein is that being which essentially exists
within a “world,” that being to whom the Being of beings primordially discloses itself.26 Whereas
traditional renderings of the Heideggerian substitution of Dasein for Husserlian transcendental
subjectivity tend to highlight its “worldly”—its “being-in-the-world”—as opposed to the
worldlessness of the pure Husserlian consciousness,27 Marion instead privileges the theme of
radical receptivity. Dasein, unlike transcendental consciousness, does not primarily constitute, but
rather is that being who stands “in the truth of Being.”28 This receptivity—in its distinction from
the traditional Western “subject”—is highlighted with increasing clarity throughout Heidegger’s
oeuvre: being particularly evident following his transition from the language of Dasein to the
language of “the clearing” in the early 1930s. Heidegger’s comments in “The Origin of the Work
of Art” are exemplary of this development:
In the midst of beings as a whole an open place occurs. There is a clearing. Thought
of in reference to beings, this clearing is more in being than are beings. This open
center is therefore not surrounded by beings; rather, the clearing center itself
encircles all that is. … Beings can be as beings only if they stand within and stand
out within what is cleared in this clearing. Only this clearing grants and guarantees
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to us humans a passage to those beings that we ourselves are not, and access to the
being that we ourselves are.29
For Heidegger, this receptive approach is more capable of manifesting phenomena in their
originary givenness, because phenomena are not grasped or delimited by transcendental
subjectivity: the truth of beings (phenomena) “is not a feature of correct propositions that are
asserted of an ‘object’ by a human ‘subject’.”30 Heidegger instead turns to a mystico-poetic31
language of radical receptivity. The true philosopher is that one who maintains a comportment of
“letting-be” [Gelassenheit] towards beings: “to let beings be as the beings which they are—means
to engage oneself with the open region and its openness into which every being comes to stand.”32
For Marion, this Heideggerian development of the reduction and the phenomenological
self marks a decisive step forward in phenomenology’s aim to open itself to the manifestation of
the phenomenon as it gives itself to be. But the receptivity of Dasein and the Heideggerian clearing
nevertheless still fail to finish the return to pure givenness.33 Like the Husserlian reduction, the
Heideggerian reduction fails to manifest the givenness of the phenomenon without condition.
While it recognizes the diversity of modes of Being among beings as well as the ontological
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difference between Being and beings, it nevertheless limits itself to that which “is.” The
Heideggerian redoubled reduction “excludes therefore that which does not have to be, in particular
the preliminary conditions of the ‘phenomenon of Being’ (boredom, claim, etc.).” 34 It is the aim
of Marion to develop a still more radical conception of the reduction, a “third reduction” which
might finally grant access to the givenness of the phenomenon without restriction.
Marion first sketches out the basic moves of the third reduction—what he will later
designate the “erotic reduction”35—in the concluding section of Reduction and Givenness. Under
this third reduction, the phenomenon is not only reduced from the general thesis, but reduced from
every horizon of visibility, every condition, every determination. Through this radical reduction,
Marion attempts to grant access to the pure givenness of the phenomenon before it is constituted
as an object (Husserl) or a being (Heidegger). Such a phenomenon is not bound by the strictures
of the constituting subject: that which sculpts, grasps, or controls the phenomenon. As he will later
write, “ I reduce each thing to the given in it. And I know that I am performing this reduction
correctly when I reach in each thing what I cannot myself give to myself.”36 Instead, givenness is
permitted to manifest as it gives itself to be: “phenomenality is not grasped: it is received.”37
What Marion discovers through this third reduction is that the basic structure of givenness,
insofar as it can be called a structure, is that of the gift or the call. The third reduction, he writes,
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is the reduction of “every claim to the pure form of the call.” 38 Within the purity of the call the
phenomenon manifests itself, from itself, in its radical heterogeneity. “Givenness,” he writes,
“goes farther than objectness and Being because it comes from farther away.”39 In light of this
radical heterogenous account of phenomenological givenness, Marion is forced to reconceptualize
the very nature the phenomenological self: “the reduction of each and every thing to the given
implies obviously that the ego, so reduced, is reduced first to the rank of given—first gift, absolute
and without remainder, unconditioned and thoroughly so.”40 Already in Being Given, Marion
names this respondent “the gifted” (l’adonné).
While much of Marion’s early career was devoted to a recovery of Cartesian thought for
the contemporary world,41 he nevertheless suggests that the ego cogito and its philosophical heirs
remain trapped in the logic of subjectivity that would foreclose any access to the phenomenon as
it gives itself. Against the Cartesian cogito and its philosophical descendants—which Marion will
trace through Heideggerian Dasein42—Marion develops the figure of “the gifted” as a figure of
radical receptivity: a “successor to the ‘subject,’ … [that] receives itself entirely from what it
receives.”43 In a series of passages that belie the influence of the Levinasian priority of the
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encounter with the Other,44 as well as Jean-Louis Chrétien’s account of the call and the response,45
Marion contends that the phenomenological subject does not function as the ultimate condition of
possibility for the manifestation of phenomena. In a reversal of this traditional constructivist
account, Marion insists to the contrary that the gifted is born in its response to a counterintentionality: that which “sees me first, because it takes the initiative.”46 In this ultimate act of
receptivity, “the call gives me to myself … the I is only insofar as the call has always already
claimed and therefore given to itself something like a myself/me.”47 To use Marion’s grammatical
language, the self discovered by this radical phenomenology is a self in the dative.48
Against the impulse to control or grasp, the gifted manifests as a “filter or prism,”49 a mere
screen upon which givenness projects itself. “The receiver therefore does not only receive what
gives itself,” Marion suggests, “it allows the given to show itself insofar as it gives itself.”50 This
passivity or receptivity grants activity, construction, and constitution merely penultimate roles in
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the self. The gifted is preceded by a heterogenous givenness that it does not ground; it is always
already a respondent, is always anticipated by an Other that precedes it and calls it into itself.51

B. Radical Phenomenologies
Throughout this reconsideration of phenomenology, Marion consistently marks Henry as a
profound philosophical inspiration. As he writes in the preface to Reduction and Givenness, “I
would like to say to Michel Henry how much his faithful friendship and his example of
philosophical probity have sustained me.”52 Nevertheless, as should be increasingly apparent, the
two phenomenologists are marked by deep differences. Whereas Henry’s emphasis upon autoaffective self-givenness results from an attempt to access the manifestation of life before all
transcendence and exteriority, Marion’s more Levinasian-inflected phenomenology remains
committed to a strong notion of otherness, a hetero-givenness that precedes any self. This obvious
discrepancy appears to suggest an almost oppositional relation between the philosophers. But the
reality requires a more nuanced analysis that can best be engaged through the debate surrounding
Reduction and Givenness and the “fourth principle.”
In “The Four Principles of Phenomenology,” Henry places Marion’s principle—“as much
reduction, as much givenness”—into conversation with three phenomenological principles
outlined by Husserl and Heidegger: “so much appearance, so much being,” “the principle of
principles,” and “to the things themselves!” Although Marion’s principle significantly postdates
these earlier principles, not emerging until 1989, Henry suggests that “its importance hits upon the
entirety of phenomenological development,” where it functions, “as a hidden presupposition that
51
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is always already at work.”53 Each of the first three principles, Henry suggests, contain
indeterminate or ambiguous premises. These ambiguous premises—regarding the relation between
appearance and Being, realism and idealism, and so forth—call into question the very status and
possibility of phenomenology. Marion’s fourth principle on the other hand, through its clear
grounding of phenomenality in givenness, provides a much needed clarification of the
phenomenological project. For Henry, the recognition of this principle—and its correlate “third
reduction” to the absolute givenness of the phenomenon—provides an essential tool in the return
to the radical promise of phenomenology: the access to “objects in their How [Wie].”54
In a key footnote to Being Given, Marion returns the favor, suggesting that his own turn to
phenomenological givenness finds a key predecessor in Henry’s Material Phenomenology. To cite
the passage in full:
I introduced this formulation [as much reduction, as much givenness] in the
conclusion of Réduction et donation. It goes without saying that I would not dare
elevate it to the rank of principle of phenomenology if Michel Henry had not
validated it in his commentary (“Les quatres principes de la phénoménologie,” pp.
3 and 26). In fact, one could also refer to Michel Henry himself if one wanted to
acknowledge the principal role of givenness: “Because [ipseity] belongs, inasmuch
as its self-givenness, to all givenness whatsoever ... , any being can have in this
givenness, and through it alone, as phenomenon, a ‘self’” (Phénoménologie
matérielle [Paris, 1990], p. 74).55
What Marion identifies in Henry is an account of phenomenology that privileges givenness over
intuition. “Without going so far as to speak of ‘murder’,” Marion writes, in reference to Henry’s
critique of intuition, “one can certainly speak of a betrayal of phenomenality by intuition. By
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serving it and displaying its dignity, intuition lowers phenomenality to the status of mere
fulfillment of the intentional aim at an object.”56 Simply put, for both Henry and Marion, intuition
finds its justification in givenness and not vice versa. As Henry writes in Material Phenomenology,
“the second givenness, which is the ek-static givenness in the perception of the now [intuition],
presupposes the first non-ek-static givenness in affectivity, … the second givenness presupposes
its realization elsewhere in the affectivity and impressionality.”57 Nevertheless, this ostensible
commonality is undermined by marked differences in Henry and Marion’s respective accounts of
givenness itself. These differences are already apparent in Henry’s analysis of Reduction and
Givenness.
While Henry commends Marion’s fourth principle as a step beyond Husserl and Heidegger,
it is nevertheless the case, as Marion notes, that ultimately, “none of these four formulations
receive Henry’s endorsement.”58 For Henry, while Marion’s principle makes a decisive step
forward, by relativizing both Dasein and the transcendental Ego, it nevertheless fails to enact the
total return to genuine immanence promised by the phenomenological project. Marion thinks
givenness through the structure of the call and response. By maintaining this structure of the call
and response, Henry argues, Marion’s phenomenology of givenness remains trapped within the
very transcendent horizon of visibility that it seeks to escape. Even if Marion succeeds in
overcoming the specific transcendent conditions of phenomenality in Husserl (consciousness) and
56
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Heidegger (Being), he nevertheless continues to think phenomenality through the most basic
conditioning structure of the transcendent horizon of visibility: the distance or gap that Henry
names the world. “The structure of the call borrows this disposition from an established mode of
appearing, a mode in which opposition is constitutive of phenomenality,” Henry argues, “and this
established mode is precisely that of the world.”59 Rather than escaping the oppositional
manifestation of the horizon of visibility, the call and the response reproduces this dualistic
structure.
For Henry, this third reduction to the givenness of the call is insufficiently reductive—it,
like its predecessors, fails to permit givenness to give itself in its most primordial manifestation.60
What is necessitated, Henry argues, is a radical reduction to the self-affectivity of life. In order to
escape every horizon of visibility that would condition the givenness of the given, Marion must
collapse the call and the response into a single dimension. That which is given must give nothing
but itself, and it must give it to nothing other than itself. Such a givenness can only be found in the
immanence of life’s self-affectivity.
Only a reduction that goes all the way to the end of its capacity of reducing, that
suspends the ek-static dimension of visibility in which every conceivable giving
intuition and evidence itself flow, and that suspends all possible showing, can
discover the original givenness, the givenness that by giving life to itself, gives to
it to be life.61
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Marion’s full response to this critique would not appear for over two decades, with the
2015 publication of “The Reduction and ‘The Fourth Principle’.” Here, Marion identifies the core
of Henry’s argument as a key presupposition: “that ecstasy, or a distance and gap, separates the
call and the response essentially.”62 For Henry, the call and response necessarily reproduces the
gap or distance of ekstasis because it is part of the eidetic structure of the call that it might not be
answered. Insofar as there remains a possibility of rejecting the call, there is no total unity of that
which is given and that which receives. This critique can be clarified through a comparison with
Henry’s account of the inescapable manifestation of life. Life cannot be rejected (without the selfdestruction of suicide) because there is no gap between that which is given and that which receives.
As Henry writes in Barbarism:
Getting rid of oneself or denying oneself, however, is what neither suffering nor
life can do. … As the phenomenological actualization of auto-affection in the
primal Suffering and as a radical and insurmountable passivity of life with respect
to itself, they are absolutely linked to pathos. This link cannot be disconnected. To
try to break this link is in some way to increase its infrangibility: to experience it
more strongly. … Life runs up against an insurmountable failure in its desire to get
rid of oneself.63
For Henry, it is not possible to have a total immanence, if there remains a gap or fissure that would
permit the rejection or affirmation of the given. It is this fundamental presupposition that Marion
challenges.
Marion’s response takes the form of a paradox. On the one hand, the call is “always already
given, but not yet phenomenalized.”64 Within the register of givenness, the call precedes the
response. But, at the same time, the response is “first phenomenalized but always after the fact.”65
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Within the phenomenal register, the response precedes the call. This ostensible paradox can be
dissolved, because givenness is not beholden to the ekstatic temporality of the world: “the relation
between the call and response cannot be conceived according to a simple chronological succession
(physical, worldly), since their relation does not make use of the ecstatic gap of intentionality.” 66
Manifesting outside of the ekstatic horizon of visibility, the result is a simultaneity of call and
response.
Phenomenologically there is no I (above all no transcendental I) who precedes the
call, who anticipates it like an intentional consciousness anticipates its object. The
addressee of the call is born at the same time as the call, is awakened by this call
and bursts forth out of the depths of their own absence. He who is awoken therefore
undeniably hears the call at the very moment of the response (the awakening), to
the point that he reconstitutes the call by the response that he brings to it, even after
it.67
The gifted receives itself from the call of givenness and simultaneously brings this call into the
light of phenomenal visibility. Unbound by the temporality of any intentional horizon, the call and
the response are not reducible to an oppositional duality of ekstatic phenomenality.
The result, for Marion, is not only that he is able to step around Henry’s critique, but more
strongly, that he is able to ground the very possibility of Henry’s material phenomenology. “Not
only,” he writes, “does the fourth principle (and its corollary in the structure of the call and
response) not fall under the weight of Henry’s critique since it does not assume ecstatic
phenomenality, but it might alone allow for the non-ecstatic phenomenality of ‘life’ to be
conceived.”68 Henry’s dualistic phenomenological ontology presupposes a seemingly
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unbridgeable heterogeneity between “the truth according to the world” and the “truth of life.”
Nevertheless, this relation is also conceived as a relationship of grounding, wherein the nonekstatic phenomenality of affectivity is presumed to ground ekstatic phenomenality. But, the
precise means or mechanism by which the division between these heterogenous regions can be
breached remains problematically unclarified.69 With the fourth principle and the conception of
givenness as a call, Marion believes himself to have discovered a means of articulating the selfgivenness of affectivity that does not detach it from the mundane phenomenality of the world.
[The fourth principle] allows us, or at least does not prohibit us from also clarifying
self-affection as an extreme case, but one that coheres with others, with
phenomenality in general, without having to divide phenomenality into two regions
and into two incompatible phenomenologies: understood through the call, the
response, and the gifted, the “embrace” of life could also extend to worldly figures
of phenomenality and take account of them as a number of variations, more and
more distant and doubtless ecstatic, of that which it first establishes, but not
exclusively, as immanent unfurlings of originary givenness.70
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Under Marion’s analysis, self-affectivity constitutes the limit case of phenomenality. But this
phenomenon, like all phenomena whatsoever, remains subordinated to the conditions of givenness
more broadly construed.
This analysis of the relationship between Henry and Marion is key to the foregoing
discussion, because, as we will see, Marion’s account of the flesh is drawn almost directly out of
Henry’s thought. As Christina Gschwandtner notes:
Although Marion does interact with Romano on the saturated phenomenon of the
event, with various painters and their writings in regard to the phenomenon of the
idol, and with Levinas in regard to the phenomenon of the icon, his reliance on
Michel Henry’s phenomenology for the phenomenon of the flesh is much more
extensive. Marion basically adopts Henry’s account of the self-affection of the flesh
and merely illustrates how it can be understood as a saturated phenomenon of
relation.71
Nevertheless, as we will see, whereas for Henry the flesh stands at the very ground of
phenomenality itself, for Marion, the self-givenness of the flesh is simply one example of a limit
phenomenon among others. Marion designates these limit cases: “saturated phenomena.”

§II: Flesh: The Saturation of Relation
A. The Saturated Phenomenon
Although Marion proffers a sharp critique of the primacy of intuition, privileging instead the pure
givenness of the phenomenon, intuition is by no means excised from Marion’s account of
phenomenology. Intuition is, in fact, recognized as a privileged form of givenness: “intuition
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always gives,” Marion insists, “in it and in it alone, it is a matter of giving what shows itself.”72
Due to this privileged status, intuition is granted a central role in what might be regarded as JeanLuc Marion’s most significant contribution to phenomenology: the “saturated phenomenon.”
Under the name saturated phenomenon, Marion does not seek to inaugurate a radical break
within phenomenology, but rather to develop “one of the possibilities that is by right already
inscribed within the commonly accepted definition of the phenomenon.”73 This commonly
accepted definition is that proposed by Edmund Husserl and Immanuel Kant, wherein the
phenomenon is constituted by two autonomous factors: the concept (Kant) or intentionality
(Husserl) on the one hand, and intuition (Kant and Husserl) on the other.74
In the common or mundane phenomenon, the concept/signifier/intention (Marion will
often use these three interchangeably) exceeds the intuitive givenness. “The realm of meaning,”
Husserl writes, is “much wider than that of intuition.”75 My concept of Boston, for example, always
exceeds my various intuitions of Boston in such a manner that even while I continually enrich and
clarify this concept through new intuitions—I discover this new pub, that new alleyway, this new
overlook, etc.—these new intuitions remain subsumed under a single concept or intention
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(“Boston”). The exact proportion of this intuition/intention relationship is not static; rather, it
remains essentially—that is, eidetically—variable; “givenness,” Marion writes, “admits of
degrees.”76 The phenomenon might manifest with the clarity of substantial givenness (fulfillment),
with the unclearness of empty (unfulfilled) intentionality, or it might pass from one extreme to the
other over time. I may find myself moving to a new city (Pittsburgh, for example), where my
intuition remains relatively empty or unfulfilled. But over a number of years, as I explore the city
to a continually greater extent, my concept attains ever increasing levels of intuitive fulfillment—
passing from near-emptiness to substantial intuitive givenness.
For Husserl, mundane phenomena are generally perched between the two extremes of
complete emptiness and total fulfillment (adequate givenness): the “zero-limit is obscurity, [and]
the unity-limit is full clearness.”77 In the case of empty intentionality, the intentional ray finds no
intuitive givenness. Such a case does not even result in the constitution of an object, properly
understood: “the phase of givenness is not reached at all. Consciousness … intuits no longer, in
the strict sense it no longer ‘gives objects’ at all.”78 At the other extreme is the idea of the
adequately given phenomenon. In such an instance, a phenomenon would be given with a full
clarity, “which ‘excludes otherness’.”79 Such an adequate givenness is a relatively infrequent
experience—one which is limited to eidetic phenomena. Such “adequation,” Marion writes, “can
never be realized, or at least only rarely.”80 The majority of phenomena, including all transcendent
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phenomena, are not even in principle open to adequate fulfillment.81 Rather, for such phenomena
adequate givenness is an “idea (in the Kantian sense),”82 an ideal possibility that can only be
approached asymptotically, but never fully achieved. The most direct case of this restriction is the
perceptual act, wherein it is impossible to view an object from every possible perspective
simultaneously, thereby necessarily producing gaps of intuitive lack.83
For Marion, this account of phenomena suggests a possibility that is never explored in
Husserl’s analyses. Whereas, in the empty intention no intuitive fulfillment is granted, and in the
mundane phenomenon partial or adequate intuitive fulfillment is granted, what, Marion asks,
would happen if intuition were to exceed intentionality? Or, in his own words:
To the phenomenon characterized most often by lack or poverty of intuition (a
deception of the intentional aim), indeed, exceptionally, by the mere equality of
intuition and intention, why wouldn’t there correspond the possibility of a
phenomenon where intuition would give more, indeed immeasurably more, than
the intention would ever have aimed at or foreseen.84
It is the aim of his analyses of the saturated phenomenon to perform an eidetic analysis of precisely
this phenomenological possibility.
Although it is absent from Husserl’s analyses, Marion does find a partial antecedent to the
saturated phenomenon in Kant’s notion of the aesthetic idea. “It is Kant himself—the thinker of
the intuitive shortage of the common phenomenon—who had a foretaste of what I call a saturated
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phenomenon.”85 Unlike the idea of pure reason—wherein knowledge is not granted and an object
cannot be truly constituted, because of a total lack of intuitive givenness—the aesthetic idea marks
a representation of intuition itself, a case wherein an object cannot be constituted not because
intuition lacks, but because no concept measures up to the excess of intuition. In Kant’s words:
By an aesthetic idea, however, I mean that representation of the imagination that
occasions much thinking though without it being possible for any determinate
thought, i.e., concept, to be adequate to it, which, consequently, no language fully
attains or can make intelligible.86
The aesthetic idea is presented by Kant as the inverse of the idea of reason: the aesthetic idea “is
the counterpart (pendant) of an idea of reason, which is, conversely, a concept to which no intuition
(representation of the imagination) can be adequate.”87 In this regard, Kant has outlined three
categories of phenomena:88
1.) Object: a phenomenon in which intuition and concept coincide either partially
or fully. This corresponds to phenomenology’s mundane phenomenon and
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adequate phenomenon, respectively.
2.) The idea of reason: a phenomenon in which intuition is completely lacking. This
corresponds to phenomenology’s empty intention.
3.) The aesthetic idea: a phenomenon in which intuition exceeds every possible
concept. This possibility is found nowhere in traditional phenomenology, and it is
this possibility that Marion seeks to develop as the saturated phenomenon.
What Marion draws from the aesthetic idea is the possibility of a saturation not only of intuition,
but ultimately of givenness, “since according to Kant (and, for the most part, Husserl) intuition
always gives.”89 In the aesthetic idea an object cannot be truly rendered, but not due to an absence
of givenness. On the contrary, within the aesthetic idea conceptuality finds itself overwhelmed by
an excess of givenness: “intuition is no longer exposed in the concept; it saturates it and renders it
overexposed—invisible, unreadable not by lack, but indeed by an excess of light.”90
This Kantian precedent is essential for understanding the saturated phenomenon, as it
decisively determines Marion’s subsequent eidetic analysis of saturation. For Marion, saturation’s
excessive givenness not only exceeds or bypasses conceptuality, but overwhelms the very horizon
of conceptuality itself, epitomized by the Kantian categories of the understanding.91 Thus, it is not
only the case that the saturated phenomenon eludes conceptuality, but, more directly, that it
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actively inverts these Kantian categories.92 Marion therefore writes:
I will sketch a description of the saturated phenomenon by following the lead of the
categories of the understanding defined by Kant. The saturated phenomenon
exceeds these categories (as well as principles), since in it intuition passes beyond
the concept. I will therefore follow them by inverting them. The saturated
phenomenon will be described as invisable according to quantity, unbearable
according to quality, absolute according to relation, irregardable according to
modality.93
It is here that the necessity of the third reduction is brought to fruition. Having overwhelmed the
categories of the understanding, the saturated phenomenon manifests outside of any possible
horizon which would delimit or predetermine its phenomenality; saturation is givenness given in
its purity. Such a phenomenon, Marion writes, “is freed because it does not depend on any horizon.
In every case, it does not depend on this condition of possibility par excellence—a horizon,
whatever it may be. I therefore call it an unconditioned phenomenon.”94
Taking each of the four Kantian categories in turn—quantity, quality, relation, and
modality—Marion develops four “types” of saturated phenomena. For the saturation of quantity,
Marion marks the event; for quality, the idol; for relation, the flesh; for modality, the icon.95 To
these four Marion also appends a fifth form wherein all four categories are simultaneously
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saturated, a redoubled saturation or “saturation of saturation”: revelation. An examination of all
five of these types of saturation is certainly beyond the scope or aim of the present investigation.96
Rather, focus will be reserved for the third mode of saturation, the flesh, the saturation of relation.
For, it is through the flesh that Marion will introduce his deepest examinations of the body and its
relation to the erotic and the sexual.

B. The Saturation of Relation
Jean-Luc Marion’s account of body stands directly within the phenomenological tradition that we
have traced from Husserl to Henry. Like his French antecedents, Marion institutes a primary
distinction between the body understood as an objective phenomenon within the visibility of the
world and the lived experience of the body. Drawing upon the language popularized by Didier
Franck and Michel Henry,97 Marion designates the objective manifestation of the body as “body”
(le corps) and the lived or subjective manifestation of the body as the “flesh” (la chair). For
Marion, as for his predecessors, the “objective body” (le corps) is an object of knowledge; it can
be touched, dissected, and most importantly, gazed upon. The flesh (la chair), on the other hand,
is never seen; it is rather the capacity of sensibility as such. Whereas the body is seen and touched,
the flesh sees and touches.98
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Marion writes very little about the objective manifestation of the body. Nevertheless, given
the Henrian pedigree of his analyses, it can be construed that the body is constituted as an object
within the horizon of visibility. It is therefore bound by the conditions of objectivity: the body in
its objectivity remains like “the bodies of the world[, which] are objects of sense (sentient as feelable) but themselves feel nothing (insentient as non-feeling).”99 As a poor or mundane
phenomenon, the body’s intentionality essentially exceeds its intuitive fulfillment. Marion’s
analyses instead primarily focus on the flesh. The flesh, unlike the body, exceeds the horizon of
objectivity; it is a saturated phenomenon.100
Because Marion thinks the flesh through a saturation of the category of relation, it will be
helpful to begin with relation in its standard function. In “The Analytic of Concepts,” Kant
“systematically generate[s]”101 the categories of the understanding through an examination of the
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table of all possible forms of judgment. The twelve judgments determined to be comprehensive
are organized into four titles, each of which includes three moments. The third of these titles,
Relation, includes three varieties of judgment: categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive. What
unites these three categories under the title of “Relation” is their association of two or more
members: “in the first kind of judgment … two concepts are considered to be in relation to each
other, in the second, two judgments, and in the third, several judgments.”102 From these judgments,
Kant derives three categories of relation: Inherence or Subsistence, Causality or Dependence, and
Community. In the first instance one object is subordinated to another, in the second, one object
temporally succeeds another, and in the third—whose connection to its related judgment
(disjunction) Kant himself admits “is not as obvious as in the other cases”103—a number of objects
are related “reciprocally, as in an aggregate.”104 What remains essential for our investigation is
that in each of these instances the phenomenon in question bears a categorical, spatial, or temporal
connection to other phenomena. Experience, Kant insists, is only possible “through a
representation of the necessary connection of the perceptions.”105 Or as Marion paraphrases Kant,
“we can never perceive an object of experience ... without setting it in relation to a different
object.”106 Conversely, as we have already seen in Henry, any such relation simultaneously
assumes a conceptual, spatial, or temporal distance between these related phenomena. This is the
dual role played by the category of relation: connection without identification.
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Marion first determines the saturation of relation in a general sense, naming this component
of saturation the “absolute.” The saturated phenomenon, he writes, “appears absolute according to
relation, which means it evades any analogy of experience.”107 The saturation of relation produces
a phenomenon that is no longer found within any categorical, causal, spatial, or temporal relation
to other phenomena. Thus, the absolute phenomenon is a phenomenon that cannot be synthesized
within the horizon of visibility.
Marion marks out the precise contours of this saturation through a contestation of three
Kantian presuppositions. First, against Kant’s assertion that every phenomenon must obey the
temporal unity of experience, Marion suggests that the saturation of relation requires precisely the
opposite, that the phenomenon manifest as an “unforeseeable phenomenon (in terms of the past),
not exhaustively comprehensible (in terms of the present), not reproducible (in terms of the future),
in short, absolute, unique, coming forward.”108 Second, against Kant’s assertion that this unity be
grounded in an analogy of experience, Marion suggests that the saturated phenomenon “will not
maintain any measure in common with these terms [inherence, causality, commonality]; it would
be free of them as from all other a priori determinations of experience that might claim to impose
itself on the phenomenon.”109 Third, and finally, against Kant’s assertion that “all phenomena are
in time,”110 Marion argues that the saturated phenomenon exceeds the temporal horizon of
manifestation: “it does not depend on this condition of possibility par excellence—a horizon,
whatever it might be.”111 In sum, Marion suggests that the saturation of relation would produce a
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phenomenon which is absolutely unique, set apart from any relation or analogy with other
phenomena, and outside of the conditioning capacity of any horizon (particularly the temporal
horizon) of manifestation.
Having established the characteristic features of the saturation of relation, in what might
be roughly described as an eidetic analysis, Marion turns to the flesh as a paradigmatic case of an
“absolute” phenomenon. This first analysis in Being Given covers a mere page and a half,
nevertheless, this basic sketch already establishes the central themes of the flesh.112 First, the flesh,
as in Henry, is set apart by its radical auto-affection: “the flesh is defined as the identity of what
touches with the medium where this touching takes place (Aristotle), therefore of the felt with what
feels (Husserl), but also of the seen and the seeing or the heard and the hearing—in short of the
affected with the affecting (Henry).”113 This identity of the flesh’s affective capacity with its
receptive capacity (its auto-affection), sets the flesh apart from all other phenomena. In the flesh,
it is a matter of a self-relation that “saturates the horizon to the point that there is no longer any
relation that refers it to another object.”114 Because there is no relationality, there is also no gap or
distance; the flesh produces an absolute immanence devoid of opacity. In the words of Henry, it is
“an internal, immanent relation, namely, the absence of all relation.”115 This immanence is a self-
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presence that radically individualizes the flesh; it is always first and foremost my flesh. The flesh,
Marion writes, “provokes and demands solipsism; for it remains by definition mine,
unsubstitutable—nobody can enjoy or suffer for me (even if they can do so in my place).”116
This account of the flesh is worked through with more detail in the fourth chapter of In
Excess. There Marion more carefully situates his analysis in relation to the Cartesian Ego and the
Husserlian Leib, and marks the unique character of the flesh as its sentience: unlike “the bodies of
the world,” my body is a “body gifted with sense.”117 Insofar as it is gifted with sense, it is no
longer merely one body among other bodies, but precisely a flesh, or rather, my flesh. This
radicality produces a qualitative gap: “the flesh of the other remains absolutely inaccessible to me,
like mine to him or her.”118 The flesh, to borrow the language of Leibniz, is an inaccessible,
invisible, and unbreachable monad. “Absolved” of all relation, it appears destined to manifest in
an absolute solipsism.
Yet, and it is here that Marion constitutes his most significant break with Henry’s account,
the flesh cannot remain purely confined to this solipsism. At the same time that the flesh gives the
self to itself in its auto-affection, the given also gives itself to the flesh as its hetero-affection:
It fixes it in it as an adonné—that which receives itself from this very thing that it
receives, according to the simultaneity characteristic of flesh since Aristotle. If a
subjectivity must surmount the destruction of the metaphysical subject, it can only
come from flesh, where hetero- and auto-affection are mixed.119
Whereas for Henry the flesh was defined by its radical exclusion of all hetero-affection, for Marion
the flesh—as the body gifted with sense—is the site of affectivity as such, whether that affectivity
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finds its origin in the flesh itself or in the givenness of any phenomenon whatsoever. This capacity
for hetero-affection finds its culmination in the only phenomenon which might permit the
manifestation of the flesh of the other: the erotic phenomenon.

C. The Flesh and the Erotic
The relation between the flesh and the erotic relation is an early and permanent theme in Marion’s
corpus. In his early theological treatise, Prolegomena to Charity, Marion attempts to draw a
distinction between the theological account of charity and the “contemporary explosion of
eroticism.”120 While Marion will ultimately insist upon the structural univocity of love, 121 he
nevertheless distinguishes these two as divergent manifestations or modalities of love.
On the one side Marion marks the love or eroticism of the contemporary world. This love
depends upon the reduction of the object of love to that which is objectifiable, to its visibility: “in
the contemporary explosion of eroticism,” he writes, “we love by sight. … we have no trouble
seeing objectifiable bodies, consumed and caught in the sex trade.”122 The object of contemporary
eroticism is the objective body, the body constituted by an intentional gaze that originates from
the lover. As Marion more recently stated in partisan terms, “if you are not a Christian there is no
eroticism, there is pornography instead—it is very clear today.”123
Authentic eroticism, on the other hand, is invisible, is centered upon the heterogeneity of
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the beloved, and emerges from—even as it supersedes—the domain of the flesh. “Without flesh,”
he suggests, “no body can accede to love, for it remains unaffected by another person, or even any
sort of other.”124 That is to say, only by means of the flesh—because the flesh, and not the body,
is sentient—can one be affected by the beloved, and therefore granted access to a “third state of
the body: neither physical body nor the flesh,”125 the eroticized flesh.
Marion’s early phenomenological analyses of the flesh likewise point toward this erotic
component of the flesh. In Being Given, Marion situates the erotic affectivity of the flesh together
with other varieties of auto-affection: “the flesh auto-affects itself in agony, suffering, and grief,
as well as in desire, feeling, or orgasm.”126 In In Excess, Marion supplements this notion of erotic
auto-affection with a brief reflection on the child—the ostensible culmination of the erotic
encounter. “Two ipse,” he suggests, “are never the same flesh, neither do they have the same flesh.
The injunction that ‘they will become one flesh’ would remain a pious vow, unceasingly
contradicted, if it could not be understood from the flesh of the child at birth, effectively
common.”127 Nevertheless, these analyses remain relatively understated. It is only with the 2003
publication of The Erotic Phenomenon, that Marion treats these erotic phenomena with the
requisite care and depth.
In this later work, Marion largely continues the trajectory set by his earlier
phenomenological analyses of the flesh, but with one central caveat. Whereas the
phenomenological descriptions of the flesh in both Being Given and In Excess strongly emphasize
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the impenetrable singularity and subjectivity of the flesh—its “mineness”128—The Erotic
Phenomenon will seek to unveil the structure of a limit phenomenon, authentic eros, within which
the flesh of the beloved might be manifest, where the flesh of the lover and the beloved might
meet.
Marion’s initial intuition that the flesh of the other is essentially inaccessible emerges from
a reading of the fifth of Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations. There Husserl argues that the encounter
with the alter-ego begins with the body (Körper) of the other. The recognition that this other is
animated—is a living being like myself, with a full interiority—is the secondary product of an
associative appresentation. “The body over there, which is nevertheless apprehended as an animate
organism” Husserl writes, “must have derived this sense by an apperceptive transfer from my
animate organism.”129 When I encounter another, the flesh (Leib) of this other is not originally
given within my sphere of ownness; this flesh remains inaccessible, invisible to my intentional
gaze. Instead, I infer the interiority of the other through an analogy with myself.130 In the words of
Marion, “the other’s flesh in effect remains merely inferred from his [sic] visible behaviors, by
analogy with my flesh and my behaviors.”131
While this Husserlian account of intersubjective experience seems to foreclose access to
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the flesh (la chair or Leib) of the beloved, Marion already hints in Prolegomena to Charity that “a
thinking of charity can advance further”132 than this Husserlian analysis. But to do so, this thinking
must think outside of the horizon of visibility from which the flesh of the other is always hidden.
Marion orients the analyses of The Erotic Phenomenon with an existential question: “Does
anyone out there love me?” For Marion, the attempt to access the other’s flesh in an erotic
encounter is first and foremost an attempt to guarantee love. But what the lover engaged in this
erotic consummation discovers is instead a series of failures. Even if the flesh of the other can be
shared in the erotic embrace, this love is always marked by an impermanence: “the erotic
conversation, which consists of never concluding, is going to have to conclude ineluctably (which
signifies not success, but running aground). One can name this contradiction the orgasm.”133 This
structural failure repeats in every modality of love. Love of self, love of the other, and love of the
child—in each instance Marion finds an insufficiency and instability in love. Love of self becomes
self-hatred, love of the other becomes jealousy, and love of the child faces the inevitable departure
or independence of the child. What is instead required to guarantee love is the inversion of the
love: the lover must take the form of a respondent to the beloved:
The other loves me more as lover than I love myself, or rather (for I in fact never
love myself), that the other loves me more than I hate myself. In the end, I love
even myself, because the other lover, through her own advance, has made me a
lover, and thus lovable in her eyes and, because I believed her, lovable in my own
eyes. … This final swing of the center of gravity can be expressed thus: “You loved
me first.”134
In an echo of Augustine’s Confessions, this inverted love or counter-intentionality of the beloved
finds its ultimate manifestation in the love of God: the true first lover who “loves infinitely better
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than do we,” and who always already loved us “from the very beginning.”135
Overall, this account of the erotic encounter deserves praise in a number of regards,
including first and foremost, its sensitivity to the close relation between love and hate, its nuanced
treatment of jealousy, and its choice to treat sexual consummation directly and unambiguously.
Nonetheless, it is also within The Erotic Phenomenon and subsequent texts (e.g. Negative
Certainties) that the contours of Marion’s reactionary and “exaggeratedly rigorous”136 sexual ethic
and recourse to an explicit heteronormativity manifest most conspicuously. For the present
investigation, we will treat three paradigmatic cases: beginning with the sexual act (perversion),
passing through birth (the advent of the third), and into fatherhood (filiation).

§III: The Limits of Heteronormativity137
A: “Unnatural” Perversions
The very possibility of the erotic encounter begins with an essential gap or distance between
oneself and another.138 This gap results in an incapacity, at least at this point in Marion’s analysis,
of the lover to access the person of the beloved through eroticization. Fearing the suspension of
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the erotic reduction and the return of the body, the lover seeks to gain access to the beloved’s flesh
by their own power. Ultimately, Marion will offer an account of a healthy surmounting of this gap
through a reintroduction of the Levinasian “face of the Other.”139 But, before doing so, Marion
offers two transgressions which attempt to illicitly bridge this gap: abduction and perversion.
The first transgression manifests with levels of increasing, violent intensity: appearing first
as coercion, second as rape—though Marion is, to his credit, sensitive enough to note that the first,
coercion, is itself thoroughly violent140—and finally, in murder, wherein one accedes to the twisted
logic “I loved her too much, I killed her.” Unfortunately, Marion’s account of the second
transgression lacks the nuance and sensitivity of the first. In this second case, Marion once again
posits a sequence of increasing intensity—beginning with roleplaying and Sadomasochism,141
Marion continues to homosexuality, and ultimately bestiality. As he writes:
I will constrain the flesh of the other as well as my own flesh at any price, through
every trick and every convention: make-up, disguise, masks, play-acting. … it is
necessary that I push bodies, and thus their naturalness, to their limits, or even
beyond these limits. … Thus I will transgress the borderline of excitations, passing
from pain to pleasure; I will transgress the borderline between the sexes; I could
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almost end up—why not?—transgressing the borderline between species.142
Here, Marion primarily employs a rhetorical strategy of association. Whereas Marion
avoids a rigorous or direct attack upon queer sexuality, he nevertheless employs a faulty implicit
argument. On the one hand, at a primary level, one finds a classic slippery slope argument against
queer sexuality as the inevitable precursor to bestiality. Such arguments are not uncommon, having
often linked homosexuality to pedophilia, incest, adultery, or, as in this case, bestiality.143 One
might recall, for example, US Senator Rick Santorum’s assertion that “if the Supreme Court says
that you have the right to consensual [gay] sex within your home, then you have the right to
bigamy, you have the right to polygamy, you have the right to incest, you have the right to adultery.
You have the right to anything.”144 A similar argument can be found in Justice Scalia’s infamous
dissent in Lawrence v. Texas’ sodomy ruling, wherein he argued that:
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution,
masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable
only in light of Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single one
of these laws is called into question by today’s decision; the Court makes no effort
to cabin the scope of its decision to exclude them from its holding.145
Courtney Cahill describes this unique category of anti-queer slippery slope arguments as a “politics
of disgust,” designed to provoke a visceral reaction. Yet, as Cahill’s argument goes on to show,
such rhetoric also harbors a distinct ethico-legal strategy. In her analysis of the role of incest within
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such slippery slope arguments, she writes:
This analysis of incest as boundary violation has demonstrated the extent to which
nature, or the notion of what is ‘natural,’ continues to shape the ideal conception
of kinship in the context of family law. That is, same-sex relations and cloning are
often grouped together with incest in slippery slope arguments because all three
represent a perversion of what is considered to be a natural form of the family and
a natural form of sexual reproduction.146
It is only by way of a foundation within “nature,” or a concept of the “natural,” that the slippery
slope argument can find its ultimate grounding. Though its affective goal is disgust, this affect can
only be rationally justified through a recourse to clear metaphysical presuppositions.
The applicability of Cahill’s analysis of the “politics of disgust” to Marion’s account of
homosexuality is clear. The language of “transgression” saturating the passage suggest an
inevitable question: “transgression of what?” The answer that Marion offers is manifold: the
transgression of the division between pain and pleasure, between male and female, between human
and animal. Yet, each of these distinct “borderlines” is reducible to a single source that Marion
will mark with full clarity; these are the borders established by nature. It is the “naturalness” of
the body, as Marion writes, that is here being transgressed.147
Yet, even if one were to ignore the historical and cultural specificity regarding what
qualifies as natural,148 then one still encounters a deeper methodological problem: how can the
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notion of the natural be employed following the phenomenological reduction? It is precisely the
center of the phenomenological method to begin analysis with a “reduced phenomenon,” an
experience stripped of all metaphysical positings—not only the general thesis of existence, but
also any conception of the natural derived from scientific or metaphysical discourse. Without
denying their legitimacy within their own domains, Husserl unambiguously insists upon the
evacuation of any postulate of the natural world from phenomenological analyses:
I do not then deny this ‘world,’ as though I were a sophist, I do not doubt that it is
there as though I were a sceptic; but I use the ‘phenomenological’ εποχη, which
completely bars me from using any judgment that concerns spatio-temporal
existence. Thus all sciences which relate to this natural world, though they stand
never so firm to me, though they fill me with wondering admiration, though I am
far from any thought of objecting to them in the least degree, I disconnect them all,
I make absolutely no use of their standards, I do not appropriate a single one of the
propositions that enter into their systems, even though their evidential value is
perfect, I take none of them, no one of them serves me for a foundation.149
Such metaphysical accoutrements are the domain of the “natural attitude,” which, while they may
be perfectly justifiable within their own domain, fail to offer phenomenological evidence. While
many phenomenologists reject the priority of the reduction, Marion, as we have seen, is a thinker
of the reduction par excellence. He not only defends the centrality of the phenomenological
reduction, but also proposes his “third reduction” to pure givenness (here designated as the “erotic
reduction”150) as a more rigorous variant of the reduction. Quite against any supposition that the
erotic reduction could let in a conception of “naturalness” which had been bracketed by the
phenomenological reduction, Marion’s third reduction remains markedly more stringent. Thus,
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from a purely methodological perspective, Marion’s ethico-phenomenological judgment against
non-heterosexual erotic relation appears deeply problematic.
At a deeper level, the implicit argument from association becomes markedly more
disturbing. Holding this section together in its totality, queer sexualities are here directly correlated
not only to bestiality, but ultimately, to rape. Both abduction and perversion, it should be
recognized, are bound to one another, for Marion, by their mutual dependence upon a reduction of
the human person to a depersonalized manifestation. Simply put, for Marion, both abduction and
perversion are attempts to directly access the flesh—to “capture” it—by controlling and
manipulating the body. While this description may account for coercion and rape, a justification
for its use as a description of queer sexuality is completely absent from Marion’s account.
On the contrary, Marion’s analysis lacks anything that could be understood as a proper
phenomenological analysis of queer sexuality.151 Without such an account, Marion’s correlation
of queer eroticism and violence appears to lack the requisite phenomenological evidence. Quite to
the contrary, countless first-person accounts of queer eroticism—both phenomenological and nonphenomenological152—stand as evidence that not only is authentic eroticism possible in queer
relations, but that it might there find a great depth and intensity. Julia Horncastle’s “Queer
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orientation: Selfhood and poetics,” for example, offers numerous phenomenological analyses of
queer erotic encounters. Analyzing the penetrative act, for example, she finds not violence, but an
erotic communion of flesh:
In sex, there can occur a corporeal threshold moment when one comes to be ‘inside
someone’—with a fist, a tongue, a strap-on, with energetic focus, eye contact, any
body part or surface, a prosthesis or object as extension of the self, even through
utterances, or the draughts of breath onto skin, or into hearing. In this moment one
cannot tell exactly which body parts are one’s own or another’s. Penetration
becomes interpenetration, sensed as touching someone, whereupon one ‘feels’ and
one is ‘felt’ (touched by the surface one is touching)—one ‘loses sight’ of which
sense is which. In this threshold state one penetrates and cannot be anything other
than also and simultaneously penetrated; possibly doubly-so if the other person/s
also intentionally penetrate/s.153
Within this properly phenomenological analysis of queer sexuality, there emerges a moment of
erotic penetration within which one can no longer distinguish one’s flesh from that of the
beloved—“in this moment one cannot tell exactly which body parts are one’s own or another’s.”
Is this not precisely the erotic communion—wherein one is granted access to the flesh of the
other—that Marion’s erotic reduction has sought?
Even outside of “phenomenology proper,” narrative, depth-descriptive, and poetic
accounts of queer sexuality open up vital venues for thinking queer eroticism. Monique Wittig’s
The Lesbian Body, for example, stands out as a paradigmatic celebration of queer eros, “an erotic
female song of songs.”154 Its deeply sensual, embodied prose testifies to an authentic eros that
cannot be merely set aside on account of a pre-phenomenological prejudice. Wittig speaks from
the site of a rapturous love:
I have a deathly chill, I moan, I fall into an abyss, m/y head is awhirl, m/y heart is
in m/y mouth, it feels as if m/y blood is all congealed in m/y arteries. You say
153
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nevertheless that you receive an enormous quantity of it in your hands. You speak
of the colour of m/y organs. I cannot see them. I hear your voice hissing in m/y
ears, I concentrate on listening to you. I see m/yself stretched out, all m/y entrails
are unwound. I open m/y mouth to sing a cantata to the goddess m/y mother. M/y
heart fails in this effort. I open m/y mouth, I admit your lips your tongue your palate,
I prepare to die by your side adored monster while you cry incessantly about m/y
ears.155
While such an account may lack the full methodological rigor of a properly phenomenological
analysis, its insights may nevertheless serve the phenomenologist; for, as Gayle Salamon notes,
“queer folks are natural (and I use that word advisedly) phenomenologists, since careful reading
of our surroundings, of the physical and social circumstances through which we move, is often a
matter of survival.”156
Lacking such phenomenological or descriptive accounts, Marion instead here relies
entirely upon a series of plays on language: equivocations upon “force,” “constrain,” “capture,”
“transgression,” are the materials out of which an analogy between rape and queer sexuality is
implicitly constructed. Marion speaks, for example, as though the act of “capturing” the body of
the other in abduction is ethically equivalent to “capturing” the other in the gaze, 157 or as though
the transgression of the other’s body (e.g. rape) may be straightforwardly marked as equivalent to
“transgressing” gender norms. However, such correlations remain wholly unsubstantiated.
It is within the literature of queer studies and lived queer sexuality that the most direct
challenge to Marion’s paradigm can be formulated. For, it is phenomena such as those presented
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above—personal accounts of an undeniable eros—that strike at the very foundation of Marion’s
heteronormative presuppositions. The phenomenologist is here faced with a choice, either one
must presuppose (prior to an eidetic analysis) the content of love as necessarily heterosexual, and
therefore preemptively restrict any queer phenomenological accounts of eros, or the eidetic
analysis of the necessary structure of love, as presented by Marion, must be placed into question.
Thus, in summary, while Marion’s arguments might hold weight in a metaphysical debate,
they completely lack standing as phenomenological evidence. In the first case, there is direct
recourse to a posited notion of “natural,” a presumption that appears incapable of surviving within
Marion’s own stated methodology. In the second case, his argument appears to stand on little more
than baseless rhetorical flourish, ultimately devoid of philosophical or phenomenological
substance. What is lacking is a phenomenological account of queer sexualities that would justify
their correlation to bestiality and rape. Lacking such a justification, this association becomes more
revelatory of Marion’s pre-phenomenological sexual ethic than the diverse phenomena of queer
sexuality.

B: The Necessity (of the Possibility) of the Child
The second case of heteronormative discourse follows directly from the first. Having extinguished
the possibility of non-heteronormative sexual intercourse from the domain of authentic eros,
Marion subsequently presumes procreative sexuality as the only legitimate consequence of
sexuality. Thus, the denigration of queer sexuality leads inexorably to the “advent of the third
party.” In Marion’s description, the great tragedy of the erotic is its suspension; one cannot make
love forever, eventually climax comes and one is thrust outside of the relation. The secret desire
of every lover, Marion suggests, is to discover a means of loving forever. Here enters the child.
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The child manifests as a culmination of the erotic relation, a concretization or reification of the
very oath of love itself.158 “The passage to the child,” Marion suggests, “has the function of
producing a more stable visibility of the erotic phenomenon … and thus of assuring the visibility
of the lovers, as it is present and to come.”159
On its own, these passages on the child have a certain beauty and intimacy, clearly
reflective of Marion’s own experience of fatherhood. This is not surprising, as Marion already
admits in the opening chapter that he will intentionally undertake his analysis from a deeply
subjective perspective. “I will say I,” he states, “and I will not be able to hide myself behind the I
of philosophers, that I who is supposed to be universal, … I will say I starting from and in view of
the erotic phenomenon within me and for me—my own.”160
From a certain perspective then, Marion remains true to the particularity of his own
experience, and his work maintains a pseudo-phenomenological character in this limited regard.
However, the failure of Marion’s analysis manifests precisely at the point where Marion attempts
to determine the “essential” character of love as such, without offering a sufficiently thorough
bracketing of his own pre-phenomenological baggage.161 Simply put, the problem arises when
158
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Marion attempts to make the child a necessary piece of the erotic structure. The claim that the
child is a necessary, rather than a merely possible outcome of love, is explicitly presented by
Marion; who writes that it is “in no way optional,” is “unconditional,” is a “phenomenological
requirement,” and is an “unavoidable stage.”162 What precisely is meant in the claim that the child
is necessary is here marked without ambiguity. The erotic reduction as such—that is to say, the
very possibility of authentic love—is broken when one blocks access to the child: “we understand
the child as an unconditional demand of the erotic reduction, which in no case the lover can even
claim to avoid, except by suspending this reduction…”163
For the queer erotic relationship where biological reproduction is not possible—most
clearly the homosexual relation, but also certain heterosexual relations which include trans or
queer members or any other number of non-normative erotic relations—authentic love is not
possible, the reduction must be suspended.164 Even the mere use of birth control, on this account,
disrupts the erotic relation, rendering its love incomplete or partial. Marion does not wish to punish
the infertile, the elderly, or similar cases and therefore insists that “it is not first and foremost a
matter of the actual child,” but rather that “the passage to the child … must first, be understood as
the possibility of the child more than its actuality.”165 For Marion, the true loving relationship finds
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It is a—perhaps unconscious—recognition of this reality, Marion suggests, that accounts for homosexual
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itself determinatively limited to the heterosexual union of cis-gender couples, open to the
possibility of childbirth. All else suspends and disrupts this erotic reduction; all else is an
inauthentic love.
Marion appears to anticipate critiques of this account, and therefore preemptively insists
that his analyses are not ideological, but rather fall from the phenomenon under investigation
(eros): “this passage” to the child, he writes, “has nothing arbitrary or ideological about it.”166
Marion employs two arguments to defend the ideological (and phenomenological) neutrality of
these analyses. His first argument in this regard is quite plainly circular. Here he argues that these
analyses are not ideological because they emerge from a phenomenological demand: “the passage
to the child does not result from a biological or social law, but from a phenomenological
requirement.”167 That is to say, he argues tautologically that it is properly phenomenological
because it is phenomenological.
His second argument offers little additional support. Here he contends that this assertion is
not ideological because it concerns the possibility (of the child) and not the actuality. 168 This
distinction between possibility and actuality—and more specifically, the claim that the former is
the proper domain of phenomenology, while the latter the proper domain of theology or
metaphysics—is already attested in “Metaphysics and Phenomenology.” There, glossing
Heidegger’s insistence that “higher than actuality stands possibility,”169 he argues that, “between
166
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phenomenology and theology, the border passes between revelation as possibility and revelation
as historicity.”170 Simply put, for Marion, phenomenology concerns the possibility of phenomena,
while theology argues for the reality of certain phenomena (God, the resurrection, grace, etc.).
According to Marion’s second argument, therefore, since the requirement of “the possibility of the
child” does not require the actuality of the child, it passes phenomenological muster.
Here Marion once again relies upon a slippery equivocation. Unlike the authentic
conditions of the “possibility of phenomena” revealed by the phenomenological method,
“possibility,” in Marion’s account of the child, masks a deeper actuality or necessity. That is to
say, what renders Marion’s requirement phenomenologically untenable is that it does not concern
the mere “possibility of the child,” but the necessity of a subjective openness to the possibility of
the child; “the passage to the child,” as we saw above, “responds to a requirement.”171
Counter to Marion’s claim, this requirement is not a phenomenological requirement, but
an ontic ethical requirement, perfectly traceable to Catholic doctrine. In fact, Marion’s conception
of a “necessary possibility” remains directly correlated to magisterial teaching. There as well, it is
not the child that is dogmatically mandated, but an openness to the possibility of childbearing. As
Humanae Vitae argues, “the Church… teaches that each and every marriage act (quilibet
matrimonii usus) must remain through itself open to the transmission of life.”172 Thus, for example,
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the supposed moral failure of contraception comes not from the lack of an actual child, but from
the technological suspension of the natural human reproductive system’s necessary direction
toward procreation: “they obstruct the natural development of the generative process.”173 This is
precisely the argument that one finds in Marion’s text, where he condemns the “bio-technical
manipulations or socio-medical traffickings which would reduce [the child] to the rank of a
manufactured object.”174 Thus, rather than pointing beyond an ideological investment at the center
of Marion’s phenomenology of love, his argument for the “necessity of a possibility,” rather than
an actuality, remains true to the ideological investments that ground Marion’s analyses of
sexuality.
Apart from these particularly magisterial-ideological commitments—that will be examined
with more depth in the following chapter—Marion here also enacts a more general Western
ideology that Lee Edelman names “reproductive futurism.” In his 2004 No Future: Queer Theory
and the Death Drive, Edelman brings to light the confluence of a certain “image of the Child” and
anti-queer polemics. “The Child,” Edelman insists, is “not to be confused with the lived experience
of any historical children.”175 Indeed, “the Child” is an imaginary figure, invested with the very
possibility of a future or futurity; a figure who therefore functions as the precondition for any
politics or collectivity. The child represents the boundaries of debate, the site wherein all political
opinions converge: “Children,” as Max Horkheimer suggests, “symbolized the Golden Age as well
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as the promising future.”176
Resistance to the necessity of reproduction is therefore rendered as a rejection of sociality
in favor of hedonistic jouissance: “if, however, there is no baby … then the blame must fall on the
fatal lure of sterile, narcissistic enjoyments understood as inherently destructive of meaning and
therefore as responsible for the undoing of social organization, collective reality, and, inevitably,
life itself.”177 Non-procreative eroticism is figured as a dereliction of social duty: “the homosexual
can only be a degenerate, for he does not generate.”178
For this reason, the figure of the Child likewise generates the necessary, imaginary counterfigure of “the queer” as its constitutive exception, the abject figure to be cast out of society and
social discourse. In the words of Edelman, “the sacralization of the Child thus necessitates the
sacrifice of the queer.”179 The queer is that figure which stands outside of acceptable politics,
because it denies the necessity of reproduction and its logic of futurity.180 Because queer sexuality
resists the call for reproduction as the necessary end or telos of eroticism, the queer is figured as
anti-child and anti-future: “queerness names the side of those not ‘fighting for the children.’”181
This connection between the child and futurity could not be more explicit in Marion’s
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writing. His very terminology—the advent of the third [l’avènement du tiers]—marks his
indebtedness to the ideology of reproductive futurism. The advent—l’avènement—from the Latin
advenire “to come,” from which the French also get l’avenir, “the future.” The third—le tiers—
Marion makes explicit is the child—“… Le tiers ou l’enfant.” Taken together, the advent of the
third, of the child, is for Marion nothing other than the guarantee of love’s futurity, the passage to
the child “has the function of producing a more stable visibility of the erotic phenomenon … as it
is present and to come.”182
What Edelman reveals is that this connection between the figure (or advent) of the child
and futurity—reproductive futurism—is not merely contingently connected to Marion’s denial and
denigration of queer eroticism. Indeed, this figuring of the child as a necessary component of the
erotic structure preserves “the absolute privilege of heteronormativity by rendering unthinkable,
by casting outside the political domain, the possibility of a queer resistance to this organizing
principle of communal relations.”183 The child becomes necessary not on account of the
phenomenological evidence, but because non-procreative eroticism is, for Marion and
reproductive futurism, truly unthinkable. This unthinkability reveals a certain falsity within
Marion’s ostensible concern for the prioritization of sexual difference: as Stephen E. Lewis writes,
for example, “sexual difference is to be taken seriously in [The Erotic Phenomenon].”184 This is
not to cast even the slightest aspersions on Lewis’ translation, but rather to note the way in which
Marion’s insistence upon sexual difference and heterosexual reproduction serves to mask a deeper
logic which expels difference in service of a reproduction of the same. “The Child,” Edelman
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writes, “marks the fetishistic fixation of heteronormativity: an erotically charged investment in the
rigid sameness of identity that is central to the compulsory narrative of reproductive futurism,”185
a futurism that “generates generational succession, temporality, and narrative sequence, not toward
the end of enabling change, but, instead, of perpetuating sameness, of turning back time to assure
repetition … in the service of representation and, by extension, of desire.”186 Quite against his
ostensible insistence upon difference, Marion here reveals that his conception of the erotic is bound
by a commitment to a reproduction of the same, precisely insofar as non-normative sexualities are
cast out of the realm of thinkable discourse, and therefore out of the eidetic structure of eros.

C. Paternity and the Name of the Father
The third case of heteronormative, and in this instance explicitly patriarchal, discourse follows
logically from the second. Having instituted an openness to the possibility of the child as a
necessary component of authentic eros, Marion turns to the question of filiation, particularly the
relationship between the father and the (implicitly male)187 child. The centrality of this
phenomenological description is attested by its repetition and extension over a decade and a half—
appearing first in Being Given and later in an extended form in the essay “The Reason of the
Gift,”188 itself subsequently revised into the third chapter of Negative Certainties.189
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Throughout these texts, Marion draws forward the phenomenon of fatherhood (paternité)
as a paradigmatic example of a gift that avoids absorption into the economic logic of exchange. In
an analysis that reveals an indebtedness to Jacques Derrida’s Given Time,190 Marion argues that
there are three standard ways—corresponding to the giver, the givee, and the gift given—in which
the gift is “abolished in favor of its contrary: exchange.”191 First, the giver, even if they do not
receive material equivalence, nevertheless may find symbolic gratification—esteem, contentment,
moral superiority, etc.—from the act of giving; “the giver never loses anything in the gift, but in
exchange, she always finds herself there, making a good deal.”192 Second, the givee “receives not
only a good, but especially a debt.”193 This debt or poison (German: Gift),194 “whether real or
fictive,”195 erases the gift, and through the assumption of debt, reintegrates the gift into the logic
of exchange. Finally, the given gift itself obscures the act of giving and invariably transmutes into
a simple commodity: “no longer to appear except as a pure and bare piece of merchandise.”196 In
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each instance, the gift loses its unique phenomenological character, becoming a mere object of
exchange. Thus, it initially appears that the gift must either remain a pure possibility or, insofar as
it is actualized, lose its status as a gift.
Yet, even given these difficulties, Marion seeks to defend the possibility of the gift, offering
a solution to these Derridean critiques. Through the bracketing of one or more of the components
of the gift—giver, givee, gift given—he argues, the gift can be maintained in its excessive
phenomenality; “there is a gift only if one of these terms of exchange is missing.”197 One can
bracket the givee, giving to a recipient incapable of receiving the gift as gift—whether because
they are an enemy or an ingrate.198 One can bracket the giver, paradigmatically in the example of
inheritance, where the gift is only given in the event that the giver is no more.199 Or one can bracket
the gift itself; one can give that which is properly speaking nothing, no-“thing”—one’s time,
attention, etc.200
It is within this context that Marion privileges the phenomenon of fatherhood. Fatherhood
is a paradigmatic gift precisely because all three components of the gift find themselves bracketed.
First, at the moment in which life is granted, the givee (child/son) does not yet exist. Second, that
which is given—life—is precisely nothing, no-thing within the ekstatic horizon of visibility. Third,
the giver (father), as we will see below, is fundamentally defined by his absence. Given this triple
bracketing, the event by which fatherhood emerges—marked by the giving of the name of the
father to the child—is drawn out as an example of the gift given in its purity.
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The numerous difficulties that plague this analysis have already been investigated by Colby
Dickinson in “The Problem of Having Both a Body and a Name in the Work of Jean-Luc Marion:
Names, Fathers, and the Hopeful Possibilities of a Queer Phenomenology,”201 and the present
investigation closely follows his lead. For Dickinson, the very delimitation of the phenomenon
already renders the analysis suspect. Certainly, fatherhood is a worthy phenomenon for
phenomenological investigation, as are all manifest phenomena. As Raymond Aron famously
exclaimed to a young Jean-Paul Sartre, “you see, my dear fellow, if you were a phenomenologist,
you could talk about this cocktail glass and make philosophy out of it.”202 Nevertheless, as
Dickinson notes, Marion’s choice to treat fatherhood in opposition to motherhood, and without
reference to other family configurations, predisposes his investigation to the repetition of
questionable tropes under the guise of eidetic necessity. In Dickinson’s words, Marion’s is an
analysis that forgets “the fact that not all fathers have a ‘wife,’ that not all children take the father’s
name or that not every birth has a discernible father figure (as in the case of lesbian households,
for example).”203 Unfortunately, Marion’s analyses ultimately bear out this apprehension.
The description of the phenomenon of fatherhood begun in Being Given is centered neither
on the biological relation of father and child—as one might expect from a naturalistic account—
nor the relationship/interactions between the father and child—as one might expect from a
phenomenological account. Rather, Marion “focuses solely on the name given to the child as that
which bestows fatherhood.”204 For Marion, “the child (and the context surrounding his birth) exerts
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over him a call to recognition in paternity.”205 Yet, this call is not the call for care, nurturing,
support, or relationship. On Marion’s account, that which calls the father into his fatherhood, is
the call for a name; “the child silently calls the father to call him with his name—with the name of
the father, with the name that he does not have.”206 Why does the prospective father experience
the child as a call to grant his own name? The father gives his own name (“son propre nom”)
because “the father knows, through intimate experience, that this child is born from his own (ses)
deeds, from his own (sienne) wife, in his (sa) house, in front of him, etc.”207 The child carries his
name because it is the proper name, for the child too is “his own” (propre), he belongs to him—is
properly his child, is his property.
Already, the absence of the mother makes itself felt. For, although Marion admits that
“these excellent reasons nevertheless suffer from a well-known weakness,”208 this weakness is not
the erasure of the mother, but instead is the fact that, due to “the temporal delay of birth’s initial
belatedness to conception, biological paternity remains without immediate and direct proof, always
doubtful.”209 As Dickinson notes, “what results from this seems to be nothing short of a certain
paternal anxiety about whether or not the father can claim the child before him as his own.”210 The
mother disappears as a subject—Marion “finds no room for the example of the mother,”211 indeed,
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she appears only as “his wife”—in order to create the space for a masculine insecurity that haunts
the giving of the name.
Nevertheless, rather than confirming the givenness of fatherhood, Marion’s language belies
the fact that it is precisely this masculine anxiety that strips the naming of the child of its giftcharacter. In the giving of the patronymic, Marion seems to unconsciously recognize that the erotic
reduction is suspended, and the relationship is abruptly thrust back into the logic of exchange: for,
the child adopts the father’s name “as collateral for his own adoption by the father.”212 Collateral—
en gage, deposit, security, guarantee—this is not the language of the gift, but precisely that of
exchange. The pursuit of the givenness of fatherhood does not find its completion in the anxiety
of the absent father, but on the contrary this masculine insecurity strikes at the heart of Marion’s
argument, rendering his reconstruction of “fatherhood as a gift” in Being Given self-contradictory.
The later account set forward in “The Reason of the Gift” and Negative Certainties, largely
follows the trajectory of Being Given, with one key difference: whereas Being Given
systematically erased the role of the mother, these later texts reintroduce the mother, but only as
the “symbolic opposite”213 of the father. As was already suggested above, for Marion the father is
defined by absence: “the father is missing.”214 Or, in phenomenological language, “the father
appears as the giver who is perfectly reduced to givenness, the bracketed giver.”215 The father is
bracketed because the father is transcendent. Against the immanence of the child, the father
manifests as a radical alterity.216 Yet, this alterity is not simply the alterity implicit in every
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intersubjective experience, for the child is not alone in their immanence. Instead, through a
phenomenologically unclarified merger, the father discovers both the child and the mother in the
immanence of the child: the father “is lacking because he can never merge with the given child (in
contrast to the mother, who can and even must do so, if only for a time).”217 From the site of this
“happy immanence to the child,” the mother “stigmatizes the father’s miserable transcendence.”218
This transcendence results from manifold causes: the masculine anxiety of paternity, the fact that
the father “procreates only at the moment and then, having become superfluous, withdraws
immediately, in contrast to the mother who remains,”219 and lastly from the fact that “he can only
remain united with the child by taking leave—precisely so as to bestow his help, as extroverted
provider, as hunter, warrior, or traveler; in short, as the one who constantly returns, coming back
to the hearth from which he must distance himself if he wants to maintain it.”220 Apart from its
obvious recourse to traditional gender norms—certainly questionable as phenomenological
necessities, given the numerous alternate familial configurations not only possible but actual—
Marion’s analysis suffers from a number of identifiable limitations. Dickinson summarizes these
problems in two passages worth citing in full:
Rather than steer such a discussion toward the many fathers who in reality are
unknown to their children, not through their inability to name them (and as many
such children do in fact bear the absent father’s name), but through their literal
absence, Marion tries to establish a phenomenological sketch of why such absences
are inherent to the role of the father in the child’s life something which, practically
217
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speaking, can only appear as a most dangerous legitimation of a father’s absence,
perhaps indirectly justifying their choices and anxieties of many truly absent
fathers. … Marion’s presentation of fatherhood … hence appears in many ways as
a justification for the absentee and irresponsible father, an upholding of patriarchal
normativity and its generational legitimacy, an unfair ‘stigmatizing’ of the mother’s
lived responsibility for her child.221
It does not here seem that the phenomenon has been permitted to manifest as it gives itself
to be. Rather, quite to the contrary, what this analysis suggests is that the phenomenon of
fatherhood—and therefore, correlatively, its symbolic opposite: motherhood—has been bound by
the strictures of a “quasi-theological, patriarchal agenda”222—an ideology that not only figures
heteronormative presuppositions as eidetic necessities, but one that also codes the phenomena of
sexuality in such a way that traditional gender norms are likewise rendered as phenomenological
requirements. The rendering of these norms into essential characteristics appears to directly
contradict a central principle of Marion’s phenomenology. As he writes, “that man would
recognize himself as created ‘in the image and likeness of God’ does not imply his submission to
some strictly defined essence, … but instead releases and exempts him from the duty of being
conformed to any known norm,”223 or again, without the theological intonation, “man distinguishes
himself from all the other beings in that he is defined by his very resistance to every definition.”224
Any attempt to delimit humanity, to make of them an object, Marion rightly recognizes, constitutes
an act of violence—or at least functions as the precondition for violence: “defining man by a
concept does not always or immediately lead to killing him, but it does fill the first condition
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required to have done with all that which (all of he who, quis, quisqui) does not fit this
definition.”225
Yet, it appears unavoidable that Marion has here imposed a defining concept, a norm, in
short, an essence upon each and every father and mother—one ostensibly validated
phenomenologically, but an essence nonetheless. This essence, drawing as it certainly does from
a Western tradition of patriarchal presuppositions, bounds both mother and father, strips them of
their dignity, because it submits them to (metaphysical) concepts—absence/transcendence
presence/immanence—rather than recognizing that which is “undefinable” within them.
Moreover, this essentialization likewise generates its constitutive other, the queer or the
homosexual, as its necessary supplement—that which does not “fit this definition.” As Marion
already insists by 1979, the queer is marked by a rejection of difference—“homosexuality [is] the
ultimate refusal of dissimilarity.”226 Yet, the difference that is here refused is not the alterity that
marks the indefinability of the human, the resistance to every essence, but rather the imposed
masculine/feminine essences that Marion has himself imposed as conditions for the manifestation
of the human person in general, and the erotic manifestation of human sexuality more specifically.

§IV: Smuggling the Ontic into the Ontological
What is revealed by this critical analysis of Marion’s account of the erotic flesh is an inability to
think sexuality in terms that would allow the diverse phenomena of queer sexuality to manifest.
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These analyses are heteronormative insofar as they have, in Marion’s language, failed to permit
the phenomena of queer sexuality to give themselves as they are given to be. Instead, the givenness
of the erotic phenomenon has been filtered through a mediating condition of phenomenality, a
delimiting horizon of visibility that we might simply name—to borrow Husserl’s convention—a
heteronormative attitude.
In Marion, this attitude manifests in two registers: both concealing and disclosing. What is
concealed are the erotic components of non-normative sexual acts—whether sadomasochism,
queer sexuality, or non-procreative sex. Read through a heteronormative lens, such acts cannot
manifest other than as “perversions” or “transgressions.” The very possibility that they might
manifest an authentic eros—understood here in Marion’s terms as the coming together of my flesh
and the flesh of the other—is excluded a priori from any eidetic analysis of eros. Because these
queer eroticisms are, as Edelman suggests, “unthinkable,” they cannot enter into Marion’s
imaginative variation by which he seeks to uncover the phenomenological givenness of eros.
This concealing is grounded in a disclosing or pseudo-disclosing that presents certain
phenomena—“nature,” a binary notion of sexual difference, the necessity of procreation, the
maintenance of traditional gender norms, etc.—as constitutive of eros. These phenomena
preemptively mask the phenomena of queer eroticism. That is to say, it is precisely insofar as
something like the “naturalness of the body” steps forward, that something like queer eroticism is
covered over or erased. Under the reign of the heteronormative attitude, they are, to use Paul’s
language, rendered “unpresentable”: τὰ ἀσχήμονα. Indeed, insofar as these non-normative
sexualities are permitted to manifest within this heteronormative attitude, they can only find
themselves correlated with violence and dysfunction.
This tendency to present “traditional theological claims in the guise of a rigorous
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phenomenology”227 is not unique to Henry and Marion. Indeed, this discussion strikes at the very
center of phenomenology as a methodology. As Merleau-Ponty famously wrote, “the most
important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction.” 228
In the present case, this passage might be read in the following manner: no phenomenological
reduction, even a redoubled or third reduction, is immune to the creeping influence of ideological
investments. There is, to use Heidegger’s language, a perpetual tendency to smuggle the ontical
into the ontological, to import non-phenomenological concerns into the very heart of ostensibly
pure phenomenological analyses. Husserl himself commented on this risk explicitly in Experience
and Judgment, writing:
This treatment [pure eidetic seeing] is achieved only when every connection to
pregiven actuality is most carefully excluded. If we practice variation freely but
cling secretly to the fact that, e.g. these must be arbitrary sounds in the world, heard
or able to be heard by men on earth, then we certainly have an essential generality
as an eidos but one related to our world of fact and bound to that universal fact. It
is a secret bond in that, for understandable reasons, it is imperceptible to us. …
Only if we become conscious of this bond, putting it consciously out of play, and
so also free this broadest surrounding horizon of variants from all connection to
experience and all experiential validity, do we achieve perfect purity.229
Husserl’s comments on this matter are particularly helpful, as they not only diagnose the illness,
but prescribe a cure as well: we must “become conscious of this bond, putting it consciously out
of play.” That is to say, the means of eliminating non-phenomenological presuppositions from our
analyses must begin with a thorough accounting of these presuppositions, their status, and their
origin.
This task therefore necessitates genealogical work. For, if it is to be claimed that the
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specific structure of Henry and Marion’s accounts of sexuality emerges from an ideological
investment then it will be necessary to chart the precise contours of this investment. Specifically,
what will be shown is that the account of sexuality proffered by Henry and Marion does not merely
emerge from a general heteronormativity, nor even from traditional Catholic sexual ethics
generally construed, but rather that this account of sexuality finds a specific genesis in the socalled “communio school” of Catholic theology: epitomized by the work of Hans Urs von
Balthasar and Karol Józef Wojtyła (Pope John Paul II).
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CHAPTER 4 - Nuptial Theology in the Communio School
and Radical Phenomenology
Heterosexuality has difficulties in understanding sexuality outside the biological
discourse, that is, outside the epistemological boundaries of reproductive organs.
Marcella Althaus-Reid

§I: Textual and Theological Connections1
While on their own, Henry and Marion’s phenomenological analyses of the sexual body may
appear confounding; their conclusions become considerably more comprehensible once they are
situated within their theological context: what will here be referred to as the “Communio school.”
It is only for simplicity's sake that I will here refer—and with some reservation—to a Communio
“school.” For Communio, more than most other schools of Catholic theology—from liberation
theology to transcendental Thomism—can only be understood in relation to its founder, the swiss
theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar. As Marion notes, “everything was animated by Balthasar.”2
Neither von Balthasar as an individual nor Communio as a loosely connected school can
be easily categorized. Horner, for example, suggests that Marion’s association with Communio “is
not without significance, since it has been argued that Communio epitomizes neo-conservative
Catholicism, and that Marion represents a conservative push within the church.”3 Yet, any simple
designation of Communio as “conservative” requires further nuance. For as Kilby reminds readers,
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“Balthasar, while he might be seen as a conservative, is at many points certainly not traditional.”4
Indeed, von Balthasar’s Johannes Verlag (St. John’s Press) published many key texts in 20th
century liberal Catholicism, including, Küng’s Justification and Rahner’s Free Speech in the
Church. Thus, one might be served to follow Moss and Oakes suggestion that von Balthasar and
his followers are “neither liberal nor conservative as these shopworn terms are normally
understood.”5 Rather, in von Balthasar (and Communio), “we encounter a man teeming with
paradoxes.”6
Von Balthasar found himself largely ostracized throughout the first half of his career, due
to a variety of factors, including: his decision to leave the Jesuits in 1950 in order to found a secular
institute with the mystic Adrienne von Speyr, his critique of natural theology in The Theology of
Karl Barth, and his critique of anti-modernism in Razing the Bastions. As Kilby notes, for
example, “in the 1960s, when the second Vatican Council was called, Balthasar stood alone among
his generation of great theological minds in not being invited.”7 Nevertheless, despite his absence,
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champion of their causes. His image as a reactionary was also fostered by the fact that most of the English
translations of his books were published by a company whose catalogue is filled with books written by
theologically, politically, and culturally conservative Catholics.” Kevin Mongrain, The Systematic Thought of Hans
Urs von Balthasar: an Irenaean Retrieval (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2002), 13.
7

Kilby, Balthasar, 27.
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Vatican II would end up serving as something like a vindication of many of his most important
theological positions. Yet, rather than resting on his laurels, von Balthasar instead became
increasingly worried about the majority interpretation of the council and immediately “threw all
his energies into openly opposing the majority trend in theology, especially as advocated in the
pages of the international journal Concilium, which he cheekily countered with his own antiaccommodationist periodical, the journal Communio.”8
A further confirmation of von Balthasar’s theological program would come in the form of
two Popes, both of whom largely supported his theological agenda: John Paul II and Benedict
XVI.9 At the event of von Balthasar’s death, John Paul II’s eulogy would describe him as “a great
son of the Church, an outstanding man of theology and the arts,”10 and Benedict XVI (then
Cardinal Ratzinger) would give von Balthasar’s funeral homily wherein he would state that “the
Church itself, in its official responsibility, tells us that he is right in what he teaches of the Faith,

8

Moss and Oakes, “Introduction,” 6. Or more precisely, close collection of related journals. “Some among them,
Balthasar, Daniélou, Lubac, Bouyer, and the (then) young professor of systematic theology, Ratzinger, decided to
create a different journal [than Concilium], which was called Communio. Or rather, it was a federation of
independent journals, coming out in different countries. … Communio most often depended on lay people, some
university trained but not only those, including women and some really young people.” Marion, The Rigor of
Things, 23. In the words of Cardinal Ratzinger the Communio program sought to resist those who “sold goods from
the old liberal flea market as if they were new Catholic theology.” Joseph Ratzinger, “Communio: A Program,”
Communio: International Catholic Review 19, no. 3 (Fall 1992): 437. While these two journals are often simply read
as the liberal and conservative positions respectively, the reality is more nuanced. As Tracey Rowland writes,
“whereas Concilium approached the Conciliar documents with a hermeneutic of rupture, the Communio authors
offered a hermeneutic of continuity” (Tracey Rowland. Guides for the Perplexed: Benedict XVI (London, GBR:
Continuum International Publishing, 2010), 5). That is to say, for the Concilium school the reforms of Vatican II
represented a radical break in the Catholic tradition, the emergence of something substantially new, while for the
Communio school the documents of Vatican II necessitated no significant break in Catholic teaching or dogma, only
a shift in expression or presentation.
9

“He was said to be the favorite theologian of Pope John Paul II, and is held in high esteem also by Benedict XVI.”
Kilby, Balthasar, 1. A first major recognition would come in 1984, when John Paul II granted von Balthasar the
honor of being the first theologian to receive the International Paul VI Prize “for the development of research and
religious knowledge.” But, the support of these two popes would never be as clear as in 1988. At the request of John
Paul II, von Balthasar was to be made cardinal—though he would unfortunately pass two days before his
installation.
10

Ibid., 36.
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that he points the way to the sources of living water.”11

A: Communio and Phenomenology
The relationship between Communio and phenomenological philosophy is quite complex. For,
despite its distinctly theological aims and, as we will see below, its ambitions to return to patristic
sources, it has nevertheless been the case that Communio has been continuously indebted to
phenomenological thinking. This debt finds its earliest expression in von Balthasar’s complex
relationship to Martin Heidegger. Indeed, the metaphysical underpinnings of von Balthasar’s
theology might be read as something like a “Heideggerian Thomism.”12
According to von Balthasar, the question of Being—most famously posited by Leibniz as
“why is there something rather than nothing?,”13—perpetually remains the fundamental
metaphysical issue: “the Greek question about the being of what exists is as new today as it was
in the age of Heraclitus and Parmenides, of Plato and Aristotle.”14 In the 20th century, the figure
who embodied this philosophical pursuit most fully was Heidegger.15

11

Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, “Homily at the Funeral Liturgy of Hans Urs von Balthasar,” in David Schindler (ed),
Hans Urs von Balthasar: His Life and Work (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991), 295. And likewise called
Communio “a powerful source for correct renewal as opposed to counterfeit forms.” Ibid., 294.
12

Fergus Kerr, “Balthasar and metaphysics,” in David Moss and Edward T. Oakes (eds.), The Cambridge
Companion to Hans Urs von Balthasar (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 237.
13

G. W. Leibniz, “Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason” in Philosophical Essays, trans. Roger Ariew
and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), 210.
14

Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Philosophy, Christianity, Monasticism,” in Explorations in Theology II: Spouse of the
Word (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991), 342.
15

“Why are there beings at all, and why not rather nothing?” Martin Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?” in Basic
Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964), ed. David Darrell Krell (New York: Harper
& Row Publishers, 1977), 110.
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For Heidegger, the question of Being is ultimately the question of the meaning of Being.16
In his magnum opus, Being and Time, Heidegger pursues this question of the “meaning” of Being
through an analysis of the particular manner of being unique to the human person, what he calls
Dasein. According to Heidegger, Dasein is that being which “is ontically distinguished by the fact
that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it.”17 It is humans who ask, “why do I exist? Why
does anything exist?” Indeed, “the very asking of this question is [Dasein’s] mode of Being.”18
And because we are the being which interrogates Being, it is Dasein alone which discloses the
meaning of Being.
In admittedly oversimplified terms, Heidegger’s answer to the question of the meaning of
Being, is that Being is that which permits any being to be disclosed within the horizon of the world.
In every experience of a being, no matter how mundane,19 Dasein likewise experiences the Being
of that being.20 Whereas beings are simply the ontical objects within the world, “‘Being’ cannot
indeed be conceived as a being.”21 Rather, it is the ontological condition of beings; it is what
determines beings as beings.22 This, for Heidegger, is precisely the transcendental task of
phenomenology, not to “investigate the being itself but the possibility of the precursory

16

“Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word ‘being’? Not at all. So it is
fitting that we should raise anew the question of the meaning of Being.” Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans.
John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1962), 1.
17

Ibid., 32.

18

Ibid., 26.

19

Heidegger will give particular emphasis, for example, to the Being of a tool (e.g. a hammer).

20

“It discovers all beings, both in the fact that they are, and in their Being as they are.” Ibid., 33 [translation
modified for consistency].
21

Ibid., 23, Or again, “The Being of beings ‘is’ not itself a being.” Ibid., 26 [translations modified for consistency].

22

“We are able to grasp beings as such, as beings, only if we understand something like being.” Heidegger, The
Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 10.
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comprehension of the Being of the being.”23 The result of this transcendental or ontological
distinction is a consistent insistence by Heidegger upon a fundamental difference between beings
[Seiendes] and Being [Sein]: or as he will later name it, the “ontological difference.”24
Already by 1940, von Balthasar was deeply engaged with Heideggerian phenomenology,
reading him from a distinctly “Catholic standpoint.”25 While von Balthasar’s appropriation of
Heidegger would be anything but uncritical, it is nevertheless the case that von Balthasar was
deeply taken by Heidegger’s reading of the history of Being and insistence upon ontological
difference.26 Thus, von Balthasar’s reading of the history of philosophy in the fourth and fifth
volumes of The Glory of the Lord bears the distinct marks of a Heideggerian influence.27
Moreover, the fifth volume culminates in an explicit engagement with Heidegger’s notion of the
fourfold, entitled: “The Miracle of Being and the Fourfold Difference.”28

23

Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. James S. Churchill (Indianapolis: Indiana
University Press, 1972), 20 [translation altered for consistency]. Likewise, this becomes, for Heidegger, the true
meaning of the phenomenological reduction, “for us, phenomenological reduction means leading phenomenological
vision back from the apprehension of a being, whatever may be the character of that apprehension, to the
understanding of the Being of this being (projecting upon the way it is unconcealed)” Martin Heidegger, The Basic
Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 21.
24

“We must be able to bring out clearly the difference between Being and beings in order to make something like
Being the theme of inquiry. This distinction is not arbitrary; rather, it is the one by which the theme of ontology and
thus of philosophy itself is first of all attained. It is a distinction which is first and foremost constitutive for ontology.
We call it the ontological difference—the differentiation between Being and beings” (Heidegger, The Basic
Problems of Phenomenology, 17). Or again, “we speak of the difference between Being and beings” (Martin
Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh [New York: Harper & Row, 1969], 50).
25

Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Heidegger’s Philosophie vom Standpunkt des Katholizismus” Stimmen der Zeit 137
(1940): 1-8.
26

“For Christian theology, and particularly for the theology of God’s glory—so Balthasar contends—Heidegger’s
project is by far the most fertile in modern philosophy.” Kerr, “Balthasar and metaphysics,” 235.
27

As Kerr notes: “Unlike Rahner, Balthasar never attended lectures by Heidegger. Ironically, however, as we shall
see, his conception of metaphysics, as well as his massive reinterpretation of the history of Western philosophy in
the fourth and fifth volumes of The Glory of the Lord, are deeply indebted to his reading of Heidegger. Balthasar is
far more radically ‘Heideggerian’ than Rahner ever was.” Kerr, “Balthasar and metaphysics,” 225.
28

This account of the “fourfold” serves as a useful heuristic of von Balthasar’s complex relationship to Heidegger,
insofar as he here both positively affirms and negatively critiques his predecessor. Heidegger’s fourfold marks his
increasingly mytho-poetic speculations on Being (See: John D. Caputo, Demythologizing Heidegger [Bloomington:
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Indiana University Press, 1993]). Here, the human person finds itself held at the cross-section of four elements—
earth and sky, divinities and mortals—which, as Kerr notes, “excludes all reference to the Christian God and equally
any reference to human intersubjectivity” (Kerr, “Balthasar and metaphysics,” 235).
Von Balthasar therefore borrows the notion of a fourfold, embracing Heidegger’s assertion that the world is
“disclosed” rather than “posited” or “constructed,” but seeks to highlight four key differences constitutive of the
human being’s place in the world. This fourfold difference is: “(1) The intersubjective difference of the awakening
child’s ‘I’ from its mother (and implicitly from every other human and from all else in the world); (2) the difference
of the to-be of beings from the beings themselves; (3) the converse difference of being from being; and (4) the
difference between all of these and God” (Ibid., 236).
In the first difference, von Balthasar seeks to strip away Heidegger’s solipsistic tendencies. Key to human being is
the differential relationships between one’s self and others. The second difference is precisely von Balthasar’s
appropriation of Heidegger’s “ontological difference” between beings and Being. The third difference seeks to
highlight the symmetrical relationship between beings and Being. Not only do beings depend upon Being as their
ontological condition. But likewise, “Being does not subsist in itself, on its own, in isolation” (Ibid., 236-237).
Rather, it too depends upon beings. This may be read as akin to Heidegger’s assertion in Being and Time, “Insofar as
Being constitutes what is asked about, and “Being” means the Being of beings, then beings themselves turn out to be
what is interrogated. These are, so to speak, questioned as regards their Being. But if the characteristics of their
Being can be yielded without falsification, then these beings must, on their part, have become accessible as they are
in themselves. When we come to what is to be interrogated, the question of Being requires that the right way of
access to beings shall have been obtained and secured in advance.” Heidegger, Being and Time, 26 [translation
modified for consistency].
Von Balthasar’s most striking challenge to Heidegger is his assertion in the fourth difference that everything,
including Being itself, is marked by a primordial difference between itself and God, the difference between creature
and creator. Thus it is not ultimately Being that discloses the world, but rather the divine. Here von Balthasar is
opposing Heidegger with what might be called an Irenaean phenomenology. According to von Balthasar, Irenaeus
teaches the theologian that “the primary aim is not to think, to impose Platonic intellectual or even mythical
categories on things, but simply to see what is” (Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological
Aesthetics: Volume II: Studies in Theological Style: Clerical Styles, trans. Andrew Louth, Francis McDonagh, and
Brian McNeil [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1984], 45). It is therefore not surprising that the preceding volume is
itself importantly sub-titled “Seeing the Form” (Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological
Aesthetics: Volume I: Seeing the Form, trans. Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982]). This
demand to “see what is” is remarkably reminiscent of Husserl’s charge: “meanings inspired only by remote,
confused, inauthentic intuitions—if by any intuitions at all—are not enough: we must go back to the things
themselves” [Edmund Husserl, The Shorter Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. Findlay [New York: Routledge,
2001], 88). But, against Heidegger, von Balthasar suggests that when one genuinely sees what is—when one sees
the Gestalt (“totality” or “form”)—what one sees is not the ontological difference, but this more originary
theological difference, “the phenomenon of Christ” (Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Logic: Volume One: The Truth
of the World, trans. Adrian Walker [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000], 20): “the invisible Father renders himself
visible in his Word and Son, who reveals him to us as the loving Father and Creator of all things” (Hans Urs von
Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory: Volume II: Dramatis Personae: Man in God, trans. Graham
Harrison [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990], 141). In Kevin Mongrain’s words: “Irenaeus’s definition of faith is
‘seeing’ this paradoxical unity-in-difference of God and creation in Christ” (Mongrain, The Systematic Thought of
Hans Urs von Balthasar, 31).
This fourth difference can be understood as anticipating Marion’s own attempts to bypass the Heideggerian charge
of onto-metaphysics, in God Without Being, where God’s goodness will be positioned “above” Heideggerian Being,
(epekeina tes ousias).
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Whereas Heidegger functions as von Balthasar’s principal interlocutor, Karol Józef
Wojtyła (John Paul II) takes his phenomenological starting point from Max Scheler. Like von
Balthasar, Wojtyła lacked any formal training in phenomenology, but rather, “came to
phenomenology, contrary to popular assumption, entirely on his own.”29 It was at the prompting
of his doctoral advisor, Father Ignacy Rozycki, that Wojtyła decided to examine the ethics of Max
Scheler in his dissertation: “The Ethical System of Max Scheler as a Means to Elaborate Christian
Ethics” (1953). In Scheler’s philosophical anthropology, Wojtyła discovered a means of
articulating the human experience of moral value: thus a conception of the human as a “moral
person.” This personalistic phenomenology would find its culmination in Wojtyła’s 1969, The
Acting Person: A Contribution to Phenomenological Anthropology.
Despite the subtitle to The Acting Person, it is unclear precisely how phenomenological
Wojtyła actually remains. It is indisputable that “the departing point for Wojtyła is the experience
of man.”30 Nevertheless, it remains methodologically unclear to what extent “experience” in
Wojtyła can be correlated to anything like its phenomenological counterpart. For, “Wojtyła seems
to separate himself not only from the transcendental reduction and epoché, but from the particular
eidetic methodology of realistic phenomenology.”31 In place of this method, Wojtyła seems to
demand a turn to “meta-phenomenological or meta-physical premises.”32

29

Anna-Theresa Tymieniecka and Roger Duncan, “Karol Wojtyła, between phenomenology and scholasticism” in
Anna-Theresa Tymieniecka (ed), Phenomenology World-Wide: Foundations—Expanding Dynamics—LifeEngagements. A Guide for Research and Study (Dordrecht: Springer, 2002), 497.
30

Ibid., 110. He was drawn to “the phenomenological proposal [demanding] fidelity ‘to things themselves,’ i.e., the
reaffirmation of a cognitive process, which operates after having been affected by the actual ‘givenness’ of things.”
Carmen Beatriz Gonzalez, “Karol Wojtyła’s Ethical Thought,” Analecta Husserliana 114 (2009): 131-146, 137.
31

Juan Manuel Burgos, “The Method of Karol Wojtyła,” Analecta Husserliana 114 (2009): 107-129, 118.

32

“Scheler’s ethical system is not suitable for interpreting an ethics that has an objective character as Christian
Ethics does. There is no doubt that Scheler’s insufficient objectivism springs from his phenomenological principles.
Because of these principles the ethical value always remains in an intentional and—despite everything—subjective
position. In order to grasp ethical value in its real and objective position, one would have to proceed from different
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Ultimately therefore, it seems that rather than pursuing a rigorous phenomenological line,
Wojtyła can best be understood as embracing a hybrid methodology. As he declares, “the Christian
thinker, especially the theologian, who makes use of phenomenological experience in his work,
cannot be a Phenomenologist.”33 Rather, maintaining the phenomenological orientation to
experience, Wojtyła aims to supplement this with both a consideration of intersubjective
experience34 and the metaphysical realism of Thomism. Wojtyła names this hybrid methodology
“Thomistic Personalism.”35

B. Phenomenology and Communio: Textual Connections
If Communio has been marked by its engagements with phenomenological thinking, then the
reverse is even clearer—at least in the case of radical phenomenology. For, although the
“theological turn”36 of French phenomenology includes thinkers from a variety of theological
perspectives—such as Emmanuel Levinas’ Judaism or Paul Ricoeur's Protestantism—the
movement has not only been largely Catholic, but disproportionately influenced by von Balthasar
epistemological premises, namely, meta-phenomenological and even meta-physical premises.” Karol Wojtyła, “The
Ethical System of Max Scheler as a Means to Elaborate Christian Ethics” as translated in Michael Waldstein,
“Introduction” in John Paul II, Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body, trans. Michael
Waldstein (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 2006), 69. Or again, later, “With the phenomenological method, for
example, we can study experiences of morality, religion, or simply what it is to be human, and draw from them a
significant enrichment of our knowledge. Yet we must not forget that all these analyses implicitly presuppose the
reality of the Absolute Being and also the reality of being human, that is, being a creature. If we do not set out from
such 'realist' presuppositions, we end up in a vacuum.” John Paul II, Memory and Identity: Conversations at the
Dawn of a Millennium (New York: Rizzoli, 2005), 12.
33

Wojtyła, “The Ethical System of Max Scheler as a Means to Elaborate Christian Ethics,” 196.

34

“It is impossible to state that our experience, as experience of conscience, of one’s conscience itself, exhausts the
perceptive horizon of the given; man’s experience as source of knowledge, is composed of self-experience as much
as of every other man’s experience.” Gonzalez, “Karol Wojtyła’s Ethical Thought,” 137.
35

Karol Wojtyła, “Thomistic Personalism,” trans. Theresa Sandok in Andrew N. Woznicki (ed), Person and
Community: Selected Essays, (New York: Peter Lang, 1993): 165-75.
36

See: Dominique Janicaud (ed), Phenomenology and the ‘Theological Turn’: The French Debate (New York:
Fordham University Press, 2000).
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and Communio theology. Thus, although the present investigation concerns the influence on the
radical phenomenologies of Henry and Marion, one could likewise detect the clear influence of
Communio on a variety of phenomenological thinkers, such as Jean-Yves Lacoste and Emmanuel
Falque.37
Although chronologically second, it will here be helpful to begin with Marion, whose
personal and textual relationship to Communio is much more direct than Henry’s. Xavier Tilliette
describes the young Marion as “a brilliant Normalien and agrégé; … who emigrated to Communio
under the leadership of Father Urs von Balthasar.”38 Indeed, it is quite difficult to describe
Marion’s early career without reference to the key role of von Balthasar and Communio. In the
early 70s, Marion knew relatively little of von Balthasar. Thus it must have come as quite a surprise
when von Balthasar chose Marion (and Jean Duchesne) to found the French edition of the journal
Communio. As Marion describes the event in his own words:
Hans Urs von Balthasar, whom we knew a little bit due to Résurrection, for which
he had encouraged us, was deaf in that ear: He summoned us (that’s the right word)
to discuss it with him in Basel. I still remember it: He invited us to eat lunch in the
restaurant of the Basel zoo (an allusion to what awaited us?) in order to tell us that,
without a penny, without any acknowledged skill, without any institutional support,
we should nonetheless launch the Francophone edition of Communio. Our protest
changed nothing in his decision. We were caught in the trap. That was the summer
of 1974.39

37

It is here worth noting that, Falque likewise fails to offer a liberatory sexual ethic. As Gschwandtner notes, “one
should probably point out in this context that Falque’s treatment is decidedly heterosexual and seems to make
homosexuality impossible, or at least deeply problematic. While he does not explicitly condemn homosexuality, any
consideration of it is entirely excluded from his account.” Christina Gschwandtner, Postmodern Apologetics?
Arguments for God in Contemporary Philosophy (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 316.
38

“Brillant normalien et agrégé, élève d’Alquié et de Beaufret, il provenait du groupe ‘tala’ de Résurrection qui
avait émigré à Communio sous la houlette du Père Urs von Balthasar.” Xavier Tilliette, “Phénoménologies
autonomes: Michel Henry & Jean-Luc Marion,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 60 (2004): 473-484, 478
[translation my own].
39

Marion, The Rigor of Things, 24.
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Despite the inauspicious beginning of this “foolhardy undertaking,”40 Marion would go on to edit
the journal for another decade. Thus, not only would Marion be influenced by Communio thought,
but he would also function as a principal contributor to its international shape. In that time, Marion
would come to regard von Balthasar as “the greatest Catholic theologian of modern times.”41
The explicit influence of von Balthasar can be found on occasion throughout Marion’s
corpus. He turns to Balthasar in his analysis of love in the Prolegomena to Charity (70n10, 122,
145n17), in connection to his notion of distance in On Descartes’ Metaphysical Prism (307n30)
and in The Idol and Distance (155).42 Yet, given Marion’s tendency to forego citation,43 it will not
be surprising if these few references represent only a small portion of the actual influence of
Communio thought on his work. Marion has suggested precisely as much, when he writes, “I
always have them in mind. I do not write a single line without asking myself what Hans Urs von
Balthasar, Jean Daniélou, Jean Beaufret, Emmanuel Levinas, or Michel Henry would think of it.”44
The influence of Jean-Paul II was less direct; for, Marion found himself disappointed by The Acting
Person. nevertheless, he appreciated Love and Responsibility, which “has a simultaneously
pastoral, biological, and spiritual dimension, which is completely lacking in [his] Erotic

40

Ibid., 22.

41

Ibid., 25.

42

Here he remarks, “To H. Urs von Balthasar my approach owes much.” Jean-Luc Marion, The Idol and Distance:
Five Studies, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (New York: Fordham University, 2001), xxxviii.
43

A tendency explicit in The Erotic Phenomenon, for example, where he will write that “an initial precaution, as
insufficient as it is obligatory, will consist in avoiding scrupulously the citation of any author at all.” Jean-Luc
Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, trans. Stephen E. Lewis (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 8.
44

Marion, The Rigor of Things, 19. This, despite the fact that von Balthasar took a passing “dig” (Ibid., 184) at
Marion in the second volume of the Theo-Logic. There, glossing Plato, von Balthasar writes that despite the fact that
the good is marked as “beyond being”: “it must not lead us however, into removing God from being (Jean-Luc
Marion, Dieu sans être [Paris: Fayard, 1982]). Groundless love is not prior to being but the supreme act of being.”
Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Logic: Truth of God, trans. Adrian Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 20.
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Phenomenon.”45 Thus, to understand the full significance of Communio for Marion, it will be
necessary to examine some key themes that Marion shares in common with this tradition. But,
before doing so it will be helpful to remark on the connection between Henry and Communio.
If Marion’s connection to this tradition could not be clearer—as editor of its primary
journal—then the same cannot be said for Henry. For, even more than Marion, Henry tends to
obscure his sources, particularly his theological sources. Where Henry does cite theological
precedent these sources tend to either be the church Fathers or Meister Eckhart, almost never will
Henry cite a contemporary theological voice. Thus, the task of tracing Henry’s theological lineage
is rather difficult for the commentator. But evidence suggests that Henry was not only familiar
with Communio, but may have at least partially subscribed to the theological tradition’s program.
First, and most obviously, Henry published in the French edition of the journal on multiple
occasions, over more than a decade—and at precisely the time when his own project was explicitly
turning to theology—publishing “Représentation et auto-affection”46 in 1987,

“Archi-

christologie”47 in 1997, and “Incarnation”48 in 2000.
Additionally, as in the case of Marion, there are clear methodological and thematic points
of convergence. These will be explored more concretely below, but the reader will benefit from
Rivera’s existing comparative study of Henry and von Balthasar’s conceptions of “form,” 49 and

45

Marion, The Rigor of Things, 183.
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Michel Henry, “Représentation et auto-affection” Communio XII, 3, n°71 (1987): 77-96.
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Michel Henry, “Archi-christologie” Communio XXII, 2-3 - n°130 (1997): 195-221.

48

Michel Henry, “Incarnation” Communio XXV, 6 - n°152 (2000): 81-96.

49

As Rivera notes, “it is perhaps instructive for us to show just how Henry may come in contact with Hans Urs von
Balthasar, for instance, given that the latter has devoted considerable space to the concept of ‘form’” (Joseph Rivera,
The Contemplative Self After Michel Henry: A Phenomenological Theology [Notre Dame: The University of Notre
Dame Press, 2015], 129). According to Rivera, Henry and von Balthasar are united in this concern for the
transcendental form of Christ (Gestalt Christi), their “deeply aesthetic mode of expression” (Ibid.) and their
“Johannine piety and temperament” (Ibid.).
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Kungua’s comparative study of their respective critiques of historical-critical method.50 But, apart
from these concerns, there remains much that binds Henry—and Marion—to the Communio
school. Before ultimately turning to the convergences surrounding sexuality which are particularly
relevant here, I will first draw out important similarities in theological method and content.

C. Theological Method: Ressourcement
Since its inception, the Communio school has understood itself in opposition to the NeoScholasticism dominant in early 20th century Catholic theology. Von Balthasar famously

Nevertheless, despite these similarities, these two retain a key difference. Where Henry adopts a subjective
interpretation of form, von Balthasar’s concern for the maintenance of difference necessitates a clear recourse to
ontological distance. As Rivera notes, “while it appears there is so little that separates Henry from Balthasar: …
Balthasar holds to the distinction between the Creator and the creature, or the form and content, and Henry simply
does not” (Ibid., 132). Thus, Henry will instead turn to Eckhart’s assertion that “the eye with which I see God is
exactly the same eye with which God sees me” (Meister Eckhart, “Sermon 16: Qui audi me non confunditur” in
Selected Writings, trans. Oliver Davies [New York: Penguin Books, 1994], 179). In multiple instances Henry will
paraphrase this famous passage, e.g.: “each of my actions is revealed to God at the same time as it is revealed to me,
and in the very act by which it does so” (Michel Henry, I am the Truth: Toward a Philosophy of Christianity, trans.
Susan Emanuel [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000], 174), or more directly, “to say it in the fashion of the
mystics: the Eye by which God sees Cain and the one by which Cain sees himself are but one and the same Eye”
(Michel Henry, Words of Christ, trans. Christina M. Gschwandtner [Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans
Publishing, 2012], 104). This citation of Eckhart serves to mark an original identity that can only be lost by a
“forgetting” (See: Henry, I am the Truth, Chapter 8 “Forgetting the Condition of Son: ‘Me, I’ / ‘Me, Ego’”)—and is
therefore recovered by remembering. Put more strongly, “all men are in Christ … they are Christ himself” (Michel
Henry, Incarnation: A Philosophy of Flesh, trans. Karl Hefty [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2015],
237). Von Balthasar on the other hand denies such an originary identity: “this is not a question of the (gnostic)
recovery of one’s own form, once possessed and then lost.” (Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A
Theological Aesthetics: Volume VII: Theology: The New Covenant, trans. Brian McNeil [San Francisco: Ignatius
Press, 1989], 293). Rather, for von Balthasar the form of Christ, granted to humans by the grace of God, is a
radically “new creation,” a “new man.”
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According to Kungua, Henry and von Balthasar offer markedly similar critiques of the historical-critical method:
“comme H. Urs von Balthasar, Michel Henry a des propos absolument incendiaires, caustiques et durs conte l’hybris
et le totalitarisme de l'exégèse historico-critique issue de la Révolution galiléenne qui sous-tend la science
occidentale et positiviste moderne” (Benoît Awazi Mbambi Kungua, Déconstruction phénoménologique et
théologique de la modernité occidentale: Michel Henry, Hans Urs von Balthasar et Jean-Luc Marion [Paris:
L’Harmattan, 2014], 112). As Kungua shows, both von Balthasar and Henry “assument l’interprétation
heideggerienne de l’essence de la technique moderne comme figure extrême du nihilisme en tant qu’oubli de l’oubli
de la différence ontologique de l’Être irréductible aux étants manipulables” (Ibid., 109-110). From this assumption,
they develop remarkably similar critiques of modern historical-critical methods, understood in each instance as an
attempt to submit the “la transcendence du Dieu toujours plus grand” (Ibid., 110) to the delimited strictures of
modernity and its scientistic rationalism.
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described his experience of neo-scholastic training as “a grim struggle with the dreariness of
theology, with what men had made out of the glory of revelation.”51 In response to this theological
climate, von Balthasar took up the study of the Patristics with Henri de Lubac in 1933 at
Fourvières.52 Although not an official student of de Lubac, the two would become important
theological collaborators and life-long friends. Under the tutelage of de Lubac, von Balthasar
produced a number of manuscripts on important Patristic sources, including: Origen, Gregory of
Nyssa, Clement of Alexandria, Evagrius of Pontus, Dionysius, and Maximus the Confessor.
Though, it was his study of Irenaeus which would be most formative for his future theological
endeavors.53
Following in the footsteps of de Lubac’s ressourcement tradition, von Balthasar saw these
patristic figures as an escape from the overly rationalized—even gnostic, he will on occasion
polemically claim—neo-scholastic theology. Where Neo-Scholasticism privileged the concept
(Begriff), the Fathers opened a route to a theology of symbol (Vorstellung). Yet, as suggested by
the name ressourcement (“return to the sources”), this methodology did not only aim to offer
commentary or historical analyses of the Fathers, but rather von Balthasar “saw in them models
for carrying on the work of theology in his own world.”54 It is precisely this approach that can
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As cited in Peter Henrici, “Hans Urs von Balthasar: A Sketch of His Life” in David L. Schindler (ed) Hans Urs
von Balthasar: His Life and Work (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991), 13.
52

“The imposition of neo-scholastic uniformity seems to have given birth to a tremendous collective impulse … to
go back … beyond Thomas to the richness and beauty of patristic thought” Kilby, Balthasar, 21.
53

“Von Balthasar granted Irenaeus of Lyons privileged status as the quintessential patristic figure whose theology is
the standard by which all other patristic theologies should be judged.” Mongrain, The Systematic Thought of Hans
Urs von Balthasar, 9.
54

Daley, “Balthasar’s reading of the Church Fathers,” 189 [emphasis added]. Some have suggested that
ressourcement thinkers are more interested in using these figures, than in accurately understanding them; that they
are read anachronistically. As Daley notes, “when all is said and done, [von Balthasar] still treated them essentially
as sources to support his own theological engagement with modern European culture and thought” (Brian E. Daley,
“Balthasar’s reading of the Church Fathers” in David Moss and Edward T. Oakes (eds.), The Cambridge Companion
to Hans Urs von Balthasar [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004], 189). it might instead be suggested that
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likewise be found in Henry and Marion, both of whom draw upon Patristic theology at key
moments in order to intervene in contemporary debates in phenomenology and theology.
As has been seen above (chapter 2) Henry traces ontological monism—the reduction of all
phenomenality to visibility—back to its “origin in Greek truth.”55 In his Christian trilogy, this
struggle is recast as a conflict between a Greek “truth of the world”56 and a Johannine “truth
according to Christianity”57—between “the Christian God” and “the Greek God.”58 Nowhere is
this conflict between Greek and Christian truth more evident, Henry will suggest, than in the
writings of the Church Fathers, who spoke in the language of Hellenistic philosophy, but only ever
of a Christian truth: “the Hellenization of language,” he argues, “goes hand in hand with a deHellenization of the faith.”59
Drawing upon Acts 17’s account of Paul at the Athenian Areopagus, Henry marks the
incarnation—particularly as manifest in the resurrection of the body—as the locus classicus of this
dispute between Greek and Christian truth: “when they heard of the resurrection of the dead, some

this tendency reflects the fact that—despite its seeming backward-facing posture—ressourcement does not advocate
a simple or insufficiently nuanced adoption of the Patristic assumptions or metaphysics. As von Balthasar insists,
“nothing would be more perilous than to demand from our completely different situation a pure return to patristic
Platonism” (Hans Urs von Balthasar, “The Fathers, the Scholastics, and Ourselves” Communio: International
Catholic Review 24 [1997], 379).
55

Michel Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, trans. Douglas Brick (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1993), 165.
56

It remains unclear if this phrase “truth of the world” refers to the title of the first volume of von Balthasar’s Theologic (von Balthasar, Theo-Logic: Volume One: The Truth of the World) or if the similarity is coincidental. If an
intentional gesture, it is nevertheless worth noting that while both conceptions of the “truth of the world” will mark
its dependence upon a more primordial truth, von Balthasar will tend to think this dependence in relational terms,
while Henry’s dualistic tendencies will lead to a rather harsh, polemical treatment of the “truth of the world.”
57

Henry, I am the Truth, 12-32.
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Henry, Incarnation, 122.

59

Ibid., 9. Here paraphrasing Bernard Sesboϋé, “Jésus Christ dans la tradition de l’église,” in Jésus et Jésus Christ,
no. 17 (Paris: Desclée, 1993), 100.
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scoffed.”60 This therefore becomes the heart of Henrian orthodoxy: “very great thinkers, the
Fathers of the Church, will devote themselves to this reflection [on the incarnation],” 61 while,
Gnosticism and heresy, because they are corrupted by Greek truth, represent every theology that
denies the incarnation.62 It is therefore the Fathers of the church that will become the champions
avant la lettre of Henry’s phenomenology of flesh.
If this conflict reads as an overly simplistic account of the Patristic context, this is because
Henry here undertakes two reductions. First, despite the apparent diversity of views and clear
disputes among these early figures, Henry will insist upon a fundamental homogeneity, a “genius
of the Church Fathers … that weaves its way little by little through their dazzling intuitions.” 63
Thus, for example, he will breathlessly write of that “which we find in all the Fathers as well as in
the councils.”64 Nevertheless, much like von Balthasar’s use of Irenaeus as the interpretive key for
the Patristics, Henry too frames his discussion around a central figure. Thus, while he cites a
variety of Fathers: Athanasius, Cyril of Alexandria, Justin Martyr, and even devotes an entire
section to Irenaeus and Augustine’s accounts of salvation, 65 it is ultimately Tertullian—and
perhaps even more narrowly, Tertullian’s De Carne Christi—which serves as the guiding
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Acts 17.32 NRSV.
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Henry, Incarnation, 8.
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Here, as above, one might detect an uncited reference to von Balthasar and his rather broad (and polemical)
conception of “Gnosticism.”
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Ibid., 9.
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Ibid., 234.
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Ibid., §46 “The Way of Salvation according to Irenaeus and Augustine.”
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interpretive model. He will therefore unproblematically mark major claims as “according to
Tertullian and the other Fathers…”66 or “in the eyes of Tertullian and the Fathers…”67
Conversely, this reduction of the Fathers to a “singular ideal sequence”68 is likewise paired
with a reduction of all Greek philosophy, Gnosticism, and Christian heresy to a singular
affirmation of the “Greek body” rather than the “Christian flesh” of incarnation. “In his idea,”
Perrot writes, “heresy forms a ‘compact block,’ which is basically the homologous negative of the
‘ideal sequence’ unique to the ‘Fathers’.”69 As Henry writes:
All this debris of Greek thought (or of more ancient prejudices) is not only refused
across the different forms of Gnosticism; it is pieced together immediately as a
compact block: heresy. “Heresy” means everything that, under various masks and
through spurious and false constructions, denies the truth (in other words the
reality) of Incarnation.70
As in the case of the Fathers, the ultimate viability of this reduction is suspect. Nevertheless, it
serves Henry, who, like von Balthasar before him, is less concerned with properly historical or
philological research than with the lessons that might be learned from these figures. Particularly,
in this instance, these two simplifications permit Henry to appropriate Gnosticism and heresy into
his figure of ontological monism.71
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Ibid., 130.

67

Ibid., 127.

68

Ibid., 9.
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“Dans son idée que l’hérésie forme un ‘bloc compact,’ qui est au fond l’homologue négatif de la ‘séquence
idéologique’ unique des ‘Pères’.” Arnaud Perrot, “Michel Henry, Lecteur des Pères de l’Eglise,” Revue des Sciences
Philosophiques et Théologiques 100(4) (2016): 647-660, 653 [translation my own].
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Ibid., 10.

71

As Perrot remarks, “Le philosophe peut ainsi lire, dans un auteur majeur de la littérature chrétienne du II e siècle, la
proposition centrale de sa théologie de la chair.” Perrot, “Michel henry, Lecteur des Pères de l’Eglise,” 655.
This tendency to read the Fathers in light of his own philosophy is rather clear throughout Incarnation. This is seen
grammatically in Henry’s unjustified use of the capitalized “Life” in his translations of Irenaeus: “the flesh is
capable of receiving Life, this is proved by this very Life from which it already lives right not” (Irenaeus, as
translated by Henry in Incarnation, 136). As Perrot’s instructive study notes, “l’assimilation de la doctrine d’Irénée
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Given his earlier engagement with Communio, it is perhaps not surprising that Marion
assimilated Patristic thinking earlier than Henry. Indeed, much like von Balthasar, Marion was
driven to the Fathers by his disinterest in Neo-Scholasticism.72 In the Fathers, Marion found a truly
Christian alternative to the onto-theology critiqued by Heidegger, a “pre-metaphysical” theology

se fait, de plus, par une subtile modification d’ordre typographique, que le texte original n’exige d’aucune façon. M.
Henry s'écarte ici sciemment—quoique discrètement—de la traduction d’A. Rousseau qu’il suit par ailleurs, en
écrivant le mot vie avec une majuscule” (Perrot, “Michel henry, Lecteur des Pères de l’Eglise,” 655). In this manner,
what is in Irenaeus a mundane reference to the individual life of a living body, becomes a reference to the indwelling
spirit of the divine source of all life: “From Life means from God,” Henry elsewhere remarks, “since according to
Christianity, the essence of Life and that of God are one and the same” (Henry, I am the Truth, 51).
Likewise, in his analysis of Tertullian, Henry imports a distinction between flesh and body that is completely foreign
to the Father. “Dans le débat qui oppose, au IIe siècle, Tertullien à ses adversaires gnostiques, la doctrine chrétienne
se comprend, précisément, comme la volonté de ne pas substituer à la ‘chair,’ c’est-’à-dire au corps du Christ
compris de manière obvie, un ‘chair’ d’un autre ordre” (Perrot, “Michel henry, Lecteur des Pères de l’Eglise,” 655).
Yet, through his introduction of a transcendental flesh over-and-against the mundane body, such a substitution is
precisely what Henry ends up undertaking. Thus, there is “an ironic effect” (ibid.) to Henry’s appropriation of De
Carne Christi. For, like Valentinus, Henry seems to admit “both the flesh and the nativity, [while having] interpreted
them in a different sense” (Tertullian, “On the Flesh of Christ,” in Ante-Nicene Fathers: Volume 3: Latin
Christianity: Its founder, Tertullian I. Apologetic; II. Anti-Marcion; III. Ethical, eds. Alexander Roberts and James
Donaldson [Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1995], I [521]); insofar as Henry redefines the muscles and
bones of Tertullian’s analysis into a monadic, organless flesh. Other commenters have noted this irony, and
suggested that, against his own intentions, Henry ends up advocating something like a Valentinian Gnosticism. As
Hart argues: “Henry’s ‘philosophy of Christianity,’ at least in C’est moi la vérité, ends up being closer to certain
strains of Gnosticism than to the current that became orthodox Christianity” (Kevin Hart, “The Reduction of
Scripture” in The Journal of Scriptural Reasoning, 13, no. 1 [2014]). This argument is more fully worked out in Jad
Hatem, Le sauveur et les viscères de l’être: Sur le gnosticisme et Michel Henry (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004); Paul
Clavier, “Un tournant gnostique de la phénoménologie française? à propos des Paroles du Christ de Michel Henry,”
Revue thomiste 105, no. 2 (2005): 307-315; and Rivera, The Contemplative Self After Michel Henry, 160-166, 198199.
For a phenomenological reading of Tertullian that remains closer to the text and contemporary patristic scholarship,
see: Emmanuel Falque, God, the Flesh, and the Other: From Irenaeus to Duns Scotus, trans. William Christian
Hackett (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2015), 143-166. It is worth noting that, despite his differences
with Henry, Falque offers a kinder assessment of Henry than those above: “it should be understood that I agree with
the interpretation of Tertullian that Henry gives in Incarnation. If we can hold that ‘the flesh is life auto-affected in
the Son by the Father’ (and here we would depend more on Irenaeus than Tertullian), the density and solidity of the
flesh is such in Tertullian that it is related also to the ‘body’ and not only to the lived experience of the flesh. One
would be surprised to find Gnostic leanings in an author who relies on the most virulent anti-Gnostic thinkers to
develop his theses (see §24)!” Ibid., 324 n. 68 [emphasis added].
72

“Rather than doing classical Thomism (which seemed to us anyway too wrapped up in metaphysics, in
Heidegger’s sense), we were spontaneously inclined to a study of the Fathers and the history of spirituality. I recall
having done workshops on the Epistle to the Hebrews, Dionysius, Saint Augustine, [and] Maximus the Confessor.”
Marion, The Rigor of Things, 22.
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that could address postmodern concerns with metaphysics.73 Therefore, in works like The Idol and
Distance and In Excess, Marion would turn to Gregory of Nyssa and Dionysius 74—who function
for him much like Irenaeus for von Balthasar or Tertullian for Henry—in order to conceptualize
an ontological difference deeper and more substantive than Heidegger’s,75 and to challenge
Derrida’s reading of the (im)possibility of the gift and the possibility of a saturated phenomenon.76
This influence would be so apparent that Levinas supposedly once remarked that “Marion has his
Talmud, namely the Fathers of the Church!”77
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“The Fathers found themselves in a premetaphysical position, hence not yet in the (metaphysical) situation, in
which we probably really are no longer. At the time of the Fathers, metaphysics was not yet constituted as a system;
one can reasonably say today that this constitution is accomplished, historically, with Duns Scotus and extends all
the way to Nietzsche. The Fathers, for the most part, obviously thought before this system of metaphysics and even
without knowing its medieval basis, with Aristotle’s corpus and its various successive introductions.” Ibid., 132. As
Graham Ward notes, “it is in grasping the roots of modernity that Marion’s postmodern thinking sees the possibility
of returning to the premodern world which de Lubac, Daniélou and Gilson had reintroduced into early twentieth
century French Catholicism.” Graham Ward, “Introducing Jean-Luc Marion,” New Blackfriars, 76, No. 895
(July/August, 1995), “Special Issue on Jean-Luc Marion’s God without Being,” 323.
74

“He cites some of the earliest Christian figures and apologists—Ignatius of Antioch, Clement of Rome, and Justin
Martyr— as well as the Alexandrians— Clement, Origen, and Athanasius. He is clearly familiar with all three of the
Cappadocians, and they appear throughout his writings. He cites Ambrose and Augustine, the formative ecumenical
councils of the fourth and fifth centuries, John of Damascus, Theodore the Studite, and Maximus the Confessor.
However, the influence most frequently present to Marion’s thought is found in the writings collected under the
name of Dionysius the Areopagite.” Tamsin Jones, A Genealogy of Marion’s Phenomenology of Religion: Apparent
Darkness (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), 14. See, also: Wayne J. Hankey, “Jean-Luc Marion’s
Dionysian Neoplatonism” in Perspectives sur la néoplatonisme, International Society for Neoplatonic Studies, Actes
du colloque de 2006, ed. Martin Achard, Wayne Hankey, Jean-Marc Narbonne (Québec: Le Presses de l’Université
Laval, 2009), 267-280.
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Here undoubtedly drawing upon von Balthasar’s “fourth difference.” As Marion describes the project, “by way of
the Nietzschean threshold, I shall enter into commerce with other border territories of onto-theology: Hölderlin and
Denys the Areopagite. … the same question seemed to me to traverse these figures—that which is formulated here,
according to the naming that I brought it, by distance: a distance outside of onto-theology for Nietzsche, a filially
received distance of the presence of a God who is paternally in withdrawal for Hölderlin, and a distance traversed
liturgically toward the Requisite by the discourse of praise of requestants for Denys.” Marion, The Idol and
Distance, 147-148. The importance of the Dionysian move is highlighted by the books dedication “To Denys.” Ibid.,
v.
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As he writes for example, “the saturated phenomenon par excellence—the principle, [is] declined in perfectly
autonomous registers, where it gives itself to be seen, each time, only according to a perspective that is total as well
as partial, conceivable and always incomprehensible: being in the act of Being, one before unity, truth of oneself and
of the world, invisible splendor, etc. (Plotinus, Proclus, Dionysius, etc.).” Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given: Toward a
Phenomenology of Givenness, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 210.
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Emmanuel Levinas, as recalled by Marion in The Rigor of Things, 133.
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D. Theological Content: Gift, Distance, and Love
While there are innumerable theological similarities between Henry and Marion’s radical
phenomenologies and Communio theology, it will be helpful here to limit the discussion to three
closely related terms, that will be preparatory for a discussion of sexuality: gift, distance, and love.
As we have already seen in chapter 3, givenness is the central thematic of Marion’s
phenomenology. Thus in Marion’s reading of Husserl, it is not intuition, but givenness
(gegebenheit) that has primacy. The same can be said of Henry. For, it should be recalled that
Henry’s radical phenomenology aims at phenomena in their “How” (Wie), which Henry
immediately glosses as givenness, “in the ‘How’ of their givenness.”78 Indeed, Henry marks the
self-affectivity of Life not only as a unique mode of givenness, but as the Archi-revelation: the
very “givenness of givenness.”79 Even the flesh itself is understood as “a power of givenness.”80
In Marion’s Being Given this phenomenological concern for givenness is drawn into conversation
with the ongoing French debate around “the Gift.”
According to the French sociologist Marcel Mauss’ study of gift exchange in so-called
“archaic societies” (particularly those of the American Pacific Northwest and Polynesia), rather
than extra-economic, gift exchange is marked by its social and economic character. The notion of
a “free gift,” is a “polite fiction, formalism, and social deceit, … when really there is obligation
and economic self-interest.”81 Within the French philosophical community, this opened up a
debate surrounding the possibility of gift-giving as such. As Jacques Derrida writes:
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Henry, Incarnation, 23.
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Michel Henry, “Le corps vivant,” in Auto-donation: entretiens et conférences (Paris: Beauchesne, 2004), 127.
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Henry, Incarnation, 120.
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Marcel Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchanges in Archaic Societies, trans W. D. Halls (New York:
W. W. Norton, 1990), 3.
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If there is gift, the given of the gift … must not come back to the giving. … It must
not circulate, it must not be exchanged, it must not in any case be exhausted, as a
gift, by the process of exchange, by the movement of circulation of the circle in the
form of return to the point of departure. … It is perhaps in this sense that the gift is
impossible.82
That is to say, a gift, rightly given, should be given freely and without conditions. But, at least
according to Derrida’s reading of Mauss, every gift is ultimately reinscribed within the economic
sphere. Thus it seems that the naive notion of simply “giving a gift” is undermined. Rather, as
Derrida suggests, every gift is also a Gift—in the German sense; that is, a poison. To give a gift is,
at the same time, to give an obligation to reciprocate.83
For both Henry and Marion the problematic of the gift demands a response that is both
phenomenological and theological, for gift and self-givenness are, for both, central theological
motifs, particularly integral to any understanding of the relationship between God and creation or
of the erotic relationship.84 But this is not a novel innovation of radical phenomenology, but rather
one again finds clear precedence in Communio theology.
According to von Balthasar, self-givenness is at the heart of divine reality. The very
internal distinctions of the Godhead are themselves products of gift-giving: to be begotten is to
have received a gift. Thus, on von Balthasar’s kenotic account of the generation of the second
person of the trinity, “the Father strips himself, without remainder, of his Godhead and hands it
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Jacques Derrida, Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1992), 7.
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It is worth noting that, despite Marion’s reading, Derrida does not actually seem to mark the gift as impossible in
the colloquial sense. Rather, Derrida marks the inevitability of reinscription within the economic sphere as an
impossible condition of possibility; a destabilizing condition that renders the simple gift discursively unstable, but
does not necessary exclude the gift tout court.
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“Givenness; showing; phenomenalization; unveiling; uncovering; appearance; manifestation; and revelation. … It
cannot escape us that there key words for phenomenology are also, in large measure, key terms for religion, or
theology.” Henry, Incarnation, 23.
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over to the Son.”85 But this self-givenness is not limited to the sphere of divinity, rather it likewise
marks the essence of the created order. To be a creature is to have been given the gift of Being.86
Likewise, John Paul II expressly interprets creation through the “hermeneutic of the gift.”
Accordingly, he writes, “as an action of God, creation thus means not only calling from nothing to
existence, … it also signifies gift; a fundamental and ‘radical’ gift, that is, an act of giving in which
the gift comes into being precisely from nothing.”87
It would be impossible here to miss the direct correlation between these notions of a
receptive being and Marion’s refiguring of the subject as “the gifted” (l’adonné), that which
“receives itself entirely from what it receives.”88 Marion undoubtedly understands the gifted—
who receives itself from “revelation”—in von Balthasarian terms. To be the gifted is to have
received oneself from a phenomenon that gives itself without condition (Marion), or in von
Balthasar’s words: “a revelation of [God’s] glory needs no justification but itself.”89
Although Henry tends to use the notion of self-givenness in a more autistic sense, as giving
oneself to oneself—rather than as the self-givenness of the phenomenon to itself (von
Balthasar/Marion90)—his theological writings nevertheless ultimately recapitulate precisely these
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Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory: Volume IV: The Action, trans. Graham
Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 323.
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As Kilby notes, “it is never on Balthasar’s account a question of possessing anything … [but rather] on passivity
and receptivity, on our being seized, transported, transformed.” Kilby, Balthasar, 55.
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John Paul II, Man and Women He Created Them, 180.
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Marion, Being Given, 268.

89

Von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: Volume I, 140. This connection is by no means forced, Marion himself
makes it explicit, privileging “Balthasar’s argument … that Revelation has no conditions of possibility except
itself.” Marion, The Rigor of Things, 26.
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“It is the kind of evidence that emerges and sheds light from the phenomenon itself.” Von Balthasar, The Glory of
the Lord: Volume I, 464.
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theological commitments, here under the figure of Archi-givenness. For Henry, prior to the
givenness of the self to itself in its immanent flesh, the self is first given to itself by an Archigivenness, whereby Life (i.e. God) generates the living.91 As Henry notes in Communio, “that
which is ‘given from above’ [John 19.11], [is] the Archi-givenness of life to all life.”92 Thus, the
passivity or receptivity of the self to itself,93 is ultimately grounded in a deeper receptivity of the
living to Life, of the creature to God. In the words of Paul, cited by Henry in Incarnation, “what
do you have that you did not receive? And if you received it, why do you boast as if it were not a
gift?”94
For each of these figures, the giving and receiving of a gift is generative of difference and
distance.95 Thus, although colloquially we understand the gift as creating unity,96 it is here more
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“Because the most ordinary of these powers are given in absolute Life, their gift is of a singular character. … The
present that Life gives to the living—of its life, its Self, its flesh, and each of the powers that compose it—is nothing
from which it could separate itself. This impossibility is two-fold. Inscribed in givenness, given to itself in absolute
life’s self-givenness, generated in its Self in its Arch-Ipseity, and passible in its Arch-passibility, where each of these
powers is exerted in the heart of an Arch-power, the gift of life that is internally built up in the latter only subsists
within it.” Henry, Incarnation, 175. As Henry will later affirm, “a flesh such as ours … is incapable of being selfsufficient, of bringing itself into life.” Michel Henry, Words of Christ, trans. Christina M. Gschwandtner (Grand
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2012), 50.
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“Que cette ‘donation d’en haut,’ l’Archi-donation de la vie à toute vie.” Michel Henry, “Incarnation” in Michel
Henry, Les Dossier H: Michel Henry (Paris: L'Âge d'Homme, 2009), 105 [translation my own].
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See: Michel Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, trans. G.J. Etzkorn (New York: Springer, 1973), §§25-26.
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1 Cor. 4.7 NRSV. Cited in Henry, Incarnation, 177.
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Remarkably, this even seems to be true for the late Henry. For, in his differentiation of immanence first into Life
and the living, and then subsequently by the imposition of a distinction between the Father and the Archi-Son within
Life, Henry imposes (something at least very like) a distance and this, despite his contestations to the contrary (e.g.
his assertion of a “unity of the Father and the Son … [which is] not an ecstatic and abstract unity.” Michel Henry,
Words of Christ, trans. Christina M. Gschwandtner [Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2012], 89).
Thus for example, Life at least logically, even if not temporally, precedes the living: “the gift of Life in us, this gift
which always precedes us.” Ibid., 121. This may reflect an instance where theological concerns (maintaining the
unity of the persons of the Godhead, avoiding too closely identifying the soul and God) seem to have overridden the
Henry’s phenomenological considerations.
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As Kilby writes, “in general, we do not think of giving, and in particular giving of oneself, as creating distance,
difference, separation between giver and receiver—at least not unless something goes wrong.” Kilby, Balthasar,
110.

214

properly understood as generative of a unity-in-difference, a community. Due to the kenotic selfgift of the Father to the Son, for example, there remains “an absolute, infinite ‘distance’”97 between
the members of the Godhead. Here, Marion’s reading of Dionysian “hierarchy” is instructive.
Rather than representing degrees of power or control—as in contemporary usage which “our
modernity forbids us straight away from understanding correctly” 98—the Dionysian hierarchy is
grounded in the notion of the self-giving gift, wherein each rung of the ladder gives itself to the
rung below. Thus it is not power that generates difference, but ultimately, love: “hierarchy has an
ecstatic origin in the excessive love that goes out of itself to create.”99
In this way, gift and distance are ultimately reducible to love: and one should therefore not
be surprised when Marion’s “reduction to givenness” becomes, in The Erotic Phenomenon, “the
erotic reduction.” According to von Balthasar, for example, the Father’s gift of Himself to the Son,
is a gift given in love, is in fact nothing other than the love that the Father is; for, “‘being = giving.’
It is in giving that one is and has.”100 Likewise, Benedict XVI took the occasion of his first
encyclical to write of the self-giving love of God in Deus Caritas Est: “since God has first loved
us (cf. 1 Jn 4:10), love is now no longer a mere ‘command’; it is the response to the gift of love
with which God draws near to us.”101 For Henry, in the Archi-givenness of the self, “it is the
unlimited intoxication of life, the Arch-pleasure of its eternal love in its Word, its Spirit, that
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submerges us.”102 And for Marion, in the search for an answer to the question “does anyone love
me?,” one only finds an answer in the one who loved first: “I discover that this first lover, from
the very beginning, is named God.”103
But here one should not be confused, this self-givenness of love is not simply reducible to
the love of agape—the amor benevolentiae. Rather, Communio has universally marked the central
thesis of Anders Nygren’s Agape and Eros104 as an overreach. As Benedict XVI remarks, “the
more [agape and eros], in their different aspects, find a proper unity in the one reality of love, the
more the true nature of love in general is realized. … Fundamentally, ‘love’ is a single reality.”105
In like manner, von Balthasar insists upon “an indissoluble union of agapê and erôs, of the glory
of God and the beauty of the soul.”106
In Marion, this becomes the univocity of love.107 “It’s not a question of two parallel or
opposed loves,” he writes, “but of two modes of the same love: creatures, myself or my brother,
can therefore be loved, and even loved with enjoyment, provided that they come to be loved in the
enjoyment of God.”108 In this way, eros, even sexuality, will be fundamentally understood through
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the paradigm of the gift. As Henry writes, in the erotic encounter, one “gives his or her body and
thus not only gives their body, but also this gift itself: their freedom.”109 With this propaedeutic of
the gift, distance, and love, it will now be possible to turn to the ultimate concern: Communio’s
theology of sexuality.

§II: Sexual Difference, The Nuptial Body
A. The Primacy of Sexual Difference
If, as suggested above, Communio is not conservative in a traditional sense, where does its popular
designation as a “conservative” school of Catholic theology come from? Certainly this is in part
due to its oppositional relation to Concilium—widely regarded as “progressive”—, its seeming
backward-facing posture in regards to the patristics, and its resistance to liberation theology. But
most directly, this perspective seems to stem from what is regarded as its reactionary sexual ethic.
Having risen to prominence during a period of intense intra-Catholic debate regarding birth
control, abortion, homosexuality, and female ordination, the themes of sexuality and gender figure
prominently among Communio thinkers. As Mongrain notes, von Balthasar “sided with the
Vatican in opposition to women’s ordination, artificial contraception, and optional clerical
celibacy,” in a manner, Mongrain continues, often “nasty and bitter.”110 John Paul II’s Man and
Woman He Created Them likewise centers sexuality—Kerr naming it “a Christian anthropology
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of sexual difference,”111 but, in such a manner that it is often read as a mere apology for the
traditionalist sexual ethics of Paul VI’s Humanae Vitae. As Johnson writes, “by the time [John
Paul II] reaches his explicit discussion of Humanae Vitae, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion
that every earlier textual choice and phenomenological reflection has been geared to a defense of
Paul VI’s encyclical.”112
This traditionalist stance is central, because, in Communio thinking, discussions of sexual
difference are not merely restricted to one corner of moral theology or theological anthropology.
Rather, sexual difference saturates Communio theology.113 As Beattie puts it, “Balthasar’s
theology oozes sex.”114 From communion115 and ecclesiology, to trinitarian theology and
Mariology, nearly every aspect of Communio theology is read through the hermeneutic of sexual
difference.116 Indeed, Moss and Gardner ask: “is Balthasar’s genius to have recognized that it has
been decided that sexual difference is the question of our age?”117 This focus upon sexual
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difference likewise holds for Henry and Marion. For each, sexual difference is ultimately a central
thematic even if, as we have seen, it appears in Marion as a principal ideological figure, and in
Henry only in a disavowed manner, as the underside of his supposed transcendental asexuality.
For Communio theology, sexual difference is anthropologically ultimate: “there is no
‘sexless’ first man.”118 This is understood both historically—there was no historical androgyne—
and ontologically—the human person is male or female all the way down. As von Balthasar writes:
The male body is male throughout, right down to each cell of which it consists, and
the female body is utterly female; and this is also true of the whole empirical
experience and ego-consciousness. At the same time both share an identical human
nature, but at no point does it protrude, neutrally, beyond the sexual difference, as
if to provide neutral ground for mutual understanding. Here there is no universale
ante rem, as all theories of a nonsexual or bisexual (androgynous) primitive human
being would like to think.119
Here, it seems one finds a theory of sexual difference quite close to that proposed by Marion’s
heavily gendered account of sexuality. Conversely, von Balthasar seems to deny precisely the
transcendental a-sexuality that Henry affirms. “Balthasar attempts,” as Crammer argues, “to affirm
the dignity and worth of women, in contrast to theology that has either ignored women or elided
them into a false universal of ‘man,’ meant to include all humans but which on closer examination
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appears to be male.”120 To borrow an image from von Balthasar, humanity is like a symphony; and
just as “a bass trumpet is not the same as a piccolo; a cello is not a bassoon,”121 so too are men and
women fundamentally different, in an irreducible manner. It is only through a recognition of this
difference, that men and women can sound together as one symphony.
The logic underlying this symphonic metaphor is central to Communio theology, for the
affirmation of an irreducible sexual difference between men and women is regarded as a necessary
component of human dignity.122 Any demand for respect and justice must necessarily be made in
deference to the unique symmetry of man and woman—their complementarity. “Man,” von
Balthasar argues, “is always in communion with his counter-image, woman, and yet never reaches
her. The converse is true of woman.”123 This quasi-symmetrical relationship renders each sex, on
its own incomplete. Only in its relationship to its other, its converse, is one sex able to find its
fulfillment: “anything that diminishes sexual difference by allowing incursions of one sex into the
other’s natural role damages a critical balance, with baleful consequences.”124
In this way, von Balthasar is able to simultaneously affirm and deny the equality of the
sexes. Theologically speaking, man and woman are essentially equal (wesensgleich) before God.
But, as Crammer notes, “equality between the sexes is held in tension with a kind of hierarchy.”125
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For, following Paul’s assertion in 1st Corinthians, “the husband is the head of his wife,”126 von
Balthasar likewise posits a certain “primacy of the man.”127 Authority, particularly authority within
the church, is restricted to men, whereas women are cast in the role of submissive recipients of the
grace of the (masculine) priest.128
While “John Paul II has a more egalitarian understanding of the relationship between man
and woman than … Balthasar,”129 he nevertheless argues with equal insistence upon the
primordiality of sexual difference, or as he terms it: the “spousal meaning” of the body.
Methodologically centered in his pseudo-phenomenological recourse to experience, John Paul II
identifies sexual difference as a phenomenologically intuitable fact, for which one need only turn
to the “evidence of their own body in its masculinity and femininity.” 130 Yet, whereas von
Balthasar insists upon the absolute nature of this sexual difference, John Paul II’s personalism
marks this difference as penultimate, always second to the subjectivity of the individual person.
Thus he writes, for example, “although in its normal constitution, the human body carries within
itself the signs of sex and is by its nature male or female, the fact that man is a ‘body’ belongs
more deeply to the structure of the personal subject than the fact that in his somatic constitution he
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is also male or female.”131 The result of this subordination of sexual difference to a primary
embodiment is an emphasis upon a more egalitarian complementarianism. “Thus while he strongly
objects to the ‘masculinization’ of woman,” Sutton argues, “he insists, more convincingly than …
Balthasar, on her dignity and equality with man.”132 Nevertheless, one is here dealing in shades of
emphasis rather than structural disagreements; for, like von Balthasar, John Paul II will ultimately
institute an asymmetrical (and hierarchical) relationship between the sexes, stating that “the
husband is above all the one who loves and the wife, by contrast, is the one who is loved”; 133 the
husband is active, the wife is passive.
This distinction between the “active man” and “passive woman” is a defining feature of
Communio theology’s account of sexual difference—as we saw in Marion and Henry. Thus, as
Kilby remarks of von Balthasar, for example, “to be male is to be strong, to take initiative, to be
active and goal-oriented; to be woman is to be open, receptive, surrendering, passive, to be
characterized by weakness and dependence, to be contemplative.”134 Certainly, this feminine
passivity should not be understood as a total submission of woman to man. As Crammer notes, for
von Balthasar this “is an active passivity, arguably the opposite of passivity, since consent
(obedience) must be freely given and this consent-giving is active.”135 Nevertheless, this caveat
has done little to soothe the concerns of von Balthasar’s critics. As Kilby argues, “to speak of these
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characteristics as fundamentally womanly, however, is, in the first instance at least, to see [women]
not in relation to God but in relation to men.”136
In John Paul II this submission is rendered in more egalitarian terms as a reciprocal
submission: “love excludes every kind of submission by which the wife would become a servant
or slave of the husband, an object of one-sided submission. Love makes the husband
simultaneously subject to the wife.”137 Moreover, for both von Balthasar and John Paul II, despite
its feminine character, submission or obedience is a virtue for both men and women. Nevertheless,
precisely as Henry will later make thematic—in his analysis of the “the feminine character of
anxiety”138—even when passivity is attributed to men, it is nevertheless still understood as a
characteristically feminine comportment. Certainly, just as in Henry, von Balthasar “is portraying
women as ahead of the game, having the edge over the men, precisely in this weakness,
dependence, and surrender.”139 But, as we saw in chapter 2, regardless of the positive tenor given
to passivity, it is nevertheless the case that this conception tends to lend itself towards the
objectification of the passive woman, by the active man; as Beattie argues in strong terms, “to
describe a sexual relationship in terms of active man taking possession of passive woman sounds
dangerously close to offering a theological justification for rape.”140 Moreover, insofar as
submission is essentially feminine, it becomes an irreducible character of feminine being, whereas
it is merely a contingent or accidental feature of masculine being. Thus, while men “are able also
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to be female and receptive,” particularly in their relationship to God, “women cannot in turn also
be active.”141
According to Crammer, who analyzes this recourse to sexual difference through Thomas
Laqueur’s distinction between one-sex and two-sex paradigms of sexual difference,142 this
privilege of the male ends up, in spite of its intention, recapitulating a one-sex paradigm: “despite
his attempt to construct a two-sex theological anthropology, … ultimately Balthasar reproduces
the one-sex model in which the normative human being is implicitly male and Woman’s definition
is based around Man, particularly around what Man is seen to need Woman to be.”143 Or, in the
words of Beattie:
This account of sexual complementarity entails not the affirmation but the
eradication of genuine difference. If woman is man’s fullness, coming forth from
within him, there cannot also be a “polarity of man and woman.’’ Woman is
variously described by von Balthasar as man’s “answering word,” his “answering
gaze,’ the “vessel of fulfilment specially designed for him.” But an answer, to be
relevant and comprehensible, is defined by and bound to the question. If woman is
the answer to man, she can exist only within the parameters of the man’s
question.144
A similar critique is leveled against John Paul II, by Johnson:
John Paul II wants for example, to have the term “man” mean both male and female.
But the Genesis 2 account pushes him virtually to equate “man” with “male,” with
the unhappy result that males experience both the original solitude the pope wants
to make distinctively human as well as the dominion over creation expressed by the
naming of animals. Females inevitably appear as “helpers” and as complementary
to the already rather complete humanity found in the male. In virtually none of his
further reflections on sexuality do women appear as moral agents: Men can have
lust in their hearts but not women, men can struggle with concupiscence but
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apparently women do not; men can exploit their wives sexually but women can’t
exploit their husbands sexually.145
Here one finds a curious, though incredibly important, reversal. Whereas von Balthasar,
John Paul II, and Marion all seek to affirm sexual difference in its strongest terms, they
nevertheless—through their affirmation of gendered stereotypes and implicit diminishing of
feminine subjectivity—end up recapitulating an account that, rather than the opposite of the
Henrian “universal male,” is merely its photo-negative; “the same old story of the same old
sameness.”146 Just as Henry’s attempt to erase difference eventuated in a stereotyped notion of
sexual difference, so too does von Balthasar, John Paul II, and Marion’s converse recourse to
stereotyped notions of sexual difference eventuate in an erasure of difference. Despite all initial
signs to the contrary, Henry’s transcendental asexuality and Marion’s heavily gendered account
of sexual difference amount to one and the same thing: the submission of the feminine and the
erasure of sexual minorities.

B. Feminism and Queer Sexuality
Insofar as Communio theology tends to think sexual difference in traditional imagery, it has largely
regarded secular feminism as a direct threat. For, as Alenka Zupančič, argues:
The traditional division between masculine and feminine worlds, … actually does
not see sexual difference as difference, but as a question of belonging to two
separate worlds, which are ‘different’ from a neutral bird’s-eye description, but
otherwise coexist as integral parts in the hierarchy of a higher cosmic order, the
wholeness and unity of which is in no way threatened by this ‘difference.’ These
are parts that ‘know their place.’ And feminism (as a political movement) puts in
question, and breaks, precisely this unity of the world.147
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Thus, in his critique of calls for female ordination, von Balthasar sources this demand in the
“worldwide offensive of ‘feminism’.”148 According to von Balthasar, feminists—“whom,”
Crammer notes, “he appears to group together in an undifferentiated whole”149—demand an
equality with men that can only take the form of an erasure of sexual difference: “an unnatural
masculinization of woman or a leveling of the difference between the sexes.”150 This, according
to von Balthasar, is a result of an increasingly technologized and “history-less” society. “Where
positivistic, technology-oriented thinking succeeds in reigning supreme,” he writes, “the female
element also vanishes from the attitude of the man.”151
Here one might note a critique of technology and its “culture of death,” that runs across
most every Communio theology. Consider the similarities between the following propositions:
Meaning can be found only in creating a vital force against history-less,
technologized existence, in abstaining from the artificial superabundance of life.
(Von Balthasar)152
This neo-Manichean culture has led, for example, to human sexuality being
regarded more as an area for manipulation and exploitation than as the basis of that
primordial wonder which led Adam on the morning of creation. (John Paul II) 153
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[The child] cannot be desired or conceived as the product of an intervention of
medical or biological techniques; that would be equivalent to reducing him to an
object of scientific technology. (Cardinal Ratzinger)154
Science has reduced the living transcendental Self to a dead object of the Galilean
field. … Everywhere such a metaphysical situation is produced: everywhere a man
or a woman is only an object, a dead thing, a network of neurons, a bundle of natural
processes, … one is put in the presence of a man or a woman but finds oneself in
the presence of what, stripped of the transcendental Self that constitutes its essence,
is no longer anything, is only death. … Men treated mathematically, digitally,
statistically, … Men turned away from Life’s Truth. (Michel Henry)155
Bio-technological manipulations or socio-medical traffickings … would reduce
[the child] to the rank of a manufactured object, bought and sold; … moreover, the
obsession with possessing the thing, what one then calls “my” child, can easily go
hand in hand with its being forgotten out of indifference, its instrumentalization by
convenience, or even its destruction by mistreatment. (Jean-Luc Marion)156
For each of these figures, the modern world—understood to also be a masculine world—is
dominated by technologization, standardization, and objectification. Thus, the passive receptivity
of the feminine stands as a final bulwark against the total loss of culture to the “barbarism” of
modernity—a barbarism most visible in the realms of sexuality and reproduction. From this
perspective, feminism not only represents the erasure of sexual difference, but the possibility of a
total erasure of humanity’s unique character: “such a change would totally destroy the disturbed
balance, level the all-fructifying difference between the sexes in favor of an asexuality (with male
indications, however) and consume humanity’s last ideological reserves.”157
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For these thinkers, the feminist attack on sexual difference, and the family, has likewise
given rise to philosophies of gender that further threaten the traditional family, through the
normalization and propagation of queer sexualities. As Benedict XVI (then Cardinal Ratzinger)
writes, in a letter approved by John Paul II:
A second tendency emerges in the wake of the first. In order to avoid the domination
of one sex or the other, their differences tend to be denied, viewed as mere effects
of historical and cultural conditioning. In this perspective, physical difference,
termed sex, is minimized, while the purely cultural element, termed gender, is
emphasized to the maximum and held to be primary. The obscuring of the difference
or duality of the sexes has enormous consequences on a variety of levels. This theory
of the human person, intended to promote prospects for equality of women through
liberation from biological determinism, has in reality inspired ideologies which, for
example, call into question the family, in its natural two-parent structure of mother
and father, and make homosexuality and heterosexuality virtually equivalent, in a
new model of polymorphous sexuality.158
This critique of queer sexuality can certainly be traced back to Christian moral theology’s
condemnations of sodomy and other homosexual and autoerotic activities. But within the modern
period, it is John Paul II’s Veritas Splendor, which was the first encyclical to link homosexuality
to what John Paul II would later name a “new ideology of evil,” in opposition to “the traditional
conception of the natural law” whereby “contraception, direct sterilization, autoeroticism, premarital sexual relations, homosexual relations and artificial insemination were condemned as
morally unacceptable.”159
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For Communio thinkers, there are three principle critiques of queer sexuality. In von
Balthasar, queer sexuality is directly linked to a narcissistic autoeroticism and self-idolatry.
“Homosexuality is so ruinous,” von Balthasar writes, “because here man has caught sight of his
own beauty and made it into an object. If the male is involved, he has likewise objectivized his
God-willed superiority. No being, as a matter of fact, should enmesh himself in the love that seeks
full satisfaction in beauty, which a special grace graciously conceals from him.”160 For von
Balthasar, homosexuality is an erasure of sexual difference that glorifies the “same” of sexual
homogeneity.
The second and third critiques can already be found in John Paul II’s early work,
particularly Love & Responsibility. There one finds both a slippery slope argument and an
argument from reproduction, both akin to what will be later reproduced in Marion’s The Erotic
Phenomenon. Thus, for example, John Paul II directly links fetishistic fascination with sexual
attributes, homosexuality, and bestiality as chains in a single logic of “perversion”:
The sexual urge in a human being is always directed towards another human
being—this is the normal form which it takes. If it is directed towards the sexual
attributes as such this must be recognized as an impoverishment or even a
perversion of the urge. If it is directed towards the sexual attributes of a person of
the same sex we speak of a homosexual deviation. Still more emphatically do we
speak of sexual deviation if the urge is directed not towards the sexual attributes of
a human being but towards those of an animal. The natural direction of the sexual
urge is towards a human being of the other sex.161
For this text, these various forms of sexuality constitute perversions precisely because they diverge
from the exclusive site of sexual intimacy. As John Paul II writes, “the union of man and woman
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needs a suitable framework, one which permits the full development of the sexual relationship
while ensuring the durability of their union. Such a union is, of course, called marriage.” 162 But
this is not just any marriage, for “attempts to solve the problem of marriage other than by
monogamy (which implies indissolubility) are incompatible with the personalistic norm and fall
short of its strict demand.”163 For John Paul II, it is only the monogamous, indissoluble,
heterosexual marriage which can be the site of sexual union. This necessity follows from two
demands, first the personalistic norm, which demands respect for individual persons, and second,
the natural law:164 “a man and woman who, as husband and wife, unite in a full sexual relationship
thereby enter into the realm of what can properly be called the order of nature.” 165 Moreover, the
singular object of this nature is reproduction, “sexual intercourse, on all occasions, is in the nature
of things affected in one way or another by its primary purpose, procreation.”166
This argument will subsequently be rearticulated in Man and Woman He Created Them,
There John Paul II inscribes this procreative objective directly into the body itself, writing of the
“spousal nature” of the body revealed most conspicuously in reproduction: “there is inserted, in a
future-related perspective, the procreative meaning of the body, that is, fatherhood and
motherhood.”167 Here, in passages whose very language is almost identical to Marion’s, the child
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marks the culmination of eros, the call of futurity, the “third” which seals love. “Procreation,” John
Paul II writes, “brings it about that ‘the man and the woman (his wife)’ know each other
reciprocally in the ‘third,’ originated in both.”168
Insofar as many queer sexualities cannot procreate, they are written out of this account of
sexuality and love. As Johnson notes, John Paul II’s phenomenological descriptions—much like
Marion’s phenomenological descriptions in The Erotic Phenomenon—quietly slip from the merely
descriptive to the normative.
What appears in the guise of description serves prescription: human love and
sexuality can appear in only one approved form, with every other way of being
either sexual or loving left out altogether. Is it not important at least to acknowledge
that a significant portion of humans—even if we take a ludicrously low percentage,
at least tens of millions—are homosexual? Are they left outside of God’s plan if
they are not part of the biblical story? Would not an adequate phenomenology of
human sexuality, so concerned with ‘persons,’ after all, rather than statistics, take
with great seriousness this part of the human family, who are also called to be
loving, and in many fashions to create and foster the work and joy of creation?169
Here, queer sexuality finds itself erased from the biblical narrative, as well as the
phenomenological story of sexuality and love, precisely because it does not fit into the paradigm
of sexual difference and reproductive futurity demanded by the Communio sexual ethics.170
But, the scathing character of the Communio critique and erasure of queer sexuality is not
reducible to its conflict with natural law morality. Rather, the acerbic, even vitriolic tenor of this
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critique—“the new ideology of evil”!—is a consequence of a larger role of sexual difference in
Communio theology, one that extends well beyond the sphere of moral theology into the very heart
and identity of the Church itself.

C. From the Nuptial Body to Nuptial Ecclesiology
The figure of Mary stands at the intersection of two key discourses in Communio theology: sexual
difference and ecclesiology. For these thinkers, Mary is the epitome of femininity: she “is woman,
pure and simple, in whom everything feminine in salvation history is summed up.”171 But, at the
same time, she is the image of the church, which is called to “bear-Christ” and live responsively
and obediently.
In Mary two things become visible: first, that there is to be found the archetype of
a Church that conforms to Christ, and second, that Christian sanctity is ‘Christbearing,’ ‘Christophorous’ in essence and actualization. To the extent that the
Church is Marian, she is a pure form which is immediately legible and
comprehensible; and to the extent that Christians become Marian (or
‘Christophorous,’ which is the same thing), Christ becomes just as simply legible
and comprehensible in them as well.172
This feminine image of the church—the “bride of Christ” (viz. Eph. 5; II Cor. 11; Rom.
7)—is absolutely central to Communio ecclesiology, together with all of its associated stereotyped
notions of femininity (e.g. fecundity, humility, virginity, passivity, etc.). As one reads in
Ephesians:
Wives, be subject to your husbands as you are to the Lord. For the husband is the
head of the wife just as Christ is the head of the church, the body of which he is the
Savior. Just as the church is subject to Christ, so also wives ought to be, in
everything, to their husbands. Husbands, love your wives, just as Christ loved the
171
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church and gave himself up for her, in order to make her holy by cleansing her with
the washing of water by the word, so as to present the church to himself in splendor,
without a spot or wrinkle or anything of the kind—yes, so that she may be holy and
without blemish. In the same way, husbands should love their wives as they do their
own bodies. He who loves his wife loves himself. For no one ever hates his own
body, but he nourishes and tenderly cares for it, just as Christ does for the church,
because we are members of his body. “For this reason a man will leave his father
and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two will become one flesh.” This is a
great mystery, and I am applying it to Christ and the church. Each of you, however,
should love his wife as himself, and a wife should respect her husband.173
This tendency appears with considerable clarity and regularity in von Balthasar, who
suggests that the “ordered sexual relationship,” that is, the heterosexual nuptial relation, “exists in
Christian terms only in the encompassing space of the relationship of Christ-church, for which the
original relationship of Adam-Eve remains an eloquent parable. … Here the Church is wholly
female; it is conceiving, bearing, and giving birth to what she has received from Christ as his
fruitfulness.”174 As Crammer notes, von Balthasar here “associates masculinity with divinity, and
femininity with creation,”175 in a manner, it might be added, deeply reminiscent of Mary Daly’s
aphorism: “if God is male, then the male is God.”176 This nuptial relationship between Christ and
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church—and therefore sexual difference—is for von Balthasar “the central mystery of all
theology,”177 insofar as it gathers together the disparate disputes within the Church. Thus, for
example, von Balthasar’s insistence upon a masculine priesthood is emboldened by its analogical
relationship to the nuptial Christ-Church relation:
The institution [of the priesthood] guarantees the perpetual presence of Christ the
Bridegroom for the Church, his Bride. So it is entrusted to men who, though they
belong to the overall feminine modality of the Church, are selected from her and
remain in her to exercise their office; their function is to embody Christ, who comes
to the Church to make her fruitful.178
This turn to nuptiality will be continued and expanded by John Paul II’s Man and Women
He Created Them. Like von Balthasar before him, John Paul II expands the gendered categories
of his anthropology into an image of the greater union of the masculine Christ with the feminine
Church, who mutually “interpenetrate”179 one another. “To the marriage of the first husband and
wife [Adam and Eve], as a sign of the supernatural gracing of man in the sacrament of creation,
there corresponds the marriage, or rather the analogy of the marriage, of Christ with the Church,
as the fundamental great sign of the supernatural gracing of man in the sacrament of
redemption.”180
Yet, even more explicitly than von Balthasar, John Paul II insists upon the reciprocal nature
of this analogy. That is to say, the church is not only understood by consideration of nuptiality, but
inversely, the heterosexual nuptial relation is understood by consideration of the Christ-Church
relation. As he writes, “the comparison of marriage (due to spousal love) with the relationship
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between ‘Yahweh and Israel’ in the Old Covenant, and between ‘Christ and the Church’ in the
New, is at the same time decisive for the way of understanding marriage itself.”181 Therefore
heterosexual marriage, as the proper image of the Christ-Church relation, becomes the only licit
site for sexual intimacy. In this way, the necessarily heterosexual nature of the Communio sexual
ethic is authorized and insured by the very structure of the church itself.
In this regard, the theological motivation underlying Communio’s characteristically
traditionalist reaction to the sexual liberation, feminist, and queer liberation movements—their
retrenchment of heteronormativity and traditional gender roles—can be easily understood. The
connection of these sexual themes to the church’s very self-identity, through its nuptial
ecclesiology, almost inevitably fosters a dogmatic reading of sexual determination. Due to the
nuptial correlation, any rejection of a strict relegation of sexual intimacy to heterosexual marriage
subsequently strikes at the very meaning of the Church itself. According to Guy Hocquenghem,
homosexual flirtation is “a formidable power of disjunction, … [an] extremely efficient … nuptial
deconstructor.”182 But, for the Communio theologian, such a deconstruction of the ultimacy of the
heterosexual nuptial relation is a direct attack upon the very identity and ultimacy of the Church
itself—the “Bride of Christ.”
Even more strongly, insofar as the Bride of Christ, the Church, is understood as the medium
of the Holy Spirit’s activity in the world—for Communio affirms “the doctrine of a directly
proportional relationship between the institutional church and the Holy Spirit’s work in
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history”183—then any challenge to the primacy of heterosexual nuptiality is likewise a challenge
to the Spirit, and even the internal constitution of the Godhead. For, as Crammer notes, “sexual
difference, which permeates all creation, is derived analogously from something resembling sexual
difference, ‘suprasexuality,’ within the Trinity.”184 “In trinitarian terms,” von Balthasar writes,
“the Father, who begets him who is without origin appears primarily as (super-)masculine; the
Son, in consenting, appears initially as (super-)feminine.”185 Thus, at least for von Balthasar, the
nuptial relation of sexual difference is determinative of the very nature of the persons of the trinity.
To affirm queer sexuality would be, at the same time, to destabilize this very understanding of the
trinity itself.
While neither Henry nor Marion engages at length with ecclesiology, this nuptial theology
is nevertheless subtly determinative of their phenomenologies of sexual difference. Thus, for
example, the final division of Henry’s Incarnation is devoted to “salvation in the Christian
sense.”186 Yet, the internal unity of this section has often eluded commentators. As Karl Hefty
notes, “the intrinsic connections between the various parts of his analysis are here perhaps most
difficult to decipher: power, freedom, anxiety, sin, desire, passivity, eroticism—how do these
themes hold together under the subheading ‘salvation in the Christian sense’?”187 Communio
nuptial theology offers at least one possible explanation for this confluence of themes—
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particularly the extensive discussion of the erotic, sexual sin, passivity, and the closing meditations
on the body of Christ. Simply put, Henry seems here to be assuming, without explicitly marking
the debt, the central features of Communio nuptial theology; wherein, the heterosexual erotic
encounter between the active man and passive woman, is a model for the passive/receptive
relationship of members of the Church (Body of Christ) and God (Life).
Precisely the same model can be found in Marion’s The Erotic Phenomenon, where an
extended discourse on sexuality and the erotic culminates in a quasi-mystical experience of the
divine. But here—in a phenomenological recapitulation of medieval commentaries on The Song
of Songs—the experience of the divine is cast in decidedly erotic terms, here “God names himself
with the very name of love.”188 More importantly still, one should not discount the subtle gendered
language of these passages, following, as they do, Marion’s rather explicitly gendered account of
femininity. Here, God—or more specifically, the Christ; since God “ends up … identifying himself
in the incarnated Son”189—is the one who “loves first.” Christ, always gendered masculine, is the
active lover. Whereas the reader, the recipient of Christ’s love, takes on precisely those
characteristics of feminine sexuality as explicated by Marion above—passivity, receptivity, etc.
What one finds here, albeit in covert language, is nothing other than the erotic union of the
masculine Christ and the feminine church: or in Marion’s own language, “the nuptial distance that
weds, without confusing, the visible and the invisible.”190
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Given the consistent methodological and theological overlaps between Communio theology and
radical phenomenology, it therefore becomes quite unsurprising to find Henry and Marion’s
phenomenological analyses of sexuality and the flesh adopting an account of sexuality largely
congruent with this traditionalist approach. In fact, the emphasis upon the stereotyped notions of
sexual difference, the limitation of authentic love to heterosexual union, and the critique of
technological intervention, are not only completely consistent with official magisterial doctrine,
but more importantly, their justification borrows directly from Communio’s theological
hermeneutic. Simply put, it appears increasingly clear that Henry and Marion’s ostensibly pure
phenomenological analyses are, in this regard, marked by a pre-phenomenological—in this case,
theological—source.
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CHAPTER 5 - A Radical Phenomenology of the Sexual
Flesh
Pleasure does not derive from uniformity, for uniformity brings forth disgust and
makes us dull, not happy: this very principle is a law of delight.
G. W. F. Leibniz
According to Martin Heidegger, “higher than actuality stands possibility.”1 This is the definitive
role of phenomenology, to be a philosophy of the possible. For, already in Kant’s critical
philosophy, the priority of possibility over actuality is the guiding intuition of his transcendental
idealism,2 wherein the conditions of possibility of any experience are granted primacy over any
particular (viz. actual) experience. Even having abandoned Kant’s transcendental I, Heidegger
nevertheless recognizes this debt, glossing Kant:
[Kant states,] “I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so
much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects insofar as this
mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori.” Thus, transcendental knowledge does
not investigate the being itself but the possibility of the precursory comprehension
of the Being of the being.3
This is what Heidegger understands as the proper role of the phenomenological reduction, granting
access to the Being of beings.4
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Even Marion—who as we have seen, attempts to extend Heidegger’s decentering of the
constituting subject even further—maintains this priority of possibility, employing it in order to
mark the distinction between phenomenology and theology. As he writes:
Of itself, phenomenology can identify the saturated phenomenon of the being-given
par excellence only as a possibility—not only a possibility as opposed to actuality
but above all a possibility of donation itself. … Its phenomenological analysis
therefore bears only on its re-presentation, its ‘essence,’ and not directly on its
being-given. The intuitive realization of that being-given requires, more than
phenomenological analysis, the real experience of its donation, which falls to
revealed theology. Between phenomenology and theology, the border passes
between revelation as possibility and revelation as historicity. There could be no
danger of confusion between these domains.5
Thus, from Kant to Husserl, and from Heidegger to Marion, one can identify a distinct priority of
phenomenological possibility, which must precede, even anticipate any theological claims to
actuality. “Phenomenology from below,” Emmanuel Falque rightly recognizes, “precedes and
grounds any theology from above.”6
Thus, one might likewise postulate that any theological violence from above emerges from
a more primordial phenomenological failure from below. Put another way, the previous chapter’s
recourse to Communio theology is on its own insufficient to account for the patriarchy and
heteronormativity endemic to radical phenomenology. In order for these theological
presuppositions to take root, the phenomenological ground must already be fertile. Thus, the
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solution to this heteronormativity will not be found by simply evacuating these radical
phenomenologies of their theological content. On the contrary, it will now be suggested that Henry
and Marion’s phenomenologies of the flesh are themselves far from innocent. In Heideggerian
language, it is failure to properly articulate the ontological that has permitted Henry and Marion
to import an ontical account of sexuality—in place of a properly ontological account of the relation
between sexuality and the flesh. The first half of this chapter will therefore seek to diagnose this
phenomenological failure; while the second half will seek to undertake an alternative
phenomenology of the sexual flesh, avoiding the respective missteps of Henry and Marion—while
nonetheless seeking to remain true to the fundamental principles of their radical phenomenology.

§I: The Monadic Flesh
A. The Underlying Unity
The previous chapters have sought both to explicate Henry and Marion’s phenomenologies of the
flesh and to offer some basic critiques of their accounts of sexuality from the perspective of
feminist and queer theory. Throughout these analyses, it has been necessary to articulate both the
similarities and the evident differences between these two phenomenological philosophies. Thus,
for example, it was suggested above (chapter 3) that a fundamental division between the two
thinkers’ respective conceptions of radical phenomenology can be understood as a dispute
regarding the notion of self-givenness: understood as the auto-affection of the self in Henry and as
the self-givenness of the phenomenon to the gifted (hetero-affection) in Marion. This concern for
the “same” in Henry and the “different” in Marion is likewise recapitulated at the level of their
respective phenomenologies of sexuality: where Henry advocates a transcendental a-sexuality, and
Marion, an explicit recourse to traditional notions of binary sexual difference. Given these

241

divergent, if not ostensibly opposed accounts of sexual difference, it will be helpful here to begin
by articulating an underlying unity that justifies a univocal critique of these two unique figures.
A basic sketch of this commonality has already been seen above (chapter 4), in the figure
of Hans Urs von Balthasar. For as Crammer made clear in her critique of von Balthasar’s account
of sexual difference, a recourse to a traditional notion of a sexual hierarchy is by no means immune
to the critique of “sameness.”7 The result, Crammer argues in regard to von Balthasar, is a “onesex” model of sexual difference. To recall the words of Alenka Zupančič, “the traditional division
between masculine and feminine worlds, … actually does not see sexual difference as difference.”8
Exactly the same tendency can be seen in Marion. For despite a consistent, clear recourse
to sexual difference throughout Marion’s œuvre—just as his progenitors von Balthasar and John
Paul II—the feminine is nonetheless rendered secondary and subservient to the theoretical (and
theological) primacy of the masculine. The philosophical subject, as well as the subject of the
erotic encounter is always either explicitly or implicitly masculine, whereas the (passive) recipient
of the erotic caress is figured as distinctly feminine. Likewise, in the case of Henry, we have
already explicitly shown (chapter 2) the way in which the seeming “a-sexuality” of his
phenomenology actually masks an identical privilege of the masculine, the “universal male.”
Thus, rather than opposed, these two perspectives are simply two sides of the same coin,
photo-negatives of one another. Whether one defends a rigidly binary notion of sexual difference
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or seeks to erase sexual difference from the ultimate constitution of the subject entirely, the result
is the same: the erasure and denigration of the feminine and sexual minorities.
Are we therefore simply stuck with patriarchal and heteronormative accounts of sexuality,
regardless of whether one seeks to amplify or diminish sexual difference? The answer, is perhaps
yes, but only insofar as one presumes Henry and Marion’s account of the flesh. Thus, in order to
develop a phenomenology of sexuality that is not encumbered by these pre-phenomenological
prejudices, it will be necessary to, at the same time, reconsider the phenomenology of the flesh
itself. Indeed, in order to construct an account of sexual difference that can thread the Charybdis
of Henry’s transcendental a-sexuality and Scylla of Marion’s rigidly binary account of sexual
difference—one must here undertake a phenomenology of the sexual flesh that neither erases the
fundamental role of sexual difference nor reduces individuals to pre-established roles within a
sexual hierarchy.
But, before undertaking this positive phenomenological project, it will be necessary to
name precisely that point where Henry and Marion’s respective phenomenologies have gone
astray. Here I will draw forward a name to which I have periodically referred, but have not yet
given a formal or systematic account: the monadic flesh. What Henry and Marion’s
phenomenologies of the flesh have in common, despite the differences in their accounts of
sexuality, is a presupposition that, unlike the body, the flesh must manifest in complete unity with
itself; it is a flesh without gap or internal difference, and therefore without organs or members. The
flesh has, in their hands, been dis-membered. Thus, we should not be surprised that, at the same
time, the markers of these disavowed members within the social field, feminine and queer folk,
have likewise become dysmembers—castigated and denigrated, excluded and excommunicated
from the social body, if not (as will be suggested in chapter 7) the body of Christ.
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This theoretical dismemberment has replaced the truly incarnated flesh of the living
individual, with all of its associated complexities of individual sexual difference, with the sterility
of a disembodied soul and its mere life. For, as Kant rightly notes, “life without the feeling of the
corporeal organ is merely consciousness of one’s existence.”9 Indeed, insofar as life is stripped of
its members, so too are the members stripped of their life. Like the Valentinians against whom
Henry rails, Henry and Marion have contradicted their own philosophies of life by themselves
stripping life from the members of the flesh: “in this very manner do those men, by alleging that
they are alive and bear life in their members, contradict themselves afterwards, when they represent
these members as not being capable of [receiving] life.”10
B. The Body and Soul in Leibniz’s Monadology
To refer to Henry and Marion’s phenomenologies of the flesh as “monadic” is to immediately and
intentionally invoke the spectre of Leibniz. For those familiar with radical phenomenology, and
particularly the radical phenomenology of the flesh, this will undoubtedly seem an odd gesture.
For, while the influence of Kant and Fichte, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, or the Fathers of the
Church has been widely recognized, Leibniz seldom emerges in conversations of radical
phenomenology. Even among the post-Cartesian rationalists, one might instead expect Spinoza, of
whom Henry makes consistent recourse.11 Indeed, in his published works, Henry will almost never
9

Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), 159.
10

mIrenaeus, “Against Heresies” in The Writings of Irenaeus: Ante-Nicene Christian Library: Vol. IX, trans.
Alexander Roberts and W. H. Rambaut (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1869), Book V, Ch. III [63]; cited by Henry in
Incarnation, 136.
11

See, e.g.: Michel Henry, Le bonheur de Spinoza: etude sur le Spinozisme de Michel Henry, (Paris: Presses
Universitaires France, 2004). It is worth noting that Emmanuel Falque will take this Spinozist route in order to level
a quite similar critique against Henry. What I have here called, in a Leibnizian mode, the monadic flesh, Falque will
refer to as “a Spinozistic type of ‘carnal monism’.” Emmanuel Falque, “Is There a Flesh Without Body? A Debate
with Michel Henry,” trans. Scott Davidson, Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy XXIV, No 1 (2016):
139-166, 159.
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cite Leibniz. And while Marion gives considerably more space to Leibniz, this is almost always in
order to critique the primacy of the law of non-contradiction12 and the principle of sufficient
reason.13 What one would search almost in vain for, is a recognition that the phenomenology of
the flesh is indebted to Leibniz.14 In point of fact, the closest one will come to a recognition of this
debt is Marion’s note that, according to Leibniz, the “monad is always carnal.”15
Despite this paucity of citation, Leibniz’s influence upon the radical phenomenology of the
flesh is surprisingly direct, having been transmitted by a single mediator: Maine de Biran. While
the Leibnizian character of de Biran’s spiritualism has often been recognized for its influence upon
other French thinkers—such as Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze16—it has not been recognized
in the phenomenological context. But, as was seen above (chapter 2), Maine de Biran constitutes
the single greatest influence upon Henry’s conception of the relationship between the flesh and the
body; appearing as the singular focus of Henry’s Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body and
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See, e.g.: Jean-Luc Marion, Negative Certainties, trans. Stephen E. Lewis (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 2015), 104; Jean-Luc Marion, “Nothing is Impossible for God” in Believing in Order to See: On the
Rationality of Revelation and the Irrationality of Some Believers, trans. Christina M. Gschwandtner (New York:
Fordham University Press, 2017), 94-97
13

See, e.g.: Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 179-184; Marion, Negative Certainties, 106-114, 169; Jean-Luc
Marion, “The Marches of Metaphysics,” in The Essential Writings, ed. Kevin Hart (New York: Fordham University
Press, 2013), 48-49; Marion, “Nothing is Impossible for God” in Believing in Order to See, 94-97.
14
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the body to wanton speculative constructions—Malebranche’s occasionalism, Spinoza’s parallelism, Leibniz’s preestablished harmony,” thereby effacing the key influence of Leibniz on his own account of the organic body. Michel
Henry, Incarnation: A Philosophy of Flesh, trans. Karl Hefty (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2015), 74.
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Jean-Luc Marion, In Excess: Studies in Saturated Phenomena, trans. Robyn Horner and Vincent Berraud (New
York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 98. But even here, this is only noted in order to be immediately turned
against Leibniz, “and it is why, to the contrary of Gottfried Leibniz, we understand that monads can die.” Ibid.
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This is, of course, due in part to Deleuze’s own self-recognition of the influence of Leibniz. See, e.g.: Gilles
Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
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(New York: Zone Books, 2005), 28.
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in key sections of Incarnation. Moreover, insofar as “Marion basically adopts Henry’s account of
the self-affection of the flesh,”17 one can therefore also transitively mark the influence of de Biran
on Marion.
In fact, key terms in Henry’s account of the flesh, including the “organic body,” and the
“resisting continuum” are original to neither Henry nor de Biran, but rather have clear precedence
in Leibniz. For while, as Marion rightly noted, Leibniz always thinks the monad as “carnal,” his
term for this carnality is “organic body” [corps organique or corpus organicum], for which the
soul functions as an entelechy.18 Henry himself briefly recognizes this debt in the Philosophy and
Phenomenology of the Body, writing, “thus it is that to the original being of our body is bound a
sort of organic body from which, according to the word of Leibniz which Maine de Biran cites,
the soul is never separated.”19
But, to what extent is de Biran actually Leibnizian? As Naert notes, the influence is so
great, that “it is banal to repeat that Leibniz is everywhere present in the œuvre of Maine de
Biran.”20 This influence is most clear in his 1819 Exposition de la doctrine philosophique de
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Leibniz, but it nonetheless likewise evident in texts more directly influential on radical
phenomenology, particularly his Essai sur les fondements de la Psychologie, de Biran’s text most
commonly cited by Henry, which includes an extended analysis of the “Système de Leibnitz.”21
Entering the philosophical scene in the wake of the Galilean reduction, Leibniz’s
philosophy of the body begins with “matter in itself.”22 This raw materiality or “primary matter,”
is distinguished by its nature as an “aggregate”:
A body is not a substance but an aggregate of substances, since it is always further
divisible, and any given part always has another part, to infinity. … It necessarily
contains in itself an infinite multitude, or an infinity of bodies, each of which, in
turn, contains an infinite number of substances.23
This aggregate, insofar as it is mere passive material extension, is “something incomplete,” 24 and
ultimately, possessed of a certain irreality: “where there are only beings by aggregation, there
aren’t any real beings.”25 This mere aggregation of matter forces Leibniz to identify a source of

own philosophical program. Nevertheless, as Dunham shows, de Biran did offer a genuine Leibnizianism, albeit a
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unity outside of the body, in the soul, in order to account for the experienced unity and subjectivity
of the individual.26 As he writes to Fardella:
Now since I am truly a single individual substance, unresolvable into many others,
the permanent and constant subject of my actions and passions, it is necessary that
there be a persisting individual substance over and above the organic body. This
persisting individual substance is completely different from the nature of body,
which, assuming that it is in a state of continual flux of parts, never remains
permanent, but is perpetually changed. And so, there must be some incorporeal,
immortal substance in man, over and above the body, something, indeed, incapable
of being resolved into parts.27
Here Leibniz not only identifies the necessity of a soul, but likewise marks its key essential feature.
The soul is defined by its incapacity for division into parts;28 it is, as he will soon name it, a
“monad.” As he subsequently opens his Monadology: “the Monad, which we shall discuss here,
is nothing but a simple substance that enters into composites—simple, that is, without parts.”29
Insofar as the monad has no parts, “neither extension, nor shape, nor divisibility is possible.”30

extension and Henry’s own critique of the irreality of representation bears a striking similarity that seems to betray
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This radical division between the aggregate of the organic body and the absolute unity of
the monadic soul only serves to exacerbate the problem of the unity of the soul and the body.31
The solution proposed by Leibniz is his (in)famous thesis of the pre-established harmony: “God
originally created the soul … in such a way that everything must arise from it from its own depths,
through a perfect spontaneity relative to itself, and yet with a perfect conformity relative to external
things.”32 Yet, as his critics were quick to point out, this speculative thesis does little to
metaphysically unite the body and the soul. Indeed, Leibniz admits as much himself: “I must
admit,” he writes, “that it would have been very wrong of me to object to the Cartesians that the
agreement God immediately maintains, between soul and body, according to them, does not bring
about a true union, since, to be sure, my pre-established harmony would do no better than it
does.”33 Thus, rather than offer such a metaphysical unification, he writes, “I tried to account only
for the phenomena,”34 that is, the phenomena of unification.
But these phenomena of relation between soul and body—that is, the subjective experience
of will, e.g. movement—remain subordinate to a more primordial phenomenological distinction
between “two kingdoms.”35 True metaphysical unity is not possible between the soul and the
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body—but only conformity—because the soul and the body follow distinct “laws” or regimes of
phenomenality: “these principles have given me a way of naturally explaining the union, or rather
the conformity of the soul and the organic body. The soul follows its own laws and the body also
follows its own.”36
The phenomenality of the body—as an aggregate—conforms to its material extension:
“bodies act according to the laws of efficient causes or of motions.”37 The monadic soul, on the
other hand, acts “from its own depths”:38 “the monad’s natural changes come from an internal
principle.”39 In fact, the central conviction of Leibnizian dynamics is the necessity, above and
before extension, of a principle of action: “in corporeal things there is something over and above
extension, in fact, something prior to extension, namely, that force of nature implanted everywhere
by the Creator.”40 Thus, on this account, it is only because substances act from their own internal
impetus (conatus or nisus) that there is any activity or movement whatsoever. Moreover, insofar
as the soul generates its own activity from its interiority, it is likewise immune to all heteroaffection: “monads have no windows”41 as Leibniz famously argued.
The result of this analysis is a conception of the soul which is defined in its very essence
by its radical exclusion of every “part” or member. This exclusion necessitates an internal—one
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might say, following Henry, auto-affective—conception of activity. Whereas, on the other hand,
the body is defined precisely as an aggregate relation of extensive members: partes extra partes.
In his “selective Leibnizianism” de Biran will adopt precisely this scheme, but with one central
caveat. Where Leibniz found the soul, de Biran finds a subjective experience of the body. Thus,
what Henry names de Biran’s discovery of the subjective body, might instead be recognized as de
Biran’s incarnation of the Leibnizian soul. Yet, even incarnated, this subjective flesh will carry
forward much of its Leibnizian baggage. Including, most importantly, its monadic character; the
Biranian subjective body—and its experience of effort—does not have parts. Thus, via this
Biranian influence, radical phenomenology will likewise cast the organic body into the exteriority
of the world, while the flesh will be marked by its radical exclusion of every part or member from
its living immanence.

C. The Monadic Flesh: Against the Organic Body
According to Henry, the flesh manifests without gap, the givenness of its auto-affectivity is an
absolute givenness of the self in its totality: “feeling could not attain the ego to a more or less strict
relationship; the feeling could not attain the ego as something exterior, capable of touching it to a
greater or less degree.”42 In the manifestation of affectivity the self is saturated by a givenness
without remainder, one feels oneself in one's entirety: it is a “total exposure.”43 It is a monadic
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account of the flesh.44 This monadic character is nowhere more clearly apparent than in Henry’s
reflections upon the “organic body.”45
Henry first turns to the language of the organic body in an attempt to understand the
phenomenological experience of the “I can.” This language is introduced by Husserl’s
phenomenology of the living body in Ideas II, the subjective experience of the body is there
particularly marked by its capacity for action. As Husserl writes, “the Ego has the ‘faculty’ (the ‘I
can’) to freely move this Body [Leib].”46 For this tradition—from Husserl, to Merleau-Ponty, and
Henry—the flesh is distinguished from the objective body by its unique capacity to act.
Yet, phenomenologically investigated, this “I can”—even within the immanence of the
radical reduction—seems to run up against concrete limits. I can only move my flesh so far, so
fast, in specific manners, etc. Henry describes these moments of resistance through the Leibnizian
language of the “resisting continuum,” the boundary condition of the “I can.” When this resistance
reaches a level which not only merely resists, but fully stops the “I can”—when “this resistance,
lived internally through this effort, no longer gives way”47—one experiences the limit of one’s
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own flesh as a novel manifestation of the body. This manifestation is distinct from the objective
body insofar as it is internally lived. But this manifestation is likewise distinct from the flesh,
which, insofar as it is immediately given to itself without gap or remainder, is marked by an
“original interior unity.”48 “Consequently,” Henry writes, “it is not two bodies which we must
distinguish, but rather three.”49 Following Leibniz and de Biran, Henry names this third
manifestation: the organic body.50
The organic body functions as something like a middle-ground between the flesh and the
objective body. It is, in a sense, within immanence, but is not the original corporeity of the flesh.
It is neither inside nor outside, but, like the skin, is the boundary-line between the immanence of
the flesh and the exteriority of the body; it is “the limit against which [the “I can’s”] effort is
broken.”51 Given this position, it is marked by unique phenomenological features. Thus, for
example, whereas the various affective tonalities are fully united in the flesh, in the organic body
these various faculties discover their own unique limits, differentiating themselves from one and

48

Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, 609.

49

Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, 129.

50

Indeed, Henry’s preparatory notes for Incarnation, reveal even this tripartite conception to be limited. Henry there
marks a seven-part “table of an exhaustive phenomenology of the body”:
“L’Archi-chair;
La chair: le je peux, le corps se mouvant et le touchant/touché;
La chair auto-constitué;
Le corps organique;
Le corps résistant;
Le corps objectif de l’expérience courante de la science;
L’image du corps”
Grégori Jean, “Désir, négativité, spectralité: Michel Henry et le problème de l’erôs,” Alter, “L’érôs,” No. 20 (2012),
77-78.
51

Henry, Incarnation, 206.

253

other in the form of organs or members;52 the organic body “allows to appear in it structures to
which we will attribute the names of the different parts of our body, which will be for us our
members, our torso, our neck, our muscles, etc.”53 In this way, “the original being of our body is
bound a sort of organic body.”54 But this provokes further questions, what is the force of this
“bound”? Does Henry affirm an originary or a derivative givenness of the organic body and its
organs or members? Is Henry’s account of the original body truly monadic as has been suggested
above?
For Henry, “the process of their constitution allows us to establish … a rigorous order”55
between the various manifestations of the body. The flesh, insofar as its affectivity constitutes the

52

“This division of our senses—insofar as it is a division of our organs of sensing—rests, in reality, on a
transcendental division of our powers of sensing, on the division which exists between seeing, and hearing,
touching, etc., and which is originally given to us in the internal transcendental experience which we have of the
subjective being of our body” (Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, 112). Thus, “our body is given
us in a way such that each of its original powers, concerning which we have an immediate knowledge in the
subjective experience of movement which constitutes its essence, also manifests itself to us in the form of an organ
or some physiological or spatial determination. The difference between the original being of this power and the
organ which seems to be its instrument is in no way situated on an ontic level, it is not a difference between
something and something else, it is an ontological difference, not a difference in individuality, but in the manner of
being” (Ibid., 116).
53

Ibid., 122. Importantly, despite this internal differentiation, Henry remains firm that the extension of the organic
body is phenomenologically distinct from the extension of the objective world. This is because the organic body
represents the subjective experience of the organ. Thus, these are not the organs as understood natural-scientifically:
“their original phenomenological being has nothing to do with anatomic or physiological determinations which
science takes as its object” (Ibid., 123). As he will later reaffirm, “our organic body is the whole of our organs thus
extended. And such organs are different from the anatomical structures that science takes for its object. They are
neither dis-posed nor ex-posed partes extra partes, but are held together and are as though held up out of nothing by
the ‘I can’ of our original corporeity” (Henry, Incarnation, 150). Nor are these organs experienced in the irreality of
mere thought, but in the practical and existential subjectivity of reality: “it is not represented, because subjective
movement and it alone constitutes its proof and experience, this organic or interior space has nothing in common
with exterior space” (Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, 122); or again, “if one still wants to speak
here of exteriority, it is an exteriority fundamentally foreign to that of the world in so far as the experience in which
it occurs excludes from itself every representative element” (Henry, Incarnation, 148). Therefore, rather than
speaking of the exteriority of the world, Henry here speaks of an “internal extension” (Ibid., 149 and Henry,
Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, 122) or “quasi-extension” (Henry, Incarnation, 165) of the organic
body.
54

Ibid., 122 [emphasis added].

55

Ibid., 164.

254

transcendental condition of all experience whatsoever, is in no way constituted by external factors.
In fact, for Henry, its transcendental character is so radical as to exclude it from the region of
constitution entirely.56 The same cannot be said for the organic body. Unlike the flesh, the organic
body undergoes a process of constitution whereby the original givenness of the sensation in the
auto-affectivity of the flesh is localized onto a determinate member of the organic body. As Henry
writes:
The phenomenology of flesh has taught us to distinguish carefully original
impressions and constituted impressions: only the former are real. Thus, only the
original impressions of movement are real, as well as the impressions of pressure
considered in their auto-impressionality. But situated on the organic body and on
its limit, they are nothing more than constituted sensations.57
This argument is given its most focused explication in Henry’s critique of Scheler’s account of
sensible feelings [Empfindungsgefühle] in §66 of The Essence of Manifestation.58
For Scheler, whereas vital feelings—such as health or fatigue—“participate in the total
extension of the lived body,”59 the sensible feelings—such as an itch or a headache—are centered
upon a particular part or organ of the body; the sensible feeling’s “exclusive form of existence is
to be at some time and at some place on the lived body”60—it “is given as extended and localized
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in specific parts of the lived body.”61 Nevertheless, as Scheler subsequently notes, while they are
“structured according to the more or less clearly experienced units of organs of the lived body,”
they are not structured “on the basis of those units as perceived from the outside.”62 That is to say,
like Henry’s organic body, Scheler denies that sensible feelings manifest within the horizon of
objectivity, instead marking a specific subjective mode of extension unique to the organic body.
Nevertheless, despite this nuance, Henry insists that feelings (i.e. affections or impressions)
must be understood outside of any extension, both that of objectivity or that of the organic body.
As he writes elsewhere, “where this self-sensing that determines affectivity as pure affective
tonality, as pure impression, and as life, occurs, there is no space—neither that of things nor that
of the organic body wherein impression is objected.”63 For Henry, the situation of feeling within
any extensive field necessitates the subservience of feeling to the mode of manifestation of that
field, a mode of manifestation that is in this case transcendent and therefore representational. 64
Thus, Henry suggests that Scheler’s account of the sensible feelings “confuses two things: on the
one hand, the original revelation of feeling to itself … which consists in this very affectivity; on
the other hand, the representation of this feeling … in the ontological milieu of representation.”65
This confusion fails to recognize the “ontological heterogeneity of [these two] essences, of the
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essence of affectivity [on the one hand] and of the transcendent spatial Being of the organic
body,”66 on the other. In his own words:
Because sensible feeling is a phenomenon in the organs whose feeling it is and
because the extension of the organic body and of the time peculiar to it, viz.
extension as such, ultimately constitutes the mode of manifestation and the reality
of this feeling, the status of the latter, its ontological and phenomenological status,
is clearly defined and this status determines its reality as beginning with extension
wherein it is extended and beginning with what constitutes the foundation of this
extension as an extended and transcendent reality.67
That is to say, for Henry, Scheler’s account of sensible feelings is confused precisely because,
while it recognizes that the purely psychic feeling or spiritual feeling “in no way participates in
extension,”68 it fails to recognize that this applies with equal rigor to all feelings, including the
sensible.69 Our feelings—even our sensible feelings—are not grounded in the organs or members
of our extended organic body, Henry argues, but within the non-extended, non-temporal lived
immanence of the flesh.
In order to illustrate this argument, Henry draws forward the phenomenon of phantom limb
syndrome as a particularly illuminating case study. As he writes:
How could sensorial feeling, if it is really found in a part of the body, if its Being
is identified with the Being of this part and with the portion of extension which
delimits it, subsist when this part is destroyed, how could the feeling exist when the
part does not exist? … The Being of the mnemonic image of the amputated member
is, by definition and essence, an imaginary Being, the Being of the sensorial feeling,
far from being able to be identified with the extended-Being of the image wherein
the feeling is represented, rather differs in an essential manner from it, as the real
differs from the imaginary.”70
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Thus, since the sensible feeling can be removed from its connection to the bodily organ, this
connection is not essential (eidetic). Indeed, insofar as sensible feelings are non-intentional,71
insofar as their manifestation presupposes no gap between feeling and feeler,72 it seems that they
must manifest outside of any transcendent horizon.
In sum, for Henry the organic body and its members are derivative of the first givenness of
affectivity in the flesh.73 While sensible feelings may be projected or localized on the organs of
this derivative body, they do not find their genesis there. Thus, despite his initial intuitions to the
contrary, Henry ultimately affirms that “the constituted organic body is already a represented
body,”74 and depends upon the non-constituted, non-represented flesh as its transcendental
condition.75 Therefore, from the perspective of the flesh, the organic body can only appear as an
“objective body whose configurations, parts, members, organs, and numerous particularities …
have nothing in common with what it experiences originally, [these members can] appear to it only
as incomprehensible and, to put it briefly, absurd determinations.”76 And this remains the case,
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despite the fact that this organic body is lived internally, even despite the fact that it remains within
the radical reduction.77 It is, Henry writes, “somewhat erroneous to identify [the organic body’s]
being with that of the original body”;78 “the being of the organic body is an abstract being, that of
itself it has neither autonomy nor ontological sufficiency.”79 The organic body is “in the world, in
its appearing.”80
Behind this technical critique of Scheler, the simple fact is that, for Henry, the organic
body’s worldly character is simply evidenced by its internal differentiation into organs or
members. For Henry’s monadic account of subjectivity, the ipseity of subjective experience—its
mineness—necessitates a primordial transcendental unity at the origin of all affectivity, which
would serve as “the principle of unity of a power to which is given the infinite diversity of sensible
impressions.”81 Such a unifying power cannot emerge from an organic body which is constituted
from a manifold of diverse parts; but only from a primordial unity which precedes all
differentiation: the monadic flesh. As Henry writes,
The transcendent unity of the sensible world … is that of the resisting continuum
which traverses the various sensorial worlds and in each of them gives a foundation
to its reality, … this unity rests on the unity of the power which constitutes this
single and real continuum, it rests on the unity of our subjective body. The latter,
in turn, rests on the internal structure of subjectivity itself wherein resides the
ultimate origin and the essence of all possible unity in general.82
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Here Henry traces a hierarchical ladder of unification from the absolute diversity of the
transcendent, sensible world to the absolute monadic subjectivity of the I—a ladder wherein the
unity of each rung is granted by its preceding rung. For such an account, unity always precedes
difference, and any difference or distanciation can at most be regarded as penultimate to its
ultimate founding unity.
D. The Monadic Flesh: The Invisability of Saturation
While Marion does not undertake an analysis of the organ or member with the directness of his
predecessor, it is nevertheless possible to establish a clear privilege of the whole over the part in
Marion’s notion of saturation. For Marion, the saturated phenomenon—including the flesh—is
always given in “one fell swoop.”83
This privilege of the whole over its parts, like Marion’s account of sexuality, finds clear
precedence in Hans Urs von Balthasar. For, according to von Balthasar, the revelatory experience
of Christ is given by God, and grasped by the believer, as a “Gestalt”: a totality, whole, or figure.
In this ‘figure’ there resides an inner harmony which resists every division into
parts as well as every combination of parts. Should one want to designate the
individual figures of the Old Testament as such ‘parts’ which, by combination,
would result in the figure of Christ, prophet, king, priest, sacrificial lamb, servant
of Yahweh, Son of man, etc., then we would have to say that the simple whole is
greater than the sum of its parts, that Christ lived his simple, indivisible life without
anxious worry about integrating all possible partial aspects.84
To subordinate the Gestalt of revelation to its “parts” or “partial aspects,” would be to destroy its
“indivisible life,” the living potency of this revelatory experience: “anatomy can be practiced only

83

Marion, Being Given, 236.

84

Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Faith and ‘Objective Evidence’ of the Gestalt of Jesus” in The von Balthasar Reader,
ed. Medard Kehl and Werner Löser, trans. Robert J. Daly and Fred Lawrence (New York: Crossroad, 1982), 127.

260

on a dead body, since it is opposed to the movement of life and seeks to pass from the whole to its
parts and elements.”85
This same privilege of the whole is likewise evident in Marion’s account of revelation. For
Marion, who aims to explicate its phenomenological possibility, revelation is the redoubled
paradox [paradoxoton],86 the “saturation of saturation.”87 As he writes, “the phenomenon of
revelation is therefore defined as a phenomenon that concentrates in itself the four senses of the
saturated phenomenon”88—that is, event, idol, flesh, and icon. As such, revelation is likewise
understood to saturate all categories of the understanding: quantity, quality, relation, and modality.
In this regard, like the event, the phenomenon of revelation is understood as “perfectly
unforeseeable.”89 It is, as Marion elsewhere describes it, invisable, unable to be envisaged.90 This
invisability is likewise the defining characteristic of the event: wherein “nobody can claim for
himself a ‘here and now’ that would permit him to describe it exhaustively and constitute it as an
object.”91 Thus, revelation “is a case par excellence of the event.”92
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This invisability of the saturated phenomenon is a result of intuition’s overwhelming of the
Kantian category of quantity. According to Kant, quantity (that is, extensive magnitude) is a
determining condition of phenomenality. Every phenomenon that manifests within time or space—
i.e. every phenomenon tout court—is thus “declined by composition of the whole in terms of its
parts.”93 For, as Kant writes, “I call an extensive magnitude that in which the representation of the
parts makes possible the representation of the whole (and therefore necessarily precedes the
latter).”94 Kant names the process by which the manifold of intuition is rendered quantitative the
“successive synthesis,” a synthesis that no phenomenon as such can be constituted without.95
The result of this successive synthesis is twofold: as illustrated by Kant’s assertion “all
appearances are accordingly intuited as aggregates (multitudes of antecedently given parts).” 96 In
the first case, insofar as the synthesis assumes a manifold of intuition, the constituted whole is
understood as composed of diverse parts: it is an aggregate.97 Second, as marked by the use of
“antecedently,” this synthesis therefore necessitates a pre-comprehension, it is necessarily foreseen. As Marion notes, “this sort of phenomenon would always be foreseeable, literally seen before
being seen in person or seen by procuration, on the basis of another besides itself—more precisely,
on the basis of the supposedly finite number of its parts.”98 It is through this successive synthesis,
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which is to say, the subordination of the thing to quantity and extension as its condition of
possibility, that the phenomenon becomes an object of experience. Or, conversely, “things become
objects through … the elimination of that in those things which does not allow itself to be
abstracted according to order and measure.”99
According to Marion, insofar as saturated phenomena resist any reduction to objectivity
and any horizon understood as a condition of phenomenality, they must likewise manifest outside
of any quantity or magnitude: they are formally unforeseeable, invisable. The logic underlying this
claim is laid bare. For Marion, the saturated phenomenon is invisable, precisely because it is not
composed of parts, it is not an aggregate:
Since the intuition that gives it is not limited by its possible concept, its excess can
neither be divided nor adequately put together again by virtue of a finite magnitude
homogeneous with finite parts. It could not be measured in terms of its parts, since
the saturating intuition surpasses limitlessly the sum of the parts by continually
adding to them.100
The saturated phenomenon is therefore marked by its immeasurability: “incommensurable, not
measurable (immense), unmeasured.”101 Like the Kantian mathematical sublime, it is “great
beyond all comparison”;102 it is that which is “equal only to itself” and “in comparison with which
everything else is small.”103 And just as in the mathematical sublime, “the very inadequacy of our
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faculty for estimating the magnitude … awakens the feeling of a supersensible faculty in us,”104
so too does the saturated phenomenon reveal the inadequacy of the successive synthesis: “as the
saturated phenomenon passes beyond all summation of its parts—which often cannot be
enumerated anyway—the successive synthesis must be abandoned in favor of what I will call an
instantaneous synthesis.”105 The saturated phenomenon is not marked by a successively constituted
aggregate of parts, but by an instantaneous grasping of its whole; or in von Balthasar’s language,
the immediate vision of the Gestalt.
While Marion will primarily unpack invisability in terms of the event and revelation, it is
by no means limited to these cases—“since in all cases, there is on principle saturation.”106 For, it
should not be forgotten, Marion’s “Sketch of the Saturated Phenomenon” in §21 of Being Given
falls before the elaboration of the four figures of saturation—event, idol, flesh, icon—and should
therefore best be understood as a prolegomenon to saturation as such. It is not merely the event
that “cannot be aimed at,” it is “the saturated phenomenon [that] cannot be aimed at.” 107 Thus
while, as we have seen (chapter 3), the flesh is drawn forward as an exemplary case of the
saturation of relation, it nevertheless remains the case that all saturation in principle saturates every
category (as least to some degree).108
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In point of fact, insofar as invisability is coined by Marion as roughly synonymous with
unforeseeability, Marion seems to admit as much during In Excess’s discussion of suffering and
the flesh. As he there notes, “I will never be able to precede the intuition of fulfillment of my
fleshly pain with an intentional aim able to foresee.”109 This is because, expressly following Henry,
Marion conceives the flesh as a carnal “monad”;110 it lacks any gap or ekstasis. The flesh is defined,
for Marion, as the identity that exists “before intentionality opens a gap”; 111 it is “the immediacy
of auto-affection [that] blocks the space where the ecstasy of an intentionality would become
possible.”112 As he argues, in his discussion of suffering:
As soon as I suffer, I suffer myself. I do not suffer from fire or iron, as I see the
sword or the flame before me, their form, their colors, their dimensions, and so on,
in short, from a distance, in being able to describe them as objects. … Thus I only
suffer them in suffering from their phenomenality. I do not suffer from the fire and
from the iron—but, because immediately they hurt me, they only hurt me. I suffer
myself by them. Between the iron and the fire and me who suffers them, the gap
disappears.113
Thus, insofar as Marion understands the saturated phenomenon to be invisable, and insofar as he
understands the flesh as a paradigmatic figure of saturation, then the flesh is understood in monadic
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terms—it bears no gaps and is constituted by no parts. Marion, as his predecessor Henry, thinks
the flesh first and foremost as a whole, a Gestalt, irreducible to any part or member that might
detract from its auto-affective ipseity. This irreducibility is nowhere clearer than in his discussion
of the eroticization of the flesh in The Erotic Phenomenon. There, in language that perfectly echoes
Henry’s condemnation of the organ, Marion writes:
The process of eroticization admits neither interruption nor limit, since it aims at
everything being made flesh in me as in the other, so that nothing of us any longer
obeys the phenomenality of bodies or of the world. … Thus one cannot privilege
any particular sense as the better operative of eroticization … if it were necessary
to distinguish one, we would rather stigmatize the impropriety of sight, almost
inevitably prone to objectivization. Consequently, neither could one privilege
certain organs: there are no erotic organs, only sexual organs. First of all, this is
because these organs belong to the physical body, not the flesh.114
Such organs will only be drawn into eroticization when they lose their individuality and are drawn
into, even “submerged” within, the monadic flesh: “the sexual organs … should remain completely
foreign to eroticization: they belong to the body, not the flesh. … But emplacement in flesh
includes them; it ends up by submerging them, as if by an erotic kenosis.”115 Thus the organ or
member—the part—once again finds itself excluded or cast out of the monadic immanence of the
flesh, or more precisely, the member must abandon its individuality and be absorbed into the
undifferentiated unity of the monadic flesh.
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§2. The Multiplicity of the Flesh
A. Re-membering the Flesh
In order to rethink the flesh no longer as monadic, it will be necessary to offer a phenomenological
account of the member—not only understood as a member or organ of the objective body, or even
of the organic body, but truly as a member of the flesh. Even Marion himself, in a rare divergence
from his consistent reduction of the flesh to its monadic simplicity, will even speak—if only once,
and only in passing—of “the flesh of my members, muscles and bones.”116 The present section
will aim to extend this insight into a defining feature of flesh, no longer understood as a monadic
subjectivity or immediate Gestalt, but as a phenomenon at once transcendental, but nevertheless
constituted from a multiplicity.
In order to arrive at the member of the flesh, I will here follow a path laid by the
phenomenologist Jacob Rogozinski, who—despite some differences in regards to sexuality, that
will be explored below—has done much to influence the present approach to radical
phenomenology. In particular, Rogozinski has pioneered the synthesis of radical phenomenology
with insights from psychoanalysis and the transcendental empiricism of Deleuze and Guattari, that
I will here aim to extend.
Within phenomenology, the relationship between the flesh and its members, the organism
and its organs, has been undertaken in two directions. On the one hand, there is a monadic tradition,
that prioritizes the whole of the part. This tradition could be traced back to Hegel, who sources
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bodily membership in the primordial, substantial unity of Life, “the simple substance of Life is the
splitting-up of itself into shapes and at the same time the dissolution of these existent differences;
and the dissolution of the splitting-up is just as much a splitting-up and a forming of members.”117
This tradition enters phenomenology through France, where, before solidifying in Henry and
Marion, it periodically tempts Merleau-Ponty, who—despite his often rather elaborate
phenomenologies of the various bodily members and insistence upon bodily constitution—
nevertheless also argues that the subjective body “is not an assemblage of organs juxtaposed in
space. I am in undivided possession of it”;118 “the spatiality of the body,” he continues, “must work
downward from the whole to the parts.”119
On the other side is a tradition of thinkers who emphasize constitution. This tradition could
perhaps be sourced in Kant, who writes of the organic being, “it is required, … that its parts be
combined into a whole by being reciprocally the cause and effect of their form. … For a body, …
it is required that its parts reciprocally produce each other, as far as both their form and their
combination is concerned, and thus produce a whole out of their own causality.”120 For Kant, the
whole of the living body is produced by the reciprocal relations of its various constituent parts.
This tradition enters phenomenology through Husserl, who most clearly in Ideas II (as was seen
above in chapter 1), insists that, despite its quasi-transcendental character, the Leib nevertheless
undergoes an elaborate process of bodily constitution. Moreover, the various sensations
(Empfindung) or sensings (Empfindnisse) that enter into this constitution are not themselves
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homogeneous; they are drawn together into spheres of sensation that Husserl calls “sensationfields.”121 Each field is granted its own relative autonomy and is differentiated from other fields.
My hot/cold sensation-field, for example, is distinct from my balance sensation-field; my hunger
sensation-field, from my touch sensation-field.122 The constitution of the Leib essentially involves
the localization of diverse modalities of sensation. Thus, for Husserl, the flesh is not an organless
monad but a multiplicity, a “system of organs,”123 “an entire system of compatibly harmonizing
organs of perception.”124
These two approaches could be understood as alternate solutions to the problem introduced
by French phenomenology; insofar as French phenomenology sought to conflate the flesh and the
transcendental ego (as we saw in chapter 1), one must ask: does the flesh take on the monadic125
character of the ego, or conversely, does the ego take on the complex constituted character of the
flesh? While both Henry and Marion have taken the first path, I will here follow the groundwork
laid by Rogozinski, who draws radical phenomenology back into the Husserlian tradition of the
flesh, recapturing a key notion from Husserl’s account: constitution by passive synthesis.
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here will be adopted by Rogozinski’s account of the flesh.
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B. The Constitution of the Flesh
Rogozinski’s most important contribution to radical phenomenology is The Ego and the Flesh, the
heart of which is a critique of egocide (egicide)126—the erasure or rejection of any notion of ego
from contemporary philosophy. For Rogozinski, Jacques Lacan and Martin Heidegger stand as the
two principal defendants charged with this egocide. In each instance, he argues, one finds an
identification of the genesis of the ego with a more primordial non-ego: “a Neuter, a Being, an
Other.”127 “From the earlier to the later Heidegger, or from Freud to Lacan,” he writes, “egocide
is inexorably worsened, and no one is ever able to explain where in each of us the absolute certainty
of being ego comes from or how this illusory ego could derive from a more originary non-ego.”128
Against this egocide, Rogozinski posits a “return to Descartes”129 of sorts, a retrieval of the
notion of an ego—here understood in transparently Henrian terms130 as the absolutely unique mode
of phenomenological givenness wherein the self gives itself to itself in a radical immanence. As
he writes:
Immanence [is] a manner of being given: what characterizes an immanent
givenness is the power to be given from oneself to oneself; and in that it needs
nothing else in order to be given, then it is a matter of an absolute givenness. I
126
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define immanence, then, as self-givenness, as the identity of what gives and what
is given.131
Yet, siding with post-Husserlian French phenomenology against traditional Cartesianism,
Rogozinski thinks this ego in embodied terms; it is an ego-flesh (moi-chair, from Husserl’s
“Ichleib”).132 “The immanent ego,” he writes, “is not lodged in its flesh in the same way that a
captain is in his ship or that the Cartesian soul resides in the pineal gland: it is its flesh; it is Ichleib,
an ‘ego-body’ or ‘flesh of the ego,’ an originally incarnated ego.”133 Thus his Egoanalysis134 is, at
one and the same time, a radical phenomenology of the flesh.
But, against Henry and Marion’s monadic conception of the flesh, Rogozinski recognizes
that the ego-flesh does not emerge into its self-givenness whole cloth; we must not move “too
quickly toward the one, the same, the identical.”135 Instead, Rogozinski offers a genetic account of
the synthetic constitution of the ego out of the primordial multiplicity of immanence.
Drawing upon a diverse set of sources—notably Deleuze, Husserl, and Kant—Rogozinski
argues that immanence cannot be understood as the immediate, absolute unity of self-presence
presupposed by Henry’s phenomenology. Rather, under the guidance of the radical reduction,136
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one actually discovers that the “most originary layer”137 of the ego is not a monadic whole, but a
manifold of “innumerable sensible impressions,”138 even a certain “chaos.”139 Thus, we must not
imagine the ego as a primordial unity, he argues, but as “as the unity of the multiple, as an ego
originarily divided yet unified.”140 Following Deleuze, Rogozinski names this originary
multiplicity: the flesh’s “plane of immanence.” But, insightfully recapitulating Husserl’s notion of
“sensation-fields,” Rogozinski recognizes that this immanent plane is not a homogeneous field. It
is rather populated by clusters of resonating impressions, which disseminate across this plane of
immanence.
The field of immanence is not a pure chaos; … regularities and constant
concordances come to order the flux of appearances; … different perspectives,
series of divergent impressions, may also be able to converge on, intersect with,
and cross one another; and … each point of intersection is constituted as a pole of
identification, allowing for always larger and more stable unities to be formed.141
Despite the Deleuzian resonances of this language, Rogozinski ultimately sides with Henry
against Deleuze, insofar as he denies the Deleuzian thesis that the plane of immanence is marked
by an “anonymous life.” For Deleuze and Guattari’s transcendental empiricism, the aim is to “do
away with any subject in favor of an assemblage of the haecceity type that carries or brings out the
event insofar as it is unformed and incapable of being effectuated by persons.”142 Thus, the
multiplicities on the plane of immanence are “not a personal feeling.”143 Even when Deleuze turns
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to a quasi-vitalism, it is an anonymous vitalism, an anonymous life: “the life of the individual,”
Deleuze writes, “gives way to an impersonal and yet singular life.”144 This, for Deleuze, is marked
by the use of indefinite articles, which introduce an “individuation … which does not pass into a
form and is not effected by a subject”:145 a haecceity that is not an ipseity. “The indefinite article
is the indetermination of the person,” Deleuze writes;146 it is not my Life, but a Life.
For Rogozinski, to follow Deleuze and Guattari in this direction would result in precisely
the paradox of egocide that he is attempting to critique. For how does one get from non-ego to ego,
from a Life to my Life? The answer that Rogozinski suggests, is simple, there is no anonymous
life, there is no primordial non-ego—at least not from a phenomenological perspective. The plane
of immanence discovered by the radical reduction is “a singular life, each time my own, my
life.”147 Regardless of what a turn to metaphysics might suggest, the radical reduction never digs
below the givenness of the sensible impression to itself, its self-givenness. Such speculation is
simply beyond the bounds of phenomenology, even a radical phenomenology.
For this reason, Rogozinski entitles the multiplicities that disseminates across the plane of
immanence: “larval egos” or “fragments of ego,” in order to emphasize the ipseity of these
fragments. While each certainly carries its own haecceity—my pain is not my anxiety, nor is my
joy identical to my impression of yellow—they are all nevertheless equally mine and all are equally
moments in the constitution of my flesh. As he writes, these “larval egos, fragments of ego, are
still and always will be me. If it is impossible to derive the ego from a more originary non-ego—
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from an unconscious Id or from an impersonal transcendental field—then we must conclude that
the ego is always preceded by itself, is originally given to itself.”148
Having followed the radical reduction from the unified ego-flesh, to the multiplicity of
fragments that anticipate it, it is now necessary to reverse course, to articulate the process by which
this multiplicity is unified, the way in which these diverse parts are constituted into a whole. As
Rogozinski writes, the ego-flesh “must be broken into shards so that we can recuperate it in terms
of a genesis. [For] every unity is formed from out of a primitive multiplicity; every identity
(including the ego or the ‘individual’) is constituted through syntheses of identification.”149 He
therefore finds it necessary to return to Husserl, and suggest that the flesh emerges from “a passive
synthesis that operates without me.”150 Or, as Husserl writes of the self-constitution of the ego:
We encounter … a second kind of synthesis, which embraces all the particular
multiplicities of cogitationes collectively and in its own manner, namely as
belonging to the identical Ego, who, as the active and affected subject of
consciousness, lives in all processes of consciousness.151
If such a synthesis did not take place, he writes, “I would never be myself.” 152 Rogozinski names
this passive constitution of the flesh: the “carnal synthesis,”153 or even simply, “my birth.”154
Drawing from the language of Merleau-Ponty, Rogozinski models the carnal synthesis
upon the chiasm. In the passive constitution of the flesh, there is an “intertwining” wherein the
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larval or fragmentary egos touch one another and recognize one another “as another pole of the
same flesh.”155 In this chiasmic intertwining, these larval and fragmentary egos constitute a
“community of resonance”156 wherein the plane of immanence is part-by-part unified into a flesh,
a self-presence capable of giving itself to itself, not only in each individual sensible impression,
but also above these sensible impressions as a unified ego-flesh. Nevertheless, this selfconstitution is by no means complete or final; the flesh, as Husserl famously noted, “is a
remarkably imperfectly constituted thing.”157 Thus it is necessary to recognize a partiality to this
constitution, certain gaps or fissures that, despite the contestations of Henry and Marion, persist
within the flesh.
C. The Remainder
Despite the carnal synthesis, the flesh nevertheless does not manifest without break or rupture:
“between each [ego] pole, a gap [écarte] subsists.”158 This écarte emerges from an impossibility
already identified by Henry and Derrida’s critique of Merleau-Ponty: the impossibility of a total
chiasm.159 “The chiasm is brought about,” Rogozinski writes, “only by a partial and precarious
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identification, endlessly put into question by some element X, a divergence or gap that destabilizes
it.”160 For Rogozinski, there can never be complete self-presence without the total loss of identity:
were total self-identity enacted, “the flesh would fold back on itself, sink into itself. It would
implode without ever successfully giving itself a body with differentiated organs.” 161 That is to
say, the “remarkably imperfectly constituted” (Husserl) status of the flesh, its gaps or fissures, are
the condition of possibility for anything like the members of the flesh. It was precisely the converse
which was found in Henry and Marion. Their accounts of the flesh were monadic—they folded
back on themselves—precisely because they refused to see the persistence of the écarte, because
they imagined the total self-presence, a self-givenness sans reste.162
Against this monadic view, Rogozinski recognizes that while the larval ego-fragments are
brought into a chiasmic relation, they do not cease to remain themselves in a meaningful way; they
do not lose their prior haecceity. Even following the carnal synthesis my pain remains distinct
from the sight of green, my hearing of a tone from my taste of salt. This differentiation requires an
unbridgeable gap between each ego-pole,163 a point of rupture that is manifest within immanence;
it requires, to use Rogozinski’s language, a “remainder.”
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This use of remainder [le restant], should not be confused with Derrida’s le restance nor
Lacan’s le reste—both commonly translated into English as “remainder.” But neither should it be
understood completely outside of reference to these important figures.
For example, there is a clear resonance between Rogozinski’s remainder [le restant] and
Lacan’s objet petit a which, in Seminar X, Lacan expressly names the remainder [le reste].164
“What is the remainder?” Lacan asks, “it is what survives the ordeal of the division of the field of
the Other through the presence of the subject.”165 Like le restant, it is a division or cut. As Lacan
writes, glossing Freud’s famous dictum, anatomy is destiny: “it becomes true if we give the term
anatomy its strict and, if I may, etymological meaning that emphasizes ana-tomy, the function of
the cut. … Destiny, that is to say, man’s relation to the function of desire, only assumes its full
vitality inasmuch as the fragmentation of one’s own body, the cut that lies at the locus of select
moments of its functioning, is conceivable.”166 The very function of desire—indeed sexuality
itself—presumes the presence of the cut or the fragmentation of the flesh. But, whereas for
Rogozinski this cut is immanent to the process of the self-constitution of the flesh in immanence,
for Lacan, it is the excess of an intersubjective relation: “the object [le petit a or le reste]
functioning as the leftover of the subject’s dialectic with the Other.”167 Nevertheless, even given
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its intersubjective genesis, Lacan’s le reste or objet petit a remains (pun intended) within one’s
own flesh—unlike anxiety which is on the side of the Other. Thus, for example, “the a,” Lacan
writes, “is an object separated not from the mother’s organism but from the child’s organism.”168
It is the “pound of flesh” that one must sacrifice from one’s self.169
Thus the two notions end up quite closely related; for Lacan le reste is the object which
marks a certain heterogeneity in the relation to the Other, whereas for Rogozinski le restant
functions the condition of possibility for heterogeneity. In this way, Rogozinski understands this
remainder in the paradoxical language of “auto-hetero-givenness.”170 Yet, this should not be
understood as a vicious paradox, but rather as a gesture toward the Derridean language of the
condition of possibility that is at once ostensibly a condition of impossibility: for “if there were no
remainder,” Rogozinski writes, “there would be neither flesh nor ego. … The remainder is above
all what protects the ego-flesh and makes its genesis possible—it is my ultimate condition of
possibility.171
One may therefore, returning to the Lacanian vocabulary, describe the flesh through the
Lacanian figure of the “not-all” (pas-tout). For Lacan, this feature describes the nonuniversalizability and structural incompleteness of woman—“the woman does not exist”172 [il n’y
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a pas La femme]—in opposition to masculine universality. But it might just as well stand in for
the distinction between the flesh and the body—la chair and le corps—which by a happy
coincidence are themselves grammatically gendered feminine (la) and masculine (le) respectively.
Like masculine sexuation in Lacan, (the masculine-gendered) le corps is constituted by a logic of
completion—there is no exception: ∀𝑥 𝛷𝑥.173 Insofar as the body is an object within the horizon
of the world (Henry) or obeys the conditions of the I (Marion)—it is a common phenomenon
whose concept, Marion might say, takes priority over its intuitive shortage. Yet, what both Henry
and Marion fail to recognize is that insofar as the (feminine-gendered) flesh manifests outside of
any horizon, it will not therefore manifest with complete self-presence. That which refuses
objectification must necessarily contain a certain incompleteness—it is not whole, not-all—it bears
the traces of a remainder.
Therefore, the condition of possibility of a unified ego-flesh is precisely this lack of
complete unity: the failure of complete chiasm is precisely a constitutive excess. It is the gap within
its identity, the very inability of the ego-flesh to fully seal itself in (monadic) immanence, that
allows it to emerge at all. This remainder “guards my flesh against disaster, offering it a mouvance,
a playing field”;174 it is the first otherness, the Fichtean not-self175—present already within the egoflesh itself—which forms the condition of possibility for any experience of otherness.
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Moreover, it is our relation to this arch-otherness that conditions the mode of our relation
to subsequent others. Le restant, Rogozinski elsewhere suggests, “is the ‘first foreigner’ to whom
I am confronted, the ‘first non-ego,’ which is not another me (an alter-ego), but an other in me.”176
This is possible, because just as the impasse of anxiety incarnates itself in the Lacanian objet petit
a, so too does the impasse or failure of complete synthesis incarnate itself in the remainder,
understood not only negatively as a gap, but positively as an intruder within the flesh:
When the chiasm is interrupted, when the poles of flesh cease to mutually incarnate
one another, the remainder disfigures itself: it reappears within my flesh as a foreign
body whose apparition provokes angst and disgust. The ego endeavors to defend
itself against this threatening intrusion by expelling this ‘foreign’ body. This
gesture of exclusion can however only fail, as the remainder is not truly foreign to
the ego.”177
Therefore, as will be discussed below, if we are to relate to the Other without fear, disgust, or
horror, then we must first learn to relate to the otherness within our own flesh without fear, disgust,
or horror.
D. From the Organ to the Member
Before turning to the final step of the present argument—the reintroduction of the central figure
of sexuality—it will be helpful to mark an important semantic decision. Until this point, I have
spoken univocally of the organ and the member—employing these two terms as synonymous
figures of incarnate parts of the fleshly whole. It is now necessary to mark a key distinction
between these two terms that will become increasingly important in later chapters, which will shift
from the constitution of the individual flesh to the communal body.
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Surprisingly—given his emphasis upon the manifold nature of sensible impressions, the
synthetic nature of the ego’s constitution, and the persistence of the gap or remainder within
immanence—Rogozinski nevertheless seems to follow Henry and Marion in insisting that the flesh
appears without organs. Within the radical reduction that centers his phenomenological
Egoanalysis, he writes, “I no longer have the right to say that it is my eyes that see, my ears that
hear. When I effect the reduction, my material body disappears with all its organs and physical
qualities; what remains is not the body but rather flesh. … My flesh never crystallizes into a
differentiated organic unity, … it has neither eyes nor hands nor sex organs.”178
For Rogozinski, like his predecessors, to speak of the “organ” is always already to speak
of the organic body—the body insofar as it is marked by “spatial and temporal extension.”179 Any
discussion of “organs” must therefore be undertaken at the level of the material body (le corps),
the body insofar as it is constituted—or “self-incorporated”—within the visibility of the world.
This is the body that has “constitute[d] itself as one whole composed of differentiated organs.”180
The flesh, on the other hand, manifests without organs.
Yet, this initial exclusion of the organ from Rogozinski’s phenomenology of the flesh, must
be nuanced. For, while he remains deeply skeptical of the language of the organ, his reasoning
differs considerably from that of Henry and Marion—a difference that opens up the space for a
distinction between the organ and the “pole”181 or member.
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Contrary to Henry and Marion, Rogozinski’s critique of the organ is much more closely
indebted to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the Body without Organs; as he flatly admits, “the
flesh is not very different from Deleuze’s ‘body without organs’.”182 While this language of a body
without organs ostensibly supports a monadic rejection of all incarnate members, the reality is
almost exactly the opposite. For, while Artaud articulated the language of the BwO, he also
supplemented this language with a positive account of the “true organs.” As Rogozinski writes,
“this notion [of the BwO] has the defect of being purely negative and does not invoke this
necessary reorganization of the flesh, the ‘new dance of the organs’ of which Artaud spoke.”183
For Deleuze and Guattari, this reorganization is not merely a supplement to the BwO, but stands
at the heart of the BwO itself. “The BwO,” they write in A Thousand Plateaus, “is not at all the
opposite of the organs. The organs are not its enemies. The enemy is the organism … The BwO is
not opposed to the organs; rather, the BwO and its ‘true organs,’ … are opposed to the organism,
the organic organization of the organs.”184 Deleuze and Guattari center their critique not on the
notion of the organ, but on the notion of the organism: the theological, teleological, and
hierarchical (read: authoritarian) organization of the organs—as exemplified by the organic body.
The aim of the BwO is not the eradication of the organ, but its very liberation; the discovery of a
line-of-flight whereby one “could patiently and momentarily dismantle the organization of the
organs [that] we call the organism.”185
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Precisely the same critique can be found in Rogozinski’s phenomenology. To again cite a
key passage: “even if my flesh never crystallizes into a differentiated organic unity, if it has neither
eyes nor hands nor sex organs…”186 While the second clause appears to disqualify anything like
an organ or a member, this disqualification is a response to the first clause—it is not organs that
are the problem, but “organic unity,” the implicitly hierarchical organization of the organs. It is for
this reason that Rogozinski goes on to immediately qualify this disqualification:
[The flesh] has nevertheless, each one of which has its singular carnal site—many
fluid and mobile micro-organs that open and close constantly and never stop
touching, hearing, seeing, desiring, rejoicing, suffering. In order to avoid confusing
them with corporal organs, I will henceforth designate them as poles of flesh.”187
The clause “in order to avoid confusing them…” is particularly enlightening here; it illustrates that
Rogozinski is here making a semantic decision to avoid the language of the organ, in favor of the
pole of flesh. Thus, Rogozinski both recognizes the danger of an organicist account of the body—
in which everything has its “proper place” and “proper role”—as well as the phenomenological
insufficiency of a purely monadic account of the flesh. The only remaining option, the option that
Rogozinski takes, is to both recognize the multiplicity of the flesh, as well as the contingency and
revisibility of any distribution of this multiplicity. “The organs,” as Deleuze and Guattari write,
“distribute themselves on the BwO, but they distribute themselves independently of the form of
the organism; form becomes contingent, organs are no longer anything more than intensities that
are produced, flows, thresholds, and gradients.”188
Insofar as the language of the organ seems to almost inevitably privilege this hierarchical
organization—being co-opted by the organic body—the present project will therefore follow
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Rogozinski’s semantic decision to avoid the language of the organ. But, whereas Rogozinski chose
to replace this language with the Husserlian language of the “poles of the flesh,” I will here employ
the language of the “member of the flesh,” in order—in subsequent discussions of community and
political bodies—to employ the double meaning of member as both a constituent of the individual
body and a person belonging to a social group.

§3. The Irreducibility of Sexual Difference
A. Re-Sexualizing the Flesh
While I have here followed Rogozinski’s critique of the “organ” and choice to offer differing
language—“pole” in his case, “member” in my own—it is nevertheless worth noting a certain risk
inherent in any attempt to avoid the language of the organ: a tendency to erase sexuality. Simply
put, as soon as one conceives of an originary flesh that is “deprived of … differentiated organs,”189
then likewise this flesh is deprived of sexual organs. As Rogozinski argues, “under the
phenomenological reduction, it is appropriate to put out of play every objective or worldly
determination … In truth, the originary flesh … has neither eyes, nor hands, nor sex organs.”190 It
is a quick step from here into a monadic erasure of every trace of sexual difference from the
originary flesh.
One can see this progression play out clearly in Rogozinski, who elsewhere argues rather
straightforwardly, “I tend to consider sexual difference as being constituted on the plane of the
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organic body, and therefore not belonging to the originary plane of immanence of the flesh.”191
Thus Rogozinski, for example, writes of Freud’s Dora case-study, “on the plane of the flesh, there
is nothing equivalent to … the gaping pit of the sexual orifice.”192 There is no sexual organ on the
plane of the flesh, because there is simply no organ on the plane of the flesh.193
Yet, as has been shown above, once one has stripped sexuality from the flesh, only two
possibilities remain: either, as in Henry, the flesh is presented as an a-sexual transcendental field,
or as in Marion, the flesh manifests in a binary of two monadic sexualities. Either way—insofar
as these two options ultimately collapse into one another—what is rendered impossible is a
thinking capable of accounting for sexual difference in the strong sense, a difference-beyondbinary exemplified by queer or trans* lived, embodied experience.
Thus, Rogozinski, like Henry, begins with a transcendental a-sexuality of the originary
flesh, but nevertheless ends up (almost inevitably) recapitulating a binary account of sexual
difference. This is evident in the transition from the a-sexual originary flesh into the sexed “body
of flesh” [Leibkörper]. Whereas “the primordial flesh was too undifferentiated—both too
disseminated and too homogenous”194 for the emergence of sexual difference, the body of flesh is
191
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marked by the constitution or incorporation of the organic body. “By letting itself be traversed and
divided by the remainder in this way,” Rogozinski argues, “the body of flesh is opened to sexual
desire.”195 Thus, he continues, “the flesh is incorporated in the form of a sexed and sectioned body
with its organs opening outwards, its cavities, its folds, intercellular spaces, and orificial
crevices.”196
It is here that the a-sexual flesh has become a sexed body. But it is likewise here that
Rogozinski falls into a familiar, but suspect, binary thinking. For him, it is the incorporation of the
flesh that is “able to arrange a place for the Two of sexual difference.”197 The transition from the
primordial ego-flesh to the sexuation of the organic body is marked as a transition from the unity
of the undifferentiated One to the binary of the sexual Two. But, as even the most rudimentary
phenomenology of queer experience has taught, sexuality is neither one nor two, but always
already multiple. As Deleuze and Guattari, for example, articulate the dissemination of the binary
Two into the multiplicity of the many: “the two sexes imply a multiplicity of molecular
combinations bringing into play not only the man in the woman and the woman in the man, but
the relation of each to the animal, the plant, etc.: a thousand tiny sexes.”198 The question to be
asked is: how has Rogozinski has fallen into this binary thinking?
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I would here like to suggest that Rogozinski has misplaced the gap or fissure constitutive
of sexuality. For, as he rightly notes:
For sexuation to take place, a sectioning is necessary, an originary tearing
distributed over the entire surface of the ego-skin in a series of local openings and
differentiated orifices, thus making contact possible with different zones, on which
desire is fixated; it makes possible displacements that let it migrate from one to
another, distances, penetrations, ejections, and spasms—the unsettling intrigue of
desire and of jouissance.199
One finds a similar account of sexuation in Lacanian psychoanalysis, insofar as sexuation and
sexuality as such, emerge not as a positive property of the sexed body—a fact that is always
“secondary”200—, but as a “lack” or “fault” [faille] in the field of signification. For Lacan, sexual
difference is never reducible-without-excess to discourse. There is no simple binary signification:
for, while “a man is nothing but a signifier. … Woman is not-whole—there is always something
in her that escapes discourse.”201 Thus, Lacan’s famous dictum: “there is no sexual relationship”
[il n'y a pas de rapport sexuel].202 Yet, this seeming denial of a sexual relationship—and its
correlative denial of binary signification: Man/Woman—should not be misunderstood as a denial
of sexual difference. Quite to the contrary, as Žižek clarifies:
Because the binary signifier is primordially repressed, there is no sexual
relationship; sexual antagonism cannot be symbolized in a pair of opposed
symbolic/differential features. However, the fact that there is no sexual relationship
in no way implies that ‘there is no sexual difference in the unconscious,’ that the
unconscious is beyond or beneath sexual difference, a fluid domain of partial drives
which defy sexuation. One can even say that the unconscious is thoroughly and
only about sexual difference.203
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Rather than a “fluid domain,” or we might say transcendental a-sexuality,204 sexual difference
saturates the being of the individual—their unconscious (Žižek) or their body of flesh
(Rogozinski)—precisely as a response to this primordial negativity or lack. Here Rogozinski and
the Lacanians are in agreement.
But, where precisely is the necessary “sectioning” or “originary tearing” constitutive of
sexuality? In vulgar readings of psychoanalysis, this cut is understood as the gap between the
sexes, between man and woman. Rogozinski seems to flirt with this option when he describes the
cut as generative of “the Two of sexual difference.”205 Yet, what the Slovenian school of
psychoanalysis—particularly Zupančič and Žižek—have recently sought to demonstrate, is that
this traditional reading misses the true depth of the cut formative of sexual difference. It is not a
cut between each sex that is determinative of sexual difference, but a constitutive negativity at the
heart of each. “The lesson here,” Žižek argues, “is that sexual difference qua the Real of an
antagonism is not the difference between the two sexes (masculine and feminine), but a
difference/antagonism which runs across (traverses) each of the two sexes, introducing a gap of
inconsistency into its very heart.”206
Despite his avowed anti-Lacanianism, one finds a similar account—albeit in a
phenomenological register—in Rogozinski. For Rogozinski, the immanent genesis of the sexed
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body emerges from the inscription of the flesh’s remainder onto the surface—the “ego-skin”—of
the organic body, opening up the requisite distances, orifices, and penetrations which generate “the
unsettling intrigue of desire and of jouissance.”207 But, this does not mean that the cut is itself in
the transcendent milieu of the world. For, although he clearly marks the organic body as the site
of sexual difference, this difference is constituted through the intercession of the remainder—
which operates at the level of the originary flesh. Indeed, it appears the organic body itself is
birthed through the intervention of the remainder:
There is also an essential relation between these corporeal orifices in which the
body’s erotic dimension finds its anchorage and the effects of the cutting up of the
remainder. Because it hollows out a gap between my flesh and itself, impeding the
two poles from joining up or from adhering to one another without distance, the
flesh is incorporated in the form of a sexed and sectioned body with its organs
opening outwards.208
Yet, by making this move towards the sexed body in this manner, Rogozinski risks overturning
the radical innovation that marks his advancement beyond his predecessors. For here,
incorporation appears to be understood as the necessary response to a gap opened by the remainder.
Thus, rather than introducing an écarte into the immanence of the flesh, Rogozinski here seems to
envision this gap between “the flesh and itself” being cast out of the radical immanence of the
flesh and into a sexed body—what Henry would call a “sexually differentiated objective body.”209
In this way, Rogozinski falls into the Henrian trap of the monadic flesh, and its expulsion
of every écarte and internal differentiation (member) from the flesh. Moreover, it is precisely by
expelling the gap out of the flesh, and into the organic body, that Rogozinski—as his
predecessors—is motivated to limit the multiplicitous diversity of sexual difference. Precisely as
207
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in Henry’s erasure and Marion’s condemnation of sexual minorities, the expulsion of the écarte
from the flesh produces the implicit heteronormativity of the binary terms of the “Two of sexual
difference.”210
But, might one instead think sexuality following Rogozinski’s own principal intuition,
might one be more Rogozinskian than Rogozinski? For, if he is right that the remainder is a
necessary product of the impossibility of a complete chiasm, the necessity of an écarte within the
flesh, and, if he is likewise correct in his judgment that sexuation is the product of a gap between
the flesh and itself—could one not simply forego reference to the organic body entirely, and
suggest that, even prior to the incorporation of the organic body, the flesh is itself already marked
by sexual difference?
Indeed, one might here note another commonality between Rogozinski and Lacanian
psychoanalysis. For, Lacanians tend to think sexuation in binary terms—“whichever way we turn,”
Žižek argues, “the Two lurks beneath.”211 For these thinkers sexual difference is understood as the
two exclusive means of relating to the lack of the signifier: “every speaking being situates itself on
one side or the other.”212 Yet, even if unintentional, Žižek’s language in Incontinence of the Void
nevertheless betrays the artificiality of this binary limitation: “the ‘transcendental’ genesis of the
multiple resides in the lack of the binary signifier, i.e., the multiple emerges as the series of
attempts to fill in the gap of the missing binary signifier.”213 For, what justifies a limitation of
attempts to fill the gap to two? Neither Žižek nor Rogozinski give a satisfactory explanation.
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Moreover, the artificiality of this binary is even more conspicuous insofar as there is not a gap in
the heart of the flesh, but a multiplicity of gaps—“a series of local openings and
differentiations”214—each birthing new opportunities for response. Indeed, it might instead be
suggested that the indeterminate multiplicity of sexual positions emerges from precisely the
indeterminacy of possible attempts to fill these gaps: to the thousand possible responses to
negativity correspond a thousand tiny sexes.

B. The Irreducibility of Sexual Difference
Insofar as sexual difference manifests within the originary immanence of the flesh, the
phenomenologist might therefore affirm with psychoanalysis, “the subject is immanently,
constitutively, sexed”;215 “the subject is not only secondarily sexualized, it is sexualized in its very
formal structure.”216 In the language of radical phenomenology, one can say that there is no
transcendental a-sexuality of the flesh. Rather, sexual difference goes “all the way down.”
Sexual difference is strictly speaking, irreducible. This can be understood both in its
colloquial sense, and in a properly phenomenological sense. That is to say, even the most rigorous
phenomenological reduction—the radical reduction or the reduction to givenness—cannot
properly speaking get beyond or beneath sexual difference. The phenomenologist must therefore
resist the temptation to deduce (in a Kantian manner) a transcendental-self beyond or before this
disorganized manifold of sexuality. Phenomenologically speaking, it may very well be possible to
peek behind the sexual organization of the organic body. But, even under the most rigorous epoché,
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sexual difference, in all of its multiplicitous diversity, appears to stubbornly persist. This is
precisely because, insofar as sexual difference is a product of the écarte—the necessary remainder
of the chiasm by which the flesh is itself constituted as an ego-flesh—sexual difference is therefore
coterminus with the ego-flesh.217 As Zupančič argues, “there is no subjectivity beyond or beneath
(or simply outside) the sexual division. Sexual difference is not a secondary distinction of
subjectivity, or simply culturally constructed.”218 The body, in its manifold membership, is
originary, and this matters not only philosophically and phenomenologically, but also ethically
and politically. As Jay Prosser argues, from a trans* perspective, “that a transsexual’s trajectory
centers on reconfiguring the body reveals that it is the ability to feel the bodily ego in conjunction
and conformity with the material body parts that matters in a transsexual context; and that sex is
perceived as something that must be changed underlines its very un-phantasmatic status.”219
Yet, this affirmation of sexual difference should not be misunderstood as a return to the
traditional binary conception of sexual difference, this is not a rejection of Henry in favor of
Marion (or von Balthasar). Rather, as I have hopefully illustrated above, despite its strong claims
of respect for sexual difference, an approach that a priori delimits all sexuality to a binary
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signification (male/female) and to a single mode of expression (monogamous and heterosexual),
is not founded upon the respect for difference, but upon an enforced homogeneity, a binary logic
of sameness. Thus while Enrique Dussel may describe homosexuality as “the denial of sexual
diversity,”220 or von Balthasar may mark it as a narcissism in which “man has caught sight of his
own beauty and made it into an object,”221 the truth is precisely the opposite. As Lee Edelman
elegantly puts it:
Homosexuality, though charged with, and convicted of, a future-negating sameness
construed as reflecting its pathological inability to deal with the fact of difference,
gets put in the position of difference from the heteronormativity that, despite its
persistent propaganda for its own propagation through sexual difference, refuses
homosexuality’s difference from the value of difference it claims as its own.222
It is therefore this deeper value of difference, that not only affirms the difference between the
sexes, but likewise the multiplicitous differences between and among queer sexualities—indeed,
even the multiplicitous sexual difference that resides within each individual—that is here
phenomenologically recognized, in order that it might also be ethically and politically affirmed.
Therefore, if one wishes to open up an account of the body that refuses to serve as a model
for political violence and exclusion (as will be explored below), then we are here tasked with
thinking the member together with the flesh, of thinking members of the flesh—multiplicitous,
momentary, mobile sites of sexual manifestation beyond the reach of the organized organic body.
If we can learn to think such sexual members, within the flesh, rather than within the organic body,
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then perhaps we might discover that the flesh possesses “a much stranger unity that applies only
to the multiple.”223
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Chapter 6: Studies on the Sexual Member
The relation of the subject with the organ is at the heart of our experience.
Jacques Lacan

If the previous chapter aimed to establish both the multiplicitous character of the flesh and its
primordial saturation by sexual difference, then the following chapter will seek to further explore
the relationship between these two insights, by undertaking a phenomenological account of the
sexual member of the flesh. In order to explore the sheer multiplicity and complexity of sexual
membership, the three studies presented here will follow a trajectory that intentionally inverts the
Freudian stages of sexual development, aiming to thwart the traditional privilege of the genitalia
as the sole “proper” libidinal outlet. Thus, following this trajectory, the first study will seek to
investigate what is widely regarded as the “purely sexual organ”1—the penis—through a
phenomenology of acute sexual impotence. The second study will examine the role of anal
eroticism in the early European gay liberation movement through a phenomenological lens,
deconstructing the traditional “normal”/“pathological” distinction by tying this anal eroticism to
the traditionally “non-pathological” uses of oral eroticism in sexuality—viz. kissing. The third and
final study will look at polymorphous character of sexual membership through a phenomenology
of erogenous zones writ large.
Each of these phenomenological studies aims to highlight a particular sexual phenomenon
which has been relegated to the periphery of phenomenological considerations of sexuality. This
design is intentional and seeks to both illuminate those aspects of sexual incarnation that have
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traditionally been cast aside, as well as placing traditional phenomenologies and theologies of
sexuality in question, insofar as such accounts of sexuality have been marked by a certain “proper”
character. Simply put, traditional philosophical and theological accounts of sexuality are often
conspicuously sterile. They give the sense that sexuality is clean and tidy—ignoring the complex,
aleatory, dirty, and in a word indecent character that often marks sexuality. As will be considered
more fully in the next two chapters, this erasure of the indecent character of sexuality motivates
and permits such philosophies and theologies to marginalize those whose sexuality cannot be
“cleaned up,” cannot be made proper. Thus, borrowing the language of Marcella Althaus-Reid,
who names her fusion of liberation theology and queer theory Indecent Theology,2 one might here
speak of an indecent phenomenology. That is to say, I will here seek to undertake a phenomenology
of these philosophically marginalized sexual phenomena—impotence, anal pleasure,
polymorphous perversity—in an uncompromising fashion in order to uncover (undresses?)3 both
the underlying structures of sexual incarnation as such as well as give the lie to any sterile notion
of proper—i.e. “natural,” “normal”—sexuality.
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“By examining the dialectics of decency and indecency and exploring a theology of sexual stories from the
margins, this book brings together for the first time Liberation Theology, Queer Theory, post-Marxism and
Postcolonial analysis in an explosive mixture. … Indecent Theology is based on the sexual experiences of the poor,
using economic and political analysis while unveiling the sexual ideology of systematic theology. Theology is a
sexual act and Indecent Theologians are called to be sexual performers of a committed praxis of social justice and
transformation of the structures of economic and sexual oppression in their societies. … Indecent Theology is a
theology which problematizes and undresses the mythical layers of multiple oppression in Latin America, a theology
which, finding its point of departure at the crossroads of Liberation Theology and Queer Thinking, will reflect on
economic and theological oppression with passion and imprudence.” Marcella Althaus-Reid, Indecent Theology:
Theological Perversions in Sex, Gender and Politics (New York: Routledge, 2000), i, 2.
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time.” Ibid., 19.
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§1. “I Can’t,” a Phenomenology of Impotence
A. The “I Can” and Impotence
As we have already seen, since Husserl’s phenomenological analyses of the living body (Leib) in
Ideas II, the subjective experience of the body, what later French thinkers will name the flesh, has
been particularly marked by its capacity for action—its potency. As Husserl writes, “the Ego has
the ‘faculty’ (the ‘I can’) to freely move this Body [Leib]—i.e., the organ in which it is
articulated—and to perceive an external world by means of it.”4
This privileging of the acting flesh, the potent organ, is echoed throughout the subsequent
phenomenological tradition, where it serves a valuable role in the critique of the Cartesian subject,
aiding in the conceptualization of a truly embodied manner of existence. As Merleau-Ponty
paradigmatically notes, “consciousness is in the first place not a matter of ‘I think that’ but of ‘I
can’.”5 Indeed, this subjectively acting body can be traced back to Maine de Biran’s thesis of the
“impression of effort,”6 later translated into a phenomenological idiom by Henry in Philosophy
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Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Routledge, 1962), 159.
Henry almost simultaneously makes the same claim, writing in 1948-49 that “the ego is a power, the cogito does not
mean an ‘I think’ but an ‘I can’.” Although he will later nuance this claim, affirming Maine de Biran’s identification
of the ‘I think’ and the ‘I can’; “the Biranian cogito is in no way opposed to the Cartesian cogito, there is no
question of opposing an ‘I can’ to an ‘I think’ because the whole Biranian analysis of effort has as its sole and
essential result the determining of this effort as a mode of subjectivity itself.” Michel Henry, Philosophy and
Phenomenology of the Body, trans. Girard Etzkorn (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), 53, 55
6

See: Maine de Biran, The Influence of Habit on the Faculty of Thinking, trans. Margaret Donaldson Boehm
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1970). This “impression of effort” can be understood as Biran’s interpretation of
Leibniz’s conatus or nisus, which is “over and above extension.” G. W. Leibniz, “A Specimen of Dynamics, Toward
Uncovering and Reducing to Their Causes Astonishing Laws of Nature Concerning the Forces of Bodies and Their
Actions on One Another” in Philosophical Essays, trans. Roger Ariew (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,
1989), 118.

297

and Phenomenology of the Body.7 For this tradition, from de Biran and Husserl, to Merleau-Ponty
and Henry, the flesh is distinguished from the mere body (Körper) by its unique capacity to act.
Moreover, for the later French tradition the flesh will be distinctly marked by the
immediacy of its action. As Henry affirmatively notes of the Schopenhauerian will—whose very
“mode in which it presents itself to us is our body”8—“there is only one force, never separate from
itself, whose action is its deployment and necessary inner accomplishment.”9 For Henry, to be
body is to be will, and to be will is to be action. Impotence (impuissance), insofar as it appears in
Henry, only ever appears as the “impotence of thought.”10 This embodied-will therefore inverts
the Cartesian thinking subject. The embodied-will “has nothing to do with understanding. … It
does not regard its action as a possibility; it is that action and has already decided to accomplish
it. It is one with its action and its content.”11 This identity of action and flesh is indebted to Henry’s
broader commitment to the absolute ontological homogeneity of the monadic flesh [chapter 5].
This identification of flesh and action produces certain aporia when faced with the question
of incapacity, impotence, or the inability to act. According to many phenomenological accounts of
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the flesh, insofar as action is understood in its moments of impossibility, this incapacity must be
understood as a consequence of “external” factors, as resistance. In the same way that, as Sartre
writes, “my hand reveals to me the resistance of objects,” 12 so too must all incapacity, insofar as
the body is understood as action incarnate, be understood as the imposition of external objects.
Even when Henry attempts to account for resistance immanently in the “resisting continuum”13 of
the organic body, he nevertheless inevitably reduces the organic body to mere representation—to
the impotence of thought14—and subordinates this resistance to the originary power of the “I can”:
the continuum “remains within the ‘I can’,”15 it “submits to the powers”16 of the “I can.” Thus,
despite his use of the language of interiority, this resistance is likewise subjected to the
transcendent reign of exteriority: “the ontological character which constitutes the being of the
organ is transcendence,”17 therefore, “the constituted organic body is already a represented
body.”18
Yet, this simple schema is upset by manifold phenomena wherein the impossibility of
acting does not phenomenologically appear as the product of external resistance, but of the very
incapacity of the flesh itself. Paradigmatically, the phenomenon of acute sexual impotence
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provides an enlightening phenomenological study, not only revelatory of impotence, but of the
relationship between the flesh and the sexual member as such.
B. Premodern and Psychological Conceptions of Impotence
Despite the commonality of its occurrence, its associated psychological difficulties, and the deep
connections to masculine anxiety,19 philosophical (and particularly phenomenological)
discussions of impotence are few and far between. Marion tangentially approaches some of these
concerns with his discussion of the suspension of eroticization in The Erotic Phenomenon, there
he discusses the “puerile yet obsessive anxieties about orgasms that are too rapid or, inversely, the
difficulty of attaining one.”20 But, if one seeks a direct philosophical engagement with impotence,
one finds little to work with. In fact, it is quite noteworthy that, despite being four and a half
centuries old, Montaigne’s Essays—particularly his essay “Of the Force of Imagination”—remain
among the most substantial sustained philosophical treatments of impotence.21 While Montaigne’s
Essays are certainly not phenomenological in a technical sense, they may nevertheless serve as a
starting point for phenomenological investigation insofar as they offer something like a reflective
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attitude. As Montaigne himself notes, “some years ago … finding myself entirely destitute and
void of any other matter, I presented myself to myself for argument and subject.”22
For Montaigne, impotence (l'impuissance) can be divided into two principal modes. The
first, which Montaigne refers as the “juste faiblesse” (“genuine weakness”23) represent a physicomedical impotence which remains the domain of doctors—and as phenomenologists we might say
the domain of the Körper or le corps.24 The second, which forms the bulk of Montaigne’s
considerations, is the nouements d'aiguillettes, an impotence which cannot be resolved into a
distinct physical cause.
In ancient and medieval literature, nouements d'aiguillettes are understood as a form of
acute impotence, particularly common throughout the Medieval world and often associated with
newly married men who are unable to consummate their marriage. Traditionally, this impotence
was associated with wizardry and witchcraft. Thus one finds an extended discussion of impotence
in the Malleus Maleficarum (Part 2, Ch. VI), where it is associated with a wizard who “confessed
that for many years he had by witchcraft brought sterility upon all the men and animals which
inhabited a certain house,” and another of a man bewitched such that he would remain impotent
with every woman, save the witch who cursed him.
This notion of impotence as a curse represented a supernatural reinterpretation of earlier
Christian tradition. Responding to precisely the same paradox of the unruly will of the male
22
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member, Augustine, drawing upon Romans 7.23—“I see another law in my members, warring
against the law of my mind”—suggests that the disruptive member, whether impotent or lustful,25
operates by its own alien will.
Well, then, how significant is the fact that the eyes, and lips, and tongue, and hands,
and feet, and the bending of back, and neck, and sides, are all placed within our
power—to be applied to such operations as are suitable to them, when we have a
body free from impediments and in a sound state of health; but when it must come
to man's great function of the procreation of children the members which were
expressly created for this purpose will not obey the direction of the will, but lust
has to be waited for to set these members in motion, as if it had legal right over
them, and sometimes it refuses to act when the mind wills, while often it acts against
its will!26
For Augustine, this will is the unique product of human sin: “when the first man transgressed the
law of God, he began to have another law in his members which was repugnant to the law of his
mind.”27 Because the first humans, members of the body of Christ, rebelled against the head of
that body, so too are they compelled to contend against their own willful members.
Now, this ardour, whether following or preceding the will, does somehow, by a
power of its own, move the members which cannot be moved simply by the will,
and in this manner it shows itself not to be the servant of a will which commands
it, but rather to be the punishment of a will which disobeys it.28
As suggested by its title, Montaigne’s “Of the Force of Imagination” is marked by its
rejection of these supernatural or theological explanations. Rather, Montaigne breaks with his
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premodern predecessors and seeks to offer a psychological explanation of acute impotence. Thus,
for example, he considers a man who, upon hearing a description of another’s impotence, finds
himself immediately stricken with the same condition. Yet, just as it spontaneously emerged from
this discussion, this impotence likewise disappears in an equally sudden manner. According to
Montaigne, publicly admitting his condition releases the anxiety that binds him, freeing him from
his self-imposed impotence.
For Montaigne, this solution reflects the psychological—or one might say
psychosomatic—origin of acute impotence. The incapacity experienced by the suffering man is a
product of the “imagination,” not in the sense that it is an imagined malady, but rather insofar as
the overly invested imagination takes on an obsessive character. Thus, according to Montaigne,
“impotence can be reversed only by diverting the imagination and allowing the body to respond,
in a relaxed and spontaneous way, to erotic stimuli.”29 More recent psychoanalytic and empirical
research has often confirmed Montaigne’s intuitions.
Freud, for example, writes of a “psychical impotence” that bears striking resemblance to
Montaigne’s discussions.30 Indeed, apart from generalized anxiety, Freud suggests that impotence
is the single most common complaint among his patients. Moreover, this complaint does not
correlate with a lack of libidinous desire. Rather, “this singular disturbance affects men of strongly
libidious natures.”31 Thus, its principal form is that of an internal conflict, it “manifests itself in a
refusal by the executive organs of sexuality to carry out the sexual act, … and although a strong

29

Lee R. Entin-Bates, 649-650.

30

Ibid., 652.

31

Sigmund Freud, “On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love: Contributions to the
Psychology of Love II (1912),” trans. Alan Tyson in J. Strachey (Ed.), The standard edition of the complete
psychological works of Freud, Volume XI (1910): Five lectures on psycho-analysis, Leonardo da Vinci and other
works (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis), 179.

303

psychical inclination to carry it out is present.”32 Thus, “he has a feeling of an obstacle inside him,
the sensation of a counter-will which successfully interferes with his conscious intention.”33 Freud
offers a fairly expected etiology; psychical impotence becomes symptomatic of “psychical
complexes which are withdrawn from the subject’s knowledge.”34 That is to say, it is the product
of unconscious cathexes, particularly incestual desire and infantile trauma.
Likewise, from the empirical side, one finds Masters and Johnson writing of impotence as
a psychological phenomenon. “Fear of inadequacy,” they argue, “is the greatest known deterrent
to effective sexual functioning, simply because it so completely distracts the fearful individual
from his or her natural responsivity by blocking reception of sexual stimuli.”35
While compelling within their own domains, these analyses remain firmly situated within
the psychological region and its various metaphysical interpretations. My interest here is instead
to undertake a phenomenological investigation of impotence, particularly one which centers the
flesh, and may therefore serve to illustrate certain striking features of erotic embodiment.
C. A Phenomenology of Impotence
In the well-functioning sexual act, a certain correspondence arises between the erotic intention of
the acting subject and their flesh. Simply put, using the language common from Husserl to Henry,
the flesh manifests as an “I can”—the potent organ of action manifests within the quite literal
“potent organ.” Within this alignment of drive and result, there is manifest something like an
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identity between action and flesh. Yet, this only represents one possible outcome of the erotic
encounter. In reality, as Marion notes, one might find oneself struck with premature ejaculation or
unable to achieve orgasm. Or, struck with acute impotence, one may find oneself unable to
undertake the sexual act at all. In the case of impotence this presumed identity between subjective
aim and incarnate act finds itself fractured by a particularly conspicuous incapacity. The flesh
manifests as an “I can’t.”
Certainly, one might attempt to reconcile this incapacity within the traditional framework
by positing impotence as a case in which there is a mismatch between the objective body (le corps)
and the flesh. One might here recall, for example, Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the ill-formed
corporeal schema, in the case of phantom limb syndrome or anosognosia. Yet, such a solution
seems to miss the unique character of acute impotence. Whereas in phantom limb syndrome one
subjectively experiences a limb on le corps propre, which is not manifest objectively, and
conversely, in anosognosia one lacks a subjective experience of a limb that is objectively present—
impotence presents a different case.
In impotence there

is

no misalignment between

flesh

and body. Rather,

phenomenologically the member appears within both the corporeal schema and objective
experience. One by no means lacks the sense that this member is one’s own—as in anosognosia.
Yet, this fleshly member refuses to act in conjunction with the subject, even one might say, with
the flesh itself. Indeed, speaking phenomenologically, the member simply refuses to act at all—it
lacks the power to act: it is quite literally im-puissant. Whereas the phenomenological ontology of
the flesh which runs from Husserl to Henry tends to think the flesh as action, as capacity,
impotence reveals a member of the flesh which simply refuses action. But this member is still
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mine, or more precisely is still me. It still bears the unique ipseity of my flesh. Thus “it cannot,” is
at one and the same time “I cannot.”
Within the paradigm of Husserl, where the flesh (Leib) is itself passively constituted by a
number of distinct fields of sensings (Empfindnisse) which through acts of localization organize
into a “system of compatibly harmonizing organs,”36 this phenomenon may be adjusted for. The
same cannot be said for the monadic tradition of radical phenomenology.
What the phenomenon of impotence suggests, against the phenomenology of the flesh in
Michel Henry and Jean-Luc Marion, is the unique ways in which the immanence of the flesh is
itself marked by certain gaps or fissures. We are not, acute impotence suggests, in “undivided
possession”37 of our flesh, despite the fact that this flesh is still my own. The impotent member is
me, is my flesh, but is also not only me, insofar as it can be extracted from my action.
Here one finds phenomenological support for Jacob Rogozinski’s conception of the “pole
of flesh” or what I have suggested might be called the member of the flesh. For, insofar as the
passive synthesis of the flesh—the carnal synthesis—is only ever “a partial and precarious
identification,”38 it is necessarily marked by a certain écarte or “remainder” (le restant). Against
the monadic flesh of Henry and Marion, Rogozinski insists that there always remains gaps or
fissures at the heart of the ego-flesh. It is precisely these “remainders” that are brought to the fore
in an investigation of the phenomenon of acute impotence, the supposed total auto-affectivity of
the flesh finds itself struck by a gap.
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While each member of the flesh is marked by a certain affective ipseity—each member is
felt to be my own—the remainder’s inability to fully constitute within the flesh tends to mark it
with a second affective characteristic: negative affect. For Rogozinski not only describes the
constitution which produces the remainder, but also the unique way in which the remainder is
affectively constituted as abject. Indeed, Rogozinski might just as well have been speaking of the
impotent member when he writes of the remainder, “when this intimate Stranger reappears in our
haunting, it necessarily takes on the appearance of a dissociated part of the whole, an errant
fragment of the body outside of the body—a gaze without a face, an eye without a gaze, a shard
of voice, a sliced member, excremental waste, and so on.”39 Insofar as the remainder—or the
impotent member—refuses full incarnation into the flesh, insofar as it refuses the identification of
flesh and action, it becomes an object of anxiety, fear, and, ultimately, hate. As Mario Mieli
recognizes, “any male heterosexual goes wild at the idea of ‘not being able to get it up’.”40 Thus,
for example, in Montaigne’s Essays one finds an account of a “lustful young man who, desperate
over finding himself impotent with a beautiful mistress, cut off his penis to expiate his offense.”41
The impotent member—in precisely the same manner as its equally illuminating converse,
the inconvenient erection—marks the manifestation of a flesh that is always only mostly me,
precariously me. It is, as Augustine remarked, a member that seems to “operate [by] another
law.”42 But its abject character does not emerge from its mere counter-will. Affectively, the
39
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phenomenon of impotence is quite unlike the failure to control the member of another or a mere
object—it is not a resistance. The incapacity of impotence is quite unlike the incapacity to bend
the arm of another in an arm-wrestling match, for example. The disobedience of the member is
only a fit punishment for original sin, according to Augustine, because it is a member of my flesh.
This negative affect, the abject character of the impotent member emerges precisely from its
precarious status; it is my flesh, it should obey my aims. Instead, in both its impotent and overly
lustful state, as Montaigne notes, this member is unruly. “People,” he writes:
are right to notice the unruly liberty of this member, obtruding so importunately
when we have no use for it, and failing so importunately when we have the most
use for it, and struggling for mastery so imperiously without will, refusing with so
much pride and obstinacy our solicitations, both mental and manual.43
In each of these phenomena, the unruly member presents itself to the body not as a foreign object,
but also not as a unified acting body. In Freud’s language, the patient’s impotence is experienced
as an “obstacle,” but one that is “inside him.”44 The complexity of human incarnation, and
particularly erotic incarnation, is precisely this inability to fully demarcate the member that is
mine, from that member that is not; the rebellious organ, from the demonic influence; the obstacle
outside of me, from the obstacle within me—the flesh from its own remainder.
Yet, against Augustine’s theological reading cited above, this frustration is by no means
limited to the genitalia. Rather, as Montaigne quite rightly notes:
I ask you to think whether there is a single one of the parts of our body that does
not often refuse its function to our will and exercise it against our will. They each
have passions of their own which rouse them and put them to sleep without our
leave. … we do not command our hair to stand on end or our skin to shiver with
desire or fear. The hand often moves itself to where we do not send it.”45
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Every member is capable of exerting a will of its own because the carnal synthesis of the flesh is
not a singular event; it is a synthesis renewed in each moment. And just as this synthesis is renewed
in each moment, so too are its gaps and fissures, which move across the body in indeterminate and
unpredictable ways. The members of the body are momentary and mobile sites; unruly characters
“obtruding so importunately.” In like manner, so too are the erotic members. Eroticization is by
no means limited to the genitalia. Rather, it moves across the flesh in often unexpected and
unpredictable ways. But in order to recognize this fact, it will be necessary to break ourselves free
from the phallic rule, by which “all sexual acts have an ‘aim’ which gives them their meaning;
they are organized into preliminary caresses which will eventually crystallize in the necessary
ejaculation, the touchstone of pleasure.”46 Toward this end, I will now turn to key works in early
European gay liberation movement.

§2. The Anal and the Oral: Eroticization Otherwise than the Phallus
A. Normality and Political Anality
For the early activists of the European gay liberation movement—Guy Hocquenghem and Mario
Mieli—the political liberation of homosexuals was intimately bound both to the economic
liberation from capitalism and the liberation of eroticism from the phallic law of the genital drive
[Geschlechttrieb]. It is for this reason that both Hocquenghem’s Homosexual Desire and Mieli’s
Homosexuality and Liberation explicitly turn to the question of anal eroticism, as a key moment
of liberative potential. This threefold relation between economics, sexuality, and anal eroticism is
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perfectly captured in the title of Hocquenghem’s key chapter: “Capitalism, the Family and the
Anus.” In the words of Mieli:
The (re)conquest of anality contributes to subverting the system in its foundations.
What in homosexuality particularly horrifies homo normalis, the policeman of the
hetero-capitalist system, is being fucked in the arse; and this can only mean that
one of the most delicious bodily pleasures, anal intercourse, is itself a significant
revolutionary force.47
This suggestion of a direct connection between “anality” and economics is not as arbitrary
as it might first appear. For already in his earliest work, Freud believed himself to have detected a
strange homology between money and faeces. As he writes in Character and Anal Eroticism, “the
connections between the complexes of interest in money and of defaecation, which seem so
dissimilar, appear to be the most extensive of all.”48 For Hocquenghem and Mieli, this homology
suggests that the liberation of anal eroticism is uniquely positioned to disrupt the moral foundation
of

an

oppressive—because

repressive—“hetero-capitalism,”

by breaking through

its

presumptively natural normality. “The repressive society and the dominant morality,” Mieli writes,
“consider only heterosexuality as ‘normal’—and only genital heterosexuality at that.”49
Hocquenghem likewise insists that “capitalism turns its homosexuals into failed ‘normal people,’
just as it turns its working class into an imitation of the middle class.”50
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In order to challenge the supposed normality of hetero-genital sexuality, Hocquenghem
and Mieli target the “staged” developmental approach toward genitalization as understood by a
traditional Freudian reading of childhood development, worked out most concisely in Three Essays
on the Theory of Sexuality and An Outline of Psycho-Analysis. In each case Freud aims to explain
“perverts”—broadly understood as “people whose desires behave exactly like sexual ones but who
at the same time entirely disregard the sexual organs or their normal use.” 51 According to Freud,
these perversions can be understood primarily as forms of stagnation or regression, wherein one
fails to advance beyond, or returns to, an earlier stage of psycho-sexual development. Thus, in
each case, his discussion of perversion quickly turns to a discussion of childhood sexuality: “the
germs of all the perversions will only be demonstrable in children.”52
This work begins in 1905 with the development of a tripartite theory of sexual development
wherein the child is understood to pass through three stages: the oral, the anal, and the phallic.53
Each of these stages is marked by the emergence of a special sexual signification upon a certain
bodily zone [Körperstellen] thereafter marked as an erogenous zone [Erogene Zonen]. While
multiplicitous, Freud argues that this development nevertheless moves through a predictable
pattern that culminates in puberty with the emergence of genital sexuality:
Its activity had hitherto been impelled by individual drives and erogenous zones,
which independently of one another sought a certain sort of pleasure as their sole
sexual aim. Now [in puberty] there is a new sexual aim, for whose attainment all
partial drives work together, while the erogenous zones become subordinated to the
primacy of the genital zone.54
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Perversion is therefore marked as a regression to an erogenous zone other than the “natural” locus
of sexuality, the genitalia. As Freud writes, “certain zones of the body [Körperstellen], such as the
mucous membrane of the mouth and of the anus, constantly recur in these [perverted] practices,
clamoring, as it were, for being viewed and treated as genitals in their own right.”55
In their challenge to hetero-capitalism both Hocquenghem and Mieli argue that this heterogenital norm—and its staged understanding of sexual development—is anything but natural: “there
is nothing in life itself that requires the child to ‘grow out’ of autoeroticism and the homosexual
‘stage’ in order to attain this exclusive heterosexuality.”56 Rather, the establishment of such norms
as “natural stages” serves only to reify a political heteronormativity, which itself serves to justify
an economic order: viz. capitalism. Thus, for Hocquenghem, anal eroticism is the key to new moral
(dis)order, a “primary sexual communism”57 which would not impose a telic organization of all
sexuality toward genitalitalization and (re)production. In order to evidence this thesis, both
thinkers aim to refigure anal desire, no longer as a regression or a perversion, but as an authentic
form of erotic manifestation—for each the anus must become not merely the object of a perverse
fetishization, but a member of the sexual flesh in its own right.
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B. A Phenomenology of Anal Pleasure
While neither Hocquenghem nor Mieli undertake their discussion of anal eroticism
phenomenologically, their reflections may nevertheless serve as a starting point for a
phenomenological analysis.
In the naturalistic account of sexuality, anal eroticism generally constitutes a form of
perversion, insofar as it breaks with the “natural” reproductive aim of sexuality. Thus, for example,
Augustine condemns anal eroticism, not only in the case of homosexuality, but likewise in the
heterosexual relation. Indeed, he suggests, the act is even “more damnable” in the context of
marriage.
Sexual intercourse for begetting is free from blame, and itself is alone worthy of
marriage. But that which goes beyond this necessity no longer follows reason, but
lust. … By changing the natural use into that which is against nature, which is more
damnable when it is done in the case of husband or wife.58
Indeed, even in the case of heterosexuality, such eroticism is generally coded queer by implication.
In Thomas Aquinas’ effort to delimit the “sins against nature,” for example, anal eroticism, even
when undertaken within the confines of the marital bed, is directly linked to homosexuality and
summarily condemned.
Among sins against nature … comes the sin of sodomy, because use of the right
sex is not observed. Lastly comes the sin of not observing the right manner of
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copulation, which is more grievous if the abuse regards the ‘vas’ [vessel, orifice]
than if it affects the manner of copulation in respect of other circumstances.59
This naturalistic argument is certainly not limited to theological accounts of the natural
law. Within psychoanalysis, Freud’s regressive conception of anal eroticism discussed above
largely presupposes a reproductive and naturalistic account of anal sexuality. Where such eroticism
appears within the “normal” sexual life, it is to be understood as a merely “preparatory act,”
ultimately oriented toward genital sexuality—which constitutes sexuality’s natural aim. Therefore,
according to Freud, perversion “consist in lingering over the preparatory acts of the sexual
process.”60 The pervert is the one who treats the preparatory act as a sexual end in itself.
In order to shift from this natural standpoint to a phenomenological investigation of anal
eroticism, in order to bring anal pleasure to the fore as a phenomenon, it will therefore be necessary
to undertake a phenomenological reduction, whereby these naturalistic and normative
presuppositions might be methodologically set aside. Such a reduction is anticipated by the Front
Homosexuel d’Action Révolutionnaire (FHAR)—a French gay liberation movement of which
Hocquenghem was one of the first male members. In its 1971 booklet, Rapport contre la normalité,
this organization directly targeted the normalization of the naturalistic condemnation of anal
eroticism. As they write:
We must ask the bourgeois squarely: ‘What are your relations with your asshole
apart from the obligation to shit? Is it part of your body, your word, your senses
just like the mouth or the ears? And if you have decided that the anus only serves
to defecate, why does the mouth have other uses than eating?’61
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Through these questions, FHAR demands that anal eroticism and its unique pleasures be taken
seriously, that it be a subject of investigation on its own grounds, no longer delimited by
restrictions that might here be identified as pre-phenomenological prejudices. As Mieli writes, “the
demand for the restoration of anal pleasure is one of the basic elements in the critique made by the
gay movement.”62 It is from this starting point that the present investigation will begin.
Phenomenologically, anal eroticism can be decomposed into at least two acts of sexual
intentionality. One intentional act can be understood as roughly correlative to the historical
category of “active sodomy,” the second, to the historical category of “passivity.” In the words of
David Halperin—writing specifically of male anal eroticism—“the discourses of pederasty or
‘active’ sodomy are shaped by a crucial distinction between the male desire to penetrate and the
male desire to be penetrated.”63 In each of these cases we are dealing with an intentional direction
toward a constituted organ—what Hocquenghem calls the “anal-organ”64—whether that of oneself
or that of another. Insofar as this direction presupposes the distanciation of an intentional distance
and the constitution of a thing-like object, we are in each case thinking within the categories of
intentional phenomenology. Thus a radical phenomenological investigation will require a further
movement into the radical reduction.
Under such a radical reduction, all intentionality and all distance must be bracketed from
this analysis in order that the phenomenon might be revealed in its most immanent self-givenness.
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We will thus here deal not with the anus and anal desire as understood from the perspective of the
objective body, but as an immanent givenness within the flesh. Given the “intentional” or
directional connotations of “desire,” I will hereafter diverge from Hocquenghem and Mieli, and
refer to this reduced phenomenon no longer as “anal desire” but as “anal pleasure” in order to mark
a shift from intentionality to self-affectivity.65
When a phenomenological investigation of anal pleasure is undertaken at this level, certain
key features appear of which I will highlight five, which may be divided into two principal
categories: the first two mark a certain sexual indeterminacy, the final three mark a certain
incarnate particularity.
First, a phenomenological analysis of anal pleasure reveals a certain indeterminacy or open
possibility in regards to sexual difference. That is to say, sexual difference—whether understood
in the narrow sense of the difference between male and female, or the broader sense as exposed in
queer theories of sexuality—is never essential (that is, eidetically determined) by anal pleasure.
For, as Hocquenghem rightly, albeit rather inelegantly, put it, “the anus is not a substitute for the
vagina: women have one as well as men.”66 The same holds for other key determinations of sexual
identity: neither sexual object choice, genital configuration, nor gender identity is essentially
delimited by anal pleasure. Rather this pleasure reveals itself as a fundamentally indeterminate
pleasure which, while not experienced by all, is nevertheless not essentially (eidetically) foreclosed
to any. 67
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Second, this indeterminacy in regards to sexual and gender identity—and its neutrality in
regard to gender configuration—correlates to a further indeterminacy of stimulation. Simply put,
anal pleasure may be produced by manifold forms of anal stimulation, all possible in anal
eroticism. Thus, anal pleasure refers not only to the genital penetration of the anus, but likewise to
various manual and oral stimulations; such stimulation may be simply “organic” or assisted by any
number of sex toys or other objects; and such stimulation of anal pleasure may be autoerotic or
involve other partners.
Third, despite these indeterminacies or open possibilities, anal pleasure is also marked by
key determinations or incarnate particularities. Thus although from the natural attitude, the
biological boundaries between various organs are rather ambiguous, in anal eroticism there
nevertheless phenomenologically emerges a distinct member of the flesh. Thus, like any other
member of the flesh—be it hand, eye, or genitalia—the central anal orifice is bound together with
its surrounding flesh and sphincter musculature not only as a distinct region of the body—what
Freud might call a Körperstelle—but also as a region of the flesh. That is, anal eroticism reveals
or makes manifest a certain self-constitution of the anus as a pole or member of the flesh.
Fourth, the anal-member is not only, to borrow Freud’s language, a Körperstelle but an
Erogene Zone—an erogenous zone. That is to say, in anal eroticism one experiences a
diversification of sexual meaning. The pleasure invoked in anal pleasure bears a distinctly sexual
or erotic character. Not merely the passive receptacle for the genitalia of the other, in anal pleasure
one finds a zone of pleasure within one’s own flesh which is distinct from genitalization. That is
to say, this zone is experienced as the site of a uniquely sexual pleasure, despite the fact that it
finds itself expanded beyond the region of the genitalia.
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Fifth, and following directly from above, the emergence of this member as a site of a
distinctly sexual pleasure is likewise revealed as an end in itself. That is to say, this pleasure need
not be a merely “preparatory act” in anticipation of genital consummation—anal pleasure is not
telically oriented towards genital fulfillment. Here a phenomenology of the erogenous zone must
break from its Freudian predecessor. For according to Freud, erogenous zones “are used to
facilitate, through the medium of the fore-pleasure which can be derived from them (as it was
during infantile life), the production of the greater pleasure of satisfaction.”68 Specifically, Freud
here intends genital satisfaction.69 This is not to suggest that such pleasure cannot function together
with genital sexuality, nor that it cannot serve a preparatory role. Rather, it is to suggest that such
a preparatory role is not eidetically mandated; it is not essential to the phenomenon of anal pleasure
that it serve the higher eroticism of a “rightly sexual” act—viz. genital copulation. While anal
eroticism may serve as a fore-pleasure, it is also found to constitute a possible satisfaction in its
own right. Thus we might say of anal pleasure, what Hocquenghem said of homosexual desire,
“this leads us to desire as the plugging in of organs subject to no rule or law”70
C. Kissing, or the Banality of Oral Pleasure
Despite Freud’s naturalistic distinction between perverse and “normal” sexual function, he
nevertheless was among the first to recognize the impossibility of unambiguously demarcating the
two. As Freud notes, “everyday experience has shown that most of these extensions [of sexuality
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to non-genital organs], or at any rate the less severe among them, are constituents rarely absent
from the sexual life of healthy persons.”71 For Freud, the fetishistic bestowal of sexual meaning
onto non-genital bodily members is not only a feature prominent in childhood sexual development
and perverse sexuality, but also plays an important persisting role in a “healthy” or “normal” sexual
life.72 The key example of this phenomenon according to Freud is the kiss, as he writes, “a certain
degree of fetishism of this nature is thus a regular part of normal loving, especially in those stages
of being in love in which the normal sexual aim seems unattainable, or its fulfillment deferred.”73
In the kiss, one experiences the extension of a distinctly oral pleasure, beyond the boundaries of
the oral developmental stage, yet in a manner that is, within naturalistic paradigms, almost
universally regarded to be a “normal” sexual function.
For this reason, a phenomenology of the kiss provides a useful supplement to the discussion
of anal pleasure. For, within the naturalistic attitude, kissing and anal pleasure often constitute
polar phenomena. Whereas anal pleasure is generally regarded as an abnormal, perverse, or illicit
sexual phenomenon, kissing is generally regarded as among the most benign manifestations of
sexual pleasure. Yet, as will be suggested below, this moral distinction stands on questionable
grounds insofar as the two phenomena share remarkably similar phenomenological characteristics.
In order to clarify a phenomenological analysis of the kiss, it will be helpful to contrast it with the
kiss in Marion’s The Erotic Phenomenon.
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Within his crucial discussion of the eroticization of the flesh, Marion employs the language
of baiser: translatable either as “to kiss” or “to fuck.”74 Marion here intends this double meaning,
marking the kiss as a preparatory act that provokes the eroticization of the flesh as a whole. As he
writes:
By touching one another mouth to mouth, our two mouths set off a wave that
traverses our two bodies, so as to transcribe them wholly into two fleshes, without
remainder; the mouth begins the process, because, already open, without distinction
between exterior and interior, it offers itself from the outset as flesh. … the kiss of
my mouth upon her mouth (where each mouth gives flesh to the other without
distinction) inaugurates the infinite taking of flesh. All that remains for the whole
of the other and of me to take flesh is to extend the kiss beyond the kissing and
kissed mouth. The eroticization of everything is involved.75
There is much to be commended in this phenomenological account. While uncited, there
are here clear allusions to Luce Irigaray’s insightful account of the “lips.” According to Irigaray—
who, it should be noted, is here, unlike Marion, speaking at once of the lips of the mouth and the
vaginal lips—draws upon Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the chiasm in order to describe the
impossibility of distinguishing the lips as touching from the lips as touched. It is, she writes, “that
contact of at least two [lips] which keeps woman in touch with herself, but without any possibility
of distinguishing what is touching from what is touched.”76 Thus, she argues, woman is always
“self-embracing.”77 Marion draws forward this analysis, linking it to a larger process of
eroticization of the entire flesh.
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Like the phenomenology of anal pleasure, the oral pleasure manifest in the kiss seems to
be marked by fundamental indeterminacies. As in anal pleasure, the kiss appears essentially
unbound by sexual difference, orientation, gender, or genital configuration—each of which remain
an open possibility. Moreover, again as in anal pleasure, the kiss seems to manifest as a unique
bodily zone: “the mouth,” as Marion writes, “slightly open in order to touch another flesh [or its
own]—in order to give to the other his or her flesh.”78 This zone, and one might here return to the
double meaning of le baiser, is likewise potentially sexualized; it is an erogenous zone. Lastly,
while the kiss often serves as a preparatory act, this is by no means an essential characteristic.
It is this final phenomenological characteristic that breaks with Marion’s account of the
kiss. In his analysis of eroticization, Marion implicitly draws forward a naturalistic paradigm, that
is, he has failed to employ the reduction in a sufficiently rigorous manner. For his analysis of the
eroticization of the flesh, beginning with the lips, is nothing other than a quasi-phenomenological
recapitulation of Freud’s notion of the “preparatory act.” For Marion, the kiss does not constitute
a pleasure in itself, but rather serves the necessary role of eroticization, making possible the
emplacement of the sexual organs within the flesh and therefore preparing for genital copulation:
it is a fore-pleasure. Here, le baiser prepares the way for le baiser—the kiss for the fuck. Yet,
despite its clever employment of a double entendre, it is certainly unclear that the kiss must
essentially function as a fore-pleasure. Indeed, the kiss regularly serves as an act of romantic or
sexual intimacy completely independently of genital sexuality. Thus, like anal pleasure, the kiss
may serve as a fore-pleasure; but it is also found to constitute a possible satisfaction in its own
right.
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In this way, the nearly universal embrace of kissing as a normal function, despite the
marked phenomenological similarity between oral and anal pleasure, calls into question the
naturalistic endorsement of the former and condemnation of the latter, and perhaps reveals the
arbitrary (from a radical phenomenological perspective) character of the naturalistic conceptions
of sexual normalcy. Thus a radical phenomenology of anal and oral sexuality might say, together
with Freud:
We can discern in the partial drives a contribution from an organ receiving stimuli
(e.g., the skin, the mucous membrane, or a sense organ). An organ of this kind will
be described here as an ‘erogenous zone’—as being the organ whose excitation
lends the drive a sexual character. The part played by the erogenous zones is
immediately obvious in the case of those inclinations to perversion that assign a
sexual significance to the oral and anal orifices. These behave in every respect like
a portion of the genital apparatus.79

§3. Polymorphous Perversity
A. The Eroticization of Everything
If our analyses to this point have been correct, if the erogenous zone emerges within the flesh itself
as a member with its own unique haecceity, and moreover, if this member is marked by unique
pleasures by no means reducible to genitality, then it becomes possible to recognize an
inevitability: the sexual member, this mobile, momentary, partial site of sexual pleasure can, by
phenomenological right, appear on any surface. Indeed, a phenomenological consideration of the
sexual member, certainly no longer delimited as genitalia—but moreover, neither as an anal or
oral region—reveals the essential impossibility of marking a certain surface of the flesh as
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incapable of eroticization: “sexual organs,” As Althaus-Reid suggests, “are excessive and therefore
do not need to be biologically located.”80
In order to establish this phenomenological possibility, it might be helpful to understand
the work that has so far been undertaken as an extended case of what Husserl calls an “imaginative
variation” [Phantasievariation] or “free variation” [freie Variation], a method that Husserl
describes in the following manner:
We let ourselves be guided by the fact taken as a model. For this it is necessary that
ever new similar images be obtained as copies, as images of the imagination, which
are all concretely similar to the original image. Thus, by an act of volition we
produce free variants … It then becomes evident that a unity runs through this
multiplicity of successive figures.81
That is to say, in imaginative variation one begins with a singular model of a phenomenon, and
varies characteristics of the phenomenon in the imagination. Those features which can be varied
without distorting or losing the meaning [Sinn] of the phenomenon are non-essential, are not a
component of the phenomenon’s eidos, whereas those that cannot be changed without losing the
phenomenon under investigation are essential to the thing itself, the phenomenon as such.
Without attempting a comprehensive imaginative variation on the sexual member, we can
nevertheless employ this Husserlian methodology to consider a single aspect of this phenomenon:
incarnate location. Here the genitals have functioned as a model of the sexual member, insofar as
they are almost indisputably recognized as an (at least potential) zone of erotic significance. In the
subsequent section this initial model passed through a variation of incarnate location: if
eroticization was thought in connection to the anal zone, rather than the genital, would we lose
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sight of our phenomenon, the sexual member? Under the guidance of Hocquenghem and Mieli, it
was suggested to the contrary that this erotic potential remains clearly manifest in the case of
anality. Following Marion, this was again shown to be the case in oral pleasure. The mouth, as
attested by even the most sexually conservative, is a member clearly subject to potential
eroticization.
But surely this method can be advanced further. Members commonly described as
secondary sexual characteristics—such as the breast or the pubic hair—are undoubtedly
recognized as zones of erogenous significance. As Althaus-Reid notes, “fetishism eroticizes the
whole body, even the hairs of the head which appear powerfully erotic covered with leather
wigs.”82 Beyond these secondary characteristics, one can consider the feet—a particularly common
feature of fetishistic sexuality. One can consider the neck, of which Edmund Burke famously
regarded as among the pinnacles of human beauty, writing:
Observe that part of a beautiful woman where she is perhaps the most beautiful,
about the neck and breasts; the smoothness; the softness; the easy and insensible
swell; the variety of the surface, which is never for the smallest space the same; the
deceitful maze, through which the unsteady eye slides giddily, without knowing
where to fix or whither it is carried. Is not this a demonstration of that change of
surface, continual, and yet hardly perceptible at any point, which forms one of the
great constituents of beauty?83
Likewise in voyeurism the eye and its visual field is cast in an erotic mode. Whereas in masochism
the entire skin and its sensations of pain and pleasure become erotic, as Freud writes:
In the sexual pleasure derived from watching, and in exhibitionism, the eye
corresponds to an erogenous zone; while in the case of the component of the sexual
drive which involves pain and cruelty, the same role is assumed by the skin, which
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in particular parts of the body has become differentiated into sense organs and
modified into mucous membranes, and is thus the erogenous zone par excellence.84
Indeed, the final conclusion appears all but inevitable: every bodily zone is a potential site of erotic
pleasure; the flesh is an open region of sexual potentiality: “any part of the skin and any sense
organ could probably function as an erogenous zone.”85 This phenomenological discovery
necessitates a final step in the reversal of the Freudian stages of sexual development. Not only
must we step back from the hetero-genitality of the genital stage in order to account for the
persistence of anal and oral pleasure—with their respective erogenous zones and incarnate
members—it ultimately appears that there remains no essential limit on sexual manifestation.
Insofar as no phenomenological necessity delimits sexual expression to certain determinate regions
of the flesh, we must, so to speak, recognize the “polymorphous” character of sexuality. As Marion
writes, “my entire flesh can, and thus must, be eroticized. … The eroticization of everything is
involved.”86
B. Polymorphous Perversity in Gay Rights and Feminist Discourse
Since Freud, the earliest stages of sexual development have been characterized as a disorganized
multiplicity of sexual stimuli—what Freud calls “partial drives.” In these early years, far from
being concentrated in a single organ of sexuality—the genitalia—the body is instead marked by a
diversity of partial, momentary, and independent sensations. On Freud’s account, this
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multiplicitous sexuality—what Freud names polymorphous perversity—functions as a neutral
state of the sexual drive, that persists in the absence of restricting structures:
Children can become polymorphously perverse, and can be tempted to all possible
kinds of transgressions. This shows that the child already carries an appropriate
aptitude within its disposition; acting on such aptitude thus encounters little
resistance, because, depending on the age of the child, the psychical dams against
sexual excesses—shame, disgust, and morality—have either not yet been erected,
or are still in the process of being formed.87
Through the Freudian process of development, which we have here traced in reverse—genital,
anal, oral—, the child develops these “psychic dams,” funneling or restricting this originally open
and indeterminate sexual multiplicity into the exclusive regime of hetero-genital sexuality. As
Zupančič describes this process: “what Freud analyzed as polymorphous perverse infantile
sexuality shared by both boys and girls is a heterogeneous multiplicity which subsequently gets
organized around two different positions by means of both hormonal and cultural ‘injections’ and
demands.”88
For Hocquenghem and Mieli, this inscription of the individual into a hetero-genital regime
is a necessary prerequisite for the constitution of the liberal subject: the liberal-capitalist subject
demands the abandonment of the polymorphous character of sexuality. As Hocquenghem writes,
“to identify oneself, to bind the organs into a single person, means to leave behind the
polymorphously perverse, or rather to initiate the perversity of the polymorphous.” 89 In even
stronger language, Mieli will mark this production of the liberal subject as a “mutilation” of
sexuality: “the objective of educastration is the transformation of the infant, in tendency
polymorphous and ‘perverse,’ into a heterosexual adult, erotically mutilated but conforming to the
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Norm.”90 It is for this reason that, on their account, the political liberation of homosexuals would
not only require the awakening of anal desire, but likewise the opening up of the body in its totality
as the site of erotic pleasure. For these early thinkers of the gay liberation movement, homosexual
liberation would require the return to something like polymorphous perversity. “We all know,”
Hocquenghem paradigmatically writes—in a manner at once descriptive and normative—, “that
homosexual caresses have a greater tendency to stray over all the zones of the body than
heterosexual caresses, whose aim is clearly determined.”91
One finds an analogous move in the feminist literature of the period. Already in The Second
Sex, Simone de Beauvoir marks holism as a unique feature of feminine jouissance. As she writes:
Feminine sex enjoyment [la jouissance féminine] radiates throughout the whole
body; it is not always centered in the genital organs; even when it is, the vaginal
contractions constitute, rather than a true orgasm, a system of waves that
rhythmically arise, disappear, and re-form, attain from time to time a paroxysmal
condition, become vague, and sink down without ever quite dying out. Because no
definite term is set, woman’s sex feeling extends toward infinity.92
What distinguishes masculine and feminine sexuality, on de Beauvoir’s account, is the
polymorphous character of feminine eroticization. Whereas the phallic character of masculine
desire necessitates the delimitation of sexual pleasure to the genital zone, with a particular focus
on the achievement of orgasm as a concrete and singular experience—“male sex feeling arises like
an arrow”93—, in feminine sexuality the feminine flesh, in its entirety, is an actually or potentially
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erogenous zone: “the sensitivity of the erogenous zones is developing, and these are so numerous
in woman that her whole body may be regarded as erogenous.”94
The subsequent French feminist tradition, itself more directly influenced by psychoanalysis
and deconstruction than existential phenomenology, will reframe this insight in order to develop a
philosophy of feminine difference, that moreover aims to ground a philosophy of difference as
such. Thus, according to Luce Irigaray, “woman has sex organs more or less everywhere. She finds
pleasure almost anywhere. … the geography of her pleasure is far more diversified, more multiple
in its differences, more complex, more subtle, than is commonly imagined—in an imaginary rather
too narrowly focused on sameness.”95 This multiplicity of difference is distinguished from a
strictly Freudian conception of polymorphous perversity insofar as the latter is oriented toward the
development of hetero-genitality: within the “polymorphous perversion of the child,” she writes,
“the erogenous zones lie waiting to be regrouped under the primacy of the phallus.”96 The
polymorphous character of feminine sexuality, on the other hand, is not a stage of development; it
is not awaiting the genital organization of Freudian subjectivity. Rather, it is the multiplicity and
diversification of sexual members without telic orientation toward the genital.
For Hélène Cixous, this polymorphous character of feminine sexuality marks an escape
from every hierarchical, organic organization of the body, the escape from the monarchy of the
genitals. She writes:
If there is a self proper to woman, paradoxically it is her capacity to depropriate
herself without interest: endless body, without ‘end,’ without principal ‘parts’; if
she is a whole, it is a whole made up of parts that are wholes, not simple, partial
objects but varied entirety, moving and boundless change, a cosmos where eros
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never stops traveling, vast astral space. … That doesn’t mean that she is
undifferentiated magma; it means that he doesn’t create a monarchy of her body or
her desire.97
In feminine sexuality one discovers a democracy of the flesh—what Hocquenghem would name a
primary sexual communism. Insofar as the flesh refuses to await genitalization, it has no proper
“end.” Rather, it exists in a dis-organized state; not, Cixous emphasizes, undifferentiated, but
precisely the opposite: hyper-differentiated. The flesh is marked by the absolute diffusion of
difference across each and every site of erotic potential.
What Irigaray discovered through psychoanalysis and Cixous through deconstruction is
precisely what I have here suggested to uncover through the methodology of a radical
phenomenology: the flesh is marked by a multiplicitous heterogeneity of differentiated members,
which refuse organization, telos, or genitalization. “Heterogenous, yes, to her joyful benefit, she
is erogenous; she is what is erogenous in the heterogenous.”98

C. The Generalization of Polymorphous Sexuality
Yet, while taking these queer and feminist discourses as a point of departure, the
phenomenological analyses here undertaken suggest a generalization of this diversified geography
of pleasure. For, as was noted in the phenomenological analyses of anal and oral pleasure, such
pleasures are by no means essentially restricted to a singular position within sexual difference. 99
Polymorphous pleasure is not a unique feature of feminine jouissance, but is rather a generalized
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characteristic of flesh as such: all flesh, both the feminine and the masculine—as well as a thousand
tiny sexes—are marked by an erotic potentiality that extends well beyond the narrow limits of
hetero-genitality. We simply, as Freud remarks; “do not know to which organ or organs a person’s
sex is attached.”100
Exactly the same can be said of sexual orientation. Hocquenghem himself suggests
precisely as much. Thus, although he argues that “only homosexuals make such constant libidinal
use of this [anal] zone,”101 this privilege is by no means essential. Rather, as he clearly remarks:
“it may be said that homosexuals are not alone in making a desiring use of the anus. … Georges
Bataille, although heterosexual, perceived the peculiarly repressed nature of this zone of the
bourgeois body.”102 As was suggested above, phenomenologically speaking anality is a pleasure
bounded by no discreet sexual orientation. The same may likewise be recognized in the
phenomenology of polymorphous pleasure more broadly. There is no sexual position or orientation
which is granted unique access to polymorphous pleasure, the unbounded potential of eroticization
is granted by right to all flesh.
This generalization of polymorphous erotic potential to all flesh presents a clear risk. Does
it not, it might rightly be asked, mark a return to precisely the “sameness” that thinkers as diverse
as von Balthasar and Irigaray have sought to overturn? Does the dissemination of polymorphous
pleasures coincide with the erasure of sexual difference? As Žižek argues: “the endeavor to liberate
sexuality from all ‘binary’ oppressions in order to set it free in its entire polymorphous perversity
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necessarily ends up in the abandoning of the very sphere of sexuality—the liberation of sexuality
has to end up in the liberation (of humanity) from sexuality.”103
Quite to the contrary, I would here suggest that not only does the generalization of
polymorphous eroticization not mark the erasure of sexual difference, but rather the expansion or
radicalization of difference. But this radicalization necessitates a reconceptualization of the site of
difference: here it will be helpful to return to the analysis of sexual difference found in recent
Lacanian psychoanalytic discourse. Thus, in this way we will find the present analyses landing at
precisely the same point as the previous chapter’s discussion of Rogozinski: the necessity of
recognizing sexual difference not as an external fault between the sexes or genders, but as an
internal fault, a disruption of the flesh within itself that functions as the precondition for the erotic
potential of all flesh. As Zupančič notes, “difference cuts ‘through’ each sex, not between the
sexes.”104
As Philippe Van Haute and Herman Westerink note, sexuality—and I might add the sexual
flesh—is the product of a complex process of constitution. “The sexual drive,” they write, “is most
likely put together from various components. If the sexual activities are composites, maybe the
source from which they spring (the sexual drive) is also something composite. … What we call
the sexual drive is actually a composition or bundle of partial drives.”105 Yet, the multiplicitous
disorganized sexuality of the partial drives or of non-hierarchical sexual members does not only
temporally anticipate hetero-genital sexuality—as on a strictly developmental account. Rather, this
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polymorphous character continually haunts even the most “normal” sexuality. As Freud himself
recognized: “it becomes impossible in the end not to recognize that this same disposition to
perversions of every kind is a universal and primary human characteristic.”106
The cause of this persistence—of the inability of even the most rigorous imposition of
cultural or environmental norms to erase non-genital sexuality—is twofold. First, as Rogozinski
sought to establish, the chiasm is always haunted by an écarte. There is no constitution of the vast
multiplicity of sexual drives and erogenous zones that could ever be produced without remainder;
there is no constituted flesh that is not riven with gaps or faults. In the psychoanalytic language of
Zupančič: “‘Genital sexual organization’ is far from being primordial. It involves unification of
the originally heterogenous, dispersed, always-already compound sexual drive, composed of
different partial drives, such as looking, touching, sucking, and so on. … It is always a somehow
forced and artificial unification. … it is never really fully achieved or accomplished.”107 Second,
and as Zupančič again emphasizes, the negativity or gap at the heart of sexuality goes even deeper.
It is not only that gaps persist between individuals or that gaps persist within the constitution of
the individual—rather, the very members of the flesh are themselves haunted by difference and
negativity. “The claim is stronger,” she writes, “these partial pleasures and satisfactions are already
(in-)formed by the negativity implied by the non-relation.”108
In a speculative-Hegelian reversal characteristic of Lacanian psychoanalysis, the gap or
rupture at the heart of sexuality is recognized not as the failure of sexuality, but as its very condition
of possibility. “Taken at this level,” Zupančič ultimately concludes, “sexuality ‘unifies’ the drives
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not by uniting them in a more or less coherent whole (of sexual activity), but precisely as the crack
around which they circulate and to which they keep returning. The ‘sexual’ refers to the ‘crack’
shared (and repeated) by different drives.”109 The suggestion here is that there is no level of depth
which can be attained, whether psychoanalytically—or, I might add, phenomenologically—where
one discovers a pure sexual phenomenon, sexuality as wholeness or sameness, a site beyond the
ruptures of differentiation and negativity.110 This is not only because sexuality always fails its
unification, or in Rogozinski’s language, because as complete chiasm is impossible, but because
the incomplete character of the chiasm is itself the genesis of sexuality. It is precisely because we
are not monadic flesh that we experience all flesh as potentially eroticized.111 To recall the words
of Rogozinski: “by letting itself be traversed and divided by the remainder in this way, the body
of flesh is opened to sexual desire.”112 Thus sexuality not only emerges from the flesh insofar as
the flesh contains irreducible gaps or ruptures within itself, but moreover, the very members of the
sexual flesh, erogenous zones bearing sexual meaning and affect, are themselves situated in,
among, or on these very gaps.
The result of this situatedness is not only phenomenological, but psychological (and in the
following chapters it will be added: political and theological). Because the sexual members of the
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flesh congregate in or around these gaps in our flesh—these unruly zones that have a will of their
own and seem to manifest precariously as both flesh and other at the same time—these members
are subject to suspicion, mistrust, and violence. They can even, as Rogozinski argues, trigger a
crisis of disincarnation: “the texture of my flesh is torn apart, its nascent unity is undone, and I
become anxious about being dismembered or infinitely cut to pieces.”113 The subjection of the
sexual member to particularly harsh regulation and shaming can therefore be understood as a
response to this phenomenological characteristic of flesh. The precepts that aim to suppress
sexuality—whether social, political, or religious—are not arbitrary, but rather emerge from an
anxiety produced within the flesh itself. Insofar as the flesh manifests as a precarious
phenomenon—traversed by multiplicitous, polymorphous, and unstable sexual potential—insofar
as it finds itself riddled with gaps and fissures around which a rich and variegated sexuality gathers,
it refuses subjection to any rule of the same, any hierarchical or teleological organization. Every
story of developmental stages, genital aim, evolutionary directedness, or rational ordering finds
itself subverted by a flesh that continuously rebels against stratified organization. Anywhere that
orderly hierarchical structuring is privileged, this flat ontology of sexual manifestation can only
be experienced as disruptive and chaotic, even dangerous.
But, this anxiety directed toward the sexual member is not necessary; it is not an essential
component of incarnate being. Rather, in what Rogozinski calls redemption or Cixous liberation
and transformation, we can catch a glimpse of an alternative possibility of relating to the remainder
or the otherness within our own flesh. In the language of Rogozinski, this necessitates a new
synthesis of incorporation in which [the flesh] unites itself with the remainder engendered by the
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previous two syntheses.”114 For Rogozinski, this is the true “syn-thesis” insofar as it “puts
differentiated elements in relation in order to unite them and identify them with one another.”115
That is to say, a structured system of sameness is in principle precluded from entering into a
genuine synthesis. Authentic synthesis must be the synthesis of alterity, of otherness. Whereas the
constitution of the flesh depended upon a precarious synthesis of a multiplicity of members of the
flesh, this second-level synthesis marks the synthesis of the flesh with its own remainder, the
incarnation of the remainder into the flesh—yet, without an abandonment of its alterity.
The ability to maintain a flat ontology of the polymorphous sexual flesh is not only key to
constructing an adequate phenomenology of the flesh or even a psychology of sexual
embodiment—polymorphous sexuality, as queer and feminist scholars have always recognized, is
political. On the one hand, as Cixous emphasizes, this means that the liberation of sexuality stands
upon a transformation of the politics of difference writ large. As she writes:
Let us imagine a real liberation of sexuality, that is to say, a transformation of each
one’s relationship to his or her body (and to the other body), an approximation to
the vast, material, organic, sensuous universe that we are. This cannot be
accomplished, of course, without political transformations that are equally radical.
… Difference would be a bunch of new differences.116
On the other hand, the converse is also the case. Indeed, in the following chapters it will be
suggested that the relationship that one maintains in regard to the alterity of one’s own sexuality
is essential to the constitution of social, political, and religious communal bodies. The way in
which one relates to the remainder within their own flesh prefigures the way in which they relate
to marginalized figures in their political and religious communities.
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Chapter 7 - Membership and the Body of Christ
Perhaps the body is the only factor in all spiritual development.
Gilles Deleuze
In the final chapters of this dissertation I will seek to extend the account of the flesh laid out in the
previous two chapters in order to elucidate the constitution of religious communities. Thus
methodologically, I will in the following chapters institute a shift from an explicitly
phenomenological methodology to a theological methodology that, echoing Henry and Marion’s
own influence in the ressourcement tradition, will draw particularly strongly upon the writings of
the Patristic fathers.
Most fundamentally this chapter will aim to unpack and clarify the logic underlying the
contemporary all-to-common exclusion of gender and sexual minorities from religious
communities, while also drawing out the possibility of an alternative conception of religious
membership, a membership conceived through the logic of the multiplicitous flesh, rather than a
logic of exclusion of the dysmember. Therefore these final two chapters can perhaps be understood
as something like an incarnational ecclesiology in a Christological vernacular. That is to say, I will
here be engaging not with ecclesiology in the sense of church structures or codes of regulation, but
at the Christological level—as the Body of Christ. Moreover, this discussion of religious
communities is incarnational insofar as it will seek to identify a fundamental homology between
the constitution of the flesh of the individual and the constitution of the communal body of Christ.
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§1. The Constitution of the Community as Flesh
A. The Body Politic
The correlation of the human body and the socio-political community is certainly not novel.
Communities are commonly conceived in terms of the human body in both the religious and
secular imaginary. This image emerges clearly in the political philosophy of the ancients—Plato
and Aristotle,1 for example—but gained particular currency within early-modern realist political
philosophy. Thomas Hobbes, for example, famously unpacked the complex interrelation of
political society in terms of a body, the Corpore Politico: “which may be defined to be a multitude
of men, united as one person by a common power, for their common peace, defense, and benefit.”2
This image is manifest most conspicuously in the frontispiece of Leviathan, where the regent is
figured as an imposing giant, raised above the mountains, whose arms and torso are composed of
hundreds of individual bodies. Each of these individual subjects (in the double sense), serve as a
member—what Machiavelli had already named the membros—of the regent, members who are
“united by covenants into one person civil or body politic.”3 Indeed, it is perhaps noteworthy that
Hobbes divides The Elements of Law into two sections, the first describing human nature in its
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sensuous and embodied character, before turning to the “erection”—or one might say,
constitution—of the political community. In like manner, Hobbes’ trilogy, Elements of Philosophy,
despite being written out of order, is ultimately organized around the movement from the abstract
logical/mathematical body (De Corpore, 1655), to the physiological human body (De Homine,

1658), before turning to the political body (De Cive, 1642). Simply put, for Hobbes, it is not
possible to understand the right constitution of the body politic, unless one can understand it
as homologous with the proper functioning human body.
This understanding of the body as an image of the social community is not restricted to
this political usage. As Hobbes himself already notes:
And as this union into a city or body politic, is instituted with common power over
all the particular persons, or members thereof, to the common good of them all; so
also may there be amongst a multitude of those members, instituted a subordinate
union of certain men, for certain common actions to be done by those men for some
common benefit of theirs, or of the whole city; as for subordinate government, for
counsel, for trade, and the like. And these subordinate bodies politic are usually
called CORPORATIONS; and their power such over the particulars of their own
society, as the whole city whereof they are members have allowed them.4
Thus, just as the political, so too is the economic community understood in analogy to the body.
The very word corporation—from the Latin corpare, “to make a body”—marks the depth of this
metaphor within the Western imaginary. Indeed, a company or firm “incorporates” (literally, enters
embodiment), in order to constitute itself as a legal entity: a legal person or persona ficta.5
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Karl Marx was particularly fond of employing this body imagery in his descriptions of
economic relations—particularly the industrial capitalism of his epoch. Thus, he writes of the
structure of the capitalist economy, for example:
The result we arrive at, is not that production, distribution, exchange and
consumption are identical, but that they are all members of one totality, different
aspects of a unit. . . . Thus a definite form of production determines definite forms
of consumption, distribution and exchange as well as definite relations between
these different elements.... A mutual interaction takes place between these various
elements. This is the case with every organic body.”6
Likewise in the first volume of Capital, Marx will tend to conceptualize the industrial worker as
the member or organ of the factory and its machines: “the workers are merely conscious organs,
coordinated with the unconscious organs of the automaton, and together with the latter
subordination to the central moving force”7; or again, “in manufacture the workers are the parts of
a living mechanism. In the factory we have a lifeless mechanism which is independent of the
workers, who are incorporated into it as its living appendages.”8 Or, in the words of the American
socialist activist and presidential candidate, Eugene Debs: “the capitalist refers to you as mill
hands, farm hands, factory hands, machine hands - hands, hands! … A capitalist would feel
insulted if you called him a hand. He’s a head. The trouble is he owns his head and your hands.”9
6

Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, trans. Martin Nicolaus (New York:
Vintage Books, 1973), 99-100 [emphasis added].
7

Karl Marx, Capital Volume I: A Critique of Political Economy, trans. Ben Fowkes [New York: Penguin Books,
1976], 544-545 [emphasis added].
8

Ibid., 548 [emphasis added].

9

David Karsner, Debs: his authorized life and letters from Woodstock prison to Atlanta (New York: Boni and
Liveright, 1919), 200. As Sara Ahmed similarly remarks, in a more contemporary feminist interpretation of this
capitalist reality: “the arm matters. An arm is what allows you to reach, to carry, to hold, to complete certain kinds
of tasks. Arms are identified throughout history as the limbs of labor or even the limbs of the laborer. Arms are
supposed to be willing to labor. But not all arms. … When the laborers’ arms become tools in the creation of wealth,
the laborers lose their arms. To become his arm is to lose your arm. The factory owner does not only acquire the
laborers’ arms; he has his own arms freed. We can hear another sense in which arms are striking. To go on strike is
to clench your fist, to refuse to be handy. When workers refuse to allow their arms to be the master’s tool, they
strike. The clenched fist remains a revolutionary sign for labor movements, internationally” Sara Ahmed, Living a
Feminist Life (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017), 85.

339

B. Phenomenology and Communal Constitution
Despite its tendency to center of the individual subject, this understanding of the community as
correlate to the body is certainly not foreign to phenomenology. Indeed, already in Husserl one
finds precisely this logic being unpacked as a phenomenological—rather than a merely cultural—
assertion.
Husserl situates this idea within his language of “we-subjectivity” (Wir-Subjektivität).
Against common (albeit unfounded) accusations of solipsism, texts such as Ideas II and the
unpublished lectures on intersubjectivity show that Husserl became increasingly convinced of the
necessity of thinking the constitution of the objective world as necessarily co-constituted with
others: as an inextricably social act.10 Indeed, for Husserl, the true objective object simply is the
object insofar as it appears across a multiplicity of intersubjective manifestations. As he writes in
the Ideas II, “the ‘true thing’ is then the Object that maintains its identity within the manifolds of
appearances belonging to a multiplicity of subjects, and specifically, again, it is the intuited Object,
related to a community of normal subjects.”11
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This phenomenological reality of co-constitution produces “personal unities of a higher
order.”12 Such social bodies, or communities (Gemeinschaft), are no mere fictions (persona ficta)
or naive imaginative extensions of the individual to the communal. As Husserl insists, the notion
of the body politic is not an “inventive coincidence of natural thinking.”13 Quite to the contrary,
the notion of the social body identifies something “real” (wirklich) in social and communal
relations. This objective reality is evidenced by the temporal persistence of the social body, despite
the transience of its membership—social bodies “have their own lives, [and] preserve themselves
by lasting through time despite the joining or leaving of individuals.”14 As Miettinen notes, “a
certain social body is never tied to any particular subject, but has its existence regardless of the
entry or withdrawal of particular members. … it belongs to the very notion of communal person
that it always transgresses its particular members—it is something that cannot be reduced back to
individual subjects.”15 Mereologically speaking, that is to say, the member of the community is a
part—or more precisely, a “piece” (Stücke)—of the social whole, but is not a necessary
constituent—a “moment” (Momente).16
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Because he draws upon this tradition of viewing the social unity as a body, Husserl tends
to employ specifically biological language in his explication of social relations. He will thus speak
of the “organic” relations between individuals. In fact, in a move that anticipates work that will be
undertaken below, this organic-bodily imagery is drawn together with a decidedly theological
vocabulary in his construction of the ideal social body: the “community of love”
(Liebesgemeinschaft).17 To again cite Miettinen’s astute analysis, for Husserl, “it is love that opens
up the peculiar form of ‘organic,’ reciprocal unity of perpetual striving towards good that
constitutes the ideal form of communal life.”18 In such a community, the mere intimacy of
proximity is transformed into the reciprocal unity of a shared project. 19 “Lovers,” Husserl argues,
“do not live alongside one another and with one another, but in one another [ineinander], actually
and potentially.”20 Through this reciprocal interpenetration (homologically akin to the synthesis of
empfindness in the constitution of the Leib), the community of love emerges as a quasi-personal
social body, with a certain set of social values, memories, and even something like a communal
subjectivity.
This logic will be directly picked up by Michel Henry, who predictably re-centers the
socio-ethical relationship to the other within the context of the auto-affective relationship that one
maintains toward oneself. Thus, a cruelty directed toward the other finds its genesis within an auto-
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affective masochism toward oneself. As he writes in a commentary on Nietzsche in The Genealogy
of Psychoanalysis:
In place of the exteriority of the relation joy-suffering, which seems sufficient to
explain cruelty as a mode of experience of the other, interiority, as the opposite of
that relation, is here substituted as the relationship of the individual with himself.
For cruelty in its most general and constant form is above all cruelty toward oneself,
a cruelty consisting of making oneself suffer in which the individual takes pleasure
in his own suffering and for that reason makes himself suffer.21
For Nietzsche, insofar as the relation to the other remains dependent upon this primordial
relationship to self, it is this primary auto-affective relationship which must be mastered—if one
cannot eliminate cruelty (what Henry would call “suffering”), then one must become “an artist and
transfigurer of cruelty.”22 As Nietzsche argues, “almost everything we call ‘higher culture’ is based
on the spiritualization of cruelty, on its becoming more profound: this is my proposition.”23
This connection between social communities and the auto-affective relationship to one's
own flesh—suggested in the Genealogy of Psychoanalysis—is first worked out carefully in
Material Phenomenology’s discussion of “pathos-with.” There—as was briefly discussed above
(chapter 2)—Henry counters accusations that his auto-affective philosophy is necessarily
solipsistic. Against such views, Henry posits the fundamental site of human intersubjectivity as an
affective relationship: “pathos-with.”24 “Before intentionally grasping the other as other and before
the perception of the other’s body,” he argues, “every experience of the other in the sense of a real
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being with the other occurs in us as an affect.”25 In this way, Henry shifts the level at which the
constitution of the community should be understood to occur. Rather than a worldly phenomenon
in which temporally and spatially proximate individuals establish a relationship of mutuality, the
community is first and foremost an affective bond between individuals outside (or before) the
constitution of an ek-static spatio-temporal world.26 “Must we then say that, in spite of all
appearances, every community is invisible?” Henry asks, “let us take this risk.”27
The theological intonation of a primary “invisible community” would not have been lost
by Henry’s early readers, and throughout the following decade Henry will make this theological
content explicit. Thus, by the time he writes Incarnation, this affective relation to the other—
“pathos-with”—will be understood as triangulated through Life-itself: which since I am the Truth,
Henry had unambiguously given the name God: “from Life means from God, since according to
Christianity, the essence of Life and that of God are one and the same.”28 As he writes, “every
relation from one Self to another Self requires as its point of departure not this Self itself, an I—
my own or the other’s—but their common transcendental possibility, which is nothing other than
the possibility of their relation itself: absolute Life.”29 Thus Henry’s phenomenological assertion
of a privileged affective relationship to the other—itself grounded in a primary affective
relationship to oneself—is ultimately transfigured into a theological claim. The true community is
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the invisible community of affective resonance triangulated toward the source of all affectivity and
life: God. Thus, he writes, “every community is by essence religious.”30
In the final section of Incarnation, this invisible community will be granted its traditional
title in Christian theology: “the mystical body of Christ.”31 Here, like the Hobbesian corpore
politico, the constitution of the community—its “process of continuous self-growth”32—is directly
correlated to the constitution of the individual body. This body is composed of many members—
“its members are all those who, sanctified and deified in him and by him, belong to him from then
on, to the point of becoming parts of this body itself, precisely its members.”33 It is therefore
essential to situate this discussion of the body of Christ within its context: the phenomenology of
the flesh and of incarnation. For Henry, it is only possible to understand the body of Christ, if one
understands its constitution as one with the constitution of the individual body. Thus he will have
repeated recourse to his prior investigations of the impressional constitution of the flesh—“our
critique of Husserl’s problematic concerning the Impression has shown…”34—with the final result
that the constitution of the body of Christ is constituted (“grows from”) the constitution of the
individual:
Each transcendental Self’s givenness to itself—a givenness in which that Self is
edified within, as growing from itself and thus from its own becoming—is the
operation of the Word, and the Word repeats it in each conceivable transcendental
Self, whether past, present, or future. Thus the mystical body of Christ grows
indefinitely from everyone who is sanctified in Christ’s flesh.35
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Insofar as the constitution of the individual flesh serves as the condition of possibility for
the constitution of the community, the latter will reflect key characteristics of the former. In this
way, the phenomenological correlation of the flesh and the social community—whether political,
economic, or religious—is not merely analogical, but—to use the language introduced by Lacan’s
seminar, L’Autre á l’autre—homological. “Homology, clearly means—as I emphasized—that the
relation is not one of analogy,” Lacan there writes, “it is indeed the same thing.”36 The constitution
of the flesh and the constitution of the community are not comparable, analogical, or similar; they
are two poles of one and the same logic of incarnation. The relation is, as Husserl argued, “real”
[wirklich]. Thus the same appears in the case of the sexual member. Just as one may—through
various philosophical or theological conjurings—seek to expel the sexual member of the
immanence of the flesh, to dismember the flesh, so too does the community employ precisely the
same logic of exclusion in regard to sexually divergent members. That is to say, the oppression of
marginalized communities can in many instances be directly traced back to an unsustainable
account of embodiment: a failure to reconcile the body with its various reminders, those disavowed
members and gaps at the heart of the flesh itself. Thus, for example, just as Henry tends to conceive
the flesh as monadic (Chapter 5), so too does he repeatedly speak of the body of Christ in monadic
terms: it “is not divisible,” “neither are [its members] separated,” it is “identical,” Christ “remains
in this ‘entire’ body.”37 This monadic conception of the Christian community—itself motivated by
the prior expulsion from the sexual member from the flesh—in turn justifies Henry’s patriarchal
posture and denigration of sexual minorities (Chapter 2).
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This possibility is directly picked up by Jacob Rogozinski who even more directly than
Henry recognizes the key homological relationship between the flesh and the community—writing
that “we can affirm too that there is a parallelism between the immanent life of the ego and the
existence of social and political communities.”38 Specifically, Rogozinski argues that the
constitution of the community precisely mirrors the passive synthesis of the individual ego-flesh.
Therefore, like Husserl, he will defend the notion of the body politic, not only as a useful cultural
metaphor, but rather as a phenomenological discovery (or in the Lacanian jargon: no mere analogy,
but a homology): “the synthesis of incorporation, which constitutes my body, is similarly repeated
on the intersubjective level by uniting all the singular bodies within a unique Total Body.”39
But even more than his predecessors, Rogozinski seeks to explicitly unpack the violent and
exclusionary potential of this process. Thus, while from the outside it appears that Rogozinski’s
philosophical production has recently turned from phenomenological consideration of the body to
political critique, the reality is that this constitutes a continuation of precisely the same project
discussed above (chapters 5-6). As he writes in the concluding pages of The Ego and the Flesh:
The corpus mysticum of the Church, the Kingdom, the Republic, or the Party … is
grounded in the immanent syntheses that gives body to my flesh. … The haunting
of the remainder reappears on the plane of the community by being fixated on an
individual or particular group, on a ‘caste’ or class, a ‘racial’ or religious, political
or sexual minority. … The ‘political body’ is grounded, like my own body, on the
exclusion of the remainder.40
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In a certain sense, this short passage therefore functions as a précis of his subsequent scholarship
on politics, terrorism, and Islamism. For Rogozinski, the vast litany of 20th century violence can
be understood as a problem of the (failed) incorporation of the remainder: “the experience that the
twentieth century brings us,” he writes, “is the power of the opposing tendency that resists
disincorporation, which in blood and in death strives to reinstitute the total unity of the great
Body.”41 Multiplying examples from across modern Western History, from the French Revolution
and Stalinism, to the rise of Nazism and contemporary Islamist violence, Rogozinski suggests each
of these instances of authoritarian violence mark attempts to restore the unity of the body politic42
by excluding the social remainder:
This is what I specially take from Bataille: every political community constitutes
itself while creating an accused share, a heterogeneous surplus. For a community
to be capable of configuring itself as a body, it must reject part of itself—a cast, a
class, or a sexual, racial, or religious minority—a detached fragment of its own
flesh which it no longer recognizes as its own, though one that remains nonetheless
flesh of its flesh. This excluded part that was rejected from the Great Body, this I
call the remainder of the community.43
One can see this logic of social exclusion of the communal remainder across political
discourse: in every argument that seeks to root out an internal foe (e.g. anti-Semitic discourse)
and/or police the communal or national boundaries (e.g. immigration or border discourse). For
Rogozinski, following Henry and Nietzsche, in each instance one finds an externalization of what
is primordially an auto-affective, masochistic hate: “my hate toward others always finds its source
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in a hate toward myself, toward an internal outsider that I recognize with horror in the other. If
someone proclaims his disgust and his hate of women or of homosexuals, we may wonder that he
detests in them his own femininity, which he refuses in himself.”44 By projecting the rejected
remainder of oneself or one’s community onto the other, one aims to disincorporate them, to
remove them from the body. In this way the abject member of the community (the dysmember) is
systematically cast out of the social body, which is itself thereby dismembered. “As soon as a
community is configuring itself as a body,” Rogozinski writes, “it must reject a part of itself, a
social, sexual, ‘racial’ or religious minority: a detached fragment of its own flesh, which it no
longer recognizes as its own.”45 This communal dismemberment serves to constitute a dichotomy
between self and other—us and them, pure and impure, clean, and dirty, good and evil. As
Rogozinski writes:
Such obsessive hate brings into play primordial oppositions between the self and
the other, the inside and the outside, the native and the foreign, which we find in all
cultures, all epochs, because they have their origin in our relationship with our
singular body—or, more precisely, with our flesh.46
The question opened by this analysis is the question of inevitably. Must the constitution of
the community always stand upon the exclusion of the remainder? Is something like the Husserlian
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“Community of Love” possible? Or, as Rogozinski sometimes seems to suggest, must the very
notion of the communal body be abandoned? Should we not, instead, seek to identify “new spaces
of speech and action, the irruption of a multitude of ‘popular societies’ and of penniless [sansculottes] sections that actively resist any reconstruction of a hierarchical political body”?47 If
Husserl, Henry, and Rogozinski are correct that the body politic is no mere “inventive coincidence
of natural thinking,”48 then it may not be possible to simply cast it aside as an unhelpful metaphor.
We may find ourselves instead tasked with the project of determining a new way of thinking and
living the communal body that actively resists this tendency towards exclusion. In the following
section, this will be attempted by turning to the specific way in which the question of the body
politic has been worked out—both unsuccessfully and successfully—in Christian theology under
the name of the body of Christ.

§2. Bodies of Christ and the Persistence of Sexuality
In the first book of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche's eponymous messiah decries the “despisers
of the body.” These despisers speak “childishly” of a transcendent soul: “Body am I, and soul.”
Against this theologizing impulse, Zarathustra declares to the contrary: “body am I entirely and
nothing else; and soul is only a word for something about the body.” If these despisers wish to
denigrate the body, Zarathustra suggests, perhaps they should simply “say farewell to their own
bodies—and thus become silent.”49
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This short invective against the “despisers of the body” is paradigmatic of traditional
critiques of Christian theology. Christianity’s privileging of the soul has at the same time effaced
the body, so the common criticism goes. Indeed, if one understands the body—as I have throughout
this dissertation—always already as a sexual body, the condemnation is even more forceful. To
the extent that the body has survived the advent of the soul, it has succumbed to the asexualizing
impulse of Christianity’s prudish sexual ethic. There is no body in Christianity, or to the extent
that there is, such a body remains a sterile figure divorced from the concrete embodiment of lived
sexuality.
It is certainly beyond the scope of this chapter to negotiate the full nuances of this perennial
debate. Suffice it to say, it is undeniable that many Christianities have advocated—and still do—
a disembodied conception of the human person, having thereby precipitated sexual repression and
having often stood at the forefront of the oppression of sexual minorities.50 Yet, this is not the only
tradition of Christianity.51 The diversity of Christianity necessitates that the theology of the body
be a contested space. Not only contested academically or intellectually, but by the very bodily
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presence of alternative theologies. As Marcella Althaus-Reid argues, “Christian dogmatics is built
upon bodily struggles.”52
The locus of this struggle regarding the Christian conception of the sexual flesh, as
suggested above, is Christological. The possibility of a Christian conception of the flesh depends,
to a large extent, upon the possibility of theologizing the body of Christ. This body of Christ
operates on countless registers, of which I will here isolate four: Jesus of Nazareth’s physical body
of Christ, the resurrected body of Christ, the eucharistic body of Christ, and the communal body
of Christ. While focus of later sections of this chapter will be centered on the latter—the communal
body of Christ, insofar as that language appears with particular regularity in the writings of Paul—
I would like to at least briefly gesture toward the key role played by the first three notions of the
body of Christ, insofar as these directly inform the latter. For, any Christian theology of the flesh
must situate itself in relation to the incarnational logic of the assumptio carnis—the Word that
“became flesh and lived among us” (John 1.14).
A. The Physical Body of Christ
From the very beginning, Christian orthodoxy has insisted upon a certain materiality and
physicality of the body of Christ. This demand is exemplified in Tertullian’s, De Carne Christi,
dedicated as it is to the task of demonstrating the reality of Christ’s flesh—it’s “solidity”
[solidam].53 Without rehearsing the entirety of his arguments, this short text may be summarized
in the following manner: contrary to heretical teachings, the reality of the Christ’s flesh is attested
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by his earthly sufferings, his nativity, and his death. Speaking of the Christ’s suffering, Tertullian
writes that:
His very sufferings and the very contumely He endured bespeak it all. The
sufferings attested His human flesh, the contumely proved its abject condition. …
He hungered under the devil’s temptation; He thirsted with the woman of Samaria;
He wept over Lazarus; He trembles at death (for ‘the flesh,’ as He says, ‘is weak’);
at last, He pours out His blood.54
In like manner, the birth and death of Christ bespeak a mortality and finitude only possible for a
fully incarnate being.55 Indeed, according to Tertullian these two are but one and the same
condition: “Christ, however, having been sent to die, had necessarily to be also born, that He might
be capable of death; for nothing is in the habit of dying but that which is born. … The law which
makes us die is the cause of our being born.”56 Therefore, a being that is capable of death must
first have been capable of birth, and moreover a birth into an earthly flesh—for against Marcion,
Valentinus, and those who would contend that the Christ was clothed in a spiritual, celestial, or
angelic body, Tertullian insists upon the mundane condition of the Christ’s incarnation. “Christ,”
Tertullian insists, “had human flesh derived from man, and not spiritual, and that His flesh was not
composed of soul, nor of stellar substance, and thus it was not an imaginary flesh.” 57 Quite to the
contrary, being born into flesh, the Christ is composed of the specific material flesh of human
being with its associated members: “this flesh suffused with blood, built up with bones, interwoven
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with nerves, entwined with veins, a flesh which knows how to be born, and how to die, human
without a doubt, as born of a human being.”58
Nevertheless, despite this early Christian emphasis upon Jesus’ physical body, one
immediately discovers a paucity of literary evidence regarding his sexual body. The reader of the
New Testament may be struck by “the almost ritual silence of Jesus’ sexuality”59 and sexual body
within the text—Althaus-Reid marks Jesus’ circumcision in Luke’s Gospel as the only exception.60
Furthermore, one finds no references by which Jesus’ sexual practices or orientation might be
discerned. Nevertheless, recent queer theologians have offered a number of speculative
reconstructions of Jesus’ sexuality and sexual embodiment. Thus one will now regularly find
scholars arguing that Jesus was bisexual, homosexual, transgender, and/or intersex.61 Yet, despite
the constructive-theological use of these arguments, their speculative character offers little help in
a discussion of Jesus’ sexual embodiment. As Althaus-Reid notes in her own discussion of the
Bi/Christ: “the question of a Bi/Christ is related not to the sexual performances of Jesus, which we

58

Ibid., 525.

59

Ibid., 107.

60

“After eight days had passed, it was time to circumcise the child; and he was called Jesus, the name given by the
angel before he was conceived in the womb” (Luke 2.21). If one follows Williams, then one might also perhaps add
the fragment of the so-called “Secret Gospel of Mark” discovered in a disputed letter of Clement of Alexandria.
Robert Williams, Just as I Am: A Practical Guide to Being Out, Proud, and Christian (New York: HarperPerennial,
1992).
61

For Jesus as bisexual, see: Nancy Wilson, Our Tribe: Queer Folks, God, Jesus, and the Bible (San Francisco:
Harper San Francisco, 1995); Laurel Dykstra, “Jesus, Bread, Wine, and Roses: A Bisexual Feminist at the Catholic
Worker,” in Debra R. Kolodny (ed.) Blessed Bi Spirit: Bisexual People of Faith (New York: Continuum, 2000); and
Althaus-Reid, Indecent Theology. For Jesus as homosexual, see: Williams, Just as I Am. For Jesus as transgender,
see: Kittredge Cherry, Jesus in Love (Berkeley: AndroGyne Press, 2006). For Jesus as intersex, see: Virginia
Mollenkott, Omnigender: A Trans-Religious Approach (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 2001). The list presented in this
note is by no means complete, and is deeply indebted to Patrick S. Cheng, Radical Love: An Introduction to Queer
Theology (New York: Seabury Books, 2011), 80-86.

354

ignore. As far we are concerned, Jesus may have been a transvestite, a butch lesbian, a gay or a
heterosexual person.”62 We simply do not know the sexual status of Jesus of Nazareth.63
Despite this uncertainty regarding the particularities of Jesus’ sexuality, it may nevertheless
be possible to speak in general terms of the necessity of Jesus’ sexual embodiment by drawing
upon the Chalcedon affirmation of the full humanity of the incarnate Christ, and—as Tertullian
seeks to show—that this incarnation necessitates that the Christ take on flesh in the full human
sense. That is to say, insofar as the Christ bore a fully human flesh, so too did the Christ bear a
sexual flesh. Turning again to the patristics, one finds precisely this argument in Gregory of
Nyssa’s Oratio Catechetica. There, Gregory contends against those who dismiss the incarnation
on the grounds that taking on flesh would contaminate the Christ with the evils of materiality.
Against this view, Gregory insists that only moral evil corrupts, insofar as it is created by the
divine, material nature is in itself good: “the only thing which is essentially degraded is moral evil
or whatever has an affinity with such evil; whereas the orderly process of Nature, arranged as it
has been by the Divine will and law, is beyond the reach of any misrepresentation on the score of
wickedness.”64 For Gregory, this argument applies not only to flesh as such, but in particular to
flesh in its sexual character. Defending the natural birth of Jesus, he questions his interlocutors on
the nativity:
If, then, the Deity is separate only from evil, and if there is no nature in evil, and
if the mystery declares that God was born in man but not in evil; and if, for man,
62
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there is but one way of entrance upon life, namely that by which the embryo passes
on to the stage of life, what other mode of entrance upon life would they prescribe
for God?65
Rather, he contends that “the whole organization of the body is of equal value throughout.”66
Indeed, he will go further, insisting that the unique status of sexual members in reproduction grant
them a uniquely honorable role. In this argument, worth citing in whole, he writes:
For the whole arrangement of the bodily organs and limbs has been constructed
with one end in view, and that is, the continuance in life of humanity; and while the
other organs of the body conserve the present actual vitality of men, each being
apportioned to a different operation, and by their means the faculties of sense and
action are exercised, the generative organs on the contrary involve a forecast of the
future, introducing as they do, by themselves, their counteracting transmission for
our race. Looking, therefore, to their utility, to which of those parts which are
deemed more honourable are these inferior? Nay, than which must they not in all
reason be deemed more worthy of honour? For not by the eye, or ear, or tongue, or
any other sense, is the continuation of our race carried on. These, as has been
remarked, pertain to the enjoyment of the present. But by those other organs the
immortality of humanity is secured, so that death, though ever operating against us,
thus in a certain measure becomes powerless and ineffectual, since Nature, to baffle
him, is ever as it were throwing herself into the breach through those who come
successively into being. What unseemliness, then, is contained in our revelation of
God mingled with the life of humanity through those very means by which Nature
carries on the combat against death?67
Certainly, an analysis informed by contemporary queer theory—particularly Lee Edelman’s
critique of “reproductive futurism” (see: Chapter 3)—should remain wary of an argument for the
dignity of the sexual member that subordinates all sexual functions to reproduction. Indeed, even
seemingly radical reconstructions of Jesus’ sexuality can often serve to reify a distinctly
heterosexual theology. Althaus-Reid, for example, shows that an emphasis upon Jesus’ penis often
merely serves to reinforce an implicit heteronormativity. “The ‘Jesus=Penis’ discourse,” she
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writes, “is part of a homophobic discourse, which homologizes heterosexuality and normativity
through a discourse of biology and (selective) penile penetration.”68 This approach remains
problematic, even in instances where Jesus’ exclusive masculinity appears to be placed in question.
For example, medieval scholars such as Caroline Walker Bynum and Amy Hollywood have shown
the extremely prominent use of female imagery in the iconography of Jesus and the mystical
writings of the late Medieval period69—most prominently the use of vaginal imagery in the
portrayal of the wound on Jesus’ side.70 But while such discoveries have opened new opportunities
in queer theology—such as Virginia Mollenkott’s use of this work in Omnigender’s argument for
an intersex Christ—they often presuppose the same implicit heterosexual logic of reproduction
that one finds in Nyssa.71 As Linn Marie Tonstad suggests, “the womb-wound encapsulates the
way difference—especially sexual difference—is represented in heterosexuate and agonistic
ways.”72 Thus, despite the present dissertation’s argument for the theological power of thinking
the member of the flesh—Althaus-Reid rightly notes that the mere presence of Jesus’ sexual
member, divorced from a radically queer hermeneutic, is itself insufficient. The member of the
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flesh is a necessary, but insufficient condition of a post-heteronormative theology of the body of
Christ.
Nevertheless, this should not diminish the illustrative nature of Gregory of Nyssa’s
argument. For, Nyssa here illustrates the explicit concern among the early church to not only insist
upon the full incarnation of the Christ, but moreover, to insist that this incarnation was intimately
bound to questions of sexuality—both, in the case of the nativity (a concern likewise found in
Tertullian) and in Jesus’ own subsequent sexual embodiment.73 For both the evangelists and later
Christian theologians this concern for the flesh of the Christ and its sexual status not only persists
throughout the earthly life of Jesus of Nazareth, but into the resurrection and beyond.74 Therefore,
Tertullian’s concern for the materiality of Jesus’ flesh in De Carne Christi, for example, is
intimately bound to the second notion of the body of Christ—the resurrectional body.
B. The Resurrected Body of Christ
In De Carne Christi, Tertullian condemns the heretics who “cannot but be apprehensive that, if it
be once determined that Christ’s flesh was human, a presumption would immediately arise in
opposition to them, that that flesh must by all means rise again.”75 That is to say, for Tertullian,
the heresies against which he contends not only strike at Christological doctrines of the Christ’s
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human nature, but at the same moment put the very reality of salvation in question; for, “in putting
on our flesh, He made it His own; in making it His own, He made it sinless.”76
Likewise, in the Gospels, one finds that the evangelists go to great lengths to highlight the
continued fully-embodied character of the resurrected Christ. The resurrection of the Christ
likewise means the resurrection of the bodily members of the Christ. Here the Gospels consistently
emphasize that the manifest Christ is no phantom, but an incarnate body of flesh. Thus despite the
Christ’s apparent miraculous capacities—passing through locked doors, traveling vast distances
suddenly, etc.—the texts repeatedly foreclose the possibility of a spectral manifestation. In the
Gospel according to Luke, for example, the Christ appears to his disciples in an instant, and “they
were startled and terrified, and thought that there were seeing a ghost” (Luke 24.37). Such ghostly
apparitions are by no means completely foreign to the scriptural tradition—the medium of Endor,
at the prompting of Saul, for example, conjures the ghostly apparition of Samuel (1 Samuel 28)—
but in Luke, the evangelist insists upon the incarnate resurrected body of Christ, complete with its
full diversity of incarnate members: “look at my hands and my feet [τὰς χεῖράς μου καὶ τοὺς πόδας
μου]; see that it is I myself. Touch me and see; for a ghost does not have flesh and bones [σάρκα
καὶ ὀστέα] as you see that I have” (Luke 24.39).
Likewise in the Gospel according to John, the apostle Thomas—despite being passed down
the tradition as the doubter par excellence—appears to embody precisely the same concern for
incarnation.
But Thomas (who was called the twin), one of the twelve, was not with them when
Jesus came. So the other disciples told him, ‘We have seen the Lord.’ But he said
to them, unless I see the mark of the nails in his hands, and put my finger in the
mark of the nails and my hand in his side, I will not believe. (John 20.24-25)
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For Thomas, no mere phantom will do. The resurrection hope of the gospel demands an incarnate
resurrection of an incarnate Christ. As Paul articulates, “if Christ has not been raised, our preaching
is worthless, and so is your faith” (1 Cor. 15.14). For, according to Paul, the resurrection of the
body of Christ is the “first fruits” (1 Cor. 15.20) of a general resurrection of the dead, not only in
spirit, but in body. Certainly, Paul continues, such bodies will not be identical to the bodies that
have preceded: “it is sown a physical body, it is raised a spiritual body. … flesh and blood [σὰρξ
καὶ αἷμα] cannot inherit the kingdom of God, nor does the perishable inherit the imperishable” (1
Cor. 15.44, 50). But this recourse to the imperishable spiritual body should not itself be overly
“spiritualized.” While incorruptible, the spiritual body is nonetheless still, for Paul, body [σῶμα].77
Indeed, Paul’s condemnation of the flesh [σὰρξ] must be read in the context of his broader polemic
against sin [ἁμαρτία], corruption [φθορὰ], and the world [κόσμος]. When Paul critiques flesh, he
does not critique incarnate membership, which for him bears the name body [σῶμα]. Thus, despite
the similarity of phrasing, Paul’s “flesh and blood” [σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα] should not be read as analogous
to Luke’s “flesh and bones” [σάρκα καὶ ὀστέα]. Rather than incarnate membership, what Paul
condemns under the name of flesh is the reign of sin within the world, a reign that condemns all
to death and corruption. In the words of Tertullian, “what has been abolished in Christ is not
carnem peccati, ‘sinful flesh,’ but peccatum carnis, ‘sin in the flesh,’—not the material thing, but
its condition; not the substance, but its flaw.”78 Indeed, Paul’s account of the post-resurrection
appearances of Jesus (1 Cor 15.3-11) appear to directly cohere with that of the gospels. Therefore,
if the resurrection of the Christ constitutes the first fruits of the resurrection, and therefore the first
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image of the spiritual body—as John the Elder notes “when he is revealed, we will be like him” (1
John 3.2)—one might rightly argue that the spiritual body of 1st Corinthians might not only bear
the incarnate members of the pre-resurrection Christ (Luke’s “τὰς χεῖράς μου καὶ τοὺς πόδας …
σάρκα καὶ ὀστέα”), but moreover, according to John, bears the very marks of the crucifixion:
But [Thomas] said to them, “Unless I see the mark of the nails in his hands, and put
my finger in the mark of the nails and my hand in his side, I will not believe.” A
week later his disciples were again in the house, and Thomas was with them.
Although the doors were shut, Jesus came and stood among them and said, “Peace
be with you.” Then he said to Thomas, “Put your finger here and see my hands.
Reach out your hand and put it in my side. Do not doubt but believe.” Thomas
answered him, “My Lord and my God!” (John 20.25-28)
As in the case of Jesus’ physical or material flesh, the question of sexuality is likewise
largely absent from the gospel accounts of the resurrected Christ. But, if we again assume an
analogy between the resurrected flesh of Christ and the general resurrection (1 Cor. 15.20, 1 John
3.2), then Jesus’ words in the synoptic gospels—that “at the resurrection people will neither marry
nor be given in marriage” (Matt. 22.30)—suggest an evacuation of sexuality in the resurrected
body of Christ.79 Yet, this approach is not uniformly affirmed by the early church. Quite to the
contrary, in the concluding passages of Augustine’s De civitate dei contra paganos, for example,
79
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Augustine directly reflects upon the question of post-resurrection sexual difference. Or, as he
frames it, “will women rise as women?”80 Against the Manichean orientation of his interlocutors,
Augustine contends that, indeed, “both sexes will rise.”81 In this complex passage, Augustine
deftly moves across the various notions of the body of Christ—connecting the creation of woman
from the rib of a sleeping man, to the emergence of the church from the pierced side of the
“sleeping” (dead) Christ. Etymologically linking this analogy, Augustine notes that the former is
said to be “edified” [aedificationem] and the latter to be “built up” [aedificavit]:82 “for the scripture
used this very word,” Augustine writes, “not saying ‘He formed’ or ‘framed,’ but ‘built her up into
a woman;’ whence also the apostle speaks of the edification of the body of Christ, which is the
Church.”83 Because of this “edification” of the woman, whose very existence is a premonition of
the emergence of the church, Augustine insists—against Aristotelian orthodoxy84—that the female
sex is not merely a corruption of the male, but a necessary component of reality, and thus a
necessary component of heavenly reality. “The woman, therefore,” he argues, “is a creature of
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God even as the man; but by her creation prefigured, as has been said, Christ and the Church. He,
then, who created both sexes will restore both.”85 In this way, Augustine draws the question of the
resurrected human body into dialogue with the Christ’s incarnate body and the nuptial conception
of the Church (body of Christ)—a complex interplay wherein each facet interprets the others.86
This rhetorical strategy underlies the necessity of thinking the multiple layers of the body of Christ
together in any discussion of sexuality and the body of Christ, and serves as an impetus for turning
to the third—eucharistic—conception of the body of Christ.

C. The Eucharistic Body of Christ
In 1st Corinthians, Paul offers the first attestation of the institution of the eucharist, writing:
The Lord Jesus on the night when he was betrayed took a loaf of bread, and when
he had given thanks, he broke it and said, “This is my body [τοῦτό μού ἐστιν τὸ
σῶμα] that is for you. Do this in remembrance of me.” In the same way he took the
cup also, after supper, saying, “This cup is the new covenant in my blood. Do this,
as often as you drink it, in remembrance of me.” For as often as you eat this bread
and drink the cup, you proclaim the Lord’s death until he comes.87
According to Graham Ward this eucharistic annunciation of the last supper functions as “the
displacement of the physical body”88 of Christ, that is at the same moment a dissemination of the

85

Ibid., 999.

86

One finds an analogous, but contemporary, interpretation of Jesus’ words in John Paul II’s Theology of the Body
which suggests that, in saying “they will take neither wife nor husband” “he [Jesus] does not affirm that this man of
the ‘future world’ will no longer be male and female as he was ‘from the beginning.’ It is thus evident that the
meaning of being, with respect to the body, male and female in the ‘future world’ should be sought outside of
marriage and procreation, but there is no reason to seek it outside of that which (independently from the blessing of
procreation) derives from the very mystery of creation and thereafter also forms the deepest structure of man’s
history on earth” (John Paul II, Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body, trans. Michael
Waldstein [Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 2006], 398-399). Here, and always noting John Paul II’s extreme
gender and sexual essentialism, it is nevertheless noteworthy that he insists upon the perpetuation of sexual
difference into the eschaton, and even admits a break with the biological-procreative logic of sexuality that generally
marks his writing.
87

This institution will be reiterated with minor variations in the synoptics: Mark 14; Matthew 26; Luke 22.

88

Ward, “Bodies,” 167.

363

body of Christ. Thus, paradoxically, here “the body of Christ keeps absenting itself from the text”89
(in the crucifixion and ascension) leaving a vacuum or lack, while at the same moment appearing
in another register.90 It is for this reason that Ward insists, “it is not that Jesus at this point stops
being a physical presence. It is more that his physical presence can extend itself to incorporate
other bodies, like bread, and make them extensions of his own.”91 The eucharistic body does not
cease to be body or embodied, but this incarnation takes on a distinct form.92
This extension or dissemination occurs materially in the consumption of the eucharistic
host: as the Gospel of Matthew writes: “take, eat; this is my body [Λάβετε, φάγετε; τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ
σῶμά μου]” (Matt. 26.26). Through this consumption, the body of Christ first passes from an
individuated being—that body, there, of Jesus of Nazareth—to a communal being, anticipating
already its consummation in the ecclesiastical body of Christ.93 As one reads in the Catechism of
the Catholic Church: “the Eucharist makes the Church. Those who receive the Eucharist are united
more closely to Christ. Through it Christ unites them to all the faithful in one body—the Church.
Communion renews, strengthens, and deepens this incorporation into the Church.”94
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Insofar as it constitutes a communal incarnation of the body of Christ, the eucharistic
institution abstracts from the (presumed) sexual body of Jesus—both prior to and following the
resurrection: “Jesus’ body as bread is no longer Christ as simply and biologically male.”95 Yet this
by no means necessitates an evacuation of sexuality from the eucharistic body nor from the
eucharistic experience. On the contrary, throughout church history one consistently finds the
eucharist to be a site of erotic desire and sexual contestation. As Lacan suggests, the eucharist
marks a distinct oral jouissance—often a sublimation of copulation96—at the heart of Christian
liturgical life: “Christ, even when resurrected from the dead, is valued for his body, and his body
is the means by which communion in his presence is incorporation—oral drive—with which
Christ’s wife, the Church as it is called, contents itself very well, having nothing to expect from
copulation. … Everything is exhibition of the body evoking jouissance … but without
copulation.”97 In this sense, the eucharist can indeed appear to express a certain “jouissance of the
body,”98 appearing in both sublimated and literal form.
This relationship is most clearly articulated in Catholic liturgy and doctrine, which at
almost every turn binds the eucharist to sexuality, marriage, and reproduction—even if in an often
un-thematized manner.99 It is, in this regard, unsurprising that the eucharist holds primacy of place

95

Ward, “Bodies,” 168.

96

“For the kind of (social) bond it proposes, Christianity does not need copulation, which functions as the
superfluous element, something on top of what would be (ideally) needed” (Alenka Zupančič, What is Sex?
[Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2017], 12). One might here recall Paul’s words to the church in Corinth: “to the
unmarried and the widows I say that it is well for them to remain unmarried as I am” (1 Cor. 7.8).
97

Jacques Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality: the Limits of Love and Knowledge, 1972-1973, Encore: The Seminar of
Jacques Lacan Book XX, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W. W. Norton & Company), 113.
98

Zupančič, What is Sex?, 14.

99

One sees in the mid-term report of the 2014 Synod on the Family, for example, calls for “a greater theological
study … starting with the links between the sacrament of marriage and the Eucharist in relation to the Churchsacrament.” Extraordinary General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops, Relatio post disceptationem (Vatican City:
2014), 8.

365

in the Catholic liturgy of matrimony, and that the questions of eucharistic participation by couples
using contraception, mixed religious households, and those who have undertaken divorce are
common.100 “There is no doubt that theological calculations have managed to reduce the list of
those invited to the gift-festivities of the sacramental acts to a select number,” Althaus-Reid
remarks, “sexual calculations, to be more specific, are very alienating in the gift-economy of, for
instance, the Eucharist.”101 Yet, the erotic dimension of the eucharist is often much more explicitly
apparent than these doctrinal disputes regarding marriage and reproduction might suggest—as is
manifest most clearly in the medieval mystical traditions.
To offer only a single example, one might turn to the thirteenth century Flemish Beguine:
Hadewijch. Throughout her poems and writings Hadewijch portrays an—at times playful, at times
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fraught102—erotic interchange between the soul and the Love (Minne) of God. Despite the clear
influence of the Song of Songs and its interpretive history, Hadewijch’s writings on Love are
rendered more sexually complex by her use of medieval courtly poetry as a theological model.
Thus, whereas traditional interpretations of the Song of Songs, from Origen to von Balthasar, read
God as a masculine figure positioned against His passive bride (the church), Hadewijch institutes
a gender inversion, whereby God is generally figured as the feminine Minne,103 while Hadewijch
herself is portrayed as the chivalrous (and masculine) courtly knight pursing his inaccessible
beloved.104 This imagery of the soul as a knight in pursuit of its courtly beloved is paralleled by a
number of other ostensibly somatic or erotic images; from courtly flirtation, to marriage, sexual
consummation (including orgasm), impregnation, gestation, and birth; an entire range of sexual
and somatic phenomena permeate Hadewijch's writings. The result is a complex—and by
contemporary standards, surprisingly queer105—literature wherein masculine and feminine,
passive and active, pain and pleasure, penetration and reception, desire and hate, all twist together
in a Gordian knot of erotic—and remarkably embodied106—mystical imagery.
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Together with her poetry and letters, Hadewijch collected a number of visions. Of
particular note is the regular convergence of two notions in these visions: eucharist as the impetus
for an experience of unio mystica and the presentation of that union as a sexual embrace. The
clearest example of this tendency is her seventh vision, appropriately titled “Oneness in the
Eucharist.” There Hadewijch recounts her experience of a Pentecost mass, wherein she was struck
with an irrepressible desire for God:
My heart and my veins and all my limbs trembled and quivered with eager desire
and, as often occurred with me, such madness and fear beset my mind that it seemed
to me I did not content my Beloved, and that my Beloved did not fulfill my desire,
so that dying I must go mad, and going mad I must die. On that day my mind was
beset so fearfully and so painfully by desirous love that all my separate limbs
threatened to break, and all my veins were in travail.107
Hadewijch’s description of the content of this desire flips effortlessly between erotic and
traditional mystical imagery.108 Thus she at once desires to “understand” and to “taste” Him; that
“his Humanity should to the fullest extent be one in fruition with [her] humanity” and that “he
might content [her] interiorly with his Godhead”; that she might be “God with God” and
“experience nothing else but sweet love, embraces, and kisses.”109
This experience reaches fruition at the eucharistic blessing. There the priest is transfigured
into the Christ-child, bearing the bread of the ciborium and a chalice of wine. At once the Christ-
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child is again transfigured into the adult Jesus: “with that he came in the form and clothing of a
Man, as he was on the day when he gave us his Body for the first time.”110 As a man, the Christ
gives Hadewijch the elements of the host, an act that Hadewijch experiences as sexual intimacy:
After that he came himself to me, took me entirely in his arms, and pressed me to
him; and all my members felt his full felicity, in accordance with the desire of my
heart and my humanity. So I was outwardly satisfied and fully transported. … Then
it was to me as if we were one without difference.111
Here Hadewijch recounts an eucharistic vision that cannot be mistaken for anything other than
sexual intimacy culminating in orgasm.112 While this vision of sexual intimacy with God or the
incarnate Christ is not unique in Hadewijch’s corpus,113 it is particularly noteworthy in the present
context insofar as it illustrates the inseparability of sexual or erotic desire or experience from the
eucharistic body. The thesis of the preceding chapters—that the flesh is inextricably a sexual
flesh—applies even when one moves outside of the realm of the specific individual person.
This recognition will be essential to the following chapter, which will now fully turn to the
logic of the communal or ecclesiastical body of Christ, but without forgetting that—like Hobbes’
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divine nature flows through them both” (Hadewijch, The Complete Works, 66); and in her twelfth letter she writes:
“think at all hours of God's goodness, and regret that it is so untouched by us, while he has full fruition of it; and that
we are exiled far from it, while he and his friends, in mutual interpenetration, enjoy such blissful fruition, and are
flowing into his goodness and flowing out again in all good” (Ibid., 71). Moreover, this erotic mysticism is not
unique to Hadewijch, it can be found in other Beguines (e.g. Marguerite Porete); in other female mystics, such as the
20th century mystic and philosopher Simone Weil, who describes “carnal love [as] a quest for the Incarnation”
(Simone Weil, First and Last Notebooks, trans. Richard Rees [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970], 84); and
even among male mystics (though less regularly), such as Symeon the New Theologian, who writes, “when,
according to the invisible movements of your heart, you find yourself in this state, you will discover Him
immediately embracing you and kissing you mystically, and bestowing on you a right spirit in your inward parts”
(Symeon the New Theologian, On The Mystical Life: The Ethical Discourses, Vol. 2, 110).
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“corpore politico,” Husserl’s “Community of Love,” and Henry’s “mystical body”—the
communal body politic is always grounded in the same syntheses that incarnate the flesh, and that
these syntheses bear the marks of the member of the flesh, that remainder which resists easy
identification and functions as the condition of all sexuality.
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Chapter 8 - The Cut and the Body of Christ
All theology is sexual theology.
Marcella Althaus-Reid

§1. The Pauline Body of Christ
This final chapter will begin precisely where the previous chapter left off, completing the
discussion of the body of Christ by turning toward the fourth and final sense of this term in the
present context: the communal body of Christ; that is, the Christian community. The aim of this
final chapter is neither to lionize nor to condemn the figure of the body of Christ, but rather, to
suggest that this figure is deeply ambiguous; a site of hierarchical oppression that nevertheless
may also constitute a site of transformation and emancipation. Like the previous chapter, the
present discussion employs a theological method that privileges the voices of the early Patristic
fathers—but not in an uncritical manner. Indeed figures like Cyprian and Augustine will here be
directly contrasted with one another, in order to draw out the liberative potential of the body of
Christ.
A. The Pauline Corpus
Throughout his oeuvre, Paul (and the deutero-Pauline authors) repeatedly employs the analogical
figure of the “Body of Christ” as a metaphor for the religious communities of the early Christian
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churches.1 This includes passages in 1st Corinthians, Romans, Colossians, and Ephesians.2 While
the discussion below will draw from all three passages, 1st Corinthians offers the fullest and most
worked-out account of the Body of Christ, and will therefore serve as the centerpiece of the present
discussion. For that reason, it will be helpful to begin by citing this passage in full:
Now concerning spiritual gifts [πνευματικῶν], brothers and sisters, I do not want
you to be uninformed. … Now there are varieties of gifts [χαρισμάτων], but the
same [αὐτὸ] Spirit; and there are varieties [διαιρέσεις] of services, but the same
[αὐτὸς] Lord; and there are varieties of activities, but it is the same [αὐτὸς] God
who activates all of them in everyone. To each is given [δίδοται] the manifestation
of the Spirit for the common good. … All these are activated by one and the same
[ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ] Spirit, who allots to each one individually [ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ] just as the
Spirit chooses. For just as the body is one [τὸ σῶμα ἕν ἐστιν] and has many
members [μέλη πολλὰ], and all the members of the body [τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος],
though many, are one body [πολλὰ ὄντα ἕν ἐστιν σῶμα], so it is with Christ. For in
the one [ἑνὶ] Spirit we were all baptized into one body [ἓν σῶμα]—Jews or Greeks,
slaves or free—and we were all made to drink of one [ἓν] Spirit. Indeed, the body
does not consist of one member but of many [σῶμα οὐκ ἔστιν ἓν μέλος, ἀλλὰ
πολλά]. If the foot [πούς] would say, “Because I am not a hand [χείρ], I do not
belong to the body [σώματος],” that would not make it any less a part of the body
[ἐκ τοῦ σώματος]. And if the ear [οὖς] would say, “Because I am not an eye
[ὀφθαλμός], I do not belong to the body,” that would not make it any less a part of
the body [ἐκ τοῦ σώματος]. If the whole body [ὅλον τὸ σῶμα] were an eye
[ὀφθαλμός], where would the hearing be? If the whole body were hearing, where
would the sense of smell be? But as it is, God arranged [ἔθετο] the members [μέλη]
in the body, each one of them [ἓν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι], as he chose. If all
were a single member [ἓν μέλος], where would the body [σῶμα] be? As it is, there
are many members [πολλὰ μὲν μέλη], yet one body [ἓν δὲ σῶμα]. The eye
[ὀφθαλμὸς] cannot say to the hand [χειρί], “I have no need of you,” nor again the
head [κεφαλὴ] to the feet [ποσίν], “I have no need of you.” On the contrary, the
members of the body that seem to be weaker [μέλη τοῦ σώματος ἀσθενέστερα] are
indispensable, and those members of the body that we think less honorable we
clothe with greater honor, and our less respectable members [ἀσχήμονα] are treated
with greater respect [εὐσχήμονα]; whereas our more respectable members do not
need this. But God has so constituted the body [συνεκέρασεν τὸ σῶμα], giving the
1

“The Church in its identification becomes the body of Christ. This identification is not the logic of A=A—
ultimately the vicious logic of Narcissus. It is the identification of analogy—a participation in and through
difference that enables co-creativity.” Graham Ward, “Bodies: The Displaced Body of Jesus Christ” in John
Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward (eds.), Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology (New York:
Routledge, 1998), 172.
2

1 Corinthians 12.12-27, Romans 12.3-8, Colossians 1.15-20, 3.14-16, Ephesians 1.22-23, 4.1-16, 5.25-32.
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greater honor to the inferior member [ὑστερουμένῳ], that there may be no division
[σχίσμα] within the body [σώματι], but the members [μέλη] may have the same
care for one another. If one member [ἓν μέλος] suffers, all the members [πάντα τὰ
μέλη] suffer together [συμπάσχει] with it; if one member [μέλος] is honored, all
rejoice together with it. Now you are the body of Christ [σῶμα Χριστοῦ] and
individually members [μέλη ἐκ μέρους] of it. (Corinthians 12.12-27)
In order to introduce Paul’s notion of the body of Christ, I will here seek to unpack the specific
language that Paul employs to discuss the body, highlighting the rhetorical and ideological
background that they assume.
Body: σῶμα. Throughout these passages Paul draws upon an existing and well-established
metaphor for thinking about the burgeoning Christian churches: the social body—the corpore
politico.3 Here Paul employs precisely the same language with which he will speak of the
individual human body, the resurrected body, and the eucharistic body: σῶμα (sōma, body). As he
writes, for example, “just as the body [σῶμα] is one … so it is with Christ” (1 Cor. 12.12). In fact,
Paul will directly connect the notion of the Body of Christ to the eucharistic body, briefly
introducing the notion two chapters earlier with the assertion: “because there is one bread, we who
are many are one body, for we all partake of the one bread” (1 Cor. 10.17). As was noted in the
discussion of the resurrected body above, this notion of the body should not be confused with the
Pauline usage of the flesh [σὰρξ], which tends to refer not to the incarnate being-body of the human
person, but rather to the reign of sin against the reign of spirit.4 In fact, only on one occasion will

3

“In order to press the point made in the previous paragraph, the need for diversity within unity, Paul adopts a
common analogy from antiquity and applies it to the Corinthian situation.” Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the
Corinthians in The New International Commentary on the New Testament (NICNT), eds. Ned B. Stonehouse et al.
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 1987), 600-601.
4

“It is noteworthy that, whereas he speaks of the solidarity between the Messiah and ethnic Jews in terms of ‘flesh’
(9:4), something has happened to create a different unity, a different solidarity, which is spoken of instead in terms
of ‘body’. Compare Paul’s language about ‘my flesh’ in 11:14, the background to which is found in 2 Sam 5:1//1
Chr 11:1, where the tribes of Israel say to David, ‘We are your bone and flesh’ (see also Judg 9:2, 2 Sam 19:12-13).
This substitution of terms fits so well with Paul’s regular language about the corruptible dying self (‘flesh’) and the
self that is to be resurrected (‘body’) that we may well wonder whether he is not suggesting that this new entity, the
‘one body in Christ; as here or the ‘body of Christ’ as in 1 Corinthians, is as it were the resurrected version of Israel
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the language of σὰρξ appear in the context of the body of Christ—“for no one ever hates his own
flesh [σάρκα]” (Ephesians 5.29)—a slippage that reflects the scholarly consensus that Ephesians
was not authored by Paul and/or serves as an allusion to the language of the Septuagint’s translation
of Genesis 2.24: “for this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife,
and the two will become one flesh [σάρκα μίαν].”5
Member(s): μέλος/μέλη. Central to this metaphor is a juxtaposition of the body with its
various members [μέλη]. Here, one should strike out any notion of membership in the
contemporary sense. As N. T. Wright notes, “we are so used to the word ‘member’ referring to
someone who belongs to a society or club that we are in danger of ignoring the fact that here
‘member’ (μέλη melē) means ‘parts of the body,’ and belongs with the extended metaphor.”6 For
Paul, a body cannot be understood apart from its composition as a differentiated series of individual
and unique members, each granted a unique role. Thus, he contrasts “the whole body” [ὅλον τὸ
σῶμα] with a variety of specifically demarcated members: foot [πούς], hand [χείρ], ear [οὖς], eye
[ὀφθαλμός], head [κεφαλὴ], internal organs [μέλη τοῦ σώματος ἀσθενέστερα], and genitalia
[ἀσχήμονα].7 Each of these members is noted for its specific capacities—the eye for seeing, the
ear for hearing, etc.8—and therefore serve as a metaphor, particularly in 1st Corinthians and
Romans, of the distribution of various spiritual gifts [πνευματικῶν, χαρισμάτων, δόματα] in the

according to the flesh’.” N. T. Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” in The New Interpreter's Bible: Commentary in
Twelve Volumes, Vol. X, ed. Leander E. Keck et al (Nashville: Abingdon, 2002), 710.
5

Ephesians 5.31, citing: “ἕνεκεν τούτου καταλείψει ἄνθρωπος τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν μητέρα καὶ
προσκολληθήσεται πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔσονται οἱ δύο εἰς σάρκα μίαν.” Genesis 2.24 (LXX).
6

Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 710.

7

For the reading of “μέλη τοῦ σώματος ἀσθενέστερα” as internal organs, see: Fee, The First Epistle to the
Corinthians, 609. For the reading of “ἀσχήμονα” as genitalia, see the extended discussion in the introduction.
8

“Not all the members [μέλη πάντα οὐ] have the same [αὐτὴν] function,” Romans 12.4.
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early church, of their ethnic diversity (“Jews or Greeks”), and of their socio-economic diversity
(“slaves or free”).
One and many: ἓν/ἑνὶ/μίαν and πολλὰ. Between these two terms—body and member—
Paul identifies a complex dialectic of unity and plurality, of individuality and participation: an
incarnate mereology. For Paul, one can neither understand the body apart from its members, nor
the members apart from their bodily incorporation. As he writes, “the body is one [τὸ σῶμα ἕν
ἐστιν] and has many members [μέλη πολλὰ], and all the members of the body [τὰ μέλη τοῦ
σώματος], though many, are one body [πολλὰ ὄντα ἕν ἐστιν σῶμα]” (1 Cor. 12.12). Yet, this
insistence upon the interplay of the one and the many could serve two distinct rhetorical functions:
either demanding unity despite diversity, or diversity despite unity. While it is undeniable that Paul
intends both readings simultaneously,9 it is nevertheless the case that Paul strictly biases the
second. In the words of Fee:
Paul’s primary concern with this imagery is not that the body is one even though it
has many members, thus arguing for their need for unity despite their diversity.
Rather, his concern is expressed in v. 14, that even though the body is one, it does
not consist of one member but of many, thus arguing for their need for diversity,
since they are in fact one body.10
Given/activated/distributed/arranged/assigned: δίδοται/ἐνεργῶν/ἔθετο/ἐμέρισεν. For Paul
the differences within the community, like those within the body, are inspired by the spirit. 11 Just
as God has constituted the body [συνεκέρασεν τὸ σῶμα, 1 Cor. 12.18] with its internal
differentiation and multiplicity, so too has God given [δίδοται], worked/activated [ἐνεργῶν],

9

“The metaphor … maintains a claim for unity—one body—while recognizing and honoring differences—many,
quite different members.” J. Paul Sampley, “The First Letter to the Corinthians,” in The New Interpreter's Bible:
Commentary in Twelve Volumes, Vol. X, ed. Leander E. Keck et al (Nashville: Abingdon, 2002), 947.
10

Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 601.

11

“Paul sees the differences as being inspired by the Holy Spirit and as enriching the community by God’s design.”
Sampley, “The First Letter to the Corinthians,” 943.
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distributed [διαιρέσεις], arranged [ἔθετο], and assigned [ἐμέρισεν] the various gifts of the spirit.
In the same way, Paul does not erase ethnic difference, but affirms its spiritual source.12 A body
composed of a single member—Paul conjures the monstrous image of a body composed entirely
of eyes or ears (1 Cor. 12.17)—cannot function. Rather, he insists, “God arranged [ἔθετο] the
members [μέλη] in the body, each one of them [ἓν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι], as he chose” (1
Cor. 12.18).
Same and different: αὐτὸς and διαίρεσις/ἑτέρῳ/διάφορα. Nevertheless, despite this concern
for difference, Paul does not affirm division [σχίσμα]. Indeed, the context of Paul’s use of the body
of Christ—particularly in 1st Corinthians—is the very real threat of internal schism [σχίσμα] within
the early church. Having received a report of “quarrels” and division among the community—
“each of you says ‘I belong to Paul,’ or ‘I belong to Apollos,’ or ‘I belong to Cephas,’ or ‘I belong
to Christ’” (1 Cor. 1.12)—Paul tasks himself with “distinguish[ing] proper diversity from schisms
and from divisive subgroups within the community.”13 Toward this end, Paul insists upon a
distinction between division and variety—between σχίσμα and διαιρέσεις. This distinction
ultimately depends upon the foundation of Christian unity-through-difference within the unity of
Christ and of the spirit: “now there are varieties of gifts, but the same [αὐτὸ] Spirit; and there are
varieties [διαιρέσεις] of services, but the same [αὐτὸς] Lord; and there are varieties [διαιρέσεις] of
activities, but it is the same [αὐτὸς] God who activates all of them in everyone” (1 Cor. 12.4-6).
For Paul, what distinguishes diversity/difference from division/schism is that, whereas the former
stands in a dialectical relation with unity, the latter merely disintegrates unification; whereas the

12

“Paul has affirmed their unity, which was grounded in their baptism, [and] has recognized once again their
differences (in the expression ‘whether Jews or Greeks,’ etc.).” Ibid., 945.
13

Ibid., 943.
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former offers an integration of the dysmember into the community, the latter institutes the
dismemberment of the community.
Unity, love, peace: ἑνότητα, ἀγάπῃ, εἰρήνης. For Paul, this unity-through-difference finds
its source in the divine, but is manifest through acts of love [ἀγάπῃ] and peace [εἰρήνης]. For these
Pauline authors, this love and peace functions as “the key to communal solidarity.”14 Thus, one
reads in Colossians, for example, “above all, clothe yourselves with love [ἀγάπην], which binds
everything together in perfect harmony. And let the peace [εἰρήνη] of Christ rule in your hearts, to
which indeed you were called in the one body [ἑνὶ σώματι]” (Col. 3.14-15). This sentiment is
directly echoed in Ephesians,15 which writes,
Bearing with one another in love [ἀγάπῃ], making every effort to maintain the unity
[ἑνότητα] of the Spirit in the bond of peace [εἰρήνης]. There is one body [ἓν σῶμα]
and one Spirit, just as you were called to the one hope of your calling, one Lord,
one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, who is above all and through all
and in all. (Ephesians 4.2-5)16
The result of this unification through love and peace is a mutuality in which the members do not
lose their unique ipseity17—“now you are the body of Christ and individually members [μέλη ἐκ

14

Pheme Perkins, “The Letter to the Ephesians,” in The New Interpreter's Bible: Commentary in Twelve Volumes,
Vol. XI, ed. Leander E. Keck et al (Nashville: Abingdon, 2000), 423.
15

This is standard practice for Ephesians, which appears to draw a large portion of its argument directly from
Colossians: “for the majority [of scholars] it is clear that the dependency is the other way and that the author of
Ephesians has used Colossians as the model on which he builds.” Andrew T. Lincoln, “The Letter to the
Colossians,” in The New Interpreter's Bible: Commentary in Twelve Volumes, Vol. XI, ed. Leander E. Keck et al
(Nashville: Abingdon, 2000), 577.
16

Or again: “Husbands, love your wives, just as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her, in order to
make her holy by cleansing her with the washing of water by the word, so as to present the church to himself in
splendor, without a spot or wrinkle or anything of the kind—yes, so that she may be holy and without blemish. In
the same way, husbands should love [ἀγαπᾶν] their wives as they do their own bodies [σώματα]. He who loves [ὁ
ἀγαπῶν] his wife loves himself. For no one ever hates his own flesh [σάρκα], but he nourishes and tenderly cares for
it, just as Christ does for the church, because we are members [μέλη] of his body [τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ]. “For this
reason a man will leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two will become one flesh [σάρκα
μίαν].” This is a great mystery, and I am applying it to Christ and the church. (Ephesians 5.25-32)
17

Henry makes precisely this point in his phenomenological analysis of the Mystical Body in Incarnation: “This
absolute unity (i.e. identity, see same page above) between all living Selves, far from signifying or implying the
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μέρους] of it” (1 Cor. 12.27)—but, gain an affective intimacy. Thus Paul will commend the church
in Rome to “love one another with mutual affection” (Romans, 12.10), or, as he writes to the
church in Corinth, “if one member [ἓν μέλος] suffers, all the members [πάντα τὰ μέλη] suffer
together [συμπάσχει] with it” (1 Cor. 12.26).18

B. Hierarchy and Sexuality in the Body of Christ
The articulation of the body of Christ in 1st Corinthians 12 opens up invaluable possibilities for
thinking the sexual member of the flesh, through the introduction of the language of the ἀσχήμων
discussed above (introduction). This language, as was already noted, literally refers to that which
is “less respectable” or “unpresentable,” but in its context indisputably refers to the genitalia. The
introduction of this term—together with the “weaker” [ἀσθενέστερα] members, i.e. internal
organs—serves the function, for Paul, of shattering expectations of incarnate hierarchy. That is to
say, an ideology of strength and respect would privilege those members which conspicuously
manifest their strength (e.g. arms, legs, etc.) and which are shown without shame (e.g. face, hands,

dissolution or destruction of the individuality of each one, is on the contrary constitutive of it, in as much as each of
them is joined to himself or herself in the phenomenological effectuation of Life in its Word, and generated in
themselves as this irreducibly singular Self, irreducible to any other.” Michel Henry, Incarnation: A Philosophy of
Flesh, trans. Karl Hefty (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2015), 248. Joseph Rivera provides a
commentary of Henry, noting: “I cannot, as this member of the body occupying my own space, somehow ‘merge’
with or become one with another member of the body. My ‘here’ as this particular limb is here by virtue of its
relation to the other’s ‘there’ as a different limb.” Joseph Rivera, The Contemplative Self After Michel Henry: A
Phenomenological Theology (Notre Dame: The University of Notre Dame Press, 2015), 315.
In a similar manner Karl Barth, in his characteristically Kierkegaardian tenor, will emphasize the persistence of
individuality, writing: “it must be fellowship that is encountered in community: but this means an encountering of
the OTHER in the full existentiality of his utter OTHERNESS. In the neighbour it must be the ONE who is
disclosed. Thus understood, Fellowship is not an aggregate of individuals, nor is it an organism. In fact, Fellowship
is no concrete thing at all. … Fellowship is communion. It is, however, not a communion in which the ‘otherness’ of
each particular individual is blurred or limited or dissolved, but that ONENESS which both requires the ‘otherness’
of each individual and makes sense of it.” Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 443.
18

Here we have perhaps discovered the (not particularly well-hidden) source of Husserl’s “community of love” and
Henry’s “pathos-with.”
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etc.). Against this ideology, Paul institutes a distinctly Christian logic of reversal, wherein “the last
will be first, and the first will be last” (Matt. 20.16), or, as Paul himself puts it earlier in the same
letter: “God chose what is foolish in the world to shame the wise; God chose what is weak in the
world to shame the strong” (1 Cor. 1.27). Through this logic of reversal, Paul suggests that despite
their apparent weakness, the internal organs are “indispensable” [ἀναγκαῖά]; those organs which
manifest a conspicuous strength, invisibly draw their strength from the internal organs without
whom they could not function. In like manner, the cultural and religious imposition of regulations
against nudity19 would seem to suggest that the genitalia are shameful and abject, a dysmember,
as I suggest translating ἀσχήμονα. Yet, Paul suggests to the contrary, that the care in modesty and
clothing represent a “greater respect” [εὐσχήμονα] and “honor” [τιμήν] for these members.
Within the text itself, Paul gives no precise explanation for this greater respect, leading to
various interpretations. Gregory of Nyssa, for example, as was seen above, in a move that perfectly
captures the logic of “reproductive futurism,” grants primacy of place to these members because
of their reproductive function: “the generative organs … involve a forecast of the future,
introducing as they do, by themselves, their counteracting transmission for our race. … By those
… organs the immortality of humanity is secured.”20 More recently, John Paul II has suggested
that this passage institutes a reversal of Eden, and a partial intimation of prelapsarian humanity.
“In Paul’s expression about ‘unpresentable members’ of the human body as well as about those
that ‘seem to be weaker’ or those ‘that we think less honorable,’ we find, it seems to us, the
testimony of the same shame that the first human beings, male and female, had experienced after
19

One might consider, for example, the ban on (even accidental) nudity in the presence of the altar: “you shall not
go up by steps to my altar, so that your nakedness may not be exposed on it” (Exodus 20.26), and the attendant
requirements regarding priestly clothing: “you shall make for them linen undergarments to cover their naked flesh;
they shall reach from the hips to the thighs” (Exodus 28.42).
20

Gregory of Nyssa, “The Great Catechism,” 497.
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original sin,” but, John Paul II continues, Paul institutes a key reversal, whereby “one can say that
from shame is born ‘reverence’ for one’s own body, a reverence that Paul asks us to keep (1 Thess.
4:4).”21 But, here I would like to highlight neither Gregory’s model of reproductive futurism, nor
John Paul II’s model of a return to primordial harmony. I will instead turn to the 10th-11th century
mystic and hymnographer Symeon the New Theologian, who suggests a reading of 1st Corinthians
that is at once mystical and eschatological.
According to Symeon, incorporation into the Body of Christ should be understood in the
double sense; that is, not only should one recognize that the individual Christian becomes a
member of the corporate body, but conversely, that in a sort of coincidentia oppositorum (to
borrow a term from Nicholas of Cusa), in the same moment Christ inhabits every member of the
individual’s body—granting a presentiment or intuition of the resurrection body. This double
character marks the uniquely embodied conception of mystical union (θεωρία) in Symeon’s
theology. To be one with God—or here, particularly, Christ—is not to leave or abandon the body
for a platonic contemplation, but to experience the incarnation within one’s own flesh.22 This is
explicated nowhere more clearly than in his “Hymn 15,” where he writes:
21

John Paul II, Man and Woman He Created Them, 347. Continuing: “we wish to call attention to the fact that
according to the author of the letter the particular effort to reach reverence for the human body and especially for its
‘weaker’ or ‘unpresentable’ members corresponds to the Creator’s original plan or to the vision about which Genesis
speaks: ‘God saw everything that he had made, and indeed, it was very good’ (Gen 1:31). Paul writes, ‘God has so
arranged the body, giving the greater honor to the member that lacked it, that there may be no disunion within the
body, but the members may have care for one another’ (1 Cor 12:24-25). ‘Disunion within the body,’ the result of
which is that some members are considered weaker,’ less’ honorable,’ and thus ‘unpresentable,’ is a further
expression of the vision of man’s—that is, historical man’s—interior state after original sin. The man of original
innocence, male and female, about whom we read, ‘both were naked … but they did not feel shame’ (Gen 2:25), did
not feel that ‘disunion within the body’ either. An analogous harmony in man’s innermost [being], the harmony of
the ‘heart,’ corresponded to the objective harmony that the Creator gave to the human body, which Paul explains as
reciprocal care of the various members (1 Cor 12:25).” Ibid., 347-348.
22

Here Symeon articulates a logic akin to that of Meister Eckhart, who will later write, “we celebrate here in
temporality with a view to the eternal birth, which God the Father has accomplished and accomplishes unceasingly
in eternity, so that this same birth has now been accomplished in time within human nature. What does it avail me if
this birth takes place unceasingly and yet does not take place within myself? It is quite fitting, however, that it
should take place within me.” Meister Eckhart, Breakthrough: Meister Eckhart’s Creation Spirituality in New
Translation (New York: Doubleday, 1980), 293.
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We become members of Christ—and Christ becomes our members, Christ becomes
my hand, Christ, my miserable foot; and I, unhappy one, am Christ’s hand, Christ’s
foot! … If you so wish you will become a member of Christ, and similarly all our
members individually will become members of Christ and Christ our members, and
all which is dishonorable in us He will make honorable by adorning it with His
divine beauty and His divine glory, since living with God at the same time, we shall
become gods, no longer seeing the shamefulness of our body at all, but made
completely like Christ in our whole body, each member of our body will be the
whole Christ; because, becoming many members, He remains unique and
indivisible, and each part is He, the whole Christ. Now, well you recognized Christ
in my finger, or in my penis23—did you not shudder, or blush? But God was not
ashamed to become like you and you, you are ashamed to be like Him? No, I am
not ashamed to be like Him, but, when you said, like a shameful member, I feared
that you were uttering blasphemy. Well, you were wrong to fear, for there is nothing
shameful, but they are the hidden members of Christ, because one covers them, and
for that reason they are more worthy of honor than the others, as hidden members,
invisible to all, of the One who is hidden.24
In this way, Symeon suggests, the indwelling of Christ within our members glorifies our
members, such that we should feel no shame in affirming not only the presence of God in our soul
or in our heart, but in an affirmation no less shocking today as it was in the 11th century, our very
penis (βἁλανος). In fact, it is nowhere more clear that Symeon’s message of the glorification and
divination of the body has not been received, then in the very translations of his own hymn, where
reference to the penis is generally rendered ambiguously in order to obscure his direct use of sexual
imagery. The word marked here as “penis” is the Greek βἁλανον (from βἁλανος), which comes
from the word for “acorn” and, according to the Liddell-Scott, refers to the “glans membri
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Translation altered to reflect Symeon’s use of explicitly sexual language. I have here opted for the more literal
translation of βἁλανον as “penis,” for what should be obvious reasons, following Thomas Arentzen’s discussion of
Symeon (The Virgin in Song: Mary and the Poetry of Romanos the Melodist [Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2017], 48-49).
24

St. Symeon The New Theologian, “Hymn 15” in Hymns of Divine Love, trans. George A. Maloney (Denville:
Dimension Books, 1976), 54-55 [translation modified, see prior footnote].
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virilis.”25 In Maloney’s translation of “Hymn 15,” it is rendered simply as “this organ,” 26 here
likely following Sources Chrétiennes, which renders it as “cet organe.”27
Unlike his interpreters, Symeon is here bold, noting the likelihood of scandalizing his
audience (“did you not shudder, or blush?”), and generating accusations of blasphemy (“I feared
that you were uttering blasphemy”), within the text of the hymn itself. But this possibility of
scandal, as Thomas Arentzen points out, arises not only because of the simple use of “penis” in a
hymn—despite the fact that this would still be unheard of in our supposedly “liberated” modern
context. More radically still, Symeon not only uses βἁλανον, but places it “in a rhyming
homeoteleuton construction”28 with “Christ” (Χριστον καἰ βἁλανον). What, within the context of
a hymn, could more directly symbolize the glorification of the sexual member than this ostensibly
blasphemous juxtaposition of the sacred and the profane—or more precisely, the sacred and the
now sacralized sexual member?
This is precisely the power of Symeon’s reading of the body of Christ and the sexual
member; he here neither subordinates it to a heterosexual logic of reproductive futurism, nor does
he relegate its glorification to a prelapsarian goodness. Rather, he suggests a direct transfiguration
of the supposedly shameful dysmember in its incorporation into the body of Christ. Moreover, he
understands this logic to have direct repercussions within the social realm. Thus, not only should
the reader no longer feel shame in their sexual member(s), but they should themselves, as an
individual, no longer feel shame. For his invocation of the “shameful member” here refers not to
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Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, Seventh Edition (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1889), 273.
26

Symeon, “Hymn 15,” 54.

27

Syméon le Nouveau Théologien, Hymnes: 1-15, trans. Joseph Paramelle (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1969), 291.
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Arentzen, The Virgin in Song, 48-49.
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the sexual member itself, but rather to the member of the community: “but, when you said, like a
shameful member …”29
Nevertheless, despite Paul’s incorporation of the sexual member—or dysmember—into his
discourse on the body of Christ, and its radical reading in Symeon, one should not permit these
openings to obscure the less liberative aspects of Paul’s theology of the body of Christ, in regards
to gender and sexuality. For, despite this affirmation of the sexual member in 1st Corinthians 12,
Paul will elsewhere, within the same letter and in other letters, manifest a less-than-open stance
towards deviations from sexual and gender norms: what he will generally denote by the umbrella
term “sexual immorality” (πορνεία).30 The most extended discourse on πορνεία in the communal
context can be found in 1st Corinthians 5. There, Paul relays that “it is actually reported that there
is sexual immorality [πορνεία] among you, and of a kind that is not found even among pagans; for
a man is living with his father’s wife” (1 Cor. 5.1). For Paul, this incestuous relationship between
a man and his step mother, is redoubled by the Corinthian church’s inaction.31 Therefore, Paul
attempts in this letter to intervene and suggest a course of action. According to Paul, the male
offender32 is to be expelled from the community: “you are to hand this man over to Satan for the
destruction of the flesh” (1 Cor. 5.5). The precise nature of this “handing over” and of the
“destruction of the flesh” remains ambiguous. Regarding the first, it is likely that the language of
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St. Symeon The New Theologian, “Hymn 15,” 55 [emphasis added].

30

“The word porneia (“sexual immorality”) in the Greek world simply meant ‘prostitution’ in the sense of going to
the prostitutes and paying for sexual pleasure. … But the word had been picked up in Hellenistic Judaism, always
pejoratively, to cover all extramarital sexual sins and aberrations, including homosexuality.” Fee, The First Epistle
to the Corinthians, 200.
31

“Should you not rather have mourned, so that he who has done this would have been removed from among you?”
(1 Cor. 5.2).
32

“The fact that the woman herself is not mentioned, especially since women are more often condemned for sexual
sins than men (cf. John 8:1-11), is a sure indication that only the man was a member of the Christian community.”
Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 200-201.
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handing one over to Satan was quasi-technical language for expelling someone from the Christian
community.33 Regarding the second, it is unlikely that Paul understands the destruction of the flesh
literally, and that this constitutes a death penalty. More likely, Paul understands “flesh” in the
theological sense discussed above, and is hoping for a purgation, “so that his spirit may be saved
in the day of the Lord” (1 Cor. 5.5).34 Through this expulsion or “handing over,” the community
seeks to establish clear boundaries between what is inside (sexually permissible) and what is
outside (sexual impermissible).35
For Paul, this boundary creation is not a one-time affair, rather he immediately seeks to
generalize this course of action: “but now I am writing to you not to associate with anyone who
bears the name of brother or sister who is sexually immoral [πόρνος] or greedy, or is an idolater,
reviler, drunkard, or robber. Do not even eat with such a one. … ‘Drive out the wicked person
from among you’” (1 Cor. 5.11-13). As Sampley notes, “the vice list here functions in an et cetera
fashion to suggest that porneia serves to typify the larger problem.”36 This thesis is justified by
Paul’s subsequent expansion of this list in the following chapter which condemns: “fornicators
[πόρνοι], idolaters, adulterers [μοιχοὶ], male prostitutes [μαλακοὶ], sodomites [ἀρσενοκοῖται],

33

“The similar usage in 1 Tim. 1:20 suggests that for Paul this was quasi-technical language for some kind of
expulsion from the Christian community, probably from the gatherings of the assembly for worship, including the
meals and supper in honor of the Lord.” Ibid., 208. See also, “[Paul] directs the community, at their next assembly,
to give the man over to Satan—that is, to put him out of the community.” Sampley, “The First Letter to the
Corinthians,” 847.
34

“Nowhere else does Paul express death in terms of ‘destruction of the flesh’... with some degree of confidence,
therefore, we may put aside the idea that Paul intended that the man should die. … What this means, then, is that we
have a typically Pauline contrast between ‘flesh’ and ‘spirit,’ although not necessarily typically expressed. What
Paul was desiring by having this man put outside the believing community was the destruction of what was ‘carnal’
in him, so that he might be ‘saved’ eschatologically.” Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 212.
35

“Paul assumes that it is the community’s responsibility to preserve its own God-given integrity by giving to Satan,
by cleansing, and by driving out the violator. … By community action, the boundaries of the community must be
redrawn so that this man is outside.” Sampley, “The First Letter to the Corinthians,” 850.
36

Ibid.
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thieves, the greedy, drunkards, revilers, robbers—none of these will inherit the kingdom of God”
(1 Cor. 6.9-10).
Here, of particular note are the terms μαλακοὶ and ἀρσενοκοῖται. Due to the ambiguity of
these terms, one finds a variety of translations.37 The first term, literally meaning “soft,” seems to
refer to effeminate men—but, despite a tradition of identifying this term exclusively with
homosexuality, in its original context it was probably considerably more general. 38 As David
Halperin notes, “in various European cultural traditions men could be designated as ‘soft’ or
‘unmasculine’ (malthakos in Greek, mollis in Latin and its Romance derivatives) either because
they were inverts or pathics—because they were womanly, or transgendered, and liked being
fucked by other men—or because, on the contrary, they were womanizers, because they deviated
from masculine gender norms insofar as they preferred the soft option of love to the hard option
of war.”39 The second, ἀρσενοκοῖται, is equally difficult to translate insofar as the term does not
appear in earlier literature. Literally, it is a neologism of “male” (ἄρσην) and “fucker” (κοῖται), 40
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To give just a few examples, the King James Version translated the first as “effeminate” and the second as
“abusers of themselves with mankind,” whereas the New King James version renders the first “homosexuals” and
the second “sodomites”; while the New International Version simply conflates the two terms into the single: “men
who have sex with men.”
38

Biblical scholarship has often sought to link this term with the passive member of a pederastic relationship, but
even this attribution appears difficult to maintain with certainty. “The first word, malakoi, has the basic meaning of
‘soft’; but it also became a pejorative epithet for men who were ‘soft’ or ‘effeminate,’ most likely referring to the
younger, ‘passive’ partner in a pederastic relationship—the most common form of homosexuality in the GrecoRoman world. … The problem is that there was a technical word for such men, and malakos is seldom, if ever, so
used.” Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 243-244.
39

David M. Halperin, “How to do the History of Male Homosexuality” in Donald E. Hall, Annamarie Jagose,
Andrea Bebell, and Susan Potter (eds.), The Routledge Queer Studies Reader (New York: Routledge, 2013), 266.
40

I have chosen “fucker” here—rather than the more clinical “intercourse”—following John Boswell, in order to
reflect the use of this term as a crude or vulgar term within its context. “The claim that this word ‘obviously’ means
‘homosexual’ defies linguistic evidence and common sense. The second half of the compound ‘κοῖται,’ is a coarse
word, generally denoting base or licentious sexual activities (see Rom. 13.13), and in this and other compounds
corresponds to the vulgar English word ‘fucker,’ i.e. a person who, by insertion, takes the ‘active’ role in
intercourse.” John Boswell, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1980), 342.
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and seems to refer either to the active partners of a pederastic relationship (where “male” is the
object) or to male prostitutes (where “male” is the subject).41 While John Boswell’s seminal
Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality (1980) opened up an extensive and ongoing
discourse regarding the applicability of “homosexual” to either or both of these terms, settling that
debate, even were such a thing possible, is unnecessary to the argument at hand. For, regardless of
which interpretation is followed, it is undeniable that Paul is here using this constellation of
terms—together with fornicators [πόρνοι] and adulterers [μοιχοὶ]—in order to flesh out the general
category of “sexual immorality” [πορνεία], in such a way that it would condemn all deviations
from strict monogamous, heterosexual norms.42
One might suggest that this condemnation be held apart from the notion of the body of
Christ, but Paul soon forecloses this possibility. In the conclusion to these sections, Paul writes:
The body is meant not for fornication [πορνείᾳ] but for the Lord, and the Lord for
the body. … Do you not know that your bodies are members of Christ? Should I
therefore take the members of Christ and make them members of a prostitute
[πόρνης]? Never! Do you not know that whoever is united to a prostitute [πόρνῃ]
becomes one body with her? For it is said, ‘The two shall become one flesh.’ But
anyone united to the Lord becomes one spirit with him. Shun fornication

41

“This word (arsenokoitai), however, is also difficult. This is its first appearance in preserved literature, and
subsequent authors are reluctant to use it, especially when describing homosexual activity. The word is a compound
of ‘male’ and ‘intercourse.’ There is no question as to the meaning of the koitai part of the word; it is vulgar slang
for ‘intercourse.’ … What is not certain is whether ‘male’ is subject (= ‘males who have intercourse’; thus a word
for male prostitutes of all kinds) or object (= ‘intercourse with males’; therefore male homosexual).” Fee, The First
Epistle to the Corinthians, 244.
42

For, even if Boswell is right that these terms should be conceived through the lens of prostitution, rather than
homosexuality (and it is more likely that Paul intends some combination of both), Paul is clear elsewhere (Romans
1) that he does not condone same-sex sexuality. There, Paul offers yet another vice list, preceded by an
unambiguous condemnation of same-sex eroticism: “for this reason God gave them up to degrading passions. Their
women exchanged natural intercourse for unnatural, and in the same way also the men, giving up natural intercourse
with women, were consumed with passion for one another. Men committed shameless acts with men and received in
their own persons the due penalty for their error. And since they did not see fit to acknowledge God, God gave them
up to a debased mind and to things that should not be done. They were filled with every kind of wickedness, evil,
covetousness, malice. Full of envy, murder, strife, deceit, craftiness, they are gossips, slanderers, God-haters,
insolent, haughty, boastful, inventors of evil, rebellious toward parents, foolish, faithless, heartless, ruthless. They
know God’s decree, that those who practice such things deserve to die—yet they not only do them but even applaud
others who practice them.” (Romans 1.26-32)
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[πορνείαν]! Every sin that a person commits is outside of the body; but the
fornicator [πορνεύων] sins against the body itself [ἴδιον σῶμα]. (1 Cor. 6.l3-18)
Here Paul explicitly links his account of πορνεία to his account of the body of Christ. One is to
refrain from sexuality, he suggests, for two reasons. Because, as the second half of the passage
argues, this sin contaminates the interiority of the body, it is inside “the body itself” [ἴδιον σῶμα].
Second, and more directly applicable to the discussion at hand, this contamination of one’s own
body is redoubled at a communal and Christological level. Because one has become a member of
the body of Christ, one is uniquely bound both to the community and to Christ. To commit an act
of sexual immorality [πορνεία], therefore, is to bring into the closed boundaries of the community,
that which is to be expelled from the community, thereby risking the shattering or rupturing of the
community itself. As Althaus-Reid writes of homosexual relations, “sodomy, by its mere structure
of the man/man relating pattern, presented to society a fracture into the hierarchical men/women
ethos; this was considered to be damaging for the life of society, the constitution of states and the
relationship of humanity with God.”43 To commit an act of sexual deviancy (to deviate from the
sexual norm) is to contaminate the community and to contaminate Christ.44
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Marcella Althaus-Reid, Indecent Theology: Theological Perversions in Sex, Gender and Politics (New York:
Routledge, 2000), 195.
44

This linkage between sexual immorality and logics of “contamination” are particularly prominent within
American evangelical purity culture. The following is a particularly visceral example, that I can personally attest is a
regular occurrence in evangelical sexual education curriculum:
“Special Brownies
February 6, 2006
Title: Special Brownies (A.K.A.–Chocolate Covered Poop!)
Bake 3 batches of brownies. Leave one batch plain, put some extras on the second batch (I used nuts, chocolate
chips, and marshmallows on the top) and add peanut butter chips (or leave plain) to the third batch. For each batch,
write out a recipe card with the ingredients – but for the 3rd batch, write down 1 Tbs. of dog poop at the end.
Have a student read off the ingredients for each batch – starting with the first and take a vote to see which students
would eat that brownie. They will go nuts when he/she reads the last ingredient on the 3rd batch!! Most likely, no
one will want to eat that batch – but that's the point. (I had one who thought he would eat it anyway … there's
always one!)
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This rigid attempt to establish the boundaries outside or around the Christian community
is supplemented with periodic reintroductions of hierarchical boundaries within the Christian
community. For Paul, the body is specifically arranged by God, “God arranged the members in the
body, each one of them, as he chose” (1 Cor. 12.18). In the same manner, as was seen above, God
distributes difference within the community—in the context of 1 Cor., the difference between the
gifts of the spirit—in an ordered manner: “God has appointed in the church first apostles, second
prophets, third teachers; then deeds of power, then gifts of healing, forms of assistance, forms of
leadership, various kinds of tongues.” (1 Cor. 12.28). Nevertheless, as his analogy with the body
sought to expose, these differences are not hierarchical.45 Here, it will be helpful to begin by briefly
noting the general Pauline conception of sexual difference, in order to more clearly highlight those
moments—within Paul, and more commonly within the Deutero-Pauline literature—where
something considerably less liberative emerges.
For obvious historical reasons, Paul’s account of sexual difference is certainly far from
identical to that proposed by contemporary queer theory or feminist discourse. Nevertheless, Paul

THE EXPLANATION …
We are all called to be pure and whole. Even a little bit of sin in our lives makes us unacceptable to God (brownies
with dog poop). If we keep ourselves free from sin, and seek reconciliation to God, then our lives can be decorated
with good things, and unique gifts that make us special brownies in God's eyes (brownies with extra stuff). But at
the very minimum, we have to be pure. Even a little bit of dog poop makes the whole brownie bad.”
Jonathan McKee, “Special Brownies,” The Source for Youth Ministry, https://thesource4ym.com/special-brownies/
(retrieved 01/14/19).
For a recent autobiographical account of evangelical purity culture, see: Linda Kay Klein, Pure: Inside the
Evangelical Movement That Shamed a Generation of Young Women and How I Broke Free (New York: Touchstone,
2018).
45

“The eye cannot say to the hand, ‘ I have no need of you,’ nor again the head to the feet, ‘I have no need of you.’
… there may be no dissention within the body, but the members may have the same care for one another” (1 Cor.
12.21, 25). As Fee notes, “this is demonstrated by the further elaborations in vv. 22-24a, which emphasize the
strictly apparent nature of such ‘hierarchy.’ He argues that the apparently weaker, the internal organs, are the more
necessary, and that the apparently less seemly, the sexual organs, are the more necessary, are accorded the higher
honor (of clothing being implied).” Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 609.
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does seem to go to great lengths to undercut a hierarchical-subordinationist account of sexual
difference. For Paul, sexual difference appears to play a role akin to ethnic or socio-economic
difference. Thus, he can write: “there is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free,
there is no longer male and female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus” (Galatians 3.28). As has
already been seen in the discussion of membership above, Paul does not seek to erase these
distinctions (as the so-called “New Perspective on Paul” definitively established in regard to Paul’s
persistent Jewish self-identity, for example). But, while Paul exhibits a great respect for difference,
he does oppose any production of division within the body of Christ. In the discussion of the
Eucharist in 1st Corinthians 11, for example, Paul laments that “I hear that there are divisions
among you” (1 Cor. 11.18). Specifically, Paul here targets those who “show contempt for the
Church of God and humiliate those who have nothing” (1 Cor. 22)—that is, the poor. By
replicating the socio-economic divisions, and not merely difference, of Roman society within their
practice of the Lord’s supper, the church in Corinth “eats the bread [and] drinks the cup of the
Lord in an unworthy manner” ( 1 Cor. 11.27). The consequence for such a divisive humiliation of
the poor is decisive: “all who eat and drink without discerning the body, eat and drink judgment
against themselves,” in fact, he continues, “for this reason many of you are weak and ill, and some
have died.” (1 Cor. 11.29-30).
Within the specific context of sexual difference, this resistance to hierarchy tends to take
the form of parallel and complementary suggestions for conduct. Thus Paul writes that “the wife
does not have authority over her own body, but the husband does;” before immediately adding the
complementary converse, “likewise the husband does not have authority over his own body, but
the wife does” (1 Cor. 7.4). Here Paul upends the normative assumptions of his contemporary
society which presumed an asymmetrical relationship between the sexes.
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But this egalitarian—or at least complementarian—account of sexual difference does not
persist without exception. This is evidenced by Paul’s discussion of head coverings within the
religious service. Without delving into the extreme complexities of this passage, 46 what is
particularly relevant here is Paul’s allusion to the body of Christ image, not for the purpose of
deconstructing hierarchies, but seemingly toward the end of affirming an asymmetrical
relationship between men and women. As he writes, “I want you to understand that Christ is the
head of every man and the husband is the head of his wife, and God is the head of Christ” (1 Cor.
11.3). Here a first of two figures emerges that will become increasingly important within the
deutero-Pauline writers: “the head” [κεφαλή].47 This emphasis upon the head serves to disrupt the
flat social-ontology established in Paul’s fuller examination of the body of Christ, through the
introduction of a layered hierarchy of authority. Here, the head is no longer conceived as one
member among many, manifesting a logic of mutual care and shared affection. Rather, the head
becomes the source of bodily authority, controlling and directing its subordinate members.48
Unsurprisingly, this image of the authoritative head at the bodily level, likewise manifests as
asymmetrical relations at the communal level, generated first in regards to the church and its

46

“This passage is full of notorious exegetical difficulties, including (1) the ‘logic’ of the argument as a whole,
which in turn is related to (2) our uncertainty about the meaning of some absolutely crucial terms and (3) our
uncertainty about prevailing customs, both in the culture(s) in general and in the church(es) in particular (including
the whole complex question of early Christian worship).” Ibid., 492.
47

“The term ‘head’ (κεφαλὴ kephalē) denotes Christ’s rule or authority over the church as his body.” Lincoln, “The
Letter to the Colossians,” 599.
48

This language of subordination appears explicitly in a short passage in 1 Cor. 14, widely regarded as a 2 nd century
interpolation: “as in all the churches of the saints, women should be silent in the churches. For they are not permitted
to speak, but should be subordinate, as the law also says” (1 Cor. 14.33-34 [emphasis added]). For an argument
against the Pauline authorship of these passages, see: Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 699-702.
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generative principle—Christ—, and second in regards to the sexual difference found within the
church: (viz. husbands and wives or men and women49).
This opening to asymmetrical relations of authority within the logic of the body of Christ
is picked up by the deutero-Pauline authors and expanded into the definitive image of the body of
Christ. Colossians, for example, writes of the Christ:
He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation; for in him all
things in heaven and on earth were created, things visible and invisible, whether
thrones or dominions or rulers or powers—all things have been created through him
and for him. He himself is before all things, and in him all things hold together. He
is the head of the body [κεφαλὴ τοῦ σώματος], the church; he is the beginning, the
firstborn from the dead, so that he might come to have first place in everything.
(Colossians 1.15-18)
Here, the analogy of the body has been radically reconfigured. Where 1st Corinthians 12 directly
targeted a notion of superiority between members, Colossians (following 1 Cor. 11) explicitly
posits the superiority of a head, which is to be granted “first place in everything,” over and against
the members of the body. This logic is brought to fruition in Ephesians, where the figure of the
head is paired with its rhetorical opposite, the foot (ποδός). As one reads in Ephesians, “he has put
all things under his feet [ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ] and has made him the head over all things
[κεφαλὴν ὑπὲρ πάντα] for the church, which is his body, the fullness of him who fills all in all.”
(Eph. 1.22-23). Whereas in 1st Corinthians 12 the head and the foot serve as ontologically equal
members of the body—“the head [cannot say] to the feet, ‘I have no need of you” (1 Cor. 12.21)—
here the foot becomes symbolic of the radical transcendence of the head vis-a-vis the members of
the body. These shifts suggests the introduction of the image of the body of Christ into a completely
new rhetorical context, whereas Paul drew upon the figure in order to tackle the question of
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Insofar as the Greek lacks separate words for man/husband [ἀνήρ] and woman/wife [γυναικὸς], the Greek is
ambiguous regarding whether the difference at hand refers to the context of marriage specifically, or to any instance
of sexual difference as such.
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division within the church, and to articulate a logic of unity-through-difference, Colossians and
Ephesians instead evidence a concern for right authority.50
Just as in Paul’s discourse on head coverings, this concern for the authority of Christ, and
the hierarchical figure of the body of Christ emerges onto the social plane, generating an
asymmetrical account sexual and social difference. Thus, in Colossians, one finds a radically
multi-layered hierarchical household code:
Wives, be subject to your husbands, as is fitting in the Lord. Husbands, love your
wives and never treat them harshly. Children, obey your parents in everything, for
this is your acceptable duty in the Lord. Fathers, do not provoke your children, or
they may lose heart. Slaves, obey your earthly masters in everything, not only while
being watched and in order to please them, but wholeheartedly, fearing the Lord.
Whatever your task, put yourselves into it, as done for the Lord and not for your
masters, since you know that from the Lord you will receive the inheritance as your
reward; you serve the Lord Christ. … Masters, treat your slaves justly and fairly,
for you know that you also have a Master in heaven. (Colossians, 3.18-4.1)
Here one finds a household code that structurally mimics the complementarity of Paul’s account
of sexual difference in 1st Corinthians 7.4, but with a key difference. Whereas Paul identifies
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“Unlike the use of the ‘body’ metaphor in 1 Corinthians and Romans, Ephesians does not point to a crisis of
disunity” Perkins, “The Letter to the Ephesians,” 423; “in Ephesians and Colossians a subtly different point is made,
Christ there being spoken of as the head of the body.” Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 709.
This is not to suggest that Ephesians never shares Paul’s concern. In Chapter 4 the image of the Body of Christ is
worked out in a manner considerably more reminiscent of 1 Cor. 12: “Therefore, the prisoner in the Lord, begs you
to lead a life worthy of the calling to which you have been called, with all humility and gentleness, with patience,
bearing with one another in love [ἀγάπῃ], making every effort to maintain the unity [ἑνότητα] of the Spirit in the
bond of peace [εἰρήνης]. There is one body [ἓν σῶμα] and one Spirit, just as you were called to the one hope of your
calling, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, who is above all and through all and in all. But
each of us was given grace according to the measure of Christ’s gift [δωρεᾶς]. Therefore it is said, “When he
ascended on high he made captivity itself a captive; he gave gifts [δόματα] to his people.” (When it says, “He
ascended,” what does it mean but that he had also descended into the lower parts of the earth? He who descended is
the same one who ascended far above all the heavens, so that he might fill all things.) The gifts he gave were that
some would be apostles, some prophets, some evangelists, some pastors and teachers, to equip the saints for the
work of ministry, for building up the body of Christ [σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ], until all of us come to the unity
[ἑνότητα] of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, to maturity, to the measure of the full stature of
Christ. We must no longer be children, tossed to and fro and blown about by every wind of doctrine, by people’s
trickery, by their craftiness in deceitful scheming. But speaking the truth in love [ἀγάπῃ], we must grow up in every
way into him who is the head [κεφαλή], into Christ, from whom the whole body [πᾶν τὸ σῶμα], joined and knit
together by every ligament with which it is equipped, as each part [μέρους] is working properly, promotes the
body’s growth in building itself up in love [ἀγάπῃ].” (Ephesians 4.1-16)
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mutual commands of care—“the wife does not have authority over her own body, but the husband
does; likewise the husband does not have authority over his own body, but the wife does”—in
Colossians, these imperatives are only structurally symmetrical. Thus wives are to be “subject” to
their husbands, who are themselves only commanded not to “treat [their wives] harshly”; children
are to “obey” their parents, while fathers (notably, mothers abruptly disappear here) are not to
“provoke”; likewise, slaves are to “obey,” whereas masters are merely to “treat … justly and
fairly.” The extreme asymmetry of this passage is nowhere more evident than in the final passage,
where the master’s leniency is grounded not in mercy or respect for the slave, but in the master’s
own submission to a higher authority. The mutuality, equality, and shared affection that marked
the Christian community in Romans and 1st Corinthians has been fully effaced in the deuteroPauline quest for authority.51
C. The Ambivalence of the Pauline Body of Christ
When the evidence of the prior two sections is taken together, the result is a conflicted conception
of the body of Christ. For, on the one hand, at points (e.g. 1 Cor. 12) the body of Christ seems to
represent a profound logic of unity-through-difference. Here, agapic love serves the function of
bridging divisions and generating mutual affective relations, such that the diffusion of difference
and multiplicity is no longer a roadblock to unity, but is instead its very condition of possibility.
Here the dysmember [ἀσχήμων] finds itself fully incarnated into the body, not as a merely abject
remainder, but as a member in full standing, granted equal respect and dignity [εὐσχήμονα]. Yet,
on the other hand, Paul simultaneously undertakes a theology of exclusion or dismemberment (e.g.
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1 Cor. 5-6), whereby any practitioner of non-normative sexuality is cast out of the community in
order to secure the borders of the community against any corruption or impurity; a logic which is
taken up by the later deutero-Pauline authors (Colossians and Ephesians) and worked out into an
elaborate multi-tiered cosmological and social hierarchy—descending from the father into the son,
the husband, the wife, the child, and finally, the slave.
For these reasons, the construction of a properly liberatory social community will require
more than a mere gesture toward the earliest Christian tradition. That is to say, despite the fact that
“the body of Christ is a multigendered body,”52 and therefore necessarily displays queer moments
of profound opening, it will be necessary to resist the temptation to simply cast the traditional
account of the body of Christ as always already queer.53 Such approaches, even if well-intentioned,
Tonstad shows, “domesticate both queerness and Christianity, reducing them to flat reflections of
widely shared liberal assumptions.”54 In resistance to this approach, Tonstad recommends a pivot
toward the anti-social turn in queer theory, exemplified by Guy Hocquenghem and Lee Edelman,
and already profoundly influential on the account of the sexual flesh developed in the two
preceding chapters.
According to Edelman, the proper posture of queer theory should not be that of a liberal
universalism.55 “Rather than rejecting, with liberal discourse, th[e] ascription of negativity to the
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queer, we might … do better to consider accepting and even embracing it.”56 In this way, Edelman
provocatively suggests that queer theory should recognize itself in the discourse of conservatism:
“conservatives acknowledge the radical potential, which is also to say, the radical threat, of
queerness.”57 Thus, citing a “hyperbolic rant” of Donald Wildmon, founder of the American
Family Association—“acceptance or indifference to the homosexual movement will result in
society’s destruction”58—Edelman recommends against an all-too-easy recourse to liberal
totalism. Perhaps, he ventures, “Mr. Wildmon might be right—or more important, ought to be
right: that queerness should and must redefine such notions as ‘civil order’?”59Against a discourse
that moves too quickly toward a logic of universal tolerance and acceptance—and therefore deradicalization—Edelman instead affirms queerness as the very site where every social body finds
its own failure to fully incorporate. Queerness, in its very otherness, refuses simple incorporation
into the body; or, as Althaus-Reid suggests, “queer theologies are a refusal to normalization.”60
Rather, like the impotent member that will not cooperate with the incorporation (and therefore
control) of a hierarchical organization of the body, queerness disrupts the self-presence of the body
politic—“queerness can never define an identity; it can only ever disturb one.”61
Queerness, on the social level, therefore plays precisely the role granted the dysmember in
the preceding chapters. The queer is the social remainder, that which cannot be made “same.” Or,
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in Edelman’s terms, the queer is the “sinthomosexual”62: “a surrogate for the perpetual failure of
universalism.”63 Just as radical phenomenology—in its monadic aspirations—has imagined a total
access to the flesh sans faille, so too have they participated in and perpetuated the sexual-political
imaginary which seeks to construct a social body sans faille. Any gap or fault within the social
body—notably that produced by the queer body, the social dysmember—necessarily had to be cast
out of the flesh in order preserve the purity and boundaries of the flesh. Thus, the dismemberment
of the flesh has served the role of preserving the unity—or more precisely, the unanimity—of the
social body. This conception of the social body is “a universalization at the expense of
particularity.”64 Moreover, this dismemberment is not merely rhetorical or philosophical, but in its
political dimension often takes the form of concrete violence against particular populations,
notably queer folk. As Tonstad remarks, “the hope of a fully unified community becomes an alibi
for the violence directed against whoever stands in for “the obstacle destabilizing every unity.”65
In this way, in an unexpected reversal, it is precisely the apologists of unity without gap or fault
who become the champions of dismemberment. In their quest for a social whole, they seek to
excise every social hole. In the name of a total presence of the social body to itself, they constitute
the Other of this body as an “unpresentable member” [ἀσχήμονα], who may be justly “handed over
to Satan,” expelled from the community on behalf of the community’s sense of self-presence.
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It therefore becomes necessary to rethink the social body no longer on the terms of direct
presence of the self to itself without gap, but from the perspective of the rupture. Unity, on such
an account, is no longer the product of a violent excision of difference, but rather takes difference
as its condition of possibility. Within the early Christian community, this possibility and its
opposite manifested through two competing social metaphors around division within the body of
Christ. Each of these models drew upon medical terminology in order to think through the
possibility of mending a divided community—of building “unity.” Yet, despite these similarities
in method and aim, the means by which these two imaginaries generate unity are nearly opposite.
I have named these two models the surgical model and the healing model, and it is with a
comparison of these two models that this dissertation will conclude.

§2. The Cut
A. The Surgical Model — Cyprian
The surgical model, as I have already begun to suggest, is constructed upon the tension of selfpresence and dismemberment. Simply put, the surgical model suggests that the proper form of
unity within a social body is the direct presence of the body to itself, a logic of sameness wherein
difference functions as an obstacle to uniformity and therefore unity. Because difference functions
as an obstacle, any form of difference or otherness (or queerness) must be cast as external to the
body politic. This is the logic of the policed border; the community, in its deepest etymological
sense, the com-munus: those who take up arms (munire) together (com), that is to say, those who
maintain a common defense.66 While external opposition is easily dealt with under such a
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paradigm, internal difference or otherness necessarily constitutes a crisis. It is here that the
“surgical” aspect of this model appears. For, any otherness within the community itself, within the
borders or boundaries that have been established to ward off difference, constitutes an existential
threat, often thought in terms of the gangrenous or the cancerous. Ontologically speaking, “in order
to speak of ‘being qua being,’ one has to amputate something in being that is not being.”67 Simply
put, for exponents of the surgical model—whether explicit or implicit—internal difference
necessitates the institution of a “cut”; the dysmember, the abject figure of otherness, must be cut
out of the body politic in order to maintain the health of the community. 68 “Walls,” as AlthausReid notes, “have teeth and can bite and can dismember.”69
Within the specific context of the Christian community—the body of Christ—this
tendency can be identified from the very beginning. As the reader has no doubt gathered, this
paradigm appears already in the Pauline corpus, first in Paul’s own discussion of the necessity of
expelling those members of the community who engage in sexually unpermitted activities—
πόρνοι, μοιχοὶ, μαλακοὶ, ἀρσενοκοῖται—and subsequently in the deutero-Pauline authors who
likewise employ its logic of exclusion, unveiling at the same moment the necessary hierarchical
supplement. A logic of sameness which demands uniformity of practice and unanimity of thought
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under the guise of unity, requires an asymmetrical hierarchical structure as a political support for
this uniformity/unanimity.
The link between this uniformity/unanimity and hierarchy can already be found in the
generations of Christian leadership immediately following the Pauline authors. On this point the
early Christian bishop Ignatius of Antioch is particularly enlightening, insofar as he reveals the
hierarchical character implicit in the surgical model. For Ignatius, the unity of the Christian
community is threatened by heretics—what he will call “wildlings,”70 or offshoots of Satan. Such
wildlings, despite their apparent presence in the community are not truly “members of his body,”71
for “God means complete oneness.”72 While the Ignatian conception of unity or “oneness” is
unspecified in the letter to the Trallians, it will be marked with full clarity in the letter to the
Ephesians. There, Ignatius glosses Jesus’ promise “where two or three are gathered in my name, I
am there among them” (Matt. 18.20), writing that “when you meet frequently in the same place,
the forces of Satan are overthrown.”73 But for Ignatius, it is not merely the gathering together that
overthrows, but more specifically, “his baneful influence is neutralized by the unanimity (ὁμονοίᾳ)
of your faith.”74 This unanimity, as Ignatius makes perfectly clear, is defined not simply by the
community, but by the authoritative word of the bishop: “it is therefore proper in every way to
glorify Jesus Christ who has glorified you, so that you, fully trained in unanimous submission
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(ὑποταγῇ), may be submissive (ὑποτασσόμενοι) to the bishop and the presbytery, and thus be
sanctified in every respect.”75 In this episcopal ecclesiology, the authority of Christ, the head of
the body of Christ, has been hierarchically delegated to the bishop and the presbyters. Thus, the
congregant is expected to submit themselves to the authority of the bishop precisely as they would
Christ, just as the deutero-Pauline authors demand wives’ submission to their husbands, as an
extension of the husbands’ submission to Christ (e.g. 1 Cor. 11.3, Col. 3.18).76 It is only through
this submission that the congregant is to gain access to the eucharistic body of Christ: “show
obedience with undivided mind (ἀπερισπάστῳ κιανοίᾳ) to the bishop and the presbyter, and to
breaking of the same Bread, which is the medicine of immortality, the antidote against death, and
everlasting life in Jesus Christ.”77 This “medicine of immortality” is available only to those who
have submitted themselves to the patriarchal authority of the bishop, all others must be purged
from the community for the sake of the community. 78
Despite its appearance in Paul and echoes in Ignatius, this model finds its apogee in
Cyprian’s De ecclesiae catholicae unitate and De lapsis. The context of these texts is the Decian
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persecution which began at the end of 249.79 These texts offer a pathos driven plea for the unity of
the Christian Church in the wake of this disaster. As De lapsis notes, this persecution greatly
fragmented the church, not simply in its execution and direct persecution of Christians, but in a
sense more traumatically, in its creation of a caste of Christians, the “lapsi”—those who “fell
away” from the church during the persecution—whose status was a source of great conflict in the
North African church. On the one side stood the Novatianists, who utterly rejected any readmittance of the lapsi into the Christian community. On the other side stood those bishops who
re-admitted without condition. In this sense, Cyprian attempts to offer a moderate or middle-route
between these two extreme positions vis-à-vis the lapsi.
Given the great upheaval and fragmentation generated by this catastrophe, Cyprian offers
De ecclesiae catholicae unitate in order to address the question of Christian unity. Toward this
end, De ecclesiae catholicae unitate is primarily addressed not to those who would threaten the
church from without (those outside of the borders), but to the inconspicuous forces that threaten
the church from within: the heretics and the schismatics (e.g. the Novatianists). “Thereupon the
Enemy,” Cyprian writes, “seeing his idols abandoned and his temples and haunts deserted by the
ever growing numbers of the faithful, devised a fresh deceit, using the Christian name itself to
mislead the unwary. He invented heresies and schisms so as to undermine the faith, to corrupt, to
sunder our unity.”80 Being primarily addressed to the question of Christian unity in the context of
heresy and schism, it is unsurprising that Cyprian's approach would make consistent reference to
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dogmatic conformity, even going so far as interpreting Christian unity primarily in the language
of doctrinal unanimity.
From the beginning of De ecclesiae catholicae unitate, Cyprian identifies the body of
Christ as one of the central images of the Catholic church, writing, “if a man does not hold fast to
this oneness [unitatem] of the Church, does he imagine that he still holds the faith? If he resists
and withstands the Church, has he still confidence that he is in the Church, when the blessed
Apostle Paul gives us this very teaching and points to the mystery of Oneness [unitatis] saying
'One body and one Spirit, one hope of your calling, one Lord, one Faith, one Baptism, one God'?”81
In De ecclesiae catholicae unitate, Cyprian employs a wide array of interrelated terms in
order to express his notion of unity—including: unitas, concordia/discordia, pacem, unanimis, and
consentio/dissideo—the entirety of which must be put into play if the subtlety of his notion, and
its divergence from competing notions of unity is to be revealed with requisite clarity. The clearest
exposition of this notion of unity can be found in De ecclesiae catholicae unitate’s exegesis of
Matt. 18.19-20: “truly I tell you that if two of you on earth agree about anything they ask for, it
will be done for them by my Father in heaven. For where two or three are gathered in my name, I
am there among them.” For Cyprian, the exegetical center of this passage is to be found in the
“agree on earth” [συμφωνήσωσιν ἐξ ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς], through which the “two or three” [δύο ἢ
τρεῖς] are to be interpreted and limited. As he writes, “for Our Lord was urging His disciples to
unanimity [unanimitatem] and peace [pacem] … showing that it is not the number but the
unanimity [unanimitatem] of those praying that counted most.”82
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Two points are essential to this exegesis: first, is the linguistic shift from unitas to unanimis.
While certainly these terms are not unrelated, both referring fundamentally to a coming together,
they do nevertheless bear quite distinct connotations. Unlike the broader unitas, unanimis directly
connotes a conformity of opinion, as the English equivalent “unanimous” indicates. Thus, having
slipped from the broader unitas to unanimis, it is unsurprising that the numerical coming together
of the “two or three,” the gathering [συνηγμένοι], is relegated to a secondary role, beneath the
primacy of the “agree on earth,” understood by Cyprian in dogmatic/doctrinal terms. The dogmatic
nature of this concern can be seen in Cyprian's assertion that “Our Lord is speaking of His Church,
… He is telling those who are in the Church, that if they are of one mind [si ipsi concordes fuerint]
…”83 Thus, for Cyprian, the impetus of this passage is primarily a call to agreement [concordes
fuerint], and a call to physical or ecclesial gathering [συνηγμένοι] only tangentially.84
In this way, Cyprian has not only transitioned from unitas to unanimis, but further, from
unanimis to concordia. This transition is made explicit in Cyprian’s continuing exegesis:
“He [Jesus] condemns the discord [discordiam] of the faithless; and with His own
lips He commends concord [pacem] to His faithful, by making clear that He is with
two or three who pray in harmony [unianimiter], rather than with any number of
dissenters [dissidentibus pluribus], and that more can be obtained by the united
[concordi] prayers of a few than by the petitioning of many who are in disagreement
[discordiosa].”85
Cyprianic unity, can thus be seen to primarily revolve around the suppression of dissidence and
disagreement—otherness and difference are obstacles to unity. And lest this dissidence be
understood in overly schismatic terms (as a breaking of communion, rather than primarily as
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doctrinal dissonance), Cyprian writes elsewhere that “our Mother should have the happiness of
clasping to her bosom all her people in one like-minded body [consentientis populi corpus
unum].”86 Thus consentio, agreement or assent, joins unanimis and concordia, further cementing
the doctrinal bent of Cyprianic unitas.
For Cyprian, the heretic or schismatics break in unanimis/concordia/consentio corrupts the
flesh of the body of Christ. Thus, Cyprian insists that dissent is a disease or a cancer which
violently tears apart the internal organs of the church. “God is one, and Christ is one, and his church
is one; one is the faith and one the people cemented together by harmony into the strong unity of
a body,” Cyprian writes, “that unity cannot be split; that one body cannot be divided by any
cleavage of its structure, nor cut up in fragments with its vitals torn apart.”87 Simply put, the church
cannot fragment and survive; the unity and therefore survival of the Christian community depends
upon the erasure or excision of any rupture or gap within the body of Christ. “Nothing that is
separated from the parent stock,” Cyprian insists, “can ever live or breathe apart; all hope of its
salvation is lost.”88
Thus for Cyprian, the manner by which schism grows and develops is clear. Schism begins
in discordia or dissideo, where it festers in the body of the church, spreading until it is “cut out.”
For as Cyprian writes in De lapsis, “he is a poor doctor whose timid hand spares the swelling,
festering wound, and who, by letting the poison remain buried deep in the body, only aggravates
the ill. The wound must be cut open, the infected parts cut out, and the wound treated with stringent
remedies.”89 For Cyprian, such a “cutting out” of the heretical infection is not the generation of
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schism, for already in their discordia and dissideo these dissenters have committed the sin of
schism; “for it is not we who have left them, but they who have left us … they have cut themselves
off from the source and origin of [Christian] realities.”90
One will find consistent echoes of this logic throughout the subsequent medieval and
modern periods, both in religious and secular contexts. Thus, for example, Aquinas employs
precisely the same argument in his justification of the death penalty, writing:
For this reason we observe that if the health of the whole body demands the excision
of a member, through its being decayed or infectious to the other members, it will
be both praiseworthy and advantageous to have it cut away. Now every individual
person is compared to the whole community, as part to whole. Therefore if a man
be dangerous and infectious to the community, on account of some sin, it is
praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common
good, since “a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump” (1 Corinthians 5:6).91
More recently, Jacob Rogozinski has also traced the way in which this logic informed political
violence in the terror of the French revolution,:
When Saint-Just strikes out at the “factions” (i.e., mostly the “Enragés” and the
most radical penniless “Sansculottes”) who enter “into the bowels of the Republic”
to “corrupt” it, when his colleague Billaud-Varenne denounces to the committee of
Public Safety, “the members who want to act without the direction of the head” and
wants to “give back to the political body a strong health,” cutting off the “gangrened
members,” they bring to light the ultimate purpose of the Jacobin Terror: the project
of rebuilding the body and rebuilding a One, of re-founding the unity of the political
body while eliminating those that, from the bottom, oppose any form of tentative
reincorporation.92

90

Ibid., 54-55. Tertullian employs a similar logic in regard to Marcion, suggesting that Marcion’s cutting out of
certain texts from the canon, in order to cut out suffering from Christ’s flesh— “have you, then, cut away all
sufferings from Christ, on the ground that, as a mere phantom, He was incapable of experiencing them” (Tertullian,
“On the Flesh of Christ,” 525)—, results in the heretics cutting themselves out of the Christian community.
91

Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologiæ of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican
Province (Cincinnati: Benziger Brothers, 1920), II-II 64.2.
92

Jacob Rogozinski, “Birth to the World (Nine Theses on the Possibility of the Political),” (unpublished), 2. The
French text was published in 2002 as Jacob Rogozinski, “Naître au monde (neuf thèses sur la possibilité du
politique)” Lignes 9 (2002): 111-133.

405

In an analogous way, he argues, one finds this surgical logic of the One-body, that nevertheless
demands dismemberment, in mid-20th century fascism and contemporary Islamist violence,
writing of the two:
In what bodily configuration does fascism or its inverse, Islamist totalitarianism,
root themselves? That of a body in crisis, a sick body, invaded by a foreign Enemy
seeking to destroy it. They claim to “heal” it, to soothe its pain by throwing out its
blistering gangrene.93
Yet, despite its historical importance within the Western imaginary, this surgical logic of
community exclusion is by no means the only viable option. Rather, there remains a strain of
thinking which does not constitute difference as an obstacle to unity, but rather—as was already
seen in the case of 1st Corinthians 12—this alternative understands difference as unity’s very
condition of possibility, because for these thinkers, the gap or fault within the individual and the
social body is unavoidable. Paradoxically, it is precisely these thinkers who affirm the ruptured
heart of every body—whether sexual or social—who articulate a logic capable of offering an
alternative to dismemberment. It is to this model that I will now turn.

B. Circumcision and the Cut
Before turning to the alternative healing model of community health, it may be helpful to briefly
consider Paul’s discussion of “the cut” in the letter to the Galatians. This letter perhaps constitutes
Paul’s most sustained single argument, challenging the movement traditionally designated the
“Judaizers,” “legalists,” or “nomists,” an early group of Christian missionaries who preach “a
different gospel” [ἕτερον εὐανγγέλιον] (1.6) than that first proclaimed by Paul.94 The Pauline
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argument functions on two levels simultaneously: at the level of the body of the gentile believer,
Paul challenges the requirement of gentile circumcision, while at the level of the social-body of
the burgeoning Christian community, Paul will seek to universalize the Abrahamic covenant
without universalizing the law.95 Drawing these levels together, Paul suggests that these teachers’
insistence upon circumcision as a prerequisite for communal participation stands in for the broader
character of this different gospel, a perverse (μεταστρέψαι) orientation that substitutes the law for
the role justly reserved for love.
The culminating thesis of the Pauline argument finds clear statements at two points: first
in 5.6 where Paul declares that “in Christ Jesus neither the circumcision nor the foreskin has any
value” [ἐν γὰρ Χριστῷ (Ἰησοῦ) οὔτε περιτομή τι ἰσχύει οὔτε ἀκροβυστία], and second, in the
closing of the letter, where this phrase is repeated almost verbatim: “for neither circumcision nor
the foreskin are anything” [οὔτε γὰρ περιτομή τι ἔστιν οὔτε ἀκροβυστία] (6.15). In these passages,
Paul ostensibly dismisses the “value” (ἰσχύει) of these concrete differences, if not their very reality
(ἔστιν). Does he not therefore repeat the central gesture of exclusion of the remainder against
which I have been developing an argument? Is this condemnation of difference (ἕτερον) not
counter to the affirmation of bodily, sexual, and social difference developed throughout the
preceding sections? Examining Paul’s argument more closely, it can be shown that the reality is
precisely the opposite.96
for gentiles (akin, to the modern colloquial use of “goy”). But, given the focus on the sexual member, I will here
employ its most direct meaning, “foreskin.”
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These agitators—“those who unsettle” [οἱ ἀναστατοῦντες] (5.12)—are, for Paul, marked
by their disruption of the agapic unity of the community: that is, they “cut in” [ἐνέκοψεν] (5.7) on
the community (pun intended), separating the gentile converts from the truth: that is, from “faith
working through agapic love” [πίστις δι᾽ ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη] (5.6). What is at stake here is not
primarily the ritual activity of circumcision as such; Paul is not concerned with the maintenance
of the physical member and its foreskin. Rather, the target of Pauline condemnation is not the act
of circumcision, but the disruption and disunity introduced by these advocates and the logic which
would underlie such a demand.97
Paul—in his idiomatic, sarcastic (even crass) manner—satirizes this alternative gospel’s
logic of mandated circumcision. Since, he suggests, these agitators insist that the cut [περιτέμνω]
is a necessary condition for the constitution of the social-body, perhaps they should simply go the
rest of the way and fully “castrate themselves” [ἀποκόψονται] (5.12).98 Here Paul not only denies
the necessary sacrifice of the remainder in the constitution of the social-body, but openly mocks
those who would substitute such a symbolic exclusion—or perhaps more precisely, who would

anatomy of belonging, … treatment of the ‘member’ centers around the presence or absence of the appropriate kind
of genitalia as an exemplary signifier” (166). Thus, rather than the inclusive interpretation that will here be
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substitute the social distinction between the foreskin and its symbolic rejection—with the role
properly apportioned to love (ἀγάπη/caritas). To those who might ask, “must one ‘cut away’ a
basic part of oneself in order to approach God?,”99 Paul therefore offers a clear “no!”
Paul situates love as the alternative to “the cut,” as the true guarantor of unity. This is
clarified in the two summary statements discussed above. In each instance, Paul posits an alternate
source of value [τι ἰσχύει] (5.6.) or being [τι ἔστιν] (6.15) that supersedes the social distinction
between foreskin and circumcision. In the first case, he writes that “the only thing that has value
is faith working through love” [πίστις δι᾽ ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη] (5.6)—that is, as Paul will
subsequently make clear, simply a repetition of the greatest commandment: “love your neighbor
as yourself” [ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου ὡς σεαυτόν] (5.14). Likewise in the second iteration he
repeats the same disjunctive, ἀλλὰ, contrasting the disunity of the Galatian community with “the
new creation” [καινὴ κτίσις] (6.15). Given the near identity of the first clause of each statement,
we might therefore tentatively presume an identity, or at least a deep conformity between these
two statements. Against the exclusion of the remainder, Paul posits a new creation, a new
community of mutual self-giving love.
This agapic love is defined by two principles. First, as we have already seen in the gesture
toward the greatest commandment, agapic love is marked by a reciprocal self-giving: “through
love become slaves to one another” [διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης δουλεύετε ἀλλήλοις] (5.13). Second, this love
cuts across traditional socio-ethnic boundaries. For Paul, “there is not Jew nor Greek, not slave nor

99

Thomas Bohache, “‘To Cut or not to Cut?’ Is Compulsory Heterosexuality a Prerequisite for Christianity?” in R.
Goss and M. West (eds.), Take Back the Word: A Queer Reading of the Bible (Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press, 2000),
231. According to Bohache, Paul’s discourse on circumcision “is directly comparable to homosexuality because
both [homosexuality and non-circumcision] challenge long-accepted standards of religious entry requirements.”
Ibid.

409

free, not male and female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus” (3.28).100 Simply put, for Paul,
love functions as the means of unification or identity formation for the burgeoning Christian
community; “it is love itself that enjoins us to ‘unplug’ from the organic community into which
we were born.”101 The dismemberment of the body—the symbolic exclusion of the remainder—
cannot achieve this end. This is because, for Paul, the agitators’ insistence upon the bodily cut is
inevitably recapitulated in a cut across the social-body (the distinction between those who are “in”
and those who are “out”). Paul decries this logic of dismemberment in scandalous language,
insisting “that if you should be circumcised, then Christ will be of no benefit to you” (5.2). The
gentile does not face the requirement to submit to the law, because the gospel exceeds such
demarcations: “we know that a person is not justified by the law, but through the faith of Christ
Jesus” (2.16).
Of course, as has been clear since the emergence of the so-called New Perspective on Paul,
and counter to anti-Semitic readings of the Pauline corpus, Paul is not here advocating for the
rejection or condemnation of Judaism, nor the total erasure of any social, ethnic, or sexual
difference.102 Such differences are not, as Alain Badiou suggests “obsolete.”103 As Hays writes,
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“does Paul mean that Jews cannot be believers? Clearly he cannot mean that; Paul himself, as a
Jew, was circumcised.”104 Rather, Paul remained a Jew, “an Israelite from the seed of Abraham”
(Rom. 11.1), a “Hebrew born of the Hebrews … according to the righteousness of the law,
blameless” (Phil 3.5-6). Paul is here instead proposing that the Christian community can only be
unified through an agapic spiritual unity, the traditional means of socio-ethnic community
formation are, for the Christian, mere division.105 It is for this reason that the Pauline Gospel is
“the gospel of the foreskin [τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς ἀκροβυστίας]” (2.7). For Paul, neither the body nor
the social-body must be dismembered, the remainder need not be cast-off, in order to constitute a
community. Indeed, if the community removes difference, through the exclusion of the gentile asgentile, than love has been lost, and the community cannot hold. It is precisely this conception of
unity-through-difference in love, that Augustine will draw from Paul in his turn from Cyprianic
surgical metaphors to healing metaphors.

C. The Healing Model — Augustine
Like the surgical model, the healing model has deep roots in the earliest Christian tradition. In his
own letter to the Corinthians, for example, Clement of Rome (cf. Phil. 4.3) manifests precisely the
same concern for the maintenance of difference within the Christian community that Paul had

rightly sees the exegetical necessity of relativizing all prior identities in relating to that of the Gospel (Gal. 3.28), he
seems to read this relativizing in an overly strict manner, that pushes against the grain of contemporary Pauline
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expressed in 1st Corinthians 12. In a passage that seems intent to directly echo the apostle’s earlier
analogy, Clement writes of the body of the burgeoning Christian community;
The great cannot exist without the small, nor can the small without the great. A
certain organic unity binds all parts, and therein lies the advantage. Let us take our
body. The head is nothing without the feet, and the feet are nothing without the
head. The smallest organs of our body are necessary and valuable to the whole
body; in fact, all parts conspire and yield the same obedience toward maintaining
the whole of the body. Therefore let the whole of our body be maintained in Christ
Jesus, and let each submit to his neighbor’s rights in the measure determined by the
special gift bestowed on him. Let the strong care for the weak, and the weak respect
the strong; let the rich support the poor, and the poor render thanks to God for giving
them the means of supplying their needs; let the wise man show his wisdom not in
words but in active help; the humble man must not testify for himself, but leave it
to another to testify on his behalf.106
Here one does not find the language of the head [κεφαλή] employed in contradistinction to that
which is “under His feet” (Eph. 1.22), but rather, as that which, against any hierarchical
organization of the body, exists in an axiological and ontological equality with the supposedly
lesser member (cf. 1 Cor. 12.21). For Clement, this is symbolic of the social relations of the early
church which are intended to subvert the ostensibly “obvious” social hierarchies of the Roman
world—particularly here, economic inequality.
Yet, as should be clear at this point, Clement’s reference to the “whole of our body” is
profoundly ambiguous, for the unity or integrity of the body can be obtained or maintained through
a recourse to the “cut,” as the Cyprianic surgical model suggests. Yet, Clement expresses a deep
antipathy toward any dismemberment of the body. As he writes, against schismatic tendencies
within the church, “why do we tear apart and disjoint the members of Christ and revolt against our
own body, and go to such extremes of madness as to forget that we are mutually dependent
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members?”107 Here, Clement seems to suggest some alternative to the surgical model, a possibility
that will be picked up by his younger contemporary, Polycarp of Smyrna, who writes in a letter to
the Church in Philippi, “I am deeply grieved, therefore, brethren, for him (Valens) and his wife; to
whom may the Lord grant true repentance! And be then moderate in regard to this matter, and do
not count such as enemies (2 Thessalonians 3:15) but call them back as suffering and straying
members, that you may save your whole body.”108
Here schism109 is not treated as a cancerous growth that must be excised for the sake of the
body. Rather, drawing from medicinal—rather than surgical—imagery, Polycarp suggests that the
health of the community be understood as a holistic phenomenon. It is not that schismatics or
heretics should be “cut out” from the community in order to safeguard the purity and health of the
body, but rather, insofar as these schismatics are understood as “straying members,” who
nevertheless remain legitimate members (not enemies), the health of the community can only be
attained when these “mutually dependent” members—to borrow Clement’s phrase—are brought
back into the fold; the health of the community depends directly upon the healing of the schismatic
member.
It is this alternative model, and its grounding in a metaphor of medicinal healing, that I will
here seek to draw out of the later Christian tradition, particularly the work of Augustine. What will
be suggested is that whereas the surgical model privileges unity (understood as unanimity and
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uniformity), but eventuates in the establishment of a social cut against all difference within the
community; the healing model begins with an affirmation of difference and multiplicity, but ends
up generating a theology of unity-through-difference, by its emphasis upon love [caritas]. For, as
Gregory of Nyssa remarks, “it is only in the union of all the particular members that the beauty of
[Christ’s] body is complete.”110
Any attempt to place Augustine in conversation with Cyprian, particularly in a critical
manner, must first contend with the great debt owed by Augustine to “the holy Cyprian, whose
dignity is only increased by his humility.”111 While I will below argue that Augustine offers a
considerably more tenable interpretation of the body of Christ, it is worth noting that he does not
appear to have conceived his reading of Christian unity to have been markedly divergent from his
predecessor. In fact, given the similarity between Augustine’s context and Cyprian’s situation with
the lapsi, Augustine relies on a considerable amount of Cyprianic material in his defense of
Christian unity, particularly in De baptismo contra donatistas. Yet, as will be shown below, even
his direct use of Cyprianic material is offered in a different register, that of caritas, which, in the
Augustinian corpus, supplants unanimis or concordia as the mechanism of unification.
This divergence can be identified in Augustine's adaptation of the medical metaphor of
Cyprian's De lapsi and De ecclesiae catholicae unitate. In a passage undeniably drawn from the
former, Augustine writes:
If anyone is brought to the surgeon, afflicted with a grievous wound in some vital
part of the body, … they entrust him to the surgeon to be cured [curandum]. Nor,
again, because they so entrust him, do they ask the surgeon to cure the limbs that are
sound as well; but they desire him to apply drugs with all care to the one part from
which death is threatening. … What will it then profit a man that he has sound faith,
110
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or perhaps only soundness in the sacrament of faith, when the soundness of his
charity [caritatis] is done away with by the fatal wound of schism, so that by the
overthrow of it the other points, which were in themselves sound, are brought into
the infection of death?112
Three points are worth noting in this passage. First, as a strictly exegetical note, it should be
recognized that, whereas in Cyprian this image functioned primarily in regards to the body of
Christ—the “member” representing an individual Christian (or schismatic)—for Augustine, this
image is here employed at the level of the individual Christian—thus the “member” or “limb”
represents aspects of the individual: faith, charity, etc. Yet, this shift to the individual should not
be taken as absolute, for as will be shown below, Augustine's account of the “individual body” is
completely homologous with his conception of the body of Christ at large. Second, whereas in
Cyprian's account of schism, the imagery tends to focus upon the necessity of a cutting out
[amputatis]113 and removal of the diseased member, Augustine maintains healing or curing
[curandum and sanetur]114 as the principle metaphors of a proper Christian response to schism.115
Thus, where in Cyprian one finds quite literally “divisive” language of separation and expulsion
of the corrupt, Augustine manifests a decidedly more inclusive posture, emphasizing health,
reintegration, and reincorporation. This emphasis upon the individual health of the schismatic will
be reiterated in his larger inclusive notion of the church as body of Christ. Third, and connected to
this emphasis upon integration, the principal mechanism for the maintenance of ecclesial
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communion is caritas. As seen above, it is neither discordia nor dissideo which generates schism,
but rather, schism is directly tied to a failure or lack of caritas. Thus, in the same way that Cyprian's
understanding of unity of the body of Christ was elaborated through an examination of the web of
related terminology, Augustine’s thought too may be clarified through an analogous examination.
Primacy of place, for Augustine—as was already seen in his examination of the “individual
body”—is given to love and health [caritas and sanitas]. These two terms can be found throughout
Augustine’s corpus, and appear with conspicuous regularity in reference to the body of Christ. In
De doctrina christiana, for example, we read that “the Church is His body, as the apostle's teaching
shows us; … His body, then, which has many members, and all performing different functions,
He holds together in the body of unity and love, which is its true health.” 116 Given this intimate
connection between unity, love, and health, it is unsurprising that Augustine's account of the
schism in De baptismo directly correlates schism and a failure of caritas. Where love succeeds,
unity flourishes; where love fails, schism spreads. The theological consequences of this conception
of the body of Christ—constructed from a model of love and health, rather than from a model of
unanimity and consent—can be found throughout Augustine’s corpus, but I will here limit myself
to two examples: the relation between married and widowed women, and a refutation of
Manichaean anti-materialism.117
In this first example, taken from Augustine's De bono viduitatis, Augustine attempts to
moderate any potentially excessive interpretations of his commendation of widowhood.
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Specifically, as in the case of Paul's famous exhortation in 1st Corinthians 7.8-9,118 Augustine does
not wish his call to celibacy to be taken as an absolute requirement. Rather, drawing upon the
image of the body of Christ, Augustine insists that “assuredly he was addressing married persons
also, [when] he saith, 'Know ye not that your bodies are the members of Christ?' So great then is
the good of faithful marriage, that even the very members of are (members) of Christ.”119
Continuing in this vein, Augustine—citing Romans 12.4-6—emphasizes the “diverse” gifts of
those who are members of the body of Christ. Thus, rather than a model of unanimity, Augustine
here emphasizes the Pauline conception of the body of Christ as a symbol of unity-throughdifference.
Analogous concerns can be identified in Augustine's rejection of the Manichaean dualistic
ontology. For Augustine, the Manichean rejection of the material world, the questions of bodily
resurrection, and the body of Christ are all intimately united concerns. This interrelation relies
upon the bi-directionality of the symbol “body of Christ.” Just as “the body of Christ” informs the
church that it should be structured as the healthful members of a human body, so too does it inform
the body that it is to be structured as the mystical unity of the church. Thus, Augustine is able to
ask, in the midst of a polemic against the Manichaeans:
How is the flesh evil, when the souls [of the church] themselves are admonished to
imitate the peace of its members? How is it the creation of the enemy, when the souls
themselves, which rule the bodies, take pattern from the members of the body, not
to have schisms of enmities among themselves, in order that, what God hath granted
unto the body by nature, this themselves also may love to have by grace?120
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Here, the common interpretation of the symbol has been inverted. Because the body is able to
function as a model for the church, it is accorded an added dignity. Drawing upon this bidirectionality, Augustine is able to make use of the symbol in two distinct contexts: in defense of
the unity of the church and in defense of a positive affirmation of material embodiment. When
combined with the more “literal” reading of the body of Christ as the physical body of Jesus of
Nazareth, Augustine models a tripartite symbol, whose complexity permits his arguments to move
with great speed and in quite unexpected directions, as I have sought to emulate above.121
What marks these three examples as exceptional is not their conclusions—e.g. the
acceptance of both the married and the unmarried into the church, the rejection of Manichaeism,
etc. Rather, the particular interest of these examples is the specific way in which the discourse
regarding the body of Christ functions. Having interpreted the unity of the body of Christ as
unanimis, concordia, and thus, uniformity, Cyprian's potential use of the body is contextually
limited to the controversies of De ecclesiae catholicae unitate and De Lapsis, or similar disputes:
that is, the affirmation of dogmatic unity against heretics and schismatics. Augustine, on the
contrary, by viewing the unity of the body of Christ through the lens of caritas and sanitas is able
to, on the one hand, use the symbol in such manners, as exemplified in his critiques of the Donatists
or Arians, but also in a precisely inverted manner, as a tool in the pure affirmation of difference.
In De bono viduitatis the body of Christ appears, not to demand conformity in sexual expression,
but to admit to a variance or “diversity” in sexual “gifts.” In De civitate dei contra paganos, the
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body of Christ appears, not to regulate sexual determination, but rather to justify this differentiation
as such. While Augustine’s conception of the body of Christ certainly privileges unity, this unity
is not undertaken at the cost of difference, but rather presupposes difference as its condition.
The unity of caritas cannot presuppose a prior uniformity, because, for Augustine, caritas
is always the union of the diverse.122 Augustine attests to this necessity throughout his corpus—
and it is thus no coincidence that his principal image of love is the union of the sexually
differentiated male and female in marriage.123 As Augustine writes of marriage in De civitate dei,
“but we, for our part, have no manner of doubt that to increase and multiply and replenish the earth
in virtue of the blessing of God, is a gift of marriage as God instituted it from the beginning before
man sinned, when He created them male and female—in other words, two sexes manifestly
distinct.”124 God's creation here is presented as the generation of two “manifestly distinct” [evidens
utique in carne] sexes; distinct not only socially or politically, but distinct in the flesh, in carne;
that is to say, God creates humanity as a materially differentiated substrate. It is not simply the
case that this differentiation is posited as static, but rather, as illustrated by Augustine's emphasis
upon the call to increase and multiply [crescere and multiplicari], the unity of these diversities in
marriage is understood as a generative process. From the unity of difference springs further
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difference. Or as Augustine writes, “‘male and female’ cannot be understood of two things in one
man, as if there were in him one thing which rules, another which is ruled; but it is quite clear that
they were created male and female, with bodies of different [diversi] sexes, for the very purpose
of begetting offspring, and so increasing, multiplying, and replenishing the earth.”125
In light of this insistence that an affirmation of difference stood at the ground of human
existence, is not surprising that Augustine would immediately move into a consideration of the
possibility of prelapsarian procreation.126 For Augustine, to deny the possibility of such
procreation is to affirm that “man's sin was necessary to complete the number of the saints.”127 Or
said differently, for Augustine, the multiplication and differentiation of humanity is not external
to the inherent good of creation, but rather, a manifest component of that good. Thus, even when
Augustine seeks to uphold sexual norms, for example the condemnation of incest, his critique is
centered around the dissemination of difference. “It is very reasonable and just [ratio rectissima
caritatis],” Augustine insists, “that man [sic], … should not himself sustain many [diversarum]
relationships, but that the various relationships should be distributed among several.”128 That is to
say, one man should not hold the relation “father” and “father-in-law” to the same child, nor should
one woman hold the relationship “sister” and “mother” to the same sibling. It is not that such
relations are unnatural in a strong sense,129 but rather, that by limiting the distribution of difference,
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they discourage the multiplication which strands at the ground of Augustine’s anthropology. That
is to say, the act of incest represents the fullest case of unity as uniformity, wherein several
relationships are maintained by a single individual. The demand of caritas, on the other hand, here
translated as the “reasonable and just” [ratio rectissima caritatis], is once again understood as a
command to unity-through-difference. It is neither the case, Augustine insists, that unity be
understood as a call toward incestuous anti-differentiation, nor that such differentiation be
permitted to fragment the social fabric. Rather, this act of differentiation, “should thus serve to
bind together the greatest number in the same social interests.”130
Like the surgical model, this paradigm continues to echo through the subsequent tradition.
To cite only one prominent example, Symeon the New Theologian meditates constantly upon the
theme of the body of Christ and its members. And yet, for Symeon, any loss or cut of membership
is a source of great tragedy: “for my part, I will naturally grieve and weep at the breaking up of
my own members, my own race, of brothers according to flesh and spirit.”131 Like Augustine
before him, therefore, Symeon aims toward a medicinal healing: “true repentance through
confession and tears, like a kind of medicine and dressing, cleanses and clears away the wound of
the heart and the scar which the sting of spiritual death had opened in it.” 132 Indeed, for Symeon,
the entire Christian narrative can be understood as a process of restitution. As Symeon argues in
his “Second Ethical Discourse,” the taking of one member from Adam (his rib), opened up a wound
which would be repeated historically throughout the Biblical narrative. At Babel, for example, “it
is as if he cut limbs off from the body of Adam, separating and scattering them away from him
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and each other. To each limb He gave a separate language so that never again would they be able
to join together.”133 And yet, despite this seeming impossibility of reconstitution of the body, this
is precisely, according to Symeon, what one discovers in the incarnation, where God reverses the
extraction of Adam’s member by taking a member from Eve (Jesus), and repairing the breach.
Yet, while this Augustinian paradigm offers a powerful model of health, wherein the social
body is maintained through love-grounded-in-difference, it is nevertheless the case that Augustine
often finds himself falling into precisely the same traps as Paul and the Deutero-Pauline authors.
Just as with Paul, the construction of a post-heteronormative account of the body of Christ will
require more than an uncritical appropriation of Augustine. For, while Augustine privileges
difference, it should always be recognized that he has a tendency to cast this difference in dualistic
terms of a binary sexual difference—thereby generating precisely those failures that will later
manifest in von Balthasar and Marion’s attempt to construct a theology of eros from difference
understood in an essentialist manner. Thus, while Augustine identifies sexual differentiation as a
fundamental good, and as a constitutive structure of human embodiment, he will generally cast
this difference as the difference between “male and female,” or more specifically, the difference
manifest in the monogamous heterosexual male and female. This is because, despite the positive
valence that I have given to his discussion of multiplicity above, this multiplicity is generally
thought in terms of heterosexual reproduction; difference is “for the very purpose of begetting
offspring, and so increasing, multiplying, and replenishing the earth.”134 One should not forget that
(as noted in chapter 1) it is precisely by recourse to a Levinasian account of difference, among the
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most extreme articulations of difference as an intrinsic value, that Dussel constructed his critique
of feminism and homosexuality as pursuits of “the same”—or in Marion’s words “homosexuality
[is] the ultimate refusal of dissimilarity”135—here echoing precisely the same logic that Augustine
employed in his critique of incest. In this manner, Augustine falls prey to precisely the privileging
of heterosexual reproduction that marks the logic of “reproductive futurism” that I have been
seeking to challenge throughout this dissertation. And while Augustine’s discussion of chastity as
a viable (even preferable) alternative to monogamy prevents a total subsumption of his account of
bodily and sexual difference into reproductive futurism, the clear rhetorical privilege of the
reproducing monogamous couple ends up undeniably coloring his theology. The result is a
tendency to construct sexual relations in a hierarchical manner, eventuating with the claim that
only men are independently the image of God, whereas women require the union with a husband
to achieve full standing and dignity: “the woman together with her own husband is the image of
God … but when she is referred separately to her quality of help-meet, with regards the woman
herself alone, then she is not the image of God; but as regards the man alone, he is the image of
God as fully and completely as when the woman too is joined to him as one.”136
For these reasons, and without belittling the contribution that Augustine’s “curandum” and
“sanetur” make to a reimagining of the body of Christ, it is necessary to again invoke Tonstad’s
warning against attempts to simply recast Christian orthodoxy as always already radical, and
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always already queer. Indeed, Augustine, together with his predecessors and successors (Paul,
Clement, Polycarp, Symeon, etc.) provide invaluable resources to the contemporary thinker of the
political and social body, but these resources must be read together with contemporary resources
in radical and queer thinking in order to guard against their inherent limitations.

§3. In the Position of the Dysmember
Drawing forward what is liberatory from these traditions, while holding in abeyance those aspects
which have historically lent themselves toward sexual hierarchy and dismemberment, what can
then be said of the body of Christ? What can the religious community learn from a phenomenology
and theology of the sexual flesh?
If the prior chapters have sought to unveil the way in which a monadic insistence upon the
direct presence of the flesh to itself without gap, motivates problematic and rhetorically violent
claims about women and sexual minorities, then the present chapter has sought to suggest that the
same privilege of the direct presence of the community to itself, without the ruptures of otherness
and difference, creates the condition for patriarchal and heteronormative hierarchy and violence at
a social level. And yet, as has been shown, this tendency toward hierarchical constructions of the
body of Christ—of the Christian community—are not the only tradition available. For, in their
most creative and generative moments Paul, Augustine, and other members of the Christian
tradition reveal the possibility of a genuinely new mode of organizing social relations that submits
unity to a love grounded in embodied difference, and that rejects the privilege of the unanimous
and uniform community of dogmatic and sexual conformity.
In order to achieve a post-heteronormative theology of the body of Christ, it will therefore
be necessary to reject any account which privileges a monadic wholeness, and instead construct a
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community that founds itself in the abject sexual member that is constituted as a dysmember: the
ἀσχήμων. As Rogozinski argues, “those who want to discover the truth about community must
first reject the fantasy of the One-Body, and for that purpose place themselves in the position of
the remainder.”137
One can find precisely this logic being worked out in the early Christian community, where
Jesus’ death, particularly his death on a cross, is understood as a kenotic self-emptying into an
abject condition: “but [Christ] emptied himself, taking the form of a slave, being born in human
likeness. And being found in human form, he humbled himself and became obedient to the point
of death—even death on a cross” (Phil. 2.7-8). For the Christians of the early church, such a death
was a true scandal (σκάνδαλον, 1 Cor. 1.23) because execution on a “tree” was a mark of
accursedness. As the law stated: “for anyone hung on a tree is under God’s curse” (Deut. 21.23).138
Paul draws out this connection unambiguously, arguing that the Christ becomes the very curse of
Deuteronomy 21; the Christ is the abject remainder. “Christ redeemed us from the curse of the
law,” Paul suggests, “by becoming a curse for us—for it is written, ‘Cursed is everyone who hangs
on a tree’” (Gal. 3.13). For the early church, the proper posture of the Christian is to likewise take
up precisely this abject condition, to—like the Christ—kenotically empty oneself and become the
accursed remainder. As Jesus proclaims in the gospels, “if any want to become my followers, let
them deny themselves and take up their cross daily and follow me” (Luke 9.23, cf. Luke 14.27;
Matt 10.38, 16.24). Or, as Lacan describes this logic, “the Christian has learnt, through the
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dialectic of Redemption, to identify ideally with he who made himself identical with this same
object, the waste object.”139
When a community is structured in this way, no longer around a logic of the “head” but of
the dysmember, there is opened a possibility of a reconstitution of the flesh of the community, no
longer on the logic of the exclusion of the remainder, but on the logic of the universalization of
the remainder, and therefore the incarnation of the dysmember. This universalization should not
be misread as assimilation, as a return to the logic of the same, but rather as the instigation of a
disruption of the social itself. As Rogozinski argues, “the position of the remainder creates the
possibility of dissidence, of revolt, a position capable of tearing down the establishment.”140 One
sees this logic play out in the political sphere in Karl Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of
Right. There Marx names the proletariat as the “positive possibility of a German emancipation.”141
And while many have noted the religious character of Marx’s socialism, this character is not a
product of his substitution of the proletariat for a victorious messiah, as has often been claimed.142
To the contrary, the truly “Christian” gesture in Marx is the identification of the figure of salvation
with that of the abject remainder. The proletariat are not the center of a socialist hope because they
are by some dialectical necessity determined for victory. It is rather their embodied suffering that
picks them out as the site of the universal. As Marx argues, liberation depends upon:
The formulation of a class with radical chains, a class of civil society which is not
a class of civil society, an estate which is the dissolution of all estates, a sphere
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which has a universal character by its universal suffering and claims no particular
right because no particular wrong, but wrong generally, is perpetuated against it;
which can invoke no historical, but only human, title; which does not stand in any
one-sided antithesis to the consequences but in all-round antithesis to the premises
of German statehood; a sphere, finally, which cannot emancipate itself without
emancipating itself from all other spheres of society and thereby emancipating all
other spheres of society, which, in a word, is the complete loss of man and hence
can win itself only through the complete re-winning of man. This dissolution of
society as a particular estate is the proletariat.143
What Marx here argues, is that the abject remainder offers a privileged position for universal
emancipation, precisely because the emancipation of this class-which-is-no-class, precipitates the
dissolution of the fantasy of the One-body.144
If the early Christian church sought the abject dysmember in the executed body, and Marx
in the political body of the proletariat, then the present work can perhaps be read as a suggestion
that it is precisely in the figure of the sexual body—the body of the marginalized woman, of the
marginalized sexual minority—that this abject dysmember might be found today. For if Irigaray
is correct that sexual difference is the question of our time; if sexuality, in other words, constitutes
the horizon of all politics, sociality, and theology,145 then it is within the realm of sexual difference
that one might expect to find the figure of universal resistance, the figure of an otherness that
refuses to capitulate to the logic of the same. Such a figure, I hope to have established, can be
found in the queer sexual body: “the queer comes to figure,” as Edelman writes, “the resistance,
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internal to the social, to every social structure.”146 Or, in theological language, “queer holiness,”
as Althaus-Reid suggests, “is always the holiness of the Other.”147
The hope incarnated by the queer sexual body, is precisely the hope of a radical social,
even political, transformation:148 “the flesh of the community comes to the surface in the shape of
a wild democracy.”149 It is this that Hocquenghem named “sexual communism,”150 the hope
incarnate in the dysmember, which interrupts every wholeness: insisting upon its own reality,
refusing assimilation, and demanding transformation. “The more we insisted on the body,” Negri
declares, “the more communist we became.”151 This is the sexual member which reminds us that
our communities, as our bodies, are constituted with gaps and fissures; this is the member of the
flesh that could be our redemption, if only we could learn to see the irreducible power of
incarnation.
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